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This doctoral dissertation has grown out of my long-standing interest in the politics  
of sustainable development and in strategies to initiate change towards more 
sustainable societies. My life with sustainable development started in 1991 when I 
wrote a master’s thesis about aid to the Sahel region and discovered a new form of 
development, a sustainable one, in the Brundtland-report Our Common Future. I 
started my professional career in 1993 as a policy officer and campaigner for a 
Flemish NGO-network on sustainable development (VODO, Vlaams Overleg 
Duurzame Ontwikkeling), a network that was founded during the preparation for the 
1992 Rio Conference as a collaboration between the Flemish environmental 
movement, the third world movement, the peace movement and a diversity of other 
groups. The seeds of this dissertation lie without any doubt in these years, when in 
VODO we discovered the multiple meanings of sustainable development, the 
different pathways into the future it promised, but also the immense challenges to 
bring it into practice. A lot of my insights have been formed in discussions with Leen 
Laenens, Georges Spriet, Ingrid Pauwels, Saar Van Hauwermeiren, Geert Fremout, 
Luc Van Krunkelsven, Jeanneke Van de Ven, Christine Beernaerts, Dirk Van 
Regenmortel, Leida Rijnhout, Arnout Fierens, Bart Bode, Jan Desmedt, Peter 
Cristiaensen, Lut De Boel, Gert Engelen and tens of others who were active in and 
around VODO. I thank them for these exciting years. 
 
In 2001, I left VODO and joined the Centre for Sustainable Development of Ghent 
University. CDO has been my home base ever since and an inspiring one at that. I 
discovered soon and somewhat to my surprise that in academia, more than in civil 
society organisations, the minds are separated by disciplines. Interdisciplinary 
research, a necessity for sustainable development, is absolutely not self-evident, let 
alone transdisciplinary research. For me, CDO has always seemed something of a 
free space, a place without much hierarchy, where researchers from various 
backgrounds are not afraid to discuss their basic assumptions and search together for 
solutions. And that always inspired by the search for that elusive “sustainable 
something”. A lot of our projects are carried out in cooperation. In my case, working 
together with amongst others Maarten Crivits, Walter De Jonge, Joeri Gerlo, An 
Heyerick, Trui Maes, Jeroen Mercy and Dominique Vandewiele has been important 
 xvi 
in my formation as a researcher. I also think back with pleasure on the several years 
of cooperation across the language border with amongst others Tom Bauler (ULB) 
and Marie-Paul Boulanger (IDD).  
 
This dissertation flows from research carried out in the frame of the inter-
universitary Steunpunt Duurzame Ontwikkeling. I thank the colleagues from Leuven 
and Brussels, not in the least coordinator Hans Bruyninckx, who expertly guided us 
through some turbulent waters and who, during a train journey between Brussels 
and Ghent in September 2009 gave me the final push to start this dissertation (it was 
a mixed pleasure, Hans). The Steunpunt provided the opportunity to engage in 
research about the Flemish transition management processes and to discuss research 
results with civil servants and other participants. I am grateful for the many hours 
that people were willing to spend with me and feed me with information during 
interviews, meetings, follow-up committees, and so on. I cannot mention all these 
people, but I single out Walter Tempst (OVAM) and Jan Larosse (EWI), who both 
have encouraged this research from the beginning. 
  
I reserve a special word of thanks for a few people without whose support this 
dissertation would have been that more difficult to write. Or would simply not have 
been written. 
 
I deeply thank my promoter Dries Lesage, who as a young professor took the risk to 
support a dissertation about the in Flanders unknown and exotic theme of transitions 
and transition management. His sharp mind for political analysis, his heart for 
sustainable development and his rustige vastheid (serene steadiness?) have guided me 
throughout this process. Until the very last day, he has been at my side. 
 
I am immensely grateful to John Grin, one of my co-promoters, who took hours of 
Skype-time, even late at night, to discuss chapter after chapter. I have learned so 
much during these three years about how to do interpretive research and how to 
develop an eye for salient information in political analysis. The connoisseur will hear 
John’s voice in the background of this book, and I am very glad that it is in there. 
 
Thomas Block, my second co-promoter, is a companion of many years. We have 
literally spent hundreds of hours discussing every corner of sustainable development 
(and of strategic planning, of course). I have no idea how much of his insights have 
made it to this dissertation, but it must be a lot. Without him, I would be a lesser 
researcher. The same can be said of Gert Goeminne and Jo Van Assche. I thank Jo for 
the many morning hours, with nobody in the office yet, during which I could test out 
my ideas and receive feedback. Since our cooperation in the ecological debt project, 
Gert has been a constant source of inspiration and an intellectual sparring partner. 
His always incisive and often surprising comments keep me awake as a researcher. 
With such colleagues – and with the young ones that have invaded CDO over the last 
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year – I look forward to ending my weeks in isolation, sharing an office again and 
continuing our discussions (starting from cycling and cyclocross). 
 
Family and friends have cheered me on from the sideline. It is a richness to always be 
surrounded with people who are willing to help where they can. And who do not 
complain when I answer their question, “En, hoe is het met uw doctoraat?” 
 
Four people have had to live through it all, without having asked for it. The 
cheerfulness, warmth and laughter of Robbe, Ruth and Tim have kept me sane and 
alive during the last months. Thanks, Tim, for help with that one sentence of chapter 
3 that finally broke the deadlock. Thanks, Robbe and Ruth, for the supportive post-its 
that kept popping up on my desk (“Doktoraat moet af! Doorwerken vake!” – “al over 
de helft, vakie!” – “nog maar een jaar of 2, 3, 4 en tis af” – “nog maar 6 hoofdstukken 
te gaan en nog 6 maanden!”). I hope that you may live to see some results of the 
transition to more sustainable societies, and of course I look forward to a long 
summer with you. Finally, I simply could not have written this dissertation without 
the unending support of my wife, Fien. I thank her for her patience with lost 
weekends and late nights of writing, for putting things in perspective at moments of 
confusion, and for filling my life with love and beauty (“And when you smile, I’m 
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 xviii 
Chapter 1. Sustainable development and transitions 
 1
1.  
Introduction. Sustainable development 
and transitions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the last few years, several analysts have pointed to the fact that sustainable 
development has lost a lot of its appeal as a policy concept for people and 
organisations that are searching for that unique new combination the concept stands 
for: quality of life, living within ecological limits, social justice, and that for current 
and future generations worldwide. While in the 1990s, sustainable development still 
held some promise of fundamental change, “with mainstreaming and 
bureaucratisation the urgency and political vibrancy was lost, and, with this came a 
dilution and loss of dynamism in a previously energetic and committed debate” 
(Scoones et al. 2007, 33). Robinson (2004), Redclift (2005), Sneddon et al. (2006), Leach 
et al. (2007), Martinez-Alier et al. (2010), to name but a few, make similar remarks. 
And in a statement as a result of a workshop at UN level in preparation of Rio+20, 
the authors conclude that “the agenda for Rio+20 must begin from a recognition that 
none, not one, of the Rio commitments has been fulfilled” (UN-DSD 2010, p. 1). 
 
It is no secret that sustainable development is a contested concept, but is it also a lost 
cause? Not if it depends on a young scientific domain, referred to as transition studies 
or sustainability transitions research, that has been taking shape over the last 10 years. 
It claims to have developed insights that combine into a new approach that not only 
helps to better understand how fundamental societal change comes about, but also 
how change can be initiated and influenced in favour of sustainable development. In 
a book that brings together important results of 10 years of research, some of the 
founding fathers of the field are not modest as to their ambitions and results: 
“This book emerged out of the ambition to develop a new, inspiring perspective on 
sustainable development. We felt that both academic and practical discussions failed to deal 
with the dynamics and governance of long-term transformative change. The time seemed 
ripe to bring together our work in one book and by doing so to sketch out common elements 
of a first theory of transition towards sustainable development. Although a greater 
understanding is still needed, significant progress has been made” (Grin et al., 2010, p. 
xvii). 
 
Transition researchers often state that contemporary societies wrestle with persistent 
problems that are at the root of unsustainability symptoms such as climate change 
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and various crises such as the energy, mobility and food crises. Dealing with 
persistent problems and developing more sustainable societies, requires 
transformational change, or transitions.  Then what is a transition? A transition is 
usually defined as a radical, structural change in a socio-technical or societal 
subsystem of society, such as the energy system, the mobility system or the agro-
foodsystem. Transitions are long-term processes that change structures, practices and 
culture that are deeply anchored in a society. During a transition a system changes in 
multiple dimensions: technology, actors, rules, infrastructures, power relations, 
patterns of thinking, problem definitions and solutions, cultural meanings.  
 
The development of the transition research field has been guided by two main 
questions. How can we analyse, understand and explain the unfolding or dynamics 
of transitions? And, based on that understanding, can we develop guidelines for 
influencing transitions and steering society in a more sustainable direction (variously 
called transition governance, transition management or transition policy)?1 From the 
beginning, the concerns were thus not only academic, but researchers also aimed at 
social relevance and at contributing to a more sustainable society. The origins of 
transitions research lie in the Netherlands, and initially most research as well as the 
first policy applications were developed there. In 2001, the fourth Dutch National 
Environment Plan (NMP4) stated that a lot of environmental problems could not be 
solved anymore by traditional policy and that a transition approach was necessary to 
structurally transform societal systems. Four domains were selected for transition 
policy: energy, mobility, agriculture, biodiversity and natural resources. From 2004 
until 2010, the Dutch government also sponsored a sizeable research network (KSI, 
Knowledge Network for System Innovation and Transitions), with around 80 
researchers in a dozen universities. Over the last decade, interest in the approach has 
been growing steadily, mostly in European countries but also broader. The first 
European Conference on Sustainability Transitions was held in Amsterdam in June 
2009, a second conference in Lund in 2011, and a third one in September 2012 in 
Copenhagen. The research community has since 2009 organised itself in a network, 
the Sustainability Transitions Research Network (STRN), and has set up a new 
journal in 2010, Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions. 
 
Flanders, Belgium’s Dutch-speaking northern region, was the first outside the 
Netherlands to start experimenting with the transition approach in its policy. In 2004, 
a transition management process started in the domain of housing and building, 
                                                  
1 I will hereafter (see also 2.2) make a stricter distinction between transition governance on 
the one hand, as a general term for all kinds of efforts to consciously influence a societal 
subsystem (such as the energy or mobility system) into a more sustainable direction. On the 
other hand, I will reserve the term transition management for the specific approach that has 
been developed by researchers like Jan Rotmans, Derk Loorbach and René Kemp, first at the 
research institutes ICIS and MERIT in Maastricht, and currently at the research institute 
DRIFT of Rotterdam University. Transition management is the most employed form of 
transition governance in Flanders.  
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called DuWoBo. In 2006, a second process started in waste and materials 
management, called Plan C2. At the launch, the Flemish government had labelled 
both processes as “experiments in innovative environmental policy”, but by 2012 
they were still running, although both were going through a difficult period. 
Meanwhile in 2011, transitions had become the central concept of the second Flemish 
Strategy for Sustainable Development. Even more important, and perhaps somewhat 
surprising, in 2011 transition management made its way into 13 projects of the 
central socio-economic innovation program of the Flemish government, Vlaanderen in 
Actie (ViA, Flanders in Action), a program that aims at making Flanders a top 5 
region of Europe by 2020. 
 
Transition management presents itself as a long-term governance approach for 
sustainable development. The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to an 
understanding and appraisal of the potential of transition management as an 
approach for stimulating policy change towards sustainable development. How does 
transition management as an innovative form of governance perform in the practice 
of policy-making? Does it lead to policy change in a particular policy domain, such 
as housing and building, or waste and materials management? How can this change 
be characterised and how can transition management’s influence on regular policy, 
or lack thereof, be explained?  
 
Most reflections on transition management in the scientific literature are based on 
Dutch experiences, in particular the processes and results of the Dutch energy 
transition (e.g. Kemp et al., 2007, Kern and Smith, 2008), but there have also been 
discussions of transition management in other fields such as mobility (Avelino, 2011). 
In this study, the experiences of DuWoBo and Plan C will be used to analyse and 
reflect on transition management and its role in the reorientation of the housing and 
building system and the waste-materials system in a more sustainable direction. The 
central focus will be on transition management as a form of innovation in governance 
and the way this innovation plays out in and influences regular policy. Even though 
transition management is a governance approach, its relation with regular policy is 
only superficially conceptualised in the theoretical literature, and its effect on regular 
policy has not been studied systematically. From a scientific point of view, this 
dissertation uses an exploratory research design to increase knowledge and 
formulate tentative hypotheses about this topic. From a policy perspective, it aims at 
increasing insights of what may or may not be expected from transition management 
vis-à-vis regular policy.  
 
 
                                                  
2  DuWoBo is an acronym for Duurzaam Wonen en Bouwen, or sustainable housing and 
building. Plan C derives its name from the idea that a Plan B is no longer enough to reach 
sustainable materials management, but that a Plan C is needed. The DuWoBo website is 
www.duwobo.be. The Plan C website is www.plan-c.eu.  
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1.1. TRANSITIONS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A SIMULTANEOUSLY 
VAGUE AND SPECIFIC RELATION 
 
There is something intriguing about the scientific literature on transitions. Although 
the research aims at contributing to sustainable development, there is hardly a text to 
be found that explicitly discusses the concept of sustainable development in itself 
and its implications for and relation with transitions. Elsewhere (Paredis, 2013), I 
have characterised the relation between sustainable development and transition 
research as simultaneously vague and specific: vague on content, specific on process. 
To clarify that statement and in order to be able to situate transition thinking within 
the debate on sustainable development, I will therefore introduce a brief discussion 
of that debate and then relate it to transitions research. 
 
1.1.1. Sustainable development in plural 
 
Meadowcroft (2005a) has rightfully stressed that from the beginning the whole 
process that brought sustainable development to international attention was deeply 
political. In the fall of 1983, the General Assembly of the United Nations created a 
well-supported commission to examine the state of the environment and the 
development problem, and to formulate actions and policy proposals to tackle these 
two interrelated global problems. Under the presidency of the former Norwegian 
prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, the World Commission on Environment and 
Development delivered its final report in 1987, Our Common Future (WCED 1987): 
‘sustainable development’ was the way forward, according to the Commission. 
Sustainable development was “explicitly formulated as a ‘bridging’ concept – as an 
idea that could draw together distinct policy domains, and unite very different 
interests behind a common agenda” (Meadowcroft, 2005, p. 268). In the oft-cited 
definition of the report, sustainable development is development that “meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs” (ibid., p. 8). In the following sentences, the text states that the 
present state of technology and social organisation and the absorptive capacity of the 
biosphere imply limits for development. However, it is added, these are not absolute 
limits since “technology and social organization can be both managed and improved 
to make way for a new era of economic growth” (ibid.).  
 
The Brundtland report received worldwide an enormous amount of attention and 
formed the basis for the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED). According to Sneddon et al. (2005, p. 255), the Brundtland 
report is “a vital historical marker” in that it highlighted the critical relationship 
between human development and the environment. It raised the global awareness 
that development and economic growth have to take into account social and 
environmental preconditions, that humans are dependent on their environment, and 
that environment and development problems are worldwide interconnected. For 
Dryzek (2005) the core storyline is the recognition “that the legitimate aspirations of 
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the world’s peoples cannot be met by all countries following the growth path already 
taken by the industrialized countries, for such action would overburden the world’s 
ecosystems”. Robinson (2004) calls this linkage the “radical aspect” of the report. 
Following Brundtland and UNCED, new principles were introduced in the 
international debate on development and environment, such as the principles of 
intergenerational equity (between present and future generations), of 
intragenerational equity (between current generations worldwide), common but 
differentiated responsibility (all countries have a responsibility for sustainable 
development, but developed countries should take the lead), respecting global 
ecological limits, the need to integrate economics and environment in decision-
making, encouragement of popular participation in development and decision 
processes (Robinson, 2004, Dryzek, 2005, Meadowcroft, 2005). 
 
Brundtland and UNCED initiated an “explosion of work” (Sneddon et al. 2005, p.255) 
in thinking about the implications of sustainability. It was also immediately obvious 
that the concept such as used in the report and at the conference, was highly 
ambiguous. The most immediate criticism focused on the policy advice to increase 
the world economic output five- to tenfold. This was perceived as trying to solve the 
problems with the same models that caused them, albeit in a form somewhat more 
sensitive to environmental concerns. This is the “reformist element” of the report 
(Robinson 2004). Furthermore, over the years it has become clear that ‘sustainable 
development’ can be interpreted in many different ways, because central concepts 
such as needs, equity, environmental limits or quality of life are necessarily 
normatively charged. The different interpretations reflect the political and 
philosophical position of the different actors in the game (such as governments, 
business, NGO’s, labour unions). Since sustainable development has grown into a 
dominant concept in environmental and development thinking, it is logical that 
actors try to produce interpretations that favour their interests. Accordingly, the 
debate around the meaning of sustainable development and the political, economic, 
social, ecological and technological solution pathways that should be followed is an 
area of a lot of contention.  
 
Several authors have sought to shed some light on the myriad of interpretations that 
exist and the different political positions they are rooted in. Sachs (1999) e.g. draws a 
distinction between different perspectives on sustainable development on the basis 
of how finiteness is interpreted, while Hopwood et al. (2005) make a classification on 
the basis of the importance given to environmental and socio-economic issues. Both 
distinguish between three perspectives which resemble each other a lot in contents. I 
start from the classification of Hopwood et al. here, because their two-dimensional 
mapping allows for easier comparison of different views (figure 1), but I complement 
it with insights from Sachs. Further down, my question will be whether it is possible 
to situate transition thinking in this debate. 
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Hopwood et al. map different interpretations of sustainable development by using a 
socio-economic axis that covers the level of importance given to human well-being 
and equality, and an environment axis that covers the priority given to 
environmental concerns. This allows them to draw a broad distinction between three 
views on the nature and scope of change necessary to reach sustainable development: 
status quo, reform and transformation (ibid., p. 42). The shaded area in figure 1.1 
more or less indicates the range of views within the sustainable development debate. 
Those falling out of the shaded area tend to pay too one-sided attention to either 
environmental or socio-economic issues3. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Different positions in the sustainable development debate (Hopwood et al., 2005, p. 41). 
 
In the status quo view, sustainable development can be achieved within the present 
structures of society, without making fundamental changes to economic structures 
and activities, power relations and decision making. Development is equated here 
with economic growth: growth provides resources to pay for environmental 
                                                  
3  This does, however, not imply that all views falling inside the shaded area would 
necessarily describe themselves as being part of the sustainable development debate. The 
term sustainable development has a too contested meaning for that, in particular for groups 
that strive for deep transformations of society. According to Robinson (2005, p. 370) it is 
therefore “not surprising that some have found it desirable to develop alternative 
terminology to express some of the same concerns about the linkage between environmental 
and social issues”. 
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measures and technologies, and can help solve poverty problems. The main driver is 
business and the main instruments are markets and technology. Sachs (1999, p. 78-83) 
calls this the “contest perspective” because it relies on international competitiveness 
to drive growth and ecological modernisation. Eco-efficiency through technology is 
the key strategy for business, and government policies should be geared to this goal, 
in particular through price mechanisms. Environmental problems in the South can be 
solved through technology transfer from the North, capacity building and growth 
strategies. 
 
The reform approach also thinks that problems can be solved within present 
economic and social structures, although major changes to politics and lifestyle will 
be necessary. The reforms have to focus on “technology, good science and 
information, modifications to the market and reform of government” (Hopwood et al. 
p. 43). Governments have a key role in guiding these processes, also on a global level 
through e.g. multilateral regulations and other forms of global governance. Sachs 
uses the term “astronaut’s perspective” (Sachs 1999, p. 83-86) to indicate that this 
approach sees sustainable development as a challenge for global management. The 
fragility of ecosystems demands global monitoring and global, rationally planned 
interventions. This also implies addressing the North-South divide, because the 
planet cannot be saved (and managed) without cooperation between all nations. A 
Marshall Plan for the South is an option here, including the diffusion of 
environmentally sound technologies, economic reforms and efforts to stabilise the 
world population (ibid., p. 85). 
 
Finally, in the transformation view, the socio-ecological problem is rooted in the 
economic and power structures of our society and in the way humans interrelate 
with nature. The historical development of these structures and mindsets has led to a 
society that dominates and exploits nature and people, and only a fundamental 
change in societal structures and people’s values and attitudes can bring on change. 
There is a strong emphasis here on social equity, with local communities and people 
renewing control over their lives, over resources, and over economic and political 
decision-making. Political action of groups outside the centres of power (indigenous 
groups, women, the poor and working class) is an essential strategy. This resembles 
Sachs “home perspective” where the stress is on developing sustainable local 
livelihoods and radically restructuring the development patterns of the North, whose 
lifestyles cannot be generalized around the globe, yet serve as the example for most 
Southern elites. An efficiency revolution is necessary but will be counterproductive 
when growth is not challenged. Sachs himself calls for new models of prosperity and 
a “twin-track approach” where efficiency (“an intelligent rationalization of means”) 
is combined with sufficiency (“a prudent moderation of ends”) (Sachs 1999, p. 88). 
 
Over the years, the mainstream of the debate – mainly carried by UN organisations, 
national governments, national advisory councils on sustainable development, 
OECD, World Bank, international ngo’s etc. – has been a mixture of the status quo 
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view and the reform view. The latter has been visible in particular in relation to the 
role of government in e.g. the drawing up of national plans for sustainable 
development, involvement of stakeholder groups, monitoring of global and national 
trends. The former shows itself in the integration with market liberalism that was 
present from the early days onwards – see e.g. the statements in the Rio Declaration 
(UN, 2002) and Agenda 21 on the compatibility of free trade and sustainable 
development – but that has increased with the growing influence of neo-liberalism 
worldwide. In particular in Europe (and Japan), the mainstream of the debate has 
become known as ecological modernisation: an approach that recognises that the 
capitalist economy needs a reorientation to deal with environmental problems, but 
that this can be done by internalising the care for the environment in existing 
political, social and economic institutions. Through a smart interaction of technology, 
science, business and markets, with a government that intervenes by setting 
standards and providing incentives through market mechanisms, ecological 
modernisation promises a “positive-sum game”, where economic growth and 
ecological protection can be combined (Hajer, 1995). However, as Dryzek (2005, p. 
160) emphasises, whatever the interpretation, sustainable development has not been 
able to produce “wholesale movements in policies, practices and institutions (…) 
Free trade, capital mobility, and governments all over the world committed to 
market liberalization and ordinary (unsustainable) economic growth as their first 
imperatives, threaten to override sustainable development”. 
 
1.1.2. The dual relation between transitions and sustainable development 
 
When I said above that the relationship between transition research and 
sustainability is vague, I refer to the fact that the transition literature always 
mentions the need for “radical” or “deep” or “fundamental” changes but almost 
never makes explicit what this radicalism implies. Where should we situate 
sustainability transitions in terms of for example Hopwood’s or Sachs’ classification 
of sustainable development perspectives: in the status quo/contest perspective, the 
reform/astronaut’s perspective, or the transformative/home perspective ? At first 
sight, one would categorise transition research under Hopwood’s transformation 
view. In a brief – and one of the few – discussions on the relation transitions-
sustainability, Grin et al. (2010) pose that “the transition approach goes beyond the 
idea of win-win, new business opportunities, competitive advantage, people, planet 
and profit (central to many expressions of ecological modernization and also 
sustainable development approaches) and acknowledges that we have to face deeper 
changes and hard choices” (p. 322-323). However, it is impossible to find an 
indication of what these deep changes and hard choices are: a choice for a steady-
state economy? A role for sufficiency strategies as essential complement to eco-
efficiency? A redistribution strategy on national and international level? A 
curtailment of the market, with reliance on other modes of provision (e.g. state, 
communal, domestic) and relocalization? The transitions literature hardly dwells on 
what sustainable development exactly means, on how environmental limits should 
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be interpreted, and even less on what equity and justice imply. It seems enough to 
state that one is in favour of sustainable development. Thus, during a discussion of 
strategic niche management (SNM) as a form of transition governance, Schot and 
Geels (2008, p. 548) argue that “while SNM recognises that different definitions of 
sustainable development exist, it is based on the assumption that sustainable 
development captures enough common ground to act upon.” Does it make sense to 
have a literature that is full of statements about the need for “radical change” in 
current socio-technical regimes, but that keeps virtually all options open on the 
(contested) content and direction of the change necessary? 
 
An explanation for this positioning should be sought in the fact that transition theory 
is essentially a process theory. And in that sense it is also specific: it tries to provide 
an explanation of how change happens in socio-technical systems and to give a 
detailed account of the processes at play during transitions. For this, it falls back on a 
combination of up-to-date conceptualisations in different scientific fields. Its 
conceptualisation of technology and technological change relies on science and 
technology studies and perspectives such as actor-network theory (ANT) and social 
construction of technology (SCOT). Its conceptualisation of economic processes relies 
heavily on evolutionary economics, with notions such as variation, selection, 
bounded rationality and co-evolution. Complex systems theory is used in the 
conceptualisation of systems and change in systems. Its conceptualisation of political 
processes draws on theories of multi-level, multi-actor and reflexive governance. The 
combination of these kind of approaches has led to a framework for studying and 
explaining the processes at work in transitions, and trying to derive strategies for 
influencing transitions in the direction of more sustainable systems. 
 
Chapter 2 will delve more deeply into transition and transition governance theory, 
but suffice it to say here that the content that is given to “sustainable development”, 
is also regarded as the result of a process. Sustainable development results from the 
interaction between societal groups, within a context that influences the potential 
outcomes of that interaction, but that is in turn also influenced by that interaction. 
Grin et al. (2010, p. 2) see sustainable development “as an open-ended orientation for 
change. Its open-endedness is a strength since it allows pluralistic appropriation in a 
deeply political and participatory process”. This seems to be the general approach in 
transition science. While in the debate about sustainable development some branches 
of thinking stress the necessity of action guided by clear and fixed policy goals, 
usually based on objective scientific evidence, transition science takes sustainable 
development as a general normative orientation, but stresses its character as a social 
process in which different forms of knowledge and preferences are combined that 
should, in the words of Robinson (2004, p. 381) “give rise to an emergent, co-
produced understanding of possibilities and preferred outcomes”. Underlying this 
point of view is the wariness for associations with social engineering when working 
with fixed goals. Of course, the consequence of this positioning of transition theory 
as a process theory is that the question of how radical the interpretation of 
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sustainable development is, becomes an empirical question: which societal choices 
are made in actually existing transition processes and to which interpretation of 
sustainable development does this lead? Are the conceptual frameworks of transition 
studies and the governance approaches it promotes, really initiating radical change? 
 
It is important to note that a view on sustainable development as the result of a social 
construction process, is in line with how part of the debate has been evolving in the 
scientific literature during the last years. The years of debate have made it obvious 
that it is impossible to try and pin down the concept of sustainable development to 
one clear definition, with unambiguous policy goals and strategies. Yet, 
simultaneously, the challenges that have given rise to the concept have not 
disappeared. On the contrary, they will increasingly demand attention and be in the 
centre of political argument in the decades to come. Instead of loathing the ambiguity 
in sustainable development and dismissing it as unworkable, scholars are therefore 
exploring ways of dealing with ambiguity while seeking “to retrieve the ideals of 
sustainable development (equity within and across generations, places and social 
groups; ecological integrity; and human well-being and quality of life) via a 
reconstructive exercise” (Sneddon et al. 2006, p. 264). In this exercise, sustainable 
development is thought of as a framework that allows debating the fundamental 
choices humanity is facing (such as the need to reconcile ecological sustainability, 
social justice and economic stability), instead of interpreting it as a consistent set of 
concepts and a desired end-state. This approach acknowledges “the inherently 
normative and political nature of sustainability” (Robinson 2004, p. 381), even takes it 
as point of departure or “embraces” it (Sneddon et al.), and thus devotes as much 
attention to the process characteristics of sustainable development as to its content. I 
cite Robinson at some length to show the enormous conceptual shift in how the 
importance of sustainable development is formulated.  
“Here we can argue for the view that sustainability can usefully be thought of as the 
emergent property of a conversation about desired futures that is informed by some 
understanding of the ecological, social and economic consequences of different courses of 
action (…) What is needed, therefore, is a process by which these views can be expressed 
and evaluated, ultimately as a political act for any given community or jurisdiction. The 
power of the concept of sustainability, then, lies precisely in the degree to which it brings to 
surface these contradictions and provides a kind of discursive playing field in which they 
can be debated” (Robinson 2004, p. 381-382). 
 
 
1.2. THE POLITICS AND POLICY OF TRANSITIONS 
 
So, when it comes to interpreting sustainable development, transition research is in 
general clear about the need for fundamental, structural change and the need for a 
reorientation of development patterns. But the form and content sustainable 
development in society eventually gets, is in this approach an open-ended process 
and the result of a continuous, deeply political interaction between societal groups 
(politicians, industry, labour unions, scientists, environmental groups, consumers 
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etc.). This almost automatically implies that the literature is vague about the relative 
worth of or the choice between typical sustainability strategies such as eco-efficiency, 
sufficiency, redistribution or de-commoditisation (Crivits et al., 2010). Nor does it 
define criteria, targets or limits for the space or range within which sustainable 
development trajectories should be situated. “Agreement on targets set for decades 
will be of little help, when we do not have an approach for how to realize this target. 
We believe that the transitions approach delivers such an approach. It brings a new 
understanding of the nature of the transition process itself as well as of its 
governance” (Grin et al., 2010, p. 321). Transition research aims at laying bare the 
processes at work during transformational societal changes. Based on that 
understanding, it also formulates guidelines for informing the steering of transitions. 
 
As I am interested in politics and policy-making for sustainable development, a 
logical question follows from this positioning as a process theory: if the insights 
about change processes from this approach – i.e. theories of transition dynamics and 
transition governance – are applied in actual policy-making, then what happens? 
Does it lead to forms of governance that are capable of influencing society in a more 
sustainable direction? How do these governance forms perform and work in practice? 
And what is the political content and the societal choices that flow from these 
governance processes?  
 
As mentioned above, other researchers have studied aspects of these questions, 
almost invariably related to the experiences in the Netherlands in using the transition 
framework. Although quite some authors have reflected and commented upon 
transition governance/management, detailed empirical studies of experiences with 
the approach are not that thick on the ground. Often, empirical studies use a specific 
angle to study transition governance practices. For the energy transition, Kern (2009) 
and Kern and Smith (2007, 2009) have studied the discursive politics of the transition 
storyline. Kern and Howlett (2009) have focused on the integration of the energy 
transition in the existing energy policy mix. Also for the energy transition, Hendriks 
(2008, 2009) investigates the democratic features of transition management as a form 
of network governance. Avelino (2011) has used experiences in the Dutch mobility 
transition to study power in transitions and transition management. Dutch 
researchers that were at the origin of transition management have commented on 
their experiences and reflected on themes such as the implementation of transition 
management, dilemmas in transition management, or the science-policy interaction 
in the co-production of the approach, again predominantly for the energy transition 
(e.g. Loorbach, 2007, Kemp et al., 2007, Kemp and Rotmans, 2009). Several others 
have used these kind of empirical studies to present broader formulated, general 
comments on transition governance (e.g. Meadowcroft, 2005b, 2009, Shove and 
Walker, 2007, Vosz et al., 2009, Grin, 2010, 2012).  
 
I will return to the results of these and other studies in more depth in chapter 2, but 
several things stand out from their reading. One is that research often focuses on the 
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characteristics of the transition management processes themselves, while the 
influence of these processes on regular policy has rarely been studied in depth. 
Loorbach mentioned already in 2007 that the effect of transition management on the 
regular policy context is “a hitherto barely explored topic of research” (Loorbach, 
2007, p. 292). This has not fundamentally changed since then, and yet, Rotmans and 
Loorbach contend when they assess research about transition management that “one 
of the major conclusions so far is that successful transition management depends on a 
balance between transition management and regular policies in a way that transition 
management positively influences and stimulates the conventional policy process 
without becoming part of it” (Rotmans and Loorbach, p. 200, my italics). The relation 
between transition management and regular policy is one of the main topics of this 
thesis. 
 
What secondly stands out is how the implementation of the transition approach in 
actual policy-making is not straightforward. Theoretical guidelines and expectations 
are crossed and influenced by factors such as power relations, discursive politics, 
actor interests, historically grown policy regimes or exogenous trends. As said, 
researchers have often taken a specific point of entry (discourse, power, democracy…) 
to study experiences. I am interested in developing an analysis that can provide an 
explanation of the influence of transition on regular policy that takes account of the 
complex of factors that at are work and that has an eye for the relationship between 
these factors. This may of course be at the cost of an in-depth treatment of separate 
factors, but hopefully adds insights through a broad and connecting perspective. One 
of the main features of this perspective is that it wants to provide a historically 
informed narrative of how the concerned transition management process should be 
situated in the long-term development of the socio-technical system and its policies.   
 
A third starting point for my research is the observation that guidelines for the 
governance of transitions are generally based on research in the characteristics of 
transitions. The resulting guidelines are often quite general and seem to apply 
largely independent of the context of an actual transition governance process. While 
this line of reasoning may be informative for the overall strategic orientation of 
transition governance, it gives no insights in the actual strategies actors use in 
transition-governance-in-practice and the circumstances under which they have to 
take practical day-to-day decisions. Such insights may also be helpful in formulating 
different and additional guidelines for the influencing of transitions. 
 
 
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
 
This brings me back to the aim and the research questions of this dissertation. My 
main aim is to generate more precise understandings of how new governance 
approaches such as transition management, that are specifically designed to 
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influence a system towards more sustainability, influence existing, regular policies, 
what kind of influence this is, and how this works in practice. 
 
Main research question: How do transition management processes influence existing 
policy regimes and policy practices? Which characteristics does this influence have, 
how can it be explained and what does it imply for the further development of 
transition governance? 
 
This general question will be answered by studying in depth two Flemish transition 
management processes and their relation with existing policy: the first process is in 
sustainable housing and building (DuWoBo), the second in sustainable materials 
management (Plan C). This empirical part of the research may also add some new 
insights to the existing literature because of its specific focus. Geographically, it takes 
a region outside the Netherlands as focus. Thematically, the systems of housing and 
building and of waste and materials have figured in studies of historical transition 
dynamics and governance, but to my knowledge hardly in research on the use of 
transition management to reorient these systems. 
 
Several more specific questions will be of help in answering the main research 
question.  
 
Sub-question 1: What is a suited analytical framework for examining the interaction 
between transition management processes and regular policy? 
 
This sub-question is an important part of chapter 2. Chapter 2, Literature review and 
analytical framework, consists of essentially two things. It first discusses the main 
insights from transition dynamics theory and how these are related to the conception 
of transition governance in transition studies. Transition management is discussed in 
some detail as well as the main insights that can be derived from the literature that 
critically engages with the theory and practice of transition management. The second 
purpose of the chapter is to construct an analytical framework that allows an 
historically informed and integrated perspective on transition management and its 
influence on regular policies. This framework builds on the multi-level perspective of 
transition studies and the policy arrangements approach from environmental policy 
studies. 
 
In chapter 3, Research design, the research design of the dissertation is further set out. 
It clarifies ontological, epistemological and methodological points of departure. I 
work from a constructivist and interpretivist position and will discuss how this is 
reflected in the dissertation. Others elements of discussion include the case study 
approach and data collection and analysis. The whole is situated in a tradition of 
critical political analysis. 
 
Chapter 1. Sustainable development and transitions 
 14 
Sub-question 2: What are the historically grown characteristics of the policy regimes 
in which DuWoBo and Plan C intervened? How do DuWoBo and Plan C differ from 
regular policy? What has been the interaction between both processes and the 
contemporary dynamics in their respective policy regimes? To which changes did 
this lead? 
 
In chapter 4 (Transition management in Flemish waste and materials policy. The role and 
experiences of Plan C) and chapter 5 (Transition management in Flemish housing and 
building. The role and experiences of the DuWoBo process), the two case studies are 
presented. Both chapters follow the same structure. They first discuss the historical 
development of the socio-technical system, focusing on the policy aspects, and 
analyse the characteristics of the existing policy regimes at the time the transition 
management processes were introduced (in both cases around 2005). The second part 
of the chapters describes the development of the transition management processes 
until early 2012 and analyses their political characteristics. In the third part, the 
recent developments in the policy regimes are analysed and the influence (or lack 
thereof) that transition management has had on these developments is discussed. 
Chapters 4 and 5 also contain some Context Boxes that provide more general 
background that is relevant for both cases and that is regularly referred to, but that is 
not studied as such in the cases. Context Boxes include information about the Belgian 
and Flemish government context, a major administrative reform called Beter 
Bestuurlijk Beleid (BBB, Better Managerial Policy), the socio-economic innovation 
programme of the last Flemish governments called Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA, Flanders 
in Action), and the Flemish sustainable development policy. 
 
Sub-question 3: What are the empirically observable similarities and differences 
between both cases? How can these be explained in terms of patterns and 
mechanisms in the relation between a transition management process and regular 
policy? 
 
In chapter 6, The role of transition management in policy change, I compare results of the 
two cases and aim at deepening the insights that can be derived from them. As I will 
explain, during the research of the cases I found that the policy arrangements 
approach was too static to understand how change (or stability) happens in different 
policy dimensions and what kind of patterns or mechanisms are behind it. I therefore 
introduce some additional interpretive frames to make a more refined analysis 
possible in the comparison between the two cases and to get a better grip on 
mechanisms of policy change. The refinements are based on Kingdon’s theory of 
agenda-setting, Hajer’s discourse analysis, Hajer’s concept of the institutional void, 
and Grin’s power framework for transition studies. 
 
Sub-question 4: Which lessons can be learned from the two case studies for the 
further development of transition governance in theory and in practice? 
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Chapter 7, Conclusions, answers the research questions, discusses contributions of the 
thesis to transition science and policy science, suggest some policy recommendations 
and provides ideas for further research. 
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2. 
Literature review  
and analytical framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the way it has developed, the transition research field revolves essentially around 
two questions. First, how do radical, long-term changes in socio-technical systems 
happen and how can they be analysed and understood? Second, can such transitions 
be influenced and, if so, how? In the background lies the assumption that 
understanding the dynamics of transitions can inform the governance of transitions, 
which in turn is a necessity for solving the deeply rooted problems in current 
consumption and production systems that are responsible for a lot of sustainability 
problems. “In order to solve such deep societal problems, changes from one system 
to another may be necessary. An understanding of the dynamics of transitions may 
assist policy makers to help bring about these changes” (Geels 2004a, p. 916). The 
field draws on insights from different scientific domains to develop a broad, 
interdisciplinary picture of how change happens in socio-technical systems. For the 
analysis of the dynamics of transitions, the field draws mainly on sociology and 
sociology of technology, evolutionary economics, innovation studies, history, and 
complex systems theory. The research into influencing and governance of transitions 
draws additionally on political sciences, management studies and social learning 
theories. 
 
In this chapter, I have two objectives. The first is to present and discuss the way 
transition research looks at the governance of transitions. I will start from some key 
concepts from the study of transition dynamics (2.1) and then discuss how the 
connection is made with the influencing or governance of transitions (2.2). The 
approach of transition management is presented in more detail (2.3), since it is the 
approach that has been followed in Flanders and that will be the focus of my case 
studies in chapter 4 and 5. Next, I analyse the debate that has been going on about 
the pros and contras of transition management, in theory and in Dutch policy 
practices (2.4). The relevance of transition management lies in how it adds new 
dimensions to existing policies (such as longer time frames or the need to address 
problems at system level), while the main criticism focuses on its political premises 
and implications. The second objective of the chapter is to build an analytical 
framework that can bring into the open the different characteristics of transition 
management and its influence on regular policies. The framework builds on the 
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foregoing discussion and combines the multilevel perspective from transition studies 
with the policy arrangement approach that originated in environmental policy 
studies (2.5). 
 
 
2.1. ANALYSING AND UNDERSTANDING TRANSITIONS  
 
2.1.1. Common conceptual notions 
 
The point of departure of most of transition research is the existence of so-called 
persistent problems in current industrialised societies. Examples are the energy and 
climate change problem, the problems associated with the global food chain and 
industrialised agriculture, the mobility problem with traffic congestion, air pollution 
and associated health consequences: all problems that are “persistent” in the sense 
that they are deeply rooted in our societal structures, occurring at different levels of 
scale, with a variety of actors involved with different perspectives on the problem 
and its solution, to be solved in the long term but with a lot of uncertainties 
regarding evolutions and solutions. The term transition is used as an encompassing 
term to indicate the kind of change needed in solving these problems. As is often the 
case in science, and certainly in a young and rapidly evolving research field, for a lot 
of concepts, even core concepts, there are no uniform definitions. In one of the 
constitutive articles of the field, a transition is defined as “a gradual continuous 
process of change where the structural character of a society (or a complex sub-
system of society) transforms (…) A transition also implies a fundamental change of 
assumptions and the introduction of new practices and rules” (Rotmans e.a. 2001, p. 
16-17). Van den Bergh en Kemp (2006) talk about “a society-wide change that goes 
beyond single sectors and involves fundamental and interrelated changes in 
technology, organisation, institutions and culture” (p. 1). According to Loorbach 
(2007) a transition is a transformation process “in which existing structures, 
institutions, culture and practices are broken down and new ones are established” 
(ibid., p. 17).  
 
In spite of these very broad definitions that seem to relate to society as a whole, the 
term is usually more strictly used to refer to radical, deep changes in socio-technical 
systems such as the energy system, mobility system or agrofood system. Rotmans and 
Loorbach (2010) prefer to speak of societal systems, as they think it also applicable to 
other complex systems such as a city, a region, or a sector. Whatever the terminology, 
two elements stand out in this view on societal change. First, the problems and 
solutions are framed as systemic. They are not just a question of specific products or 
production processes, but demand an approach on a systems level. Second, they are 
not just a question of technology, but demand “fundamental change in economic and 
wider social-cultural conditions (Van den Bergh et al., 2011, p. 8). In order to study 
transitions, several common conceptual notions are used that also serve as bridging 
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concepts between the various disciplines involved in the research. I follow the 
discussion from Grin et al. (2010, p. 4-5) to give a concise overview: 
• The first one is the concept of co-evolution: the interaction between societal 
subsystems influences the dynamics of the individual societal subsystems, leading to 
irreversible patterns of change. Transitions are not caused by single factors, but result 
from the interaction of developments in various domains: economic, cultural, 
technological, ecological and institutional subsystems co-evolve in many ways and 
can reinforce each other to co-determine a transition.  
• A second common concept is the multi-phase concept that describes a transition in 
time as a sequence of four alternating phases, each with its own characteristics. In the 
predevelopment phase there is hardly any change visible, but a lot of things are 
happening under the surface in social and technical experiments and novel practices. 
In the take-off phase, niches find more stability and the first structural changes set in. 
In the breakthrough phase, structural change occurs throughout the whole system, 
until in the last phase a new, temporary equilibrium is reached. The whole process is 
often depicted as an S-curve, which is rather meant as a heuristic to recognise what is 
happening than that it should be interpreted strictly or deterministically.  
• A third concept is co-design and learning: transitions demand new forms of 
knowledge and in particular a reframing of knowledge, problems and solutions. That 
can happen through an interactive process of co-production of knowledge with a 
range of stakeholders.  
• The last common concept, the multi-level perspective (MLP), features very 
prominently in the literature. It describes a system as consisting of three different 
scale levels and a transition as a consequence of the interaction between these levels. 
The scale levels are not geographical scales, but functional scales with increasing 
degrees of structuration: a micro-, meso- and macro-level. The levels are respectively 
called niches (at the micro-level), regime (at the meso-level) and landscape (at the 
macro-level). The relationship between the levels is interpreted as a nested hierarchy: 
niches are embedded within regimes, and regimes within landscapes (see figure 2.1)4. 
 
Apart from these common conceptual notions and although most research functions 
on a multi-disciplinary basis, the different angles of research have given rise to at 
least six ‘traditions’ of research (Kemp, 2010, Grin et al., 2010, Van den Bergh et al., 
2011, Paredis, 2009): the socio-technical perspective that is associated with the work 
of Frank Geels, Johan Schot and others; the complex integrated systems perspective, 
                                                  
4 In a recent discussion of criticisms of the MLP, Geels acknowledges that a hierarchical 
conceptualisation is perhaps not correct. The levels refer to different degrees of structuration 
of local practices, but this need not necessarily be interpreted hierarchically. “Most niches do 
not emerge within regimes, but often outside them (although niche actors are usually aware of 
regime structures). While the socio-technical landscape is an external context, the relation 
with regimes (and niches) is not necessarily hierarchical (just as one would not characterize 
soil conditions, mountain ranges and rainfall patterns as hierarchical structures for biological 
evolution). So, perhaps we should consider dropping the ‘hierarchy’ notion in the MLP” 
(Geels, 2011, p. 37-38, emphasis in the original). 
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associated with the work of Jan Rotmans, Derk Loorbach and others; the approach of 
functions of technological innovation systems, of Marco Hekkert and others; the 
social practices approach of Gert Spaargaren, Elisabeth Shove and others; the 
reflexive governance and political approach of John Grin, James Meadowcroft, 
Adrian Smith and others; evolutionary economics and evolution-based multi-agent 
models of Jeroen Van den Bergh and others. In what follows, I only elaborate on 
perspectives that are relevant for my research, i.e. mainly the socio-technical 
approach, the complex systems approach and the political approach.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. The multi-level perspective: levels as a nested hierarchy. Source: Geels and Schot, (2010). 
 
2.1.2. The multi-level perspective 
 
First, I dwell in some more detail on the multi-level perspective, because it will be 
part of my analytical framework (see 2.3). I take the work of Frank Geels and Johan 
Schot (Geels, 2004, 2005, Geels and Schot, 2007, Geels and Schot, 2010), some of the 
main theorists in the field, as a starting point.  
 
As said, the MLP is used to analyse socio-technical systems. Geels (2004) defines a 
system as a cluster of elements and their linkages that ensure that a societal function 
– such as energy provision, mobility, housing – is fulfilled. Geels and Kemp (2007) 
include the following elements: technology, science, regulation, user practices, 
markets, cultural meanings, infrastructures, production and provision networks. A 
socio-technical system only functions because a network of actors and social groups 
maintains and reproduces the system day after day. These actions are not arbitrary, 
but consciously or unconsciously guided by a semi-coherent set of rules. This set is 
called a regime. In fact, there are several regimes. The different social groups in a 
system largely employ the same rules, share problem agendas and values, see each 
other at conferences, read the same professional literature, etcetera. There is thus a 
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technological regime (linked to engineers and designers), a political regimes (linked 
to political actors), a scientific regime, an industrial regime, a socio-cultural regime, a 
users and market regime (Geels, 2004). These regimes have a common basis, because 
otherwise a socio-technical system would not be able to function. The groups of 
actors form networks that lead to coherence, mutual dependencies and sharing of 
certain rules. For this form of meta-coordination, Geels uses the term socio-technical 
regime: “ST-regimes do not encompass the entirety of other regimes, but only refer to 
those rules, which are aligned to each other. It indicates that different regimes have 
relative autonomy on the one hand, but are interdependent on the other hand” 
(Geels, 2004, p. 905) (see Figure 2.2). 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Meta-coordination of rules in a socio-technical regime. Source: Geels (2004), p. 905. 
 
A socio-technical regime, usually briefly regime, structures the activities of actors. 
Socio-technical regimes are “dynamically stable” (Geels, 2005, p. 77) in the sense that 
they leave room for creativity and adaptation to new situations and for improving 
the dominant design of a system, while leaving the basic design intact. They provide 
strong steering, but are not deterministic. Therefore, change is of an incremental 
nature. In periods of stability, the logics of the different actor groups follow similar 
trajectories. But in other periods, changes in trajectories can lead to mismatches and 
tensions between the logics of actors, connections loosen up and instability sets in. 
This is important for transitions, because during these periods, “windows of 
opportunity” can open up during which a regime may undergo profound change. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the definition of regimes by Schot and Geels as essentially 
consisting of a set of rules, has been criticised by others. Markard and Truffer (2008) 
find the definition as restricted to rules not convincing because it implies that for 
example technologies or actor networks are not part of the regime definition. They 
remark that in empirical studies the distinction between rules and other elements of a 
system are not systematically made. Rotmans and Loorbach (2010) have proposed a 
very general definition of a regime as the dominant set of structure, culture and 
practices in a certain societal system. Smith et al. (2005), Konrad et al. (2006) and 
Truffer et al. (2008) have proposed definitions that contain all the elements that make 
a regime work such as rules, artefacts, institutions, actor networks, practices. 
Regimes are then strongly structured, relatively stable configurations of institutions, 
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technologies, artefacts, practices, infrastructures, rules and actor networks that are 
the dominant way of fulfilling a specific societal function. Also in my own use of the 
term in the case studies of DuWoBo and Plan C, I will opt for this broad definition. 
 
While change at the meso-level of regimes is incremental, at the micro-level we find 
niches, where radical novelties emerge: technologies and practices that are developed 
in niches diverge strongly from what is normal in the regime. Niches are carried by 
dedicated actors that have an interest in the novelty and that try to shield the new 
practice from normal market competition, because technical performance is often low, 
application is expensive or markets are still small. Because a lot of experimentation is 
going on and technologies, rules and practices are in the making, niche 
configurations are less stable than regimes. Geels and Schot only focus on 
technological niches, but other authors have pointed to the role of a broad spectrum 
of niches. In an early report, Geels and Kemp (2000) mention non-technological 
practices (such as a simple lifestyle) and niches for systems of governance and 
exchange (tradable permits, road pricing). Van der Brugge defines “policy niches” as 
“shadow process(es), running parallel to regime processes attempting to influence 
the regime by developing innovative perspectives” (Van der Brugge, 2009, p. 97). 
Rotmans and Loorbach (2010) see niches as spaces within which “non-conformism” 
(p. 132) develops, which can be innovations in technology, behaviour, policy and 
institutions. Whether niches are successful and can exert influence, departs to a large 
extent on evolutions at the other levels. “Their potential is constrained, enabled and 
interpreted through the more powerful structures of the regime” (Smith et al., 2010, p. 
441). 
 
Finally, the macro-level is called the socio-technical landscape and refers to “the 
technical, physical and material backdrop that sustains society” (Geels and Schot 
2007, p. 403). The landscape is an exogenous factor that is beyond the direct influence 
of regime or niche actors, but that makes some actions easier than others. It usually 
evolves rather slowly and contains deep cultural patterns, macro-political 
developments, natural circumstances (climate change is currently an important 
landscape factor) and material environments (infrastructures), although sometimes 
fast changes through shocks may occur (economic crisis, war). Landscape changes 
are an important source of pressure on regimes, but they also provide new 
opportunities for niche development (Smith et al., 2010). 
 
What does all this teach us about how transitions happen? The central insight is that 
although radical novelties may start in niches, an innovation as such is not enough 
for change to break through. It is the interaction between landscape, regime and 
niches that is determining:  
“The multi-level perspective argues that transitions come about through interactions 
between processes at these three levels: (a) niche-innovations build up internal 
momentum, through learning processes, price/performance improvements, and support 
from powerful groups, (b) changes at the landscape level create pressure on the regime 
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and (c) destabilisation of the regime creates windows of opportunity for niche innovations. 
The alignment of these processes enables the breakthrough of novelties in mainstream 
markets where they compete with the existing regime” (Geels and Schot 2007, p. 400). 
 
The often published Figure 2.3 combines the insights in one drawing. Although the 
regime is entrenched in a lot of ways, in certain periods the trajectories of the actor 
networks that make up the regime, may begin to diverge. Tensions grow in 
particular under a combination of increasing landscape pressures, internal regime 
contradictions and development of promising niches. During such a period, 
windows of opportunity may open that provide chances for radically altering the 
regime. A transition is essentially a transformation or replacement of an old regime 
by a new one. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. The multi-level perspective. Source: Geels and Schot (2007), p. 401 
 
A problem with the standardized figure 2.3 is that it suggests that all change comes 
from “below”: novelties emerge, then niches grow, break through and finally replace 
the existing regime. Berkhout et al (2004) and Smith et al (2005) have been the first to 
criticize the over-emphasis in transition studies and in the MLP on niches as the main 
starting point for regime change. They have shown that regimes can be situated in 
very different contexts (depending e.g. on the level of coordination in a regime or the 
availability and control over resources), and that this context is influential in how a 
regime will change. Change does not necessarily start in niches, but can for example 
also be the result of conscious actions of regime actors with enough resources (called 
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“endogenous change” by Berkhout et al., 2004). In response to this criticism, Geels 
and Schot (2007) have developed a typology of four transition pathways that try to 
counter the idea that the MLP only supports a niche-based bottom-up model of 
transition. For their part, Rotmans and Loorbach (2010) and De Haan and Rotmans 
(2011) have proposed different patterns of niche-regime-landscape interactions that 
also qualify the bottom-up perspective.  
 
I will not further elaborate on this discussion since I do not intend to identify 
different pathways or patterns. For me, its relevance lies in the fact that the existence 
of different transition contexts, different pathways and different patterns has 
implications for policy and that any innovative form of governance – such as 
transition management – will be confronted with it. As Smith et al. (2005, p. 1498) 
express it: “The art of governing transitions becomes one of recognising which 
context for transformation prevails, and which drivers offer the best leverage for 
guiding change in a desirable direction.” But there is more to it than that, as the next 
sections will show. 
 
Summarizing the main points of the study of transition dynamics, we see that 
transitions are defined as radical, deep changes in socio-technical or societal systems. 
‘Radical’ refers to the scope of change: transitions change structures, practices and 
culture that are deeply embedded in our society. During a transition a system 
changes in multiple dimensions: technologies, the actors in the system, the rules and 
institutions, infrastructures, market circumstances, ways of defining and solving 
problems, behaviour and practices of citizens, cultural meanings of the system 
etcetera. Such encompassing changes seldom happen suddenly. Transitions are long-
term processes (40-50 years) that go through different stages (predevelopment, take-
off, breakthrough, stabilisation). However, existing systems are difficult to 
destabilize because they are characterised by different forms of lock-in and path 
dependency (of technology, institutions, lifestyles, power relations, knowledge 
development).  The interactions between the different levels in a system (landscape, 
regime, niches) determine how a transition unfolds. Transitions arise when 
developments at different levels reinforce each other. A lot of actors are involved in 
the making of transitions. The complexity of transitions are visible in a lot of 
“multi’s” in the language: they are multi-level, multi-actor, multi-phase, multi-
pattern.  
 
 
2.2. THE GOVERNANCE OF TRANSITIONS: DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
 
Is it under such circumstances possible to initiate change and orientate systems 
towards more sustainability? The answer of some researchers in the field is quite 
clear. Loorbach (2007, p. 32) for example states: “It is possible to influence societal 
change based on the understanding of transitions.” Others are more cautious, but in 
general the answer is affirmative. There are however different opinions about how a 
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socio-technical system can best be influenced. These are usually related to the 
perspective that is taken to analyse transitions (see above). Some authors stress the 
importance of technological change, in particular through nurturing radical 
innovations in technological niches and through improving the functioning of niches. 
These ideas have been developed in approaches such as Strategic Niche Management 
(SNM)(Kemp et al. 1998, Raven, 2005, Schot and Geels, 2008) and the study of 
functions of technological innovation systems (TIS) (Hekkert et al., 2007, Negro, 2007, 
Bergek et al., 2008, Hillman et al., 2008). Others have criticized the lack of attention 
for the role of consumers in transitions and have proposed ways of addressing daily 
practices and routines to shape transitions (Shove, 2003 and 2004, Spaargaren et al., 
2007, Spaargaren et al., 2011). Grin (2010) has proposed a form of “dual-track 
governance”, aimed at combining and connecting structural change at regime level 
with stimulation of novel practices at niche level, so that both type of activities 
reinforce each other. The best-known approach, transition management (Rotmans et 
al., 2001, Rotmans, 2003, Loorbach, 2007), suggests creating forums – “arenas” – of 
frontrunners that develop future visions and set up transition experiments (see 2.3). 
 
In spite of their differences, these approaches have several features in common. First, 
with the complexity of transition dynamics in mind, it is accepted that transitions 
cannot be steered top-down by a central actor such as a government, nor will 
transitions spontaneously break through as a result of market forces. There is a 
general feeling that existing institutions and practices of governing are not suited 
enough for influencing transitions and that innovative approaches are necessary. 
While government interventions and market mechanisms will be part of the tools to 
induce and influence transitions, a lot of attention is given to the role that can be 
played by new policy networks where a plurality of actors – the government being 
only one of them – interact to understand and tackle problems.  
 
Second, although straightforward steering is not possible, the different approaches 
assume that smart interventions can influence the direction and speed of a transition. 
The overall strategy for such interventions is based on the insights of how transitions 
come about and can be formulated as follows: 1. increase pressure on regimes by 
stimulating niches, 2. expose the contradictions in regimes and try to realise 
structural changes and 3. mobilise landscape trends that favour sustainable 
development. Coupling between levels is essential: “Making connections between 
innovative practice experiments and changes at the regime level is at the heart of 
transition governance in any form” (Grin et al., 2010, p. 334). Realising such 
connections demands strategic interventions from purposeful actors. 
 
Third, since the trajectories of transitions are full of uncertainties and can impossibly 
be determined beforehand, actors that have the ambition to influence transitions will 
constantly be obliged to learn from experiences and adapt to new circumstances. 
Most authors describe processes of searching, learning and experimenting as a 
crucial element of transition governance. Particular attention goes to second-order 
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learning (Grin and Loeber, 2007). This type of learning is not simply about seeking 
solutions for a problem, but about a redefinition of prevailing frameworks of thought, 
values and implicit assumptions. Second order learning often takes place though 
confrontation with unexpected events, shocks or outsider views. As a result, people 
start reflecting on their principles, values and practices, often in discussions with 
others in order to find new solutions to problems. Their framework of reference 
changes, problems are redefined and new perspectives for action are opened up. This 
is of course exactly what is needed for transitions. 
 
There is a tendency in part of the literature to call all efforts at influencing transitions 
“transition management”. This has led to a considerable confusion of tongues, since 
transition management is also the term for the specific approach that was developed 
by people like Jan Rotmans, Derk Loorbach and René Kemp, first at the research 
institutes ICIS and MERIT in Maastricht, and currently at the research institute 
DRIFT of Rotterdam University. Furthermore, the term has received some opposition 
because of the connotations of the word “management”, that suggests the presence of 
managers that have the ability to steer a system at will – a suggestion in flagrant 
opposition with the connotations of “governance” and with the insights of transition 
studies in general. I return to that discussion in 2.4, but to avoid confusion, I will 
from here on use transition governance to refer to all kinds of efforts to consciously 
influence a socio-technical system in a more sustainable direction though processes 
of steering that rely on interaction between the state, the market and civil society 
(and other realms of society could be added, such as science or media). I use 
transition management only to refer to the particular ICIS/DRIFT approach (which is 
thus one particular form of transition governance). Transition management was also 
the approach used to start the Flemish transition processes Plan C and DuWoBo. I 
now first turn to a presentation of transition management (2.3) and then to the 
discussion about transition management that has developed over the last years (2.4). 
 
 
2.3. TRANSITION MANAGEMENT 
 
Transition management made its way into science and policy around the turn of the 
century. It was constructed in fact in direct response to demands from the Dutch 
government to help rethink its environmental policy during the preparation for the 
Dutch fourth National Environmental Policy Plan (NMP4) (VROM, 2001). Dutch 
researchers had been using the term “transition” in relation to sustainable 
development since the mid-nineties, but “transition management” was coined during 
the process leading up to NMP4 and for the first time used in the report Transities & 
transitiemanagement: de casus van een emissiearme energievoorziening (Transitions and 
transition management: the case of a low-emission energy supply) (Rotmans et al., 
2000). Kemp and Rotmans (2009) show how the concept was the result of co-
production between scientists and policy-makers. They frame this process as 
boundary work, where scientists and policy-makers mutually learn from each other 
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and together produce a storyline that is acceptable for both parties. Smith and Kern 
(2009) analyse it as an extensive process of negotiation where a storyline was crafted 
that had radical overtones but yet could be fitted into prevailing institutional norms 
and logics5.  
 
NMP4 made the analysis that big environmental problems could not be solved with 
existing environmental policies, but that instead system innovations and societal 
transformations were needed that would fundamentally change the underlying 
production and consumption patterns. It identified four fields in which the 
Netherlands would have to work towards such changes: energy, mobility, 
agriculture, and biodiversity and natural resources. NMP4 followed the line of 
reasoning that had been built up in the ICIS-MERIT report (Rotmans et al., 2000), 
namely that such ambitions also required a new form of process management. The 
report identified five “golden tips” for transition management (ibid., p. 62): 
• Long-term thinking as an assessment framework for short-term policy 
• Thinking in terms of multi-domain, multi-actor and multi-level 
• Steering through learning processes  
• Focusing on system innovation and system improvement 
• Keeping open a wide playing field and a set of options 
 
Since these early years, transition management has theoretically been further 
developed, partly by René Kemp at MERIT, but in particular by Rotmans and 
Loorbach and other researchers at DRIFT. Until about 2005/2006, the theory of 
transition management was on the one hand derived from the features of transition 
dynamics, on the other hand from the governance literature that focuses on networks 
and incrementalism. In recent years, a striking novelty is that it has further become 
embedded in theories of integrated systems and complex adaptive systems, 
something that was not present in the first years (such as in Rotmans et al., 2001, 
Rotmans, 2003, Kemp and Loorbach, 2006). Complex systems theory is however the 
disciplinary background of Rotmans. In the current literature on transition 
management, the characteristics of complex adaptive systems feature prominently as 
the basis from which to derive a conceptual framework and operational principles 
for transition management. The first theoretically grounded instance of this framing 
in complex systems theory is visible in Loorbach’s PhD thesis of 2007 and it has been 
further developed in Rotmans and Loorbach (2009, 2010) 6 . In the following 
discussion, I will refer to this new framing when necessary, but do not go deeply into 
it because it does not appear in texts before 2005 and has consequently not been used 
as a basis for the practices of DuWoBo or Plan C. Since my interest lies in this practice 
                                                  
5  For interesting and detailed accounts of how transitions and transition management 
entered Dutch policy, see Loorbach (2007), Kemp and Rotmans (2009) and Smith and Kern 
(2009). 
6 One of the first times it appeared in the literature is in a publication in Dutch (Rotmans et 
al., 2005). 
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of TM as a governance approach and its relation with regular policy, it is of minor 
importance for the empirical research of this dissertation7.  
 
2.3.1. From principles to operationalisation 
 
The starting point of transition management is the existence of persistent problems 
and the observation that regular policy approaches do not seem able to reorient 
societal systems to more sustainability. Fundamental changes in societal systems are 
needed, but these can only be realised through a new governance approach. 
Transition management is an attempt at developing such a theoretical and 
operational approach to influence long-term societal change processes for sustainable 
development, taking account of the characteristics of transitions. On the basis of 
these characteristics and of the behaviour of complex adaptive systems, Rotmans and 
Loorbach derive a set of theoretical principles for transition management. These are 
(Rotmans and Loorbach, 2010, p. 144-147): 
• Creating space for innovation in niches or arenas: protected spaces are important for 
experimenting with radical novelties. 
• A focus on frontrunners: since incumbent regime actors will not be willing to 
fundamentally discuss the system and formulate radical alternatives, frontrunners 
from niches and regime are essential to bring renewal. 
• Guided variation and selection: various innovative options are stimulated and kept 
open; selection only happens on the basis of learning experiences. Variation and 
selection function as Darwinist processes instead of planning. 
• Radical change in incremental steps: immediate, radical change will lead to 
resistance and even backlash. Small, incremental steps give the system time to adapt 
to new circumstances and build new structures. “To reconcile these seemingly 
incompatible aspects of radical versus incremental change is at the core of transition 
management” (ibid., p. 145). 
• Empowering niches: niches are in need of resources (knowledge, finance, 
competence, lobby mechanisms, exemption of rules, space for experimenting) to 
grow and compete with the regime 
• Learning-by-doing and doing-by-learning: practical experience informs theory and 
vice versa. The purpose is to create social learning experiences where the perspective 
of actors is reframed. In particular experiments are deemed useful for that 
• Anticipation and adaptation: being attentive to future trends and possible seeds of 
change is important for the development of long-term strategies. This should be 
accompanied by adjusting when the structure of the system is changing. 
                                                  
7 There may of course be implications for the further theoretical and practical development of 
TM. The current embedding in complexity adaptive systems theory relies on the premise 
that this theory develops universal laws or principles that are applicable in natural, technical 
as well as social systems. Such a position is however heavily contested by constructivist and 
interpretivist scholars in the social sciences, who stress the fundamental qualitative 
differences between natural and social structures (Hay, 2002, Bevir, 2011) (this is also my 
own view, see chapter 3).  
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• Multi-level and multi-domain approach: understanding ongoing multi-level and 
multi-domain dynamics in the system is essential for being able to use them at the 
advantage of influencing transitions. 
 
The underlying assumptions for these kind of principles is clearly in line with what I 
mentioned earlier: although full control over transitions and classic management is 
impossible, a more subtle way of managing is feasible, namely 
“ (…) in terms of adjusting, adapting and influencing by organizing a joint searching 
and learning process, focused on long-term sustainability (…) The essence of transition 
management is that it focuses on the content as well as the process by organizing an 
interactive and selective participatory stakeholder searching process aimed at learning 
and experimenting” (Rotmans and Loorbach, 2010, p. 140). 
 
On how to organise such a process, Rotmans and Loorbach take some additional 
notions from governance literature. As will be obvious from the discussion so far, 
TM theorists take a normative stance towards governance, departing from the 
position that persistent problems cannot be solved through ‘old style’ policy 
approaches (either top-down state-centred or market centred). The basic steering 
philosophy is captured under terms such as “goal-oriented modulation” or 
“perspective incrementalism for sustainable development”: transition management is 
done with a long-term desirable goal or perspective as guiding image, but working 
towards it will have to be done in small steps. Furthermore, goals are not fixed but 
developed in a search and learning process, and the process of working towards 
them requires adaptation and flexibility. The authors of the approach try to position 
transition management in a middle position between incrementalism, planning, and 
markets. It is not just about small steps, because it uses long-term goals as orientation. 
Steering towards goals has elements of planning, but these are not fixed and can be 
adapted. It relies on market forces, but the collective goals serve as an alternative 
selection environment and “context control” to orientate market dynamics (Kemp et 
al., 2007, p. 320).  
 
This kind of steering is done in “multi-actor networks”, and in fact, “self-steering” is 
one of the ambitions. Still, this does not imply that the role of the government is 
completely ruled out. The role of the government is mainly discussed in early texts of 
TM theorists (Rotmans et al., 2000, Rotmans et al., 2001, Rotmans, 2003), but remains 
implicit in later treatments. In general, there is a plea for an active government, even 
in a leading role, but not as the infallible top-down commander. Rather, the 
government should act as a facilitator of processes, encourage actors to participate, 
act as an intermediary between actors and different policy processes, and create 
favourable conditions for transition management processes. The government itself is 
also one of the actors in transition management and has to clarify which visions and 
agendas it has for a particular domain. 
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Principles are of course not enough to make transition management as approach 
operational. For the next step, Loorbach (2007, 2010) has developed a framework that 
distinguishes between four different types of governance activities through which 
socio-technical systems can be influenced and, consequently, through which 
transition management can try to intervene. Strategic transition management tries to 
influence the level of ideas, goals, values, visions and concerns of the individuals and 
organisations in the system. Since this deals with the underlying culture, structure 
and practice of the system, it can take a long time before the change actually takes 
place. Tactical transition management tries to influence the structural regime barriers 
to the desired development such as rules, routines, institutions or infrastructures. 
This is the level at which policy-making often works and time frames for realising 
change are shorter, but can still take 5 to 15 years. Operational transition management 
focuses on practices by trying to influence and alter institutionalized practices and 
developing new types of solutions and creating innovations (technologies, rules, 
organisations, services). Since this is often a question of individual firms, 
organisations or consumers, action can be taken in short time. Finally, reflexive 
transition management monitors and assesses ongoing policies and societal changes 
and the transition management process itself. 
 
An important purpose of transition management is to empower change-agents – 
frontrunners at niche- and regime-level – in order to gain influence for their efforts to 
change society in a more sustainable direction. Therefore, one of the main ideas 
behind transition management as a steering philosophy is that if the actors with such 
want to have any influence on the system, they need to support and reinforce each 
other and each other’s activities over the mentioned different levels and governance 
activities. How can this be realised in practice? Rotmans and Loorbach are aware that 
defining a practical, operational framework runs the risk of losing too much of the 
complexity involved or of becoming too prescriptive. What they call the “transition 
management model” or the “transition arena model” is constructed in such a way 
that it tries to be consistent with the insights in transition analysis (based in 
complexity science) and in governance analysis as formulated above. The transition 
management model uses specific “systemic instruments” within a cyclical process, 
called the “transition management cycle”, in order “to structure, organize and 
coordinate problem structuring and envisioning processes in such a way that it leads 
to social learning amongst a network of innovators and the development of shared 
visions and agendas” (Loorbach, 2007, p. 280). The relation between the different 
theoretical notions and the translation in practical instruments is presented in Table 
2.1.  
 
The transition management cycle consists of four steps, that however do not have to 
follow a strict sequence (see also figure 2.4). The different steps in the cycle are (ibid. 
115): (1) the strategic level of problem structuring, establishment of a transition arena 
and envisioning; (2) the tactical level of developing coalitions and transition agenda’s 
(transition images and related transition paths); (3) the operational level of 
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establishing and carrying out transition experiments and mobilising the resulting 
transition networks; (4) monitoring, evaluating and learning lessons from the 
transition experiments and, based on these, adjust the vision, agenda and coalitions.  
 
 
Complexity characteristics Theoretical TM principles Systemic instruments for TM 
Emergence Creating space for niches Transition arena 
Dissipative structures Focus on frontrunners Transition arena and 
competence analysis 
Diversity and coherence Guided variation and selection Transition experiments and 
transition pathways 
New attractors, punctuated 
equilibria 
Radical change in incremental 
steps 
Envisioning for sustainable 
futures 
Co-evolution Empowering niches Competence development 
Variation and selection Learning-by-doing and doing-
by-learning 
Deepening, broadening, 
scaling up experiments 
Interactions, feedback Anticipation and adaptation Complex system analysis 
Patterns, mechanisms Multi-level and multi-domain 
approach 
Multi-pattern and multi-
level analysis 
 
Table 2.1. Linking complexity characteristics, theoretical principles of transition management and 
systemic instruments for transition management. Source: Rotmans and Loorbach, 2010, p. 147. 
 
 
For all of the activities in the transition management cycle, specific systemic 
instruments have been developed to guide the processes. These include: the 
transition arena, sustainability visions and transition images, transition pathways, 
transition experiments, the transition agenda. The central instrument in the cycle is 
the transition arena. The transition arena is the space where a group of maximum 15 
individuals meets with essentially two goals: developing a shared understanding of 
the problem at hand, and developing a shared sustainability vision for that problem. 
The individuals are carefully selected and should be “frontrunners”: forward-looking 
niche actors or innovative regime actors. The arena functions at the strategic level of 
transition management and is meant to create room for innovative actors to reframe 
a societal problem and challenge the regime with an inspiring vision. This is what 
happens in the first phase of a transition management process: the arena meets 
several times and develops a shared problem understanding and a future vision. 
 
In a second phase on the tactical level and based on the shared vision, different 
themes or sub-systems are identified. For each theme, transition images are 
developed that describe the desired future state of the theme, such as innovations at 
the level of infrastructure, technology, institutions, lifestyle, ecological and social 
impacts etcetera. At that moment, the original arena is usually opened up and 
broadened with new participants. For each theme, a different working group is 
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created. The working groups further develop the images and start discussing 
transition pathways, i.e. trajectories between the present situation and the desired 
image. Since from a theoretical point of view it is important to keep options open, it 
is not problematic when pathways are proposed that follow different routes or 
strategies to the same vision. The working groups also exchange on possible projects 
and experiments that bring elements of the vision or pathways in practice and that 
can be started up in the short term. The transition agenda brings all of the work 
together in one document: the problem definition, guiding principles and visions, the 
images, pathways and the ideas for projects and experiments. According to Loorbach, 
the transition agenda is the main outcome of the transition arena since it can be 
considered as a joint action and innovation plan of all actors involved in the arena for 
the sustainable development of a specific societal system (ibid., 147).  
 
Figure 2.4. The transition management cycle. Source: Loorbach, 2007. 
 
The transition agenda is operationalised through execution of transition experiments. 
The selected experiments will usually consist of a combination of ongoing projects 
which fit into the agenda and new transition experiments. The main aim of the 
experiments is to test and learn whether the formulated strategy and transition paths 
contribute to the desired change. Rotmans and Loorbach (2010) identify three 
mechanisms through which experiments can contribute to a sustainability transition: 
deepening, broadening and scaling up. Deepening refers to learning as much as 
possible in a specific context. The scale of the experiment, the competences and 
commitment of actors, the follow-up of learning objectives, the interaction with the 
external environment are important elements in deepening a learning experiment. 
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Broadening refers to repeating a transition experiment in a different context, linking 
it to other experiments and innovations, and translating it for different functions or 
domains. Scaling up refers to embedding an experiment in a regime context, in that 
way importing deviant practices, structures or culture in the regime. However, even 
with these mechanisms, it remains clear that experiments and niches have an 
important, yet limited role in a transition. As the MLP analysis above shows, 
processes at work at the landscape and regime level, and the interactions between the 
levels, determine the outcomes of transitions. 
 
An important role during the whole process is reserved for the so-called transition 
team. Ideally, according to Loorbach, it consists of the initiating organisation, experts 
in the field under study, transition management experts and process facilitators. “In 
practice different backgrounds can be combined (…) It is very important to make 
clear in advance how the different members of the team will function, what their 
roles and responsibilities are” (ibid. 154). The tasks of the transition team are quite 
demanding: not only surveying, managing and facilitating the whole process, but 
also feeding participants with background information and detailed knowledge, 
acting as intermediary in discordant situations and taking care of internal and 
external communication. 
 
2.3.2. Transition management and regular policy 
 
And what about the relation between transition management and regular policies? 
What is most discussed by transition management theorists is the difference between 
regular policy and transition management. Regular policy practices are conceived as 
a problem for initiating and influencing transitions. The institutional design and 
practices of current policies are not suited for tackling the persistent problems our 
societies are wrestling with. In regular policy, problem solving is short-term oriented, 
problems are narrowly defined, there is no room for structural change policy only 
focuses on incremental and gradual changes, not on long-term collective and 
sustainable futures in general, (Loorbach 2007, p. 16, 82). Rotmans et al. (2007) 
position transition management strongly against the so-called Dutch “polder model”, 
which according to them cannot implement fundamental changes because it is 
corporatist and primarily presents vested interests. In contrast with this consensus 
model, transition management offers an alternative by involving “a selective group 
of stakeholders, where dissent is a starting point and divergent and conflicting 
perspectives are worked out alongside various paths over a longer time period”. It 
focuses on “proliferation of visionary ideas through multi-scale network 
management and self-steering of small innovation networks” (ibid., p. 24). Rotmans’ 
overview of the main differences between regular policy and transition management 
can be found in table 2.2.  
 
I mentioned in chapter 1 that Rotmans and Loorbach contend that one of the major 
conclusions of research about transition management “is that successful transition 
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management depends on a balance between transition management and regular 
policies in a way that transition management positively influences and stimulates the 
conventional policy process without becoming part of it” (Rotmans and Loorbach, 
2010 p. 200, emphasis added). So, except for the fact that there are major differences 
between both, how is the relation between transition management and regular policy 
conceptualised in the theory? There is surprisingly little to be found in the literature 
to answer this question. That is of course where the research for this dissertation 
comes in, although my research angle does not start from a theoretical point of view. 
As explained in chapter 1, I look at the relation between TM and regular policy from 
the perspective of the existing practices in Flemish processes. Through an empirically-
informed, exploratory approach, I aim to formulate tentative and contextualised 
hypotheses about that relation.  
 
 
Current policy Transition management 
Short time horizon (5 – 10 years) Long time horizon (25-50 years) 
Segmented approach 
 Limited amount of actors 
 One scale level 
 One domain 
Integral approach 
 Multi-actor 
 Multi-level 
 Multi-domain 
Aimed at incremental improvement Aimed at innovation and sustainability 
Current steering forms New forms of steering 
Departs from certainty Departs from uncertainty 
Political arena Transition arena and political arena 
Linear knowledge development and 
diffusion 
Learning-by-doing, doing-by learning, 
learning-by-learning 
 
Table 2.2. Differences between regular policy and transition management. Source: Rotmans, 2003, p. 
65. 
 
 
In the existing TM-literature, the remarks about the relation between transition 
management and regular policy are restricted to a few drawings and a few 
paragraphs of explanation. Transition management is thought off as the governance 
model that can provide a long-term orientation for regular policy. But this can only 
work when it is allowed a special position: the regular policy arena must allow 
transition arenas to function in the shadow, where away from day-to-day pressures, 
in a setting that works with different rules, frontrunners can openly discuss and 
think freely about desired futures. Loorbach formulates it like this:  
Because of the tensions between regular policy processes and individual short-term 
interests on the one hand and transition management and collective societal interests on 
the other, transition management needs to be initiated besides regular policy, more or less 
as a ‘shadow track’. Of course without becoming totally detached from formal and official 
policy networks and circuits, transition management benefits from protection especially 
in the more creative and envisioning phases. A transition arena in this respect becomes a 
protected space or a niche, in which alternative visions, agendas and actions can be 
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developed and emerge. Conceptually, a transition arena then is the ‘field’ in which actors 
involved in long-term and sustainable innovation can interact, cooperate, discuss and 
compete under another logic than dominant in the regular policy or market arena (…) 
there is a continuous process of drifting apart and coming together of the different arenas 
in practice. The management of the interface between a transition management process 
and regular policies is therefore also part of transition management (…) In that sense the 
transition arena in fact is a niche for (policy) innovations to mature and from there 
diffuse and [it] can be used [as] a systemic-instrument to influence (or transitionize) 
ongoing policies” (Loorbach, 2007, p. 86) 
 
The relationship is depicted in figure 2.5, but in itself, such a picture with arrows 
between the different arenas does not clarify much. How should this work in practice? 
What is hidden within the arrows? Which procedures are needed to benefit from 
protection, work in the shadow and yet not be detached from official policy networks? 
Who should be involved in this work? This is only briefly discussed by Loorbach 
(2007, p. 292-293), who sees three elements of interaction between the transition 
arena and the regular policy context. First, it is important to watch over the creation 
and maintenance of support for the transition arena from regular policy. In order to 
get enough room, financial support and attention it is necessary to constantly make 
clear which benefits the arena yields for regular policy. Second, individual 
participants have to be assisted and stimulated to translate the results of the arena in 
their daily environment and practices. Third, communication of the results to a larger 
public can build up societal pressure on regular policy. Given the sparse treatment of 
the relation between transition management and regular policy, it is logical that 
Loorbach concludes that “how the ideas and agenda developed within transition 
arenas and transition networks can be translated into regular policy and ultimately 
be implemented, requires a whole new range of approaches, methods and 
instruments yet to be developed” (ibid., p. 284, emphasis added). 
 
Loorbach and Rotmans are aware that there is a paradox in the way transition 
management has to work. “Transition management is most effective when it is at 
least accepted by an existing regime as a welcome strategy to circumvent dominant 
short-term concerns and dynamics” (Loorbach, 2007, p. 295). The paradox is that in 
the longer term, and on the assumption that transition management works, the 
results, activities and actors from the transition arena can be threatening for the 
regime. The question is of course whether it works and if the regular policy regime 
fundamentally changes. I will investigate this empirically for the two Flemish 
transition management processes Plan C and DuWoBo in respectively chapter 4 and 
5. Meanwhile over the last years, the theory and the practice of transition 
management in the Netherlands have already initiated a lively debate. This is what I 
turn to next. 
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Figure 2.5.The transition arena as a new field of governance. Source: Loorbach (2007), p. 82, 85. 
 
 
2.4. DEBATING THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TRANSITION MANAGEMENT 
 
In their different articles and books on transition management, Rotmans, Loorbach 
and Kemp regularly make a challenging remark when they position transition 
management as a governance approach. They claim that the policy sciences do not 
have a model on offer that is suited for doing long-term governance for sustainable 
development. “The TM approach tries to fill in a void in policy and governance 
sciences with regard to influencing long-term societal change in the direction of 
sustainable development” (Loorbach, 2007,  p. 289). Loorbach (2007) as well as 
Rotmans et al. (2007) explicitly state that transition management is not just a mix of 
existing approaches – combining e.g. elements of network steering with elements of 
long-term planning and short-term incremental steps – but that it is also a distinctive, 
new approach because it introduces a combination of elements that are currently not 
found in governance models. These are (Rotmans et al., 2007, p. 25, Loorbach, 2007, p. 
279): an analytical basis in complex systems thinking and transition science that can 
structure the governance process, a coherent theoretical basis for a governance 
strategy in the transition management framework, a specific use of selective 
participation and a structured participative approach, an explicit normative focus on 
sustainable development, an emphasis on informal rather than formal policy and 
governance processes. Loorbach even boldly labels this as “the logical next phase in 
the evolution of policy-making” (ibid., p. 84). 
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The question is of course how this is assessed by others than the devisers themselves.  
Dewulf et al. (2009) have serious doubts about TM’s attempt to incorporate a wide 
range of aspects of societal change and intervention in a single theory. Transition 
management uses concepts and methods from for example incrementalism, planning, 
social learning, network governance and agenda setting, and tries to overarch them 
all as a ‘third way’ where the best of all these theories is combined. However, Dewulf 
et al. do not see how all this variety can be handled in one theory and instead suggest 
that “a multiple theory approach could be more useful for dealing with the 
enormous challenge of sustainability” (p. 25). 
 
Part of the debate about transition management is grounded in these and other 
theoretical arguments. Another part is based on how transition management 
performs in the practice of policy-making. As far as the practice goes, the academic 
empirically oriented literature is fairly limited and has almost exclusively focused 
and commented on the largest process, namely the Dutch energy transition. This 
dissertation can contribute to the debate by broadening the empirical basis for 
discussing transition management and moving into new domains (housing and 
building, waste and materials) and a different political setting (Flanders). I structure 
my discussion of the existing debate about transition management along three lines. 
First, I focus on how several authors have framed the relevance of transition 
management. Second, I present the debate about the energy transition in the 
Netherlands, where we see a mixture of strong and weak points of transition 
management. And third, I concentrate on what has surfaced as the main point of 
criticism and the Achilles heel of transition management: its political premises and 
implications.  
 
2.4.1. The relevance of a bold new approach 
 
Commentators have used two kind of arguments that support the claim that 
transition management has relevance as a new governance approach: it is an example 
of what governance for sustainable development can be, and it is an example of the 
renewed interest in long-term policy design, but with a reflexive streak. In both cases, 
the ambiguous politics of transition management also surfaces prominently, but as 
said, I leave this for 2.4.2. 
 
The argument that transition management has characteristics that may make it a 
useful approach for sustainable development governance, has most extensively been 
argued in articles by James Meadowcroft (Meadowcroft, 2005, 2009, 2011b), who 
since the nineties has been one of the influential voices on governance for sustainable 
development. In his treatment of that topic, Meadowcroft finds that contemporary 
governance systems have difficulties in responding to the challenges of sustainable 
development. These problems include (Meadowcroft, 2011b, p. 538-539): balancing 
different kinds of societal goals, working with multiple time frames, coordination in 
a functionally differentiated bureaucracy, assigning appropriate responsibilities and 
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integrating action at different scales, taking reasonable decisions in the face of 
persistent uncertainty, integrating different kinds of knowledge, developing 
appropriate participatory mechanisms, mediating complex conflicts of interests, 
escaping technological and societal lock-in. Meadowcroft states that under these kind 
of conditions “one can’t make progress towards sustainability without new 
governance approaches”, while he also firmly asserts that there remains “a critical 
place for good old-fashioned – regulative and redistributive – state action” (ibid.). 
This twofold approach is typical of Meadowcroft’s position. While the complexity of 
the sustainability challenge demands a more interactive, reflexive, participatory 
mode of governance, government still remains central to governance for sustainable 
development, amongst other things because sustainable development is essentially a 
political project, with value choices at its heart. This ultimately requires legitimacy 
for the path chosen and “formal structures to consider options and to provide for 
closure and authoritative decision” (Meadowcroft, 2007, p. 303). 
 
I will for the moment only stick to the first side of the equation, namely the new 
modes of governance. In Meadowcroft’s assessment of transition management it 
“possesses a number of appealing features” (Meadowcroft, 2011b, p. 542) or 
“promising features” (Meadowcroft, 2009, p. 325) from the perspective of governance 
for sustainable development. It is “one of the more interesting strands of research” 
(Meadowcroft, 2005, p. 483) and “there are grounds for thinking that with respect to 
policy it points in the right direction, adding a new dimension to the environmental 
management strategies that have emerged in developed countries of recent decades” 
(ibid., p. 491). So, what are these appealing features? Meadowcroft summarizes them 
as follows: making the future more clearly manifest in current decisions by adopting 
longer time frames, transforming established practices in critical societal subsystems, 
developing interactive processes in actor networks, linking technological and social 
innovation, learning-by-doing and initiating change in experiments, tailoring 
support for technologies to different phases of the innovation cycle, encouraging a 
diversity of innovations (variation) and competition among different approaches 
(selection), assigning an active role to government in mobilizing society. 
 
The connection  between transition management, longer times frames and reflexivity 
has been further commented upon by Vosz, Smith and Grin (2009), who situate 
transition management in a broader, renewed interest for long-term policy planning 
and design in the political sciences. In an overview article for a Special Issue of the 
journal Policy Sciences about “designing long-term policy”, they recall how a first 
generation of long-term policy planning has been used to build up the welfare state, 
infrastructures and bureaucratic capacity, but how it fell into disgrace in OECD 
countries after the 1970s. Planning failures, the inability to address economic crisis 
and the rise of neo-liberalism all contributed to the dismissal of interventionist public 
planning. However, new societal challenges – such as the development of energy 
systems, an ageing population, sustainable development – have made long-term 
policy design “politically salient again (…) Recent long-range policy ideas try to 
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incorporate some of the painful lessons from past planning failures; failures which 
fed the neo-liberal reaction. The current generation of long-term policy approaches 
appears more ‘reflexive’, it avoids the notion of planning and is well aware of the 
limits to full knowledge in advance and steering the course of history” (ibid., p. 276). 
Using lessons formulated amongst others by Lasswell, Wildavsky and Lindblom, 
new approaches leave the linear, unilateral model of rational planning behind, and 
instead put awareness of a fundamentally uncertain future central. Changing 
circumstances and unanticipated effects of policies not only make planning uncertain, 
but also imply that future development pathways cannot be solely subjected to 
technical calculation. “Long-term policy design is a highly political endeavour”, 
involving value judgements and interest and power games (ibid., p. 280). Policy-
making becomes the result of non-linear, open-ended processes, embedded in the 
surrounding societal context and its dynamics.  
 
Sometimes labelled as “reflexive governance”8, the new approaches to long-term 
policy design recognise the inherent ambivalence of policy goals, the uncertainty of 
knowledge, and the distribution of power and agency (Vosz. et al., 2007). In response 
to such a situation, they are in search of policy designs that on the one hand can rely 
on interactive processes and on procedures that provide room for social learning 
through deliberation, probing and learning. Instead of on planning and then 
implementation, the focus is on creating options and exploring paths. On the other 
hand, they realise that closure around options and long-term commitments are also 
necessary (Vosz et al., 2009, p. 281). The question then is which institutional 
arrangements are suited for this. 
 
Vosz et al. (2009) find that transition management “provides some imaginative 
ideas” (ibid., p. 282) for combining insights that are currently deemed important in 
long-term policy design. Examples are the combination of short and long term in 
transition management, the combination of top-down and bottom-up, of guidance 
and uncertainty, of structure and agency, of private interests and the common good.  
“We believe that transition management, both as a conceptual framework and a range of 
concrete policy experiments, does open new avenues for long-term policy design. These 
could lead us out of some of the conceptual dilemmas of planning and offer a real 
alternative to short-term oriented market-liberalism” (ibid., p. 294, emphasis in the 
original). 
 
However, this is only part of the story, because immediately important reservations 
follow. These authors, as well as all others that have investigated the theory and 
practice of transition management, point to some serious problems with and 
constraints to what transition management does and can do. These invariably turn 
around the same topic: the politics of transition management. With the ‘politics of 
                                                  
8 Two collections of articles about reflexive governance for sustainable development can be 
found in Vosz et al. (2006) and in a special issue of the Journal of Environmental Policy & 
Planning, vol. 9, no. 3-4, sept.-dec. 2007. 
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transition management’ authors refer to two kind of questions. First, questions 
related to substantial, political choices that are the result of transition management in 
practice. Second, question related to choices that are explicitly taken or implicitly 
hidden in the theory of transition management (and that may show up in the 
practices).  
 
2.4.2. The experiences of the Dutch energy transition 
 
I start the discussion from the study of transition management in the practice of 
policy, which as a matter of fact means from reflections on the Dutch energy 
transition, since this is by far the most studied experience. On the basis of scenario 
exercises and stakeholder consultation, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ, 
Economische Zaken) had around 2000 formulated three quality criteria for the future 
development of the Dutch energy supply system (secure supply, economic efficiency 
and sustainability) and selected four supply options that surfaced in all policy 
scenarios: biomass, natural gas, energy efficiency and wind energy (Rotmans and 
Loorbach, 2010). Inspired by the discussions in the lead-up to NMP4, from 2001 
onwards EZ began using the transition management approach to accelerate and steer 
the energy system in this direction. In different steps, a total of 7 transition platforms 
was set up around 7 supply options, (new gas, green resources, chain efficiency, 
sustainable electricity supply, sustainable mobility, built environment, energy-
producing greenhouse). Supported by working groups, the platforms had the task of 
developing transition pathways and proposing transition experiments. The transition 
platforms selected 31 transition pathways, that all focused on technological 
innovation (Kemp, 2010). Different programmes and funding schemes were installed 
to fund experiments9.  
 
The governance of the whole process was supported through the creation of new 
institutions, such as the creation in 2005 of an Interdepartmental Project Directorate 
Energy transition that had to coordinate the efforts of the six involved ministries10, 
and a Taskforce Energy Transition, a high-level strategic group, consisting mainly of 
government and business representatives (including the main energy actors Shell, 
Electrabel, Essent, Gasunie), that was given the task to coordinate the process and 
propose strategic decisions. The taskforce was superseded in 2008 by a Direction 
Body Energy Transition Netherlands, which had to formulate an overall vision for 
energy supply and a strategic agenda based on inputs from the platforms (ibid.). 
Other important initiatives were the set up of a Frontrunners Desk that was designed 
to help innovative companies overcome problems they encountered (with subsidies, 
permits etc.) and a fund, the Unieke Kansen Regeling, specifically designed to finance 
                                                  
9 For example, in the period 2004-2007 160 million Euros subsidies were spent, in 2007-2008 
around 56 million Euro (Kemp, 2010, p. 301). 
10  Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Health, Spatial Planning and Natural 
Environment, Ministry of Traffic and Water, Ministry of Agriculture and Nature, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance. 
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transition experiments. From the start of the transition process in 2001 until 2010, 
several hundreds of innovation projects were started, supported by a few hundred 
million Euros. In the 6 ministries, more than 20 people were directly involved. 
Several hundreds of people from business, government, science and a few NGO’s 
were involved in platforms and working groups (ibid.). However, with the ascension 
to power of the right-wing government Rutte I in late 2010, the whole energy 
transition project in EZ was finished early 2011. Also the supporting institutions 
were dismantled. 
 
Closely involved researchers 
 
Empirical research into these developments has been done by researchers that were 
at the cradle of transition management (such as Rotmans, Loorbach, Kemp) as well as 
by more external voices, such as Kern and Smith (Kern, 2009, Kern and Smith, 2009, 
Smith and Kern, 2010) and Hendriks (2008, 2009). The assessment of closely involved 
researchers is in general more positive than that of externals. Kemp and Rotmans 
(2009, p. 314-315) see four important achievements of the energy transition. First, the 
emergence of a new language – with terminology such as multi-phase, multi-level, 
niches, regime, frontrunners, learning etcetera – that not only stimulated integrated 
and long-term thinking, but also higher ambitions levels and formulation of 
sustainability goals. Second, the envisioning process resulted in a shared long-term 
perspective for the Dutch energy system in 2050. Third, the vision was translated in a 
strategic agenda with goals, pathways towards the vision, and experiments around 
the pathways. Fourth, the transition storyline broadened the policy focus beyond 
processes and products to systems and long-term transformative change. Loorbach 
(2007), Rotmans and Loorbach (2010) and Kemp (2010) mention other positive points 
such as: a broad community of professionals and scientists that became interested 
and involved in transition thinking; the analytical structure of transition 
management that had a guiding and coordinating effect for policy; a higher sense of 
urgency and more political attention that in turn opened more opportunity for 
business and more support for innovation; an improvement of policy coordination. 
 
However, they are also aware of serious tensions and problems in the energy 
transition. They find that “overall, energy transition in the Netherlands is considered 
a success in creating a new discourse, framework and orientation which is widely 
supported. Nevertheless, although many of the recommendations of the original 
model have been followed, transition management is not the open reflexive process it 
was supposed to be” (Kemp et al., 327). From early on, the process became 
dominated by regime actors – with the Task Force as prime example – instead of 
involving outsiders and frontrunners. Pathways and experiments were only 
technological, neglecting institutional, social or cultural change. Visioning was 
oriented towards consensus, policy recommendations or technological innovation 
instead of towards radically different futures. The processes thus became 
“participatory innovation policy” instead of that the processes were used “to create 
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pioneering capacity, societal self-organization and socio-technical innovation” 
(Rotmans and Loorbach, 2007).  
 
In different texts of Rotmans, Loorbach and Kemp, the main reason for this failure is 
sought in an inadequate implementation of the transition management model. They 
point out that from the beginning EZ did not follow the model. It skipped the first 
phases (preparation of the arena with a system analysis, selection of frontrunners) 
and installed a  process “that has all the characteristics of a stakeholder-network and 
consensus approach but not that of a selective, front-runner-oriented multilevel 
approach” (Rotmans and Loorbach, 2010, p. 195). Later on, the Taskforce did not 
meet the criteria for a strategic transition arena: individuals were chosen on the basis 
of representation and power, and their vision was based on business-as-usual (ibid.). 
And when the whole project experienced an explosive growth, the huge number of 
officials treated it as regular policy, “being unaware of the underlying theoretical 
notions and concepts. This translated to an often sub-optimal situation (from a 
transition perspective). For example, instead of creating new regulation, financial 
support, policy instruments based on the transition management and its outcomes, 
the main reflex of policy officials involved is to adjust and adapt existing ones” (ibid., 
p. 197-198). 
 
Outsider views 
 
Researchers that have evaluated the Dutch energy transition from an outsider point 
of view, are more critical about its results and way of functioning. They also admit 
that the energy transition makes use of an innovative governance model and can 
show “considerable achievements”, such as ambitious long-term visions, a systems 
approach to energy, a process architecture aimed at learning and stakeholder 
involvement, the encouragement of long-term thinking in the energy sector (Kern 
and Smith, 2008, p. 4093, 4101). However, they evaluate the results of the energy 
transition more negatively than transition management theorists do. More 
importantly, they also claim that the explanation does not lie in a careless application 
of transition management, but in some of the inherent characteristics of transition 
management and in how the approach is able to deal with its context, namely the 
regime with its political and power dimensions. The question of Kern (2009) and 
Kern and Smith (2008) is to what extent transition management really opens 
possibilities for structural change that are in line with transition theory. They claim 
that only looking at results of the energy transition project in itself (such as the 
amount of funded projects or the new institutions) is not enough, but that its 
potential can only be assessed in the context of wider Dutch energy policy. They find 
that the energy transition has no substantial impact on regular policy. “Core energy 
policy issues like security of supply, liberalisation and affordable prices are not being 
reframed by the energy transition” (ibid., p. 4098). On the contrary, regular criteria 
dominate the choice for experiments, so that social and institutional innovations are 
“unduly neglected” and technological options are favoured “that are already 
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economically viable or close to the market” (ibid., p. 4099). Furthermore, the 
transition project does not succeed in “opening existing energy policy networks to 
broader societal and democratic debate” and its promoters are obliged to connect it 
to the liberalisation agenda and frame it in liberalisation terms  instead of using it as 
a driver for sustainability (ibid., p.  4100). The conclusion for transition management 
is rather sobering: 
“The transition debates so far have been overly optimistic about the role of governments 
in system innovation while neglecting the realities of policy formulation and 
implementation which is essentially a political process, not a managerial task. In the 
Dutch ETP [Energy Transition Project], is has become clear that a power and legitimacy 
base for structural change is largely absent. Existing policy arrangements and political 
coalitions do not easily give way to new institutional routines. The ETP shows that even 
in the presence of ambitious goals and an innovative policy approach (which endured 
three government changes in 2002, 2003 and 2006), existing socio-technical structures 
and organisational routines are major obstacles for sustainable system innovations. ‘TM’ 
as a policy model has not yet paid sufficient attention to those aspects of power and 
organisational routines. Its analysis for policy needs to be complemented by analysis of 
transition policies and their politics” (ibid., p. 4101, emphasis in the original). 
 
Smith and Kern (2009) take the analysis one step further and try to explain why the 
transitions storyline was so successful and yet lost its components of structural 
change, such as it had been formulated in NMP4. They start from their finding that 
the power base of the advocates of the original transition storyline was too weak and 
narrow to push the ideas about structural, systemic change for sustainable 
development. Consequently, the storyline had to be presented in a language that was 
coherent with established discourses, interests and institutions associated with 
energy liberalisation and economic and innovation policy. Exactly this fact that 
transition management could be interpreted as a long-term addition to, but not as a 
threat to existing policies, made the recruitment possible of influential departments 
such as EZ. This coalition made success possible, but at the cost that it “fails to 
induce institutional change with sufficient reach and depth” (ibid., p. 95).  
 
Kern and Howlett (2009) have followed up on these conclusions by relating them to a 
well known phenomenon in policy sciences, namely that reform efforts always have 
to be embedded in pre-existing policy contexts, where they will have to struggle with 
existing policy paradigms, institutions, practices and established actor networks (p. 
392). Their question is how the energy transition project became integrated in the 
existing energy policy mix. Also here, the conclusion is sobering. The energy 
transition added new goals and new instruments to the existing policy mix, but 
without that previous goals or instruments were abandoned. This “layering” of goals 
and instruments upon one another made the already complex energy policy mix 
even more complicated “and thus made the alignment of different policy goals and 
instruments very difficult” (ibid., p. 403). 
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A somewhat particular angle of research has been followed by Hendriks (2008, 2009), 
who is not so much interested in the output of the energy transition, but in its 
democratic features. She starts from the observation that although long-term policy 
design for sustainability implies difficult political decisions, it seems taken for 
granted that the visions and policies that are formulated in transition arenas are 
acceptable and legitimate for a broader public. Furthermore, deliberations about 
these visions and policies take place in a form of network governance, alongside 
regular democratic institutions. Hendriks asserts that networks are usually 
legitimized through their outputs: networks are said to offer a greater potential to 
produce effective and efficient results in solving contemporary policy problems. 
However, input-legitimacy – whether decision procedures include all relevant 
constituents, either through direct participation or via representatives – requires 
equal consideration, in particular because of the complex and evolving nature of 
sustainable development where different societal goals have constantly to be 
balanced in collective decisions. Hendriks’ analyses of the energy transition show 
that what matters in selecting participants is “their profile, connections, expertise, 
autonomy and power. In this sense the transition arrangements collectively resemble 
a kind of ‘think-tank’ governance” (Hendriks 2008, p. 1017). Three significant groups 
of potentially affected actors are absent: small and medium enterprises, social groups 
and NGO’s, and the broader community of citizens. The actors in the energy 
transition are limited to the government and the market, supported by scientists. In 
practice then, the dominant democratic storyline is technocratic and elitist. One of 
her most interesting interpretations of this situation is that “when networks are 
unable to break open existing modes and discourses of exclusion (for example, 
technocracy or elitism), so-called ‘alternative’ modes of governing (such as transition 
management) simply replicate the prevailing policy style” (ibid., p. 1026). 
 
What should be added to all these critical assessments, is that they often end on a 
note of hope. Transition management is an attempt at an innovative form of 
governance that takes sustainability and long-term systemic change as normative 
orientation. It also tries to set steps towards a more reflexive form of governance. 
While the energy transition project shows the difficulties such an approach faces, it 
has nevertheless created spaces for a broadened debate about the practical 
translation of transition thinking. Based on “continued learning and critical reflection 
between the research and policy community” (Smith and Kern, 2009, p. 96), 
combined with the fact that new policy instruments have to go through learning 
processes,  “there is hope for future learning based on trial and error nature of the 
implementation of the transition management approach” (Kern and Howlett, 2009, p. 
404). 
 
2.4.3. The politics of transition management  
 
The critical reflection about TM goes beyond its practice and the direct experiences 
with the energy transition. Comments have also targeted the inherent characteristics 
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of transition management as a governance approach, as well as the way its 
embedding in the societal and political context is conceptualised. Some criticisms 
amount to more or less a rejection of transition management in the “DRIFT-format”, 
others think adaptations to transition management may be possible, but in the 
context of wider efforts at institutional reform and political transformation. 
 
A problematic implicit model of politics? 
 
The most critical analysts refer explicitly or implicitly to the “post-political” 
condition of current society as formulated by amongst others Mouffe (2005) and 
Swyngedouw (2010), an analysis that states that there is a strong tendency in current 
society to declare that an adversarial model of politics (such as structured around the 
left-right opposition) has become obsolete, and that dialogue and free discussion 
between individuals can lead to rational, consensual solutions for societal problems. 
Building on this framework, Kenis and Mathijs (2011) qualify transition management 
as a post-political approach that hides conflicts, power struggles and a bias for a neo-
liberal market paradigm under a ‘neutral’ managerial cloak. One of their most 
interesting observations is that transition management situates itself in the current  
economic model, but does not recognise this as an ideological position. “While TM 
developed an impressive terminology to describe system features, it seems to stay 
blind for the non-articulated market paradigm of its own discourse. As such, it is also 
not surprising that change becomes a matter of an elite of innovative business and 
policy leaders, in which ‘ordinary’ people are not more than figurants in a game of 
supply and demand” (ibid., p. 9). By obscuring this political nature, it becomes 
difficult to image future alternatives that move beyond the capitalist, growth-driven 
market framework11. 
 
This lack of awareness of the implicit political choices of transition management has 
also been signalled by other commentators, sometimes on different points than the 
market model. Shove and Walker (2007, 2008) target the implications of a series of 
choices that are presented as too self-evident: ‘a system’ is ‘managed’ by a group of 
‘frontrunners’ towards ‘sustainability’. All these terms raise questions with 
important political implications: how are system boundaries defined, what counts as 
transition vision and what not, who is included and who is not, and who takes 
decision in these kind of questions? Shove and Walker argue that transition 
management theorists too easily obscure the politics in these matter, “smoothing 
over conflict and inequality; working with tacit assumptions of consensus and 
expecting far more than participatory processes can ever hope to deliver. We also 
                                                  
11 This is in fact true for the field of transition studies in general, that seldom pronounces 
itself on the political economy of transitions. How will the productive apparatus of society, 
which is currently organised as a capitalist model, change during transitions? What does this 
imply for central economic questions such as “economic growth, the distribution of wealth 
and income, the political power of large business corporations, the role of markets, and the 
rights of property”? (Elkins, 2006, p. 792-793). 
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argue that there are important types and agents of change that are missed in much of 
this literature” (Shove and Walker, 2008, p. 768). 
 
Also Scrase and Smith (2009) analyse the implicit political model of transition 
management as a rationalistic model of policy, where “a vanguard of transition 
managers” acts on society’s behalf and informs policy-makers of necessary long-term 
goals, that can next be translated into action and serve as consensual orientation. 
“TM’s only political strategies, as such, are to frame questions in an inclusive way 
and then to defer taking politically contentious actions (…) By defining broad goals 
and visions, promoting experimentation and ‘modulating’ pressures for socio-
technical change, it is hoped a broad coalition can be constructed” (ibid., p. 719). 
However, this only works as long as hard choices and confronting the structural 
privileges of regime incumbents can be deferred. Once that can no longer be avoided, 
transition management offers no longer guidance on political strategy. This implicit, 
managerial political model, avoiding conflict, is for Scrase and Smith one of the main 
causes for TM’s vulnerability to capture by regime incumbents. Even though 
transition management is meant to be participatory and reflexive, Scrase and Smith 
conclude that “the political strategies and tactics it [i.e. transition management] 
advocates are inadequate for the task it has set itself” (ibid., p. 724). They also suggest 
two directions that further work on transition management might take. One option is 
improving transition management, less by focusing on vanguard transition arenas, 
but by using its flexibility “to empower people and facilitate a groundswell of 
bottom-up sustainability initiatives” (ibid.). The second option may lie beyond 
transition management, but focuses on strategies to change the political context in 
which transition processes play out. Apart from niche-based agency, Scrase and 
Smith refer to processes “such as mass mobilisation, attempts to achieve discursive 
hegemony, and strategies based on political economy” (ibid., p. 722). The lessons of 
historical large, purposive political programmes could be instructive here. 
 
In the overview article of Vosz et al. (2009), already referred to above (2.4.1), the 
authors reach a somewhat similar conclusion. As said above, they find that transition 
management has potential as an approach for long-term policy design, but that the 
practical experiences are “disappointing”, given its susceptibility to technocratic 
management and its instrumentalization for the interests of powerful actors (ibid., p. 
294). Whether TM can remain relevant as innovation in governance for sustainable 
development, will according to Vosz et al. depend on an adaptation of transition 
management itself, supplemented with a wider set of political strategies that can 
work towards contextual change and grasp the opportunities that arise from change 
in context. They highlight three critical issues with which any approach for long-term 
change will have to reckon: politics, context and design as process. ‘Politics’ refers to 
the kind of choices that are the result of transition management (or other reflexive 
governance designs), how these results come about, which actors are involved and 
which legitimacy these results have. The other two issues are in fact also about 
politics, but of a different kind. ‘Context’ is about how any innovative approach will 
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be confronted with a pre-existing political and institutional context that may be ill-
fitted and hinder its introduction, and how this context may even be so dominant 
that it influences the new approach. ‘Design as process’, refers to the fact that policy 
design is not a technical or scientific exercise, but that choices that are made in the 
design have political implications. The search for “the establishment of novel policy 
arrangements that work in practice involves learning and continued re-design in 
interaction with politics” (ibid., p. 289). Transition management is in fact in itself an 
experiment that will have to be constantly evaluated, “moving back and forth 
between conceptual analysis and practical experimentation” (ibid., p. 292). 
 
Adapting or complementing transition management? 
 
In the last part of this presentation of the current debate on transition management, I 
briefly turn to three researchers that have explicitly engaged with the question of 
adapting and/or complementing transition management.  
 
Avelino (2011) stays closest to transition management in the sense that she not only 
investigates the role of power in sustainability transitions, but she also develops 
principles and tools to integrate power in the transition management model itself. On 
the basis of theoretical concepts and empirical research into transition policy in the 
Dutch mobility sector, she defines a “multi-level power-in-transition framework” 
that can be used to analyse power dynamics in transitions, but that can also be 
integrated in the transition management model to help practitioners cope with power 
relations and develop a more effective power strategy for their process. An important 
finding in her research is that in spite of the radical language in transition studies, 
researchers have usually been preoccupied with moderate niches and regimes that 
are influenced by an exogenous landscape. She argues that a societal transition will 
not just be won by giving more attention to radical niches and adaptation of regimes, 
but that antagonistic, collective action is needed to alter landscape trends.  What is 
required is “the collective power of actors (e.g. social movements) to influence and 
create new landscape trends, with new paradigms and new functional systems” (ibid., 
p. 354, emphasis in the original). She thinks her framework can help to consider the 
systemic power of social movements, which for research means “to go beyond the 
study of how social movements ‘resist’ or ‘challenge’ existing regime, but also 
studying their more constructive efforts to actually create new, alternative regime” 
(ibid., p. 355). 
 
Meadowcroft has in different articles stressed the need to link transition 
management to political processes, institutions and debates. He thinks transition 
management can contribute to an opening of the debate and decision space as to 
what counts as valuable problem framings and solutions (Meadowcroft, 2009). It can 
also establish new actor coalitions and encourage societal learning about alternatives, 
but in the end, hard decisions will have to be taken about changing regulatory or 
policy frameworks, committing large scale public resources, an reorienting political 
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orientations. “Such changes can only be engineered through political processes, and 
legitimised and enforced through institutions of the state. So whatever else they may 
be, sustainability transition are inherently political” (Meadowcroft, 2011a, p. 71). The 
problem is, according to Meadowcroft, that transition management thinks it can take 
these issues out of the political arena by depoliticising them and normalising them as 
part of everyday administration and business (“But of course ‘depoliticising’ topics is 
in one sense the grandest political move of all!”) (Meadowcroft, 2011b, p. 547). 
Instead, Meadowcroft pleads for explicit attention to which political changes are 
necessary and how political conditions can be altered to move sustainability 
transitions closer to the heart of policymaking. This implies engaging with ‘ideas’ – 
how political ideologies can be influenced to alter problem definitions and acceptable 
solution spaces; engaging with ‘institutions’ – how they can be reformed to favour 
policies for transitions; and engaging with a redefinition of ‘interests’ – “this implies 
political engagement to build reform coalitions, create new centres of power, buy off 
powerful lobbies, isolate die-hards, compensate losers, and so on” (Meacowcroft 
2011a, p. 73). 
 
Also in the work of Grin, transitions are processes that are intrinsically political. 
Since transition governance approaches (such as TM) aim at transforming long 
established patterns of actions and their structural context in a more sustainable 
direction, they will unavoidably meet with resistance, power struggles, distrust and 
questions of legitimacy. Instead of seeing politics as a problem for transitions, the 
awareness that transitions are intrinsically political, should motivate researchers and 
practitioners to try to understand the political mechanisms at work in transition 
processes and in that way help them to deal with the politics. “An understanding of 
the root causes of the politics specifically associated with such efforts may help to 
address it” (Grin 2010, p. 225). In a reference to transition management, Grin remarks 
that “while it is a merit of complexity theory to offer generic insights in multi-phase 
dynamics, for applying them adequately one must contextualize them historically 
and sociologically” (ibid., p. 228). An understanding of the context they are 
embedded in, of its constraints and opportunities, can help actors to develop 
strategic agency to bring about change. Why is knowledge of the context so 
important? As discussed above, transitions come about through the alignment of and 
interaction between processes at landscape, regime and niche levels. But such 
couplings do not happen spontaneously. Central to such changes and the 
exploitation of change opportunities is the role of agents that actively work towards 
alignment and interaction of ongoing dynamics at the different levels. Agents have to 
actively exploit, create or influence opportunities for change. Grin et al. (2011) find 
that agency plays a pivotal role that determines whether, how and how fast a 
particular transition will develop. “Crucial for such agency is that actors understand 
the opportunities and constraints implied by their immediate context, and are able to 
expand their agency by positioning themselves wider in space and time” (ibid., p. 80). 
By acting strategically and making use of ongoing dynamics in and around a societal 
system, agents can try to promote and initiate more sustainable structures and 
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practices. Grin (2010) distinguishes three types of creative agency that may enhance 
the realization of transitions: a form of agency that aims at bringing about long-term 
structural change at regime level, a form of agency that tries to realize novel practices 
at niche level, and a form of agency that tries to connect novel practices with 
structural changes and in that way reinforces the dynamics between the two levels. 
This way of thinking can help actors in transition management processes to 
consciously connect their own goals and results with ongoing dynamics around them.  
 
 
2.5. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING TRANSITION MANAGEMENT’S 
INFLUENCE ON REGULAR POLICY 
 
Let me sketch for a moment the outlines of the chapter so far and situate my own 
research. Transition studies originated from a search by scholars to understand deep 
structural change in society and to use these insights to support reflections, policies 
and practices for sustainable development. Transition management as a governance 
approach grew out of the interaction between Dutch researchers and policy-makers 
during the preparation for NMP4. The Netherlands also saw the first attempts to put 
the approach into practice. Assessments of the implementation of TM mainly relate 
to the Dutch energy transition and show that the implementation has been far from 
optimal. This has sparked a debate about the theoretical as well as the practical 
implications of the politics of transition management.  Transition management has 
been favourably commented upon as an example of what governance for sustainable 
development can be, and as an example of a new generation of reflexive, long-term 
policy design. However, it has also been severely judged for its naive treatment of 
politics, something that partly explains the disappointing results – from the point of 
view of the necessary structural change in the energy system – of the Dutch energy 
transition. In the reality of policy-making, the optimistic governance approach 
transition management is confronted with a highly influential context, shaped by 
divergent interests and power games, inert institutions, competing political visions 
and a variety of exogenous trends. 
 
 One of the striking elements of the literature review is that the relation between 
transition management and regular policy has hardly been conceptualised and that, 
except for a few researchers (Kern, 2009, Avelino, 2011) it has seldom been 
empirically studied. As explained in chapter 1, my dissertation aims at deepening 
insights into what happens when TM enters the real world and how it affects regular 
policy, taking into account the different influences that can be at work. My research 
does not start from a theoretical stance on what the relation between TM and regular 
policy should be, but the analysis of practical Flemish experiences may yield 
hypotheses about that relation. To carry out my analysis, I am in need of an 
analytical framework that provides a broad contextualisation of transition 
management processes and their relation with regular policy, while simultaneously 
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being detailed enough to track a diverse set of changes that might be taking place, 
such as changes in ideas, in actors or in institutions. 
 
2.5.1. The MLP and policy dynamics  
 
The multi-level perspective is an obvious candidate for such an endeavour. 
Numerous studies using the MLP have proven that it is able to capture the 
complexity and multiple dimensions of transitions (Belz, 2004, Geels, 2005, 2006, 
2007b, Smith, 2007, Verbong and Geels, 2007, Nykvist and Whitmarsh, 2008, Van 
Bree et al., 2010). With its three levels of analysis (regime, niche, landscape) and the 
interaction between these levels it helps to understand how transitions come about 
and it provides for a broad contextualisation of change.  I have explained the features 
of the MLP in some detail above.  
 
Transition studies, and in particular studies using the MLP as an analytical 
framework, usually take technologies at regime level or technological novelties at 
niche level as a starting point for analysis. However, as discussed, also non-
technological niches can and will play an important role in a transition. One example 
are “policy niches”, a term introduced by Van der Brugge (2009). In Van der Brugge’s 
interpretation a policy niche gives room to individuals, often residing in so-called 
power-networks, to break away from their role as representative of an organisation, 
reframe problems and solutions, and develop innovative policies that may be 
reintroduced in the mentioned power networks.  A policy niche is “a shadow process, 
running parallel to regime processes attempting to influence the regime by 
developing innovative perspectives” (ibid., p. 97). In fact, this fits very well with the 
definition of a transition management process and its arena, although there of course 
the idea is that they consist of frontrunners, which are often not or only loosely 
connected to power-networks. 
 
Although this interpretation of niches broadens the possibilities of MLP analysis, it 
has repeatedly been remarked that, while the MLP has proven to be useful in 
painting a broad picture of how transitions come about and which mechanisms play 
a role, it is less suited for analysing and explaining the roles and strategies of actors. 
In particular, the MLP does not have a good conceptualisation of politics in 
transitions. While the policy regime is present in the MLP as one of the factors in the 
reproduction of socio-technical regimes, it is unclear how exactly policies and policy 
innovations play a role in regime change and multi-level interactions. Geels (2010) 
states that politics and power are usually integrated “in an ad hoc way. Because the 
MLP does not provide detailed explanations of the sources and changes of power, it 
could benefit from richer, multi-faceted views of power and conflict” (p. 506). In their 
discussion of the MLP and a future research agenda, Smith et al. (2010) state that the 
MLP will have to be further developed in dialogue with other disciplines such as 
political science. They select “the politics of transitions” and “opening the black-box 
of public policy” as important research themes. 
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2.5.2. Policy arrangements to conceptualise politics and policy innovation 
 
There are of course different approaches in political science to study politics and 
policy-making. Hay (2002) distinguishes between three analytical traditions 
(behaviouralism, rationalism, constructivism/new institutionalism), Burnham et al. 
(2008) between four (behaviouralism, rational choice, new institutionalism, 
constructivism) and in their well-known Theory and Methods in Political Science, Marsh 
and Stoker (2010) even present eight approaches (adding political psychology, 
feminism, Marxism, normative theory). Behaviouralism and rational choice do not 
seem very fit for studying politics and policy change in transitions. Behaviouralism 
seeks to explain political behaviour at individual and aggregate level and does so by 
developing falsifiable theories and testing them against empirical evidence, using 
quantitative techniques (Sanders, 2010). The rational choice approach uses methods 
of economics to study politics, starting from the rationality and self-interest of actors 
(Hindmoor, 2010). Both do not seem suited for transitions research, because they 
largely leave out the role of context in shaping politics, they do not pay attention to 
the influence of historically grown structures and institution, and they hardly value 
the role of ideas, norms and beliefs in societal and political development. As shown 
above, however, these factors are according to transition studies crucial in explaining 
how societal systems change (or remain stable) and in how systems can be influenced 
through conscious intervention of for example a transition management process. 
These factors do play a central role in institutionalist and constructivist approaches 
to politics. An institutionalist analysis would focus mainly on how the role that 
transition management can play, is shaped by the institutions within which it has to 
operate. A constructivist analysis would stress how the ideas that transition 
management produces, affect the actions of agents and influence policy12.  
 
The policy arrangements approach 
 
There is a framework for doing empirical research that does not beforehand choose 
what should receive most focus, and that is the policy arrangements approach (PAA),  
developed by Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004, Arts et 
al. 2006, Arts and Leroy 2006a). Originally, the PAA was developed to study policy 
change in environmental politics and it has been applied in a lot of studies in that 
domain (see e.g. the volume of Arts and Leroy, 2006, Arnouts and Arts, 2009, Arts 
and Buizer, 2009). One of the interesting features of the approach is that it seeks to do 
justice to some of the great debates in the policy sciences: the influence of structure 
                                                  
12 It is of course somewhat more subtle than that. As Stoker and Marsh (2010, p. 9-11) argue, 
the different (3, 4, 8, …) approaches are crossed by ontological and epistemological positions 
that influence the way they analyse politics, but this division is not straightforward. 
Behaviouralism and rational choice usually take a positivist position. Constructivist may 
differ from view about ‘how deep’ the world is socially constructed. The institutionalist 
approach is most eclectic, ranging from rational choice to constructivist. This theme is picked 
up again in chapter 3 where I discuss my own position as a researcher. 
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versus agency, the explanation of stability and change, the role of material factors 
versus ideas, and the interpretation of power (Hay, 2002, Marsh, 2010). The authors 
think they can develop “a practical ‘meso level theory’ or approach” that keeps in 
mind the lessons learned about these debates in the different sources of inspiration 
(Leroy and Arts 2006, p. 5). A second interesting feature of the policy arrangement 
approach is that it is explicitly intended as a frame for empirical research. While it 
builds on different strands of new institutionalism, it does not pronounce itself 
beforehand on the question whether change or stability prevails, or whether the 
motor of change should be situated in ideas, interests or the context (Meijerink and 
van Tatenhove, 2007). Empirical research should determine such questions. These 
two features fit in fact very well with the ambition I explained in chapter 1, namely 
charting the complex of factors that are at work when new governance approaches 
are set up to influence policy, and making the relationship between these factors 
researchable. The features of the PAA make it possible to take into account the role of 
institutions and of ideas, of change and stability, and to let their relative importance 
surface from the empirical research. 
 
I now go more deeply into the features of the approach. What is its starting point? As 
mentioned, it has been inspired by different ongoing debates in political science and 
sociology. It translates these through three pivotal concepts: institutionalisation, 
modernisation and policy arrangements (Leroy and Arts, 2006). First, the concept of 
institutionalisation refers to the fact that day-to-day behaviour of actors solidifies into 
patterns and structures, but that next these structures also structure behaviour. This 
is the so-called actor-structure duality, well-known form amongst others Giddens’ 
structuration theory (Giddens, 1984). Second, it also refers to the discourse-
organisation duality, or the fact that meaning, beliefs and knowledge also solidify in 
rules and organisational structures, that in turn reproduce these meanings. For policy 
processes, this institutionalisation means that “relatively stable definitions of 
problems and approaches to solutions gradually arise in and around policy, more or 
less fixed patterns of divisions of tasks and interaction develop between actors, 
policy processes develop in accordance with more or less fixed rules and so on” (Arts 
et al., 2006, p. 96). While there is a huge debate in political sciences about which sides 
of the dualities should prevail in analysis and what explains best change and stability 
in politics and policy, Arts et al. deliberately position their concept of institutions in 
the midst. They want to able to build on the insights of the different approaches, so 
as not to loose the complexity of social reality and to make use of their theoretical 
and methodological richness (Leroy and Arts, 2006). Their aim is “paying attention to 
the change and stability environmental politics displays, either in substantial and 
organisational matters, and induced by either agency or structure” (ibid., p. 10, 
emphasis added). As Arts and Van Tatenhove (2004) have suggested, there is of 
course no reason why the analysis should not be extended to other than 
environmental politics 
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The second concept, political modernisation, introduces the societal context in the 
analysis. It refers to different kinds of social, economic and political processes that 
are changing the relationships between the state, the market and civil society, and 
that in their wake also initiate new conceptions and structures of governance. Typical 
driving forces for political modernisation are globalisation, individualisation, the 
financial crisis of the welfare state, the ideological shift towards market steering, the 
emergence of new public management etcetera Grin (2010) relates to the same kind 
of drivers with the term ongoing processes of structural transformation. Apart from the 
already mentioned trends, he also refers to processes such as the societization of 
science and technology and the emergence of transnational civil society. These kind 
of structural societal trends cause a shift in the nature and topography of politics: 
instead of politics that is solely centred around the nation state and its classical-
modernist institutions, we witness the appearance of new sites where politics and 
policy is made, with new actors and new themes, and where new rules of interaction 
are tried out (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, Arts and Van Tatenhove, 2006). The change 
is often caught under terms such as multi-actor, multi-level and multi-sector settings, 
and a shift from government to governance.  In the political literature, different 
interpretations of this phenomenon exist. The shift is often interpreted as logical in a 
changing world, or it is even expressed as a normative demand for change (ibid.). 
However, Arts et al. stress that they do not use political modernisation as a 
normative or political programme, but “as an analytical tool to understand the effects 
of structural processes on day-to-day policy-making” (Arts and Van Tatenhove, 2006, 
p. 28). With that, they underline that they do not take the position that political 
modernisation is unidirectional and necessarily leads or should lead to a retreat of 
the state. Although its position and power transform, the state remains a dominant 
player in a lot of domains. The concept of political modernisation draws attention to 
the fact that structural elements outside the direct grasp of policy actors can be a 
source of political change.  Still, since the term remains rather ambiguous, in the case 
studies I will use Grin’s terminology ongoing processes of structural transformation. 
 
The third concept is the concept of policy arrangements. A policy arrangement is “the 
temporary stabilisation of the content and organisation of a policy domain, in a 
bounded time-space context” (Arts and van Tatenhove 2004). The concept is meant to 
analyse substance and organisation of a policy domain, as well as change or stability 
of that domain. Policy arrangements are the result of and can change through the 
day-to-day policy processes and interactions between players and/or through 
structural long-term processes of political modernisation. To analyse policy 
arrangements, four dimensions are taken into account: actors and actor coalitions, 
resources and powers, rules of the game, discourses. The first three are 
organisational elements of policy, the last one refers to substantial aspects. 
• Actors and actor coalitions: relates to the different players involved in the policy 
domain, e.g. from different administrations, business, ngo’s, experts, scientists, 
civilians etc. Analysis of policy arrangements often starts by identifying the 
relevant actors and their influence in a policy domain. 
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• Resources: the means actors can use such as money, personnel, knowledge, 
authority, technology. The division of resources among actors is one of the 
determinants of their capacity to influence policies and policy results. 
• Rules of the game: formal procedures of decision making and implementation as 
well as informal routines of interaction within institutions. Rules determine 
which actors are in and out of the game, and how actors can get in. They relate to 
norms, procedures, legislation, divisions of tasks etc. in a policy domain. 
• Discourse: interpretative schemes, ranging from formal policy concepts to popular 
story lines, by which meaning is given to a policy domain. Liefferink (2006) adds 
that discourses can be considered at two levels. The most obvious one refers to 
discourses about the concrete policy problems at stake, such as the character of 
the problem, its causes and possible solutions. The second level of discourses 
exceeds specific policies and that refers to ideas about the relationship between 
state, market and civil society, and thus the preferred mode of governance. Actors 
may hold ideas about these two levels of discourse that are incompatible (e.g. 
hold a view about governance that the state should refrain from intervention, 
while solutions for a concrete policy problem demand close collaboration with  
the state). 
The four dimensions are intricately connected, so that change in one of the 
dimensions (e.g. entrance of new actors) often causes changes in the other 
dimensions (e.g. new actors lead to a different distribution of power, new discourses, 
different rules to engage the players). This is however not an automatism. 
 
Figure 2.6. Dimensions of policy arrangements and influences leading to policy renewal. Based on 
Arnouts and Arts 2009. 
 
Figure 2.6 illustrates the connection between the different concepts: policy renewal – 
or in other words: an innovation of a policy arrangement – results from structural 
processes of social and political change on the one hand, and the day-to-day strategic 
behaviour of actors involved in daily policy interventions on the other. It is 
remarkable how close the processes identified in the PAA are to the formulations in 
the MLP (the ‘levels’ can be recognised in the presentation in figure 2.6). It is not 
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difficult to identify the structural processes of transformation with the political 
aspects of the landscape level, the existing policy arrangement with the political part 
of the socio-technical regime, and day-to-day strategic action with Grin’s three types 
of agency referred to above. One of these types are the development of innovative 
practices in policy niches.  
 
In other words, the different building blocks of the policy arrangements approach 
can be reinterpreted through the different levels of the MLP. In that way, they make 
explicit the political dimension of the MLP: 
• The exogenous trends processes of structural change are the political aspects of 
the landscape level;  
• the existing policy arrangement is the political part of the socio-technical regime;  
• the governance innovations through actors’ agency can be situated at niche level, 
regime level, or in between (cf. Grin’s three types of agency)  
In fact, this interpretation echoes almost literally the phrasing of Grin (2010) when he 
discusses what the adoption of a governance perspective adds to the understanding 
of transitions (although he does not explicitly refer to the policy arrangement 
approach): “A governance perspective emphasizes not only the nature of transitions 
as profound changes in both established patterns of action and the structure in which 
they are embedded, but also how these changes in practices and structure in a 
particular domain are influenced by long-term societal trends exogenous to that 
domain. ‘Novel practices’, ‘structure’ and ‘exogenous tendencies’ of course refer to 
what the multilevel perspective (MLP) calls experiments, regime and landscape 
developments” (p. 224). 
 
Combining MLP and PAA 
 
It is important to note that from a theoretical point of view, both MLP and PAA are 
rather similar in starting points. This is in particular striking in the interpretation of 
the relationship between structure and agency. The MLP and the policy 
arrangements approach both emphasize that actors are embedded in structures that 
constrain but also enable their actions. Actors reproduce structures through their 
behaviour, but structures are not deterministic: to a certain extent, actors actively 
interpret and tailor rules to their needs. Furthermore, Geels (2007) as well as Grin 
(2008) have positioned the MLP as a transdisciplinary middle-range theory for 
understanding profound socio-technical change. It defines and connects a limited set 
of concepts and propositions that can function as a communication tool or boundary 
object between different disciplines. I tried to show in the previous paragraphs how 
this could work when integrating MLP and PAA. 
 
Figure 2.7 tries to visualize these ideas. The political dimension of the regime is 
interpreted as the regular policy arrangement, further detailed as a configuration of 
actors, resources, rules, and discourse. Processes of structural transformation are the 
political trends at landscape level. They put pressure on the regime, in particular on 
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its policy arrangement, but can also be a source of inspiration for the initiation of 
new governance practices. These new governance practices, such as TM, can be 
thought of as  policy niches, that themselves are typified by a distinguishing 
discourse, a set of actors, rules and resources. Policy niches may challenge the 
dominant policy arrangement, but it is particular the alignment of these niches with 
(political) processes at landscape level and with destabilising trends in the regular 
policy arrangement that leads to policy change. At least, that is what we might 
expect from the propositions in MLP theory, and it is also how the theorists of the 
PAA view the renewal of a policy arrangement (see figure 2.6).  
 
 
Figure 2.7. Combining the multi-level perspective (MLP) and the policy arrangements approach 
(PAA) in one analytical framework. 
 
There is one element in figure 2.7 that I have not yet discussed. A new regime implies 
a renewal of the policy domain that is part of the regime13. Does the PAA also teach 
something about the form under which change takes place in policy arrangements? 
Based on their case studies in various environmental policy domains, Arts and Leroy 
(2006, p. 272-274) observe that the emergence of new policy arrangements can be 
grouped in three types:  
                                                  
13 This need not hold the other way round, however. Policies change regularly without that 
all different dimensions of regime change thoroughly. 
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1. the full or partial integration of existing and originally juxtaposed policy 
arrangements. In this case, two existing arrangements merge, for example 
because arrangement A becomes embedded and hierarchically nested within a 
broader arrangement B (Liefferink (2006) analyses Dutch organic farming 
arrangements as embedded in the broader agricultural policy arrangement). 
Another possibility is that several arrangements are active in the same or strongly 
related policy areas, but none of them is superior to the other. They remain 
justaposed alongside each other, but partially overlap (Liefferink (2006) mentions 
agricultural policy and groundwater protection).  
2. the discursive and/or organisational renewal of existing policy arrangements. In 
this case, a new discourse or institutional changes are introduced, which then 
lead to further changes in the existing arrangement (Bogaert (2004) has shown 
how discursive renewal in Flemish nature policy has changed the whole nature 
policy arrangement) 
3. the introduction of new arrangements that should then be able to perform and 
institutionalise. In this case, a new policy arrangement is introduced that succeeds 
in maintaining itself as a more or less autonomous arrangement, and possibly 
replaces the existing arrangement (Verbeeck and Leroy (2006) discuss the attempt 
at introducing a target group approach in Flemish environmental policy). 
These types of renewal are also included in figure 2.7. Of course, it may not always 
be possible to strictly separate them. What is meant as a type 3 renewal, may over 
time become integrated in a broader arrangement (type 1). Or it could fail as an 
autonomous arrangement but have a discursive or organisational influence on an 
existing arrangement (type 2). And perhaps other combinations are possible.  
 
There is nevertheless an important qualifying remark to be made about how the 
policy arrangements approach explains policy change. Some researchers that have 
used the approach to analyse environmental politics (Bogaert, 2004, Wiering and 
Crabbé, 2006, Crabbé, 2008), have experienced that it allows to describe in a fairly 
comprehensive way the characteristics of arrangements, of influences on 
arrangements and of what changes. However, describing does not yet explain how 
things change or remain stable. Crabbé for example finds that the PAA “only allows 
for a ‘thin’ explanation of policy change. The approach does say that policy 
arrangement are (temporarily) stable in the mid-term and it supplies concepts to 
describe policy arrangements, but it does not say why institutional arrangements 
come into being, are changed or dismantled” (Crabbé, 2008, p. 41, emphasis in 
original, my translation). Liefferink remarks that the different parts of the framework 
“should be considered as practical tools in a fairly elementary toolbox (…) they may 
be applied in different ways, according to the user’s requirements and skills. In many 
cases, moreover, they will have to be complemented by other, more refined and 
sophisticated tools” (Liefferink 2006, p. 67). Anticipating the discussion in later 
chapters, my experience with the framework is also that it allows to map fairly 
comprehensively the features of policy arrangements and the changes within them 
over time, but that for interpreting how change (or stability) happens in the different 
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dimensions and what kind of mechanisms or patterns are behind it, complementary 
frameworks are needed. In the case studies in chapter 4 (Plan C) and 5 (DuWoBo) I 
will restrict myself to the MLP-PAA framework, since this allows already for an 
extensive analysis. For the cross-case analysis in chapter 6, I will however also rely 
on other theories and concepts to provide for a more refined understanding of how 
change and stability can be explained.  
 
2.5.3. Transition management in the analytical framework 
 
So, how can we interpret transition management in the perspective of this MLP-PAA 
framework? TM can be framed as the introduction of a policy niche, set up alongside 
regular policies, with the ambition to introduce a new style and practice of 
governance that aims for innovation in the policy field on the level of substance as 
well as organisation. With the help of the PAA, it becomes possible to analyse the 
different characteristics of this policy niche and see how it differs from regular 
regime policy. On the level of discourse, and in contrast with regular policy, the need 
for system innovations, sustainability transitions, long-term thinking and transition 
experiments is prominent. Also on the level of discourse, TM takes a normative 
stance towards governance: multi-actor settings, expanding networks with 
frontrunners, approaches such as participatory visioning are deemed necessary 
instruments to influence transitions. When looking at actors, there is a plea for 
involvement of frontrunners and forward-thinking regime players. The resources of 
these change-minded actors can be strengthened vis-à-vis incumbents through 
building new networks, generating common knowledge about problem perceptions 
and future visions and transitions pathways, strengthening sustainable niches 
through funding for experiments. New rules under TM could relate for example to 
new procedures to involve innovative actors or adjustments to financial mechanisms 
in order to favour more sustainable practices. 
 
This interpretation of transition management as a niche arrangement with specific 
characteristics in its different dimensions brings me back to the research questions. 
Sub-question 1 was: what is a suited analytical framework for examining the interaction 
between transition management processes and the regular policy regime?  The combination 
of MLP and AAP seems to provide all elements that are necessary to analyse this 
interaction: it defines concepts for analysing the political characteristics of the policy 
regime and of transition management processes, it defines the relation between these 
concepts, and it even contains propositions about how they may interact with each 
other. 
 
With this framework, it should be possible to answer Sub-question 2: What are the 
historically grown characteristics of the policy regimes in which DuWoBo and Plan C 
intervened? How do DuWoBo and Plan C differ from the policy regime? What has been the 
interaction between both processes and the ongoing dynamics in their respective policy regime? 
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To which changes did this lead? To answer these questions, the analytical framework 
can be used in a series of different steps (inspired by Arts and van Tatenhove, 2006):  
• Describe the properties of the policy arrangement of the regime (namely its 
discourses, actors, rules, resources), how it grew historically and under which 
influence (part 4.1 for the Plan C case, part 5.1 for the DuWoBo case); 
• Describe the development of the TM processes and their characteristics as a policy 
niche (discourses, actors, rules, resources) (part 4.2 for the Plan C case, part 5.2 for 
the DuWoBo case); 
• Determine which structural trends are currently relevant for the waste and 
materials domain and how they exert influence (part 4.3 for the Plan C case, part 
5.3 for the DuWoBo case); 
• Describe the interaction between the different levels, determine patterns and 
mechanisms, how and why the dominant policy arrangement changes (or not) 
(part 4.3 and chapter 6 for the Plan C case, part 5.3 and chapter 6 for the DuWoBo 
case). 
 
In sum: building on the combined framework of MLP and PAA, it is possible to 
define Plan C and DuWoBo as policy niches that run parallel to regime policies and 
that attempt to influence the regime by developing innovative policy perspectives. 
The combination of PAA and MLP can then be employed to understand the policy 
characteristics of these niches and their interaction with regime policies. Because I 
have chosen for a historicising approach, this gives more relief to the relatively short 
period that is the focus of the analysis (namely the period since the early 2000’s when 
the transition management processes were initiated). Against the background of the 
genesis of the regime, the attempts at destabilising the regime and their results stand 
out in sharper contrast. The framework thus allows for: 1. an analysis of the political 
characteristics of the regular policy regime and its historical growth; 2. an analysis of 
the way the TM process is positioned vis-à-vis regular policy in terms of discourses, 
actors, rules and resources; 3. an analysis of the embeddedness of TM as an 
innovative policy arrangements in ongoing processes of structural transformation; 4. 
and an analysis how the combination of ongoing transformation processes and TM 
influences regular policy (or not).   
 
This way of positioning policy arrangements in relation to the MLP makes at least 
two things clear. First, it offers an opportunity to better conceptualise the political 
domain in the MLP and in that way strengthen the framework. Essential aspects of 
politics – discourses, coalitions, institutional rules, resources – are made explicit and 
it becomes possible to study how they influence change and stability in substance 
and organisation of a policy domain, and thus of the policies that are linked with the 
socio-technical system. Second, however, it is also obvious that the scope of the 
policy arrangements approach is limited to the political domain of society. This has 
the advantage of a clear focus, but it also limits the explanatory and analytical power 
of the policy arrangements approach, in particular when studying transitions. For 
example, exogenous trends are restricted to processes of political modernisation, 
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while the MLP and its landscape level allow for a much broader picture of influences. 
Niches – apart from innovative policy practices – are completely absent. The policy 
arrangements approach also suggest that the locus of power is situated exclusively in 
the political domain, while the MLP has always attached an important role to rules 
and power embedded in other loci, such as technology. In a comment on social 
theory, Schot and Geels (2010) state that sociologists forget that society also has 
material and technical components. But the same holds true for political scientists: 
“This is why our focus is not just on social systems, but on socio-technical systems. It 
is the combinations of humans and non-humans that create functional configurations 
that work” (p. 45). And it is the configuration of these “actants”, to use Latour’s term, 
in the regime that has to change during a sustainability transition. The combination 
with the MLP allows, at least in principle, to draw these aspects into the analysis. 
 
Before diving into the two TM-processes DuWoBo and Plan C, I first discuss in 
chapter 3 the methodological choices that have been made for the empirical analysis 
of these cases. 
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3. 
Research design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter introduces the research design that is used in this dissertation. It first 
situates the research as part of the interpretive research tradition, dwelling on the 
connection between ontological positioning, epistemology and methodology (3.1). It 
then discusses the methodological choices made in the research, such as the case 
study approach, the data collection and data analysis (3.2). It ends with a brief 
discussion of my role as an engaged researcher in sustainability and political science 
(3.3). 
 
 
3.1. INTERPRETIVE RESEARCH DESIGN: ON ONTOLOGY,  EPISTEMOLOGY 
AND  KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS 
 
Whether a researcher engages with topical questions such as sustainable 
development or not, there are different positions possible on the status of the 
knowledge he gathers, on what this tells about the world and on how this can inform 
policy-makers or the general public.  These are questions of ontology (what is the 
form and nature of the world?), of epistemology (what can we know about that 
world and how can we know it?) and of methodology (which analytical strategy and 
research design to gather that knowledge?). Usually, there is a close connection 
between these questions: one’s ontological position leads to a particular 
epistemology, which next has methodological implications (Furlong and Marsh, 
2010). I have no intentions of going into a lengthy discussion here of all positions that 
are possible, but Furlong and Marsh make a crucial point in stating that every 
researcher takes a position, consciously or not. And since this for an important part 
influences what is being studied, how it is studied and what can be claimed as results, 
it should be normal practice for every researcher to clarify his position (ibid., p. 189). 
 
3.1.1. Making positions explicit 
 
It may be worthwhile remembering that over the last decades, the mainstream in 
political science, as well as in the social sciences in general, has been a position with a 
so-called foundationalist or objectivist ontology and a positivist epistemology. From 
this perspective, there is a ‘real’ world and ‘true’ facts that exist independently of the 
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researcher. Furthermore, the claim of this position is that the researcher can gather 
objective knowledge about that world, because he can remain detached from his 
research object and his personal opinions, as an independent outsider. In the policy 
sciences, this positivist position results in a focus on “rigorous quantitative analysis, 
the objective separation of facts and values, and the search for generalizable 
findings” that are supposed to be valid independent of context (Fischer, 2007, p. 223). 
In this view, the social sciences should mirror the ideal of the natural sciences, with 
their search for universally valid and predictive scientific laws. Apart from the fact 
that even in the natural sciences this ideal is under discussion (Latour, 1987, 
Goeminne, 2011b), it can be severely questioned whether in the social sciences, it is 
possible at all. “The rules of social and political life are (…) subject to constant 
reproduction, renewal and transformation. They are, one might suggest, culturally, 
spatially and historically specific” (Hay, 2002, p. 86). A fundamental reason for that is 
the presence of consciously acting subjects that inject “an inherent indeterminacy and 
contingency into human affairs for which there is simply no analogy in the physical 
sciences” (ibid., p. 50). Or in other words, social structures do not exist 
independently of the agents in them and their reflexive reactions to them14.  
 
This way of thinking has informed another main position in contemporary social 
science, namely an interpretive or constructivist position. My own research also fits in 
this tradition. In ontological terms, this position rejects the idea that there is a world 
‘out there’ that is independent from the researcher. Value-free science with an 
independent outsider-researcher is not possible. Reality is not discovered, but always 
socially constructed and gets meaning through the interpretation of the actor15. These 
are not individual constructs, but they are shaped by social, political and cultural 
processes. This has epistemological consequences, often expressed in the term 
“double hermeneutic: the world is interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic level) 
and their interpretation is interpreted by the observer (second hermeneutic level)” 
(Furlong and Marsh, 2010, p. 185). Language, meaning-making and interpretation 
become central elements in understanding the world. The next implication is on a 
methodological level: quantitative data lose their aura of neutrality and objectivity 
for describing phenomena, and other kind of data become central. These are often 
word data (interviews, documents, field notes etc.), but can also be acts and 
interactions, images and sounds, physical objects or architectural spaces. Numerical 
data are not superior to other data and are rather used as supplement or illustration, 
often in a form similar to how they had meaning for the actors in the field (Yanow 
and Schwartz-Shea, 2006a, Schwartz-Shea, 2006).  
                                                  
14  As science and technology studies have convincingly argued, this holds also for 
technologies or for the “facts” of the natural sciences, but that discussion goes beyond the 
scope of this study. 
15 This claim is a limited one, as Furlong and Marsh add. It does not mean that researchers 
claim that there are no tables, mountains or institutions, but “that this ‘reality’ has no social 
role/causal power independent of the agent’s/group’s/society’s understanding of it” 
(Furlong and Marsh, 2010, p. 191). 
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A researcher’s position – foundational-positivist or constructivist-interpretive16 – is 
not decided on the basis of a “truth” criterion. Instead, it arises from the 
presuppositions about the nature of the world and the status of knowledge and 
science that one holds as a researcher. Hajer and Wagenaar (2003, p. xiv) make the 
additional point that an interpretive policy analysis is more consistent with the 
contemporary sociological state of society, “with its dispersed power, diminishing 
trust, ambiguous institutions, powerful transnational influences and increasing 
reflexivity”.  
 
3.1.2. Grounding knowledge claims  
 
An important difference between positivist approaches and interpretive approaches 
lies in the criteria that are used to judge the trustworthiness of research. Important 
criteria for good science in positivist research are for example internal validity 
(causal relationship between dependent and independent variables), generalisability 
of results (independent of social and historical context; also called external validity), 
and reliability (repetition of measuring leads to the same results) These criteria do 
not fit in easily with a constructivist-interpretivist approach, because they 
presuppose the existence of a stable world of objective facts, the possibility of neutral 
observation and the possibility of formulating universal truths. 
 
Interpretive research has developed its own criteria to guarantee trustworthy 
research. Lincoln and Guba (1985) were one of the first to articulate criteria that can 
be considered as parallel to positivist criteria. They use for example “credibility” as a 
parallel term for “internal validity” and “transferability” for “generalizability”. With 
the growth of constructivist-interpretive work during the two last decades, several 
concepts have become fairly common in usage for developing and assessing 
interpretive research. 
 
Of prime importance is contextuality (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2011) Instead of 
working with generalised meanings that can be abstracted from their context, 
interpretive research departs from the idea that meaning-making is always situated 
and context-specific. A phenomenon can only be understood within its context, and 
the discourses, practices, historical developments and traditions that are present 
there. This implies that a thorough description of the context of the studied 
phenomenon is needed to understand how people act and events unfold. The 
                                                  
16  There is in fact a third position, that is called realist (or critical realist). This has a 
foundationalist ontology, recognising a world ‘out there’ with social phenomena and deep 
structures that are independent of our knowledge of them. However, these cannot be directly 
observed, because observation is always mediated by theory. So, epistemologically, this 
position takes inspiration from the interpretive stance. Furlong and Marsh (2010, p. 189) 
observe that increasingly the boundaries between realist position and interpretivism are 
being blurred. This is visible in qualifications such as “modern” and “post-modern 
constructivism” (Parsons, 2010) and “thick” and “thin constructivism” (Marsh, 2010, Hay, 
2002). 
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researcher should provide enough detailed information about the phenomenon and 
the context of that phenomenon so that his interpretation of events is supported by 
sufficient evidentiary data and so that outsiders can understand and judge the 
interpretation17.  
 
An important rationale for contextualisation is transferability of results. In a positivist 
methodology, the researcher has to prove that his results are generalisable from one 
research setting to another, which then in a next phase can inform the building of a 
general, predictive theory. In contrast, in interpretive research detailed descriptions 
makes it possible for readers to compare the phenomenon and its context to their 
own situation and assess themselves whether the results are transferable. “The 
quality or value of contextualized knowledge (theory) is to be assessed by users, 
whether academic or other, who decide themselves the extent to which the 
knowledge fits their circumstances and purposes, i.e. whether it works in context” 
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2011, p. 48, emphasis in the original). While authors like 
Schwartz-Shea and Yanow shy away from generalisation by the researcher and lie 
the responsibility with the reader, other commentators agree that social science 
cannot produce general, context-independent theory, but that, depending on the case, 
limited forms of generalisation are possible. In his discussion of constructivism, 
Parsons argues that in the eyes of “modern” constructivists, and under the conditions 
of careful research designs and open debate among people with different views, it is 
possible to arrive at “pragmatically acceptable claims about how the world really 
works” (Parsons, 2010, p. 91). Mortelmans (2007) mentions the possibility of 
theoretical generalisability: patterns that arise from a specific case can inform 
hypotheses that may serve as a basis for new research, or that can be integrated in 
existing knowledge. 
 
This interpretation of generalisation/transferability is important for the kind of 
research that I aim for in this dissertation. As I explained already in previous 
chapters, the role of transition management in relation to regular policy, as well as – 
more limited – the possibilities for TM in Flanders, have hardly been investigated. 
My research is thus exploratory, trying to understand a new topic about which little is 
known, in all its complexity. The conclusions the research yields (e.g. in patterns of 
interaction between TM and regular policy), may be suitable to generate context-
specific hypotheses about that new topic, which may in turn be sensitising for further 
research18. In other words, detailed description can facilitate transferability, which 
                                                  
17 In interpretive research, the term thick description  is often used to name such a detailed 
account (Geertz, 1973). I avoid it here because of its strong ethnographic connotations. While 
my narratives of the historic and contemporary development of the housing and building 
system, of the waste and materials system, and of the role of two TM-processes therein are 
elaborate, they do not contain the typical ethnographic details that are associated with thick 
description. 
18 This line of reasoning is well-known from grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), to 
which I will briefly return in 3.2.2. 
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depends mainly on the assessment of the reader, but it can in exploratory research 
also be used by the researcher to formulate tentative, context-sensitive hypotheses, 
that can serve as stepping stones for further research. 
 
A second rationale for contextualisation is the interpretation of causality in 
interpretive research. In positive methodology, the search is for causal relationships 
between independent and dependent variables, so that there is a clear cause why 
something happens the way it does.  Interpretive research rather works with 
constitutive causality and rejects the idea of dependent and independent variables 
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2011). It relies on ‘how’ and ‘what’-questions to detect 
the different ideas and understandings of actors, to trace connections among events 
and to map context elements that all combined constitute how certain results and 
situations come about. Explanation is thus never about a one-way relationship 
between dependent and independent variables, where some set of conditions 
necessarily initiates a certain response. On the contrary, Parsons makes the point that 
an essential part of the constructivist argument is contingency. People follow a course 
of action on the basis of their interpretation of a situation. Next, “by creativity or 
accident, in a moment of contingency they chose one of many possible sets of 
meanings, thereby building certain interpretations around themselves and 
‘constituting’ one world from many that were otherwise possible” (Parsons, 2010, p. 
88). Interestingly, Parsons adds that this line of reasoning implies that the world (and 
specific situations) could also have been interpreted and constructed differently and 
“that it did not have to be this way” (ibid., p. 89, emphasis in the original). Or in other 
words, the choice of a constructivist point of view also has political implications. It 
suggest that, because of people’s continual meaning-making and interpretive acts, 
the world is deeply one of our own making and that “though changing it may be 
difficult, it is imaginable that we can remake it” (ibid.)19. 
 
Because of all previous arguments, interpretive analysis cannot rely on mainly one 
kind of analytical tool (such as quantitative, statistical measures). It rather opts for 
triangulation, or the understanding of a phenomenon by using at least three different 
analytic tools. Triangulation is important for interpretive research because it avoids 
analysing a problem from one perspective. Schwartz-Shea (2006, p. 102) remarks that 
the usual interpretation of triangulation is that multiple methods of access to data are 
used, such as observation, interviews and documents. However, it is also used to 
refer to multiple data sources (persons, times, places), the involvement of multiple 
researchers, the use of multiple theories or paradigms in one research project, and the 
use of different methods in one research project.  
                                                  
19 Hajer and Wagenaar (2003a, p. xiv) make a comparable point when they repeatedly stress 
that “methodology, inevitably, entails a political stance”. For them, positivist analysis 
assumes a certain hierarchical ordering of society, where analysts provide ‘scientific’ 
knowledge to elites about how to efficiently reach policy goals. They plead a post-positivist 
interpretive and deliberative policy analysis that can support “active participation in 
democratic deliberation over concrete policy problems” (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003b, p. 27). 
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The trustworthiness – rather that the truth – of findings can further be enhanced by 
reflexivity of the researcher about his starting points and his role in the research 
process, by making transparent choices, and of course by following a systematicity in 
the research that allows for a logical and consistent interpretation. Also specific 
techniques can be used, such as informant feedback, where the researcher discusses 
his interpretations with those studied.  
 
How these kind of criteria for interpretive research have been guarded over in the 
research for this dissertation, will be explained in the next paragraphs. 
 
 
3.2. METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES 
 
Before I go more deeply into the methodological choices that I have made in the 
empirical research, I first describe the context of the research. I then elaborate on the 
case study approach in this dissertation, the different forms of data generation that 
make triangulation possible, and data analysis.  
 
3.2.1. Context of the empirical research 
 
The first steps in this PhD dissertation date from the Spring of 2010, when I was 
working for the Flemish Policy Research Centre on Sustainable Development. 
Already since the nineties, the Flemish Government has different budgets for policy-
relevant research. In 2002, several of these budgets were grouped in the programme 
Steunpunten voor Beleidsrelevant Onderzoek (Centres for Policy-Relevant Research). 
Each of these centres consisted of a consortium of research groups from different 
Flemish universities, with the task of developing research that could support the 
different policy domains of the Flemish Government. Sustainable development was 
not a theme in this  “first generation” of policy centres (2002-2006), logically so, since 
it was not yet defined as a specific policy domain for the Flemish government. 
However, with the government Leterme I, in 2004 sustainable development was 
made a power of the Minster-President himself (see also Context Box 4 in chapter 5). 
The difficult start-up of the new policy domain initiated a demand for scientific 
support, that found a translation in a call for a Steunpunt Duurzame Ontwikkeling 
(Policy Research Centre for Sustainable Development), as part of the general call for 
the second generation of research centres in the Spring of 2006. In response to this 
call, we formed a consortium of four research groups from the Catholic University of 
Leuven, Ghent University and the Free University of Brussels 20 . Since the call 
expressed an interest for research about transitions and transition management, I 
                                                  
20 The participating research groups were the Centre for Sustainable Development (Ghent – 
my research group), the Human Ecology Department (Brussels), the Research Institute for 
Work and Society (Leuven) and the Research Group on Global Environmental Governance 
and Sustainable Development (Leuven). General coordinator of the whole project was Prof. 
Dr. Hans Bruyninckx (KU Leuven). 
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formulated two projects for my own research group (the Centre for Sustainable 
Development, Ghent University) on these themes. In the autumn of 2006, the 
consortium was approved by the government and the research could start for the 
period 2007-2011. 
 
The new Steunpunt Duurzame Ontwikkeling 21  was subsidised for nine half-time 
projects. I started working myself on the two half-time projects Sustainable production 
and consumption patterns in Flanders: the potential of system innovation and Transition 
management as an instrument of  long-term policy for sustainable development. Although 
Flanders had already started building practical policy experience with the transition 
management processes DuWoBo (started in 2004, see chapter 5) and Plan C (started 
in 2006, see chapter 4), these were the first scientific projects about transitions and 
transition management in Flanders. The general objective of both projects was 
investigating whether transition theory and transition management were useful 
approaches for Flemish sustainable development policy.   
 
As was the case for all Policy Research Centres, also the Steunpunt DO was directed 
by a Steering Group, consisting of representatives from the competent Ministers 
(sustainable development, science and innovation), the competent administration 
(sustainable development) and the scientific team, with an advisory role for 
representatives of the advisory councils SERV and MINAraad22.  The Steering Group 
met twice or three times a year to discuss the progress of the research and decide on 
directions the research should take. Each project also had a follow-up committee, 
consisting of civil servants, NGO’s, policy advisors of advisory councils, other 
scientists. This group met around twice a year to give feedback on interim results 
and discuss the design of following steps in the research. In my case, there was one 
follow-up committee for the two projects, made up of around 20 people. 
 
Since there was no research available in Belgium about transitions, the first parts of 
the two projects aimed at making an overview of the state of affairs of the scientific 
debate about transitions and transition management, and at analysing the early 
experiences of the two Flemish transition management projects DuWoBo and Plan C. 
In late 2009, the Steering Group decided to focus all efforts on the transition 
management project and asked to develop a profound description and analysis of 
DuWoBo and Plan C, in particular with an eye for their influence on regular policy. It 
was around this time that I decided that the two profound case studies for the 
Steunpunt DO could form the empirical basis for a PhD. 
                                                  
21 See http://www.steunpuntdo.be/E_SDO_origin.htm 
22  The Socio-Economische Raad Vlaanderen (SERV, socio-economic council for Flanders), 
consisting of employers and trade unions, is the most influential Flemish advisory council. 
The Milieu- en Natuurraad van Vlaanderen (MINAraad, Environment and Nature Council of 
Flanders) consists of environmental NGO’s and other interest groups such as socio-economic 
organisations (employers, trade unions), consumer organisations, representatives of towns 
and cities. 
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3.2.2. Case study approach 
 
Case studies are an often used research method in interpretive research. Because of 
the multiple manifestations of case studies, a uniform definition does not exist. 
According to Yin (1984, p. 13), a case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context and are not clearly evident; and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used.” Gerring (2009, p. 1183) talks about “an intensive study 
of a single case for the purpose of understanding a larger class of cases.” According 
to Mortelmans (2007), the core is acquiring detailed insights by using different data 
collection methods.  
 
Flyvbjerg (2011) as well as Gerring (2009) remark that case studies play an important 
role in all social sciences and that canonical books and articles are based on them, yet 
strangely enough, simultaneously case study design is often held in low esteem 
because the validity, reliability and generalisability of its results are doubted. Or in 
other words, and probably logically so, the same arguments as in the interpretive vs. 
positivist debate return. In a thoughtful article, Flyvbjerg (2011) has however argued 
that these objections are based in misunderstandings about what a case study is and 
does. 
 
Whatever the definition, similar merits of case studies return with most authors. A 
primary strength is that a case study allows for a detailed and contextualised analysis 
of a phenomenon. People, situations, organisations, projects or processes are 
followed closely during an extended period of time. Because of the focus on one or a 
small number of cases, they give the researcher the opportunity to provide depth to 
his analysis, or “detail, richness, completeness and wholeness” (Gerring 2009, p. 
1148). Case studies aim at being holistic, taking into account all relevant factors. This 
is important for the development of a nuanced view of social reality, and it is typical 
for what above was called “constitutive causality”: the different relevant factors at 
work and their patterns of interaction can be laid bare23. This is obviously necessary 
for the research I want to do, namely trace the influence of transition management on 
regular policy and the mechanisms through which this happens. This is only possible 
through a detailed reconstruction of the two TM-processes themselves (DuWoBo and 
Plan C), a detailed account of their relation to the (historically grown) policy regime 
in which they are embedded, and their interaction with the contemporary dynamics 
they are confronted with. The case study approach makes such a detailed analysis 
possible. In particular in relation to analysing policy change, Fischer argues that “the 
                                                  
23 Flyvbjerg makes an additional interesting point by arguing that this nuanced view is also 
important for the learning processes of the researcher himself. Context-independent 
knowledge and theory do not bring a researcher further then a beginner’s level, while “the 
highest levels in the learning process, that is, virtuosity and true expertise” (Flyvbjerg, 2011, 
p. 303) arise from the intimate knowledge of and experience with contextualised, real-life 
cases.   
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key to how [policy] change comes about has to be grounded in a detailed contextual 
examination of the circumstances at play in specific cases. For this purpose 
quantitative methods have to take a back seat to qualitative research” (Fischer, 2003, 
p. 108, cited in Kern, 2009).  
 
A point in case study design is always the selection of cases. Here, there was not a lot 
of choice: until 2011, DuWoBo and Plan C were the only cases of transition 
management in Flanders. In that sense, they can be labelled as typical cases (Gerring, 
2009): they are representative for the phenomenon under study, namely “transition 
management in Flanders and its relation with regular policy”, simply because they 
cover the whole range of available cases. However, could this limited selection 
possibility perhaps also be interpreted as a problem? What if new transition 
management processes are started in Flanders? Can these cases then still be labelled 
as typical? I do not think this discussion is very relevant, because my intention is not 
to formulate generally valid conclusions about TM in Flanders, but to do exploratory 
research about a hardly investigated topic, namely the interaction between new 
arrangements such as transition management and the existing political system and 
the influence of TM on that system. So, the real question is: can the cases be used to 
arrive, in a methodologically-sound way, at conclusions for this kind of exploratory 
research? The literature about qualitative and interpretive research is quite 
affirmative on this point. An invariably cited strength of case studies is that they can 
not only be used for detailed analysis, but that they also have an advantage when the 
knowledge of a phenomenon is limited and the research is exploratory. A case study 
allows to understand a new topic in all its complexity, its form of analysis yielding 
rich, detailed, contextualised knowledge. On that basis, tentative insights and 
context-sensitive hypotheses can be derived about the new topic and the related 
research questions. Such insights may next be transferable to other contexts and the 
hypotheses can be used as a basis for further research.  
 
While this is in principle possible with only one case, here, I have chosen for a 
multiple case study design: two transition management processes (DuWoBo and Plan C) 
have been followed during several years, their activities studied, as well as the 
context in which they are embedded, with the aim of understanding and explaining 
their influence on regular policy. The research for this dissertation of both cases 
ended early 2012, and description of events and evolutions also ends at that 
moment24. Apart from a within-case analysis, the multiple case design also makes a 
cross-case analysis possible by contrasting the cases and searching for similarities 
and differences in patterns and mechanisms. The within-case analysis is done in 
chapter 4 (Plan C) and chapter 5 (DuWoBo). The analysis is based on the MLP-PAA 
framework that I constructed in chapter 2. It uses the concepts defined there to 
                                                  
24 I still follow the DuWoBo-process as part of a new research project under the Policy 
Research Centre Transitions for Sustainable Development (TRADO), that is a follow-up to 
the Steunpunt DO for the period 2012-2015. See https://steunpunttrado.be/english  
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understand the characteristics of the regular policy regime, of the TM-processes and 
of the changes that are taken place. The cross-case analysis is treated in chapter 6. It 
contrasts the two cases, but in particular tries to look for patterns that explain how 
change happens or stability reigns. The procedure that I followed for doing this last 
analysis was inspired by grounded theory. I started from the open, sensitising 
concepts of my analytical framework (such as regime, landscape, niches, actors, 
discourses, rules, resources) and started looking for patterns, connections and 
mechanisms that emerged from the empirical data, trying to make sense of them 
theoretically, while always keeping in mind of course that this is exploratory 
research and not much has been said about the investigated topic. Therefore and to 
deepen insights, I connected  some of the main findings – about the importance of 
making connections in the processes, about the role of discourse, and about different 
influences of power (see chapter 6) – to existing frameworks about policy change 
(Kingdon’s multiple streams, Hajer’s discourse analysis, Arts/Van Tatenhove/Grin’s 
power framework), again using the broad concepts in these frameworks to highlight 
findings and develop context-sensitive and tentative hypotheses.  
 
3.2.3. Data collection  
 
Developing a detailed analysis of transition management’s influence on regular 
policy demands a thorough description of the two TM-processes, with a 
contextualisation along two lines. First, the cases are embedded in a historical 
narrative of the development of the policy domain. This historicizing places the case 
in a longer time perspective that allows for a sharper view of contemporary 
evolutions. Second, the TM-processes are embedded in contemporary evolutions, by 
mapping the developments that are taking place around them. The description of the 
processes and their contextualisation consequently builds on a diversity of data 
sources such as interviews, participant observation, document analysis, secondary 
literature and feedback seminars, which together make triangulation possible.  
 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
One source of information were three series of interviews, all conducted in Dutch. 
The first series of 15 interviews dates from 2007-2008. This series was part of the first 
phase of the research for the Steunpunt DO, that aimed at drawing up a state of 
affairs of the two TM-processes, their successes and problems. The interviews 
subsequently informed my first working paper for the Steunpunt DO (Paredis, 2008). 
Although at the time this PhD was not yet planned, the interviews proved valuable 
for the research, because they were conducted when the first phases of transition 
management had only just passed (DuWoBo) or were even still ongoing (Plan C). 
The events, decisions and discussions of these phases were still very fresh for the 
interviewees and their reflections less detached than they were a few years later. Half 
of the interviewees were key persons in the processes (such as the project leaders and 
presidents of the processes), the other half were people that were active in the context 
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around the processes (mainly involved with socio-economic or innovation themes). 
The interviews were semi-structured interviews, conducted on the basis of a topic list 
(see box 3.1), and usually lasted from an hour to an hour and a half. The interviews 
were not recorded, but extensive notes were taken. During my analysis in 2010-2012, 
I also coded them, taking the concepts from the MLP/PAA frame as starting point. 
 
The second series of interviews was mainly conducted for the research about Plan C 
during the second semester of 2010 and the first semester of 2011, while the third 
series was mainly conducted for the research about DuWoBo during the second 
semester of 2011 and the first trimester of 2012. During these two periods 32 
interviews were done, most of them related to one of the two processes and their 
context,  while the others were predominantly focused on the wider policy context 
(see Annex to this chapter for an overview of interviews).  
 
  
 
The interviewees were chosen on the basis of three criteria: either persons with 
several years of close affiliation with the processes, or representatives of an 
Box 3.1. Interview Topics 
 
All 47 interviews were semi-structured on the basis of a topic list. The 2007-2008 
interviews focused rather narrowly on the state of affairs in the TM-processes and their 
relation with the direct policy environment. The 2010-2012 interviews went broader and 
had two goals: understanding how interviewees perceived the ongoing developments in 
the system concerned, and how they assessed the activities of the TM-processes in the 
light of these developments. The different items were touched upon with most 
interviewees, although not always in the same depth. The order of treatment depended 
on the flow of the interview. Sometimes items were irrelevant (e.g. because interviewees 
had not personally participated in the TM-processes). Before each interview, I would go 
through the list and decide on the focus, usually specifying questions, deleting or adding 
items. In particular in the last phases of interviewing, I would regularly focus most on 
what seemed blanks in my data. 
 
Topic list 2007-2008 interviews 
1. aim of the research and interview 
2. role of interviewee in the TM-process 
3. relevance of the TM-process for the interviewee’s work/position 
4. perceived successes of the TM-process 
5. perceived problems in the TM-process 
6. advisable future development for the TM-process 
7. relevance of the TM-process for current and future policy development 
 
Topic list 2010-2012 interviews 
1. aim of the research and interview 
2. main societal and political evolutions influencing the system 
3. main actors in the system and the interviewee’s (organisation) own position 
4. perceptions of problems and solutions in the system  
5. involvement and role of interviewee (organisation) in the TM-process 
6. opinion on the role and influence of the TM-process until now 
7. opinion on the future role that the TM-process should play 
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important group in the processes (active or not), or experts about the policy context.  
This led to a mixed group of civil servants, scientists, business and NGO-
representatives, and staff members of ministerial cabinets. Also these were semi-
structured interviews, conducted on the basis of a topic list. Most lasted around an 
hour and a half, although some took up to two hours and a half.  All the interviews 
were taped, but I am in the habit of simultaneously taking extensive notes. I either 
transcribed the interviews in full (about half of them) or used the notes as an index to 
the tape and transcribed the most relevant passages (Weiss, 1994). During, the 
analysis, the interviews were coded, taking the MLP/PAA concepts as starting 
points. In this 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 interview series, I followed a strategy of 
grouping interviews in blocks.  I would start with a couple of interviews, do a 
preliminary analysis for surfacing themes and for tracing the sequence of events, and 
then continue the series to get a more nuanced and complete view. I ended with 
interviews to fill in what seemed important gaps.   
 
It is important to realise though that the interviews are just one source of information 
for the empirical research. The analysis in the next chapters builds on a combination 
of interviews and the other data sources. 
 
Participant observation 
 
Because of my involvement as a researcher in the Steunpunt DO, where I was 
expected to do policy-relevant research about transitions and transition management, 
I was easily allowed access to the activities of DuWoBo and Plan C. I started 
following Plan C from May 2007 onward, DuWoBo from September 2007 onwards. 
At the time, Plan C was still in the second phase of the TM-process (see 4.2.2), which 
implied that I was present from the moment that the vision was developed towards 
transition paths and experiments. I started following the meetings and also became 
involved in the working group that was created for the transition path “from 
products to services”. Later, when early 2009 the process was restructured, I 
systematically followed the so-called SCIA-group, that was first responsible for the 
substantive coordination of the process, and later for the substantive as well as 
organisational development (see 4.2.2). Apart from these formal meetings in Plan C, I 
followed workshops, project meetings, conferences etcetera. My close involvement 
with Plan C ended early 2012. In the case of DuWoBo, the first phases of the TM-
cycle were already passed when I became involved, but from September 2007 
onwards, I started following the Platform that was installed to steer the process (and 
that still exists). Apart from these formal meetings, like in the case of Plan C, I 
followed conferences, workshops, project meetings. Records of the follow-up of 
DuWoBo and Plan C contain several notebooks with field notes. But close 
involvement through participative observation is of course much more than just 
being present at meetings. Informal conversations during and after meetings, on the 
way in trains or on foot, telephone conversations, e-mail exchanges, etcetera are often 
important moments for getting a better feel of what is at stake.  
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Documents produced in cases 
 
The close involvement with the processes considerably eased access to the 
documents produced within them, such as meeting proceedings, discussion papers, 
project proposals, documentation for conferences and workshops, etc. Although I 
was not personally involved in the early phases of DuWoBo, my research group was 
(with colleagues Jo Van Assche, Bruno Deraedt and Trui Maes), so that all 
documents were still available a few years later. Furthermore, in both cases helpful 
civil servants and other participants allowed access to all relevant documents I asked 
for. These documents were particularly important for the reconstruction of the 
processes. 
 
Secondary literature, policy documents and legal texts 
 
In particular for understanding the historical evolutions that shaped the system and 
for describing the contemporary situation and trends that form the context of the 
TM-processes, I extensively made use of scientific articles (via Web of Science), 
scientific and policy reports (from other Flemish policy research centres, Flemish 
departments and agencies, EU, OECD etc.), policy documents (such as governmental 
declarations, Ministerial policy notes, policy plans, advices from advisory councils, 
etc.), legal texts,  and documents from different stakeholders (NGO’s, business… 
such as periodicals, information brochures, research reports, annual reports etc.).   
 
Participant feedback 
 
As explained above, this dissertation builds on my work that was done for the 
Steunpunt DO. Earlier versions of chapters 4 (Plan C) and 5 (DuWoBo) and of part 6.2 
(multiple streams analysis) were published as working papers for the Steunpunt DO 
(Paredis, 2011, Paredis, 2012, Paredis, 2013)25. This embedment in the Steunpunt DO 
eased the feedback of participants on preliminary versions of the working papers. 
The procedure followed for the three working papers was somewhat similar.  
 
For the Plan C case, I organised a seminar in March 2011 with Plan C participants 
and members of the follow-up committee of my Steunpunt-projects (see 3.2.1) to 
discuss interim results of the analysis. The discussions during the seminar enriched 
the analysis. A draft version of the paper was then sent to committee members in 
June 2011, discussed during a committee meeting and reworked. Before finalising the 
paper in October 2011 (Paredis, 2011), the SCIA-members of Plan C had a last chance 
to comment.  For the DuWoBo case, the draft paper was sent to all Platform members 
in January 2012. In March 2012, the analysis was presented during a seminar to an 
enlarged Platform group, discussed and reworked. At the end of March, a new draft 
                                                  
25 An earlier versions of part 6.2 was in fact published under the new Policy Research Centre 
Transitions for Sustainable Development (TRADO) that is a follow-up to the Steunpunt DO 
for the period 2012-2015. 
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was delivered to the members of DuWoBo’s executive committee, and after 
comments finalised in May 2012 (Paredis, 2012). The working paper that formed the 
basis for chapter 6.2 (Paredis, 2013), was discussed with the follow-up committee of 
the new Policy Research Centre TRADO in October 2012, sent around for comments 
and published in March 2013.  
 
What proved important in the three instances is that the participants’ feedback made 
the analysis richer and more nuanced. It allowed me to evaluate certain 
interpretations I was making, to better understand why some wording was touchy, 
and to judge whether the analyses were talking to the participants or whether they 
were far-fetched. Comments on the finalised working papers showed that the 
descriptions and analysis were recognisable for the participants. Chapters 4 and 5 of 
this dissertation are revised and more detailed versions of the earlier working papers; 
part 6.2 is only a minor revision. 
 
3.2.4. Data analysis 
 
As Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2009) have remarked, acquiring access to research 
sites, generating data and analysing them are often entwined processes.  Yet, I 
discuss the analysis separately, treating it according to my two empirical sub-
questions (see 1.3).  
 
Sub-question 2 
 
Sub-question 2 is: What are the historically grown characteristics of the policy 
domains in which DuWoBo and Plan C intervened? How do DuWoBo and Plan C 
differ from regular policy? What has been the interaction between both processes and 
the ongoing dynamics in their respective policy domains? To which changes did this 
lead? 
 
This question is mainly focused on the within-case analysis that is presented in 
chapters 4  (Plan C) and 5 (DuWoBo). The basis for the analysis rests essentially in 
three kind of activities: reconstructing the events in the TM-processes, 
contextualising the processes historically and in relation to current dynamics in 
policy regimes, and uncovering the characteristics of the processes and of the 
historical and current policy context.  
 
The reconstruction26 gives a detailed account of the two TM-processes between their 
start (2004 and 2006) and early 2012. I started by drawing timelines of the processes, 
                                                  
26 I prefer the term “reconstruction” to “process tracing”, that is usually used in a positivist-
qualitative tradition. Process tracing supposes that it is possible to unravel a causal chain of 
events that can explain the influence of independent on dependent variables (George and 
Bennett, 2005, Checkel, 2005). A reconstruction details processes, without losing sight of 
broader influences outside processes that constitute a result (Block, 2009). 
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filling in main events and decisions. This was mainly based on process documents, 
my own observations and interviews (such as with the two project leaders – in the 
Plan C case, I drew the first version together with the project leader). The timelines 
served to write a narrative of the development of the processes.  
 
In parallel to this work, I began adding context elements. The contextualisation was 
in first instance guided by MLP-concepts (regime, landscape, niches), which 
provided the focus for data collection and interpretation. First, I added contemporary 
developments, that either surfaced in the interviews or were derived from studying 
scientific literature and different sort of documents (see above). In early versions, I 
used drawings to cluster relevant developments around the two processes and place 
them in a timeline. Next, I started historicising the narratives by placing them in the 
historical development of the systems the TM-processes were active in. This part was 
mainly based on literature and document study. 
 
While the narratives of the processes were progressing and the contextualisation was 
taking shape, I also started detailing the policy characteristics I was interested in, 
namely the PAA dimensions of discourse, actors, rules and resources. Since I wanted 
to investigate the influence of TM on regular policy, it was necessary to analyse three 
‘moments’ with PAA-concepts: the state of the policy regime at the moment the TM-
processes started (around 2005), the TM-processes themselves, and the developments 
in the regime anno 2011. These analyses were based on a combination of the different 
data sources. 
 
For the whole within-case analysis, I always started the analysis from how the 
participants themselves had delineated their starting point in the first phase of the 
TM-processes. In the Plan C case, this is the waste system and it is (or seems) 
relatively clear who and what belongs to the waste system and which policy domain 
is relevant. With the shift from a waste to a materials perspective during the Plan C 
process, it was also obvious that the system and relevant policies were fanning out, 
but the analysis could at least start from a relatively well defined system and policy 
arrangement. However, in the case of the DuWoBo process it is much less obvious 
what the housing and building system exactly comprises and what the relevant 
policy domain is to start from. In fact, the system analysis that was made at the start 
of the process (Deraedt et al., 2005) covers all aspects of housing and building and 
mentions a series of relevant policy domains, going from the two central domains 
housing and spatial planning, to energy, environment, aspects of economic, social 
and innovation policy, and mobility. I was thus obliged to take these different 
aspects as well as possible into account during the analysis. 
 
Sub-question 3 
 
Sub-question 3 is: What are the empirically observable similarities and differences 
between both cases? How can these be explained in terms of patterns and 
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mechanisms in the relation between a transition management process and regular 
policy? 
 
This question relates to the cross-case analysis and is treated in chapter 6. While 
chapters 4 and 5 describe mainly what can be observed in both cases and already 
give some indications of how the influence (or lack thereof) of transition 
management on regular policy can be explained, the contrasting of the cases in the 
cross-case analysis is crucial for better understanding the relation between TM-
processes and regular policy. I analysed the cases for similarities, differences and 
patterns that surfaced. Of course, this kind of analysis did not just start after the other 
chapters were finished. While working on the DuWoBo case, I constantly kept an eye 
open for comparisons with the Plan C case. Still, most work was done after finishing 
the DuWoBo working paper in May 2012, because only then contrasting the cases 
could really begin. I used the concepts of my original analytical framework (such as 
regime, landscape, niches, actors, discourses, rules, resources) to look for patterns 
and mechanisms that emerged from the empirical data, systematically comparing on 
the different dimensions, meanwhile trying to make sense of them theoretically. In 
this sense, my approach is inspired by grounded theory and what Mortelmans (2007) 
calls an “in-between position” in the use of concepts: not all codes and concepts 
emerge from the data (as is the case in some forms of grounded theory), but I used 
existing, broadly defined concepts to guide me in searching for more refined 
concepts and patterns. 
 
During this work, it dawned on me that the policy arrangements framework, while 
strong in description and thus also helpful for seeing similarities, differences and 
patterns, did a lesser job in helping to understand how these similarities, differences 
and patterns came about and could be made sense of theoretically. I therefore started 
experimenting with concepts from other theoretical frameworks, in particular to gain 
a deeper insight in some of the central findings, namely the importance of making 
connections in the processes, the role of discourse, and the different forms of power 
at work. In chapter 6, I use the concepts of other existing frameworks about policy 
change (Kingdon’s multiple streams, Hajer’s discourse analysis, Hajer’s concept of an 
institutional void, Arts/Van Tatenhove/Grin’s power framework) to further refine 
the understanding of results and develop context-sensitive and tentative hypotheses 
about the relation between TM and regular policy. 
 
 
3.3. THE ROLE OF AN ENGAGED RESEARCHER AND CRITICAL POLICY 
ANALYSIS 
 
I want to end this chapter with some reflections on my position as a researcher. A 
typical position of a lot of scientists working on topics of sustainable development, is 
that they are not satisfied with just describing and analysing the world, but that they 
are also explicitly concerned with making it a better place. This is noticeable as well 
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in transition research: while part of it is concerned with understanding transition as 
such, there is almost always an underlying hope that the derived insights can be used 
for making society more sustainable. It is moreover the explicit intention of most 
research on transition governance. Such explicit engagement is, however, not normal 
practice in science. In an article, co-authored with Gert Goeminne and Filip Kolen 
(Goeminne et al., 2011, p. 201), we defended a turn to “engaged knowledge” in 
science because 
“we are deeply concerned by an apparent lack of both intellectual space and a sense of 
necessity within academic research circles to deal with issues of human well-being. In the 
academic world, the focus is on becoming competent in a particular field of research, 
competency being measured by the number of publications. In this context fundamental 
issues of human existence are regarded as ‘soft’ questions as compared to the ‘hard’ 
questions of science. Under the ideal of ‘freedom of research’, non-interestedness in social 
relevance is even regarded as a necessary condition for good science, claming that the 
benevolent societal impact is something that will eventually happen, as a necessity in the 
linear chain leading from science over innovation to societal benefit, but that the 
researcher should not be concerned with.” 
 
Specifically in relation to political science, Goodin has asked the question what the 
point is “of finding out how things are, without wondering how they could or should 
be (…) The mission of political science requires it to combine both” (Goodin 2009, p. 
7).  Yet, as Peters et al. (2010) remark, many political scientists still think they can and 
should stick to a neutral position and that only neutral descriptions and analyses of 
politics is their task. I follow the point of view of Peters et al. and of Hay (2002) that it 
is not only debatable whether such a position is possible at all, but furthermore that 
is also not desirable. The (im)possibility is a question of ontology and epistemology, 
that I already treated above (3.1). The question of non-desirability is a political stance 
in itself, that in my case is informed by 20 years of engagement with sustainability 
issues – in the 1990s in non-governmental organisations, since 2001 in academia – 
and that “originates from a particular assessment of the socio-political situation”, as 
Geels and Schot (2010, p. 91) put it. Namely that the interrelated questions of 
sustainable development as defined in chapter 1 (justice, ecological limits, quality of 
life, democracy…) pose such a challenge to humanity, that they demand a political 
science – and a science more in general – that, first, engages with these questions and 
has its agenda at least partly inspired by these issues, and second, that is critical of 
the existing social and political reality and dares to think about different societal 
paths. From a philosophy of science point of view, Goeminne (2011a) has related to 
this debate as questions of “topical truth” and “politics of the imaginable”. Topical 
truth is about whether science asks questions that are relevant and adequate for what 
is at stake in contemporary society; politics of the imaginable is about settings where 
different socio-material practices and ‘forms of life’, that should eventually constitute 
a more sustainable future, can be discussed and contested27. 
                                                  
27 Goeminne contrasts both terms with “logical truth” and “politics of the knowable”. Logical 
truth is a measure of the validity of knowledge in relation to a question. It asks “who is 
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Hay uses the term critical political analysis to defend a kind of analysis “(i)…that 
refuses to abandon its ability to think of a world different from our own simply 
because [political] claims cannot be adjudicated with ultimate certainty; (ii) that seeks 
to acknowledge its necessarily normative content; and (iii) that it strives to render as 
explicit as possible the normative and ethical assumptions on which it is premised 
(…) Its aim is to expose existing institutions, relations and practices to critical 
scrutiny as a means of promoting alternatives and bringing those alternatives to 
fruition” (Hay, 2002, p. 88, 138)28. This is the rationale in which my own research can 
be situated as well: the observation that sustainable development presents a huge 
challenge that is rooted in existing institutions and practices; that political (and other) 
scientists can and should through systematic study contribute in illuminating the 
problem; that they have a role in critically assessing and further developing potential 
solutions (such as those offered in transition studies); and that it should become 
normal practice for researchers to think about and explicate their normative positions. 
The constructivist-interpretive position that I clarified above flows logically from this: 
believing in and working for change presupposes a world that is not determined but 
can be actively constructed (Goeminne, in press; Parsons, 2010). 
 
Peters et al. (2010, p. 328-330) remark that such a positioning of research and of 
scientists often attracts some typical objections: that it is more important to focus on 
reliable methods and quality of answers than to follow the whim of the day; that 
evidence is seldom clear enough to formulate solutions; and that scientists may end 
up as handmaids of the power holders.  As they argue, however, caution in research 
is always necessary, whether a political scientist pursues relevance or not. But there 
is no a priori reason why a topical question should be associated with unreliable 
methodologies, nor why a political scientist should succumb to power holders.  On 
the contrary, dealing with the complex challenges of the real world may lead to 
methodological innovations, and topics such as sustainability may exactly challenge 
current power relations29. Solutions should of course never be reduced to simple 
messages, but there is a space for “offering tentative solutions to problems and, at the 
very least, help to frame public discussion about the scope and limitations of where 
solutions might be found” (ibid., p. 329).  
                                                                                                                                                          
right?” and science has been dominated by this norm, whereas topical truth “questions the 
interest and relevance of that truth”. Politics of the knowable is founded upon what can be 
known by science and is “typically conceived of in terms of techno-scientific parameters such 
as CO2-emissions and other matters of fact. The latter then set the boundaries of the societal 
debate which subject is now limited to the technologies and market mechanisms that should 
be deployed to reach these criteria. In such a scientifically preconditioned context, societal 
debate is easily reduced to a negotiation of technological risks and (economic) interests, 
neglecting the very concrete ‘forms of life’ and socio-material practices that should 
eventually constitute a sustainable future” (Goeminne, 2011a, p. 634). 
28 Hay’s critical policy analysis is therefore critical in two meanings of the word: critical of 
existing social realities, and critical of the dominant positivist approach to political science. 
29  Peters et al. do not mention sustainability but take examples from research about 
democratic reforms and about the extension of citizens rights. 
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This discussion brings me one last time back to the trustworthiness of the research 
and knowledge claims in this dissertation. Acknowledging my normativity and 
situatedness as a researcher, might lead some to the question whether it is not mainly 
my own perspective that dominates and whether results can be trusted. Apart from 
what has been argued in the previous paragraphs, there are two kind of answers to 
such an allegation. One is mainly on principle, the other practical. The fundamental 
answer is well formulated by Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2011, p. 112). Just like other 
kind of scientists, interpretive scientists are committed to honest scientific practices. 
Because of their orientation, they are perhaps even more aware of the influence of 
presuppositions in their research. But they are not trapped by these, on the contrary, 
precisely their positioning makes them “alert to the possibility of partial knowledge 
and multiple perspectives”. While neutral, value-free knowledge cannot be reached, 
it is possible to acknowledge different perspectives and engage with them, and to be  
transparent about presuppositions in the research and about the choices that have 
been made. In this the way, the researcher himself as well as outsiders can reflect on 
the research, the suppositions it builds upon and the results it yields.  
 
The more practical answer is that a careful research design incorporates checks 
against  “confirmation bias”. There are at least three elements in my research design 
that should guard over trustworthiness (apart from the transparency in the previous 
paragraphs). First, triangulation through the use of different data sources. The 
generated data contain a lot of different points of view that thrust themselves upon 
the analyst and that cannot simply be ignored, even if it were only for the fact that 
most of them are controllable by outsiders. Second, my analysis has been guided by 
concepts from different frameworks. While the concepts in there are always open to 
interpretation, they cannot just accommodate any interpretation. Furthermore, the 
analysis of the two TM-processes has been contextualised through a historicising and 
contemporary perspective. Both, interpretation of concepts and contextualisation are 
open to discussion. Third, as part of my work for the Steunpunt DO, large parts of the 
analysis have been commented upon by or discussed with participants in the TM-
processes. This enhanced the match between the analysis and the practical 
experiences of participants.  
Chapter 3. Research design 
 79 
ANNEX TO CHAPTER 3. LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
This annex contains the alphabetical list of interviewees during the periods 2007-2008 
and 2010-2012. For each interview, the central theme is indicated and how he or she 
is identified when cited. 
 
Interviews 2007-2008 
 
Name Organisation Date DuWoBo Plan C Policy 
context 
Identification 
De Jonge 
Walter 
Centrum voor 
Duurzame 
Ontwikkeling, UGent 
31/05/07   x Knowledge 
actor  
De Leeuw 
Els 
Departement Werk 
en Sociale Economie 
19/05/08   x Civil servant 
De Smedt 
Peter 
Studiedienst Vlaamse 
regering  
21/12/07   x Civil servant 
Dries Ilse Departement 
Leefmilieu, Natuur 
en Energie 
xx/03/07 x   Civil servant 
Larosse 
Jan 
EU Commission DG 
Research 
23/05/07  x  Civil servant 
Loorbach 
Derk 
Drift, Erasmus 
Universiteit 
Rotterdam 
11/07/07 x   Knowledge 
actor 
Maes Trui Centrum voor 
Duurzame 
Ontwikkeling, UGent 
10/07/07 x   Knowledge 
actor 
Simons To Centrum voor 
Duurzaam Bouwen 
13/12/07 x   Societal actor 
Tempst 
Walter 
Openbare Vlaamse 
Afvalstoffen 
Maatschappij 
xx/03/07  x  Civil servant 
Van Acker 
Karel 
KU Leuven  25/02/08  x  Knowledge 
actor 
Van de 
Velde 
David 
Departement 
Leefmilieu, Natuur 
en Energie 
28/11/07   x Civil servant 
Van 
Humbeeck 
Peter 
Sociaal-Economische 
Raad Vlaanderen 
10/03/08   x Societal actor 
Van 
Lieshout 
Michael 
Pantopicon 22/01/08 x x  Knowledge 
actor 
Vereecken 
Frank 
Departement 
Economie, 
Wetenschap en 
Innovatie 
03/03/08   x Civil servant 
Wouters 
Guido 
Milieu- en Energie 
Innovatieplatform 
25/02/08   x Civil servant 
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Interviews 2010-2011 
 
Name Organisation Date DuWoBo Plan C Policy 
context 
Identification 
Annaert 
Werner 
Federatie van 
Belgische 
Milieubedrijven 
11/05/11  x  Societal actor 
Bruyninckx 
Hans 
KU Leuven 26/05/11   x Knowledge 
actor 
Danneels Arne Departement 
Leefmilieu, Natuur en 
Energie 
30/06/11 x   Civil servant 
De Brabandere 
Kristof 
Bond Beter Leemilieu 22/06/10  x  Societal actor 
De Saegher 
Tom 
Kabinet min.-pres. 
Peeters 
19/03/12 x  x Political actor 
Desmet Mike  Bond Beter Leemilieu 01/02/12 x   Societal actor 
De Troyer 
Frank 
KU Leuven 14/10/11 x   Knowledge 
actor 
Dries Ilse Diensten Algemeen 
Regeringsbeleid 
10/11/11 x   Civil servant 
Dries Victor Openbare Vlaamse 
Afvalstoffen 
Maatschappij 
22/06/10  x x Civil servant 
Dua Vera Former Minister of the 
Environment 
11/06/12   x Political actor 
Geerts Hugo Kabinet minister van 
leefmilieu 
15/02/11  x x Policy 
advisor 
Larosse Jan Departement 
Economie, 
Wetenschap en 
Innovatie 
23/11/10  x x Civil servant 
Maes Trui DuWoBo 07/10/11 x   Societal actor 
Matthys Geert Vlaamse Confederatie 
Bouw 
24/10/11 x   Societal actor 
Michaux Geert 
(with Bart 
Verstraete) 
NAV, de Vlaamse 
Architectenorganisatie 
21/10/11 x   Societal actor 
Mouligneau 
Brigitte 
Diensten Algemeen 
Regeringsbeleid 
06/12/11   x Civil servant 
Moyersoen 
Johan 
i-propeller 17/05/11  x  Knowledge 
actor 
Nevens Frank Vlaamse Instelling 
voor Technologisch 
Onderzoek 
27/01/11   x Knowledge 
actor 
Rombaut Erik Sint-Lucasinstituut 27/10/11   x  
Simons To Centrum voor 
Duurzaam Bouwen 
27/09/11 x   Societal actor 
Tempst Walter Openbare Vlaamse 
Afvalstoffen 
Maatschappij 
14/02/11  x  Civil servant 
Thoelen Peter Vlaams Instituut Bio-
Ecologische Bouwen 
07/10/11 x   Societal actor 
Van Acker 
Karel 
KU Leuven  20/01/11  x  Knowledge 
actor 
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Van Acker 
Peter 
Openbare Vlaamse 
Afvalstoffen 
Maatschappij 
03/10/11 x   Civil servant 
Van den 
Bossche 
Patrick 
Agoria  26/11/10  x  Societal actor 
Van den Eede 
Merijn 
Diensten Algemene 
Regeringsbeleid 
24/10/11 x   Civil servant 
Van Lieshout 
Lieven 
Vlaams Energie 
Agentschap 
25/05/11   x Civil servant 
Van Roo Jan Departement 
Leefmilieu, Natuur en 
Energie 
25/05/11   x Civil servant 
Vrancken Karl Vlaamse Instelling 
voor Technologisch 
Onderzoek 
14/12/10  x  Knowledge 
actor 
Verheecke Jan Milieu- en 
Natuurraad van 
Vlaanderen 
21/01/11   x Societal actor 
Waer Katelijne  Bouwunie 08/11/11 x   Societal actor 
Wante John Openbare Vlaamse 
Afvalstoffen 
Maatschappij 
30/11/10  x  Civil servant 
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4.  
Transition management in Flemish 
waste and materials policy.  
The role and experiences of Plan C. 
 
 
 
 
 
When in the 1970s industrial societies were confronted with the modern 
environmental problem, waste was one of the first items on the agenda and it has 
been ever since. Just like in other countries, Flanders started from a chaotic waste 
situation in the 1970s, but by the beginning of the 21st century Flemish waste policy 
was one of the best performing in the EU and Flanders was a top regions in selective 
collection and recycling. Still, figures also showed that it became increasingly 
difficult to further reduce waste volumes and stimulate waste prevention. Policy 
officers in the Flemish public waste agency OVAM as well as some politicians felt 
that an additional step was needed.  The first ideas for a materials policy surfaced, 
but it was still unclear what that would imply. One of the ways of tackling this 
question, was the introduction of the transition management process Plan C. 
 
This chapter analyses the experiences of the Flemish transition management process 
Plan C as a new form of governance in the context of the evolutions of the waste 
system and of waste policy. I start the empirical part of this dissertation with Plan C, 
even though it was in fact the second transition management process that started in 
Flanders. The first was DuWoBo in 2004, focused on sustainable housing and 
building. But as explained in chapter 3 (3.3.4), the initial context of Plan C is simpler 
than DuWoBo’s, which makes it easier to apply the analytical framework and 
discover its potential. In chapter 5, the framework will then be applied to the more 
complex setting of DuWoBo. 
 
The Plan C process was introduced in 2006 by the Flemish Government with the goal 
of reorienting its waste policy towards a sustainable materials policy and stimulating 
a transformation of the waste system. In order to understand the potential role of 
Plan C in the renewal of policy, the chapter starts with an analysis of the context in 
which the process was introduced, namely the existing waste system and its historic 
growth until 2005 (in part 4.1). It is not my intention to present a full historical 
account of the waste system, but to highlight those aspects that make a comparison 
possible with the features of Plan C and with the changes that seem to be currently 
underway in the direction of a more sustainable materials orientation. The main 
question is what the characteristics are of the existing waste regime and in particular 
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of the policy arrangement within which Plan C was introduced. Next, part 4.2 
analyses the Plan C process itself: how and why was it introduced? How did it grow? 
What are its characteristics and how did it evolve and function as a policy niche? Part 
4.3 discusses the evolutions in the waste system since the introduction of Plan C and 
the interaction between Plan C and this changing context: does the TM process Plan 
C have influence on the system and its policy arrangement and, if so, how? Do 
evolutions in the system influence the TM process and, if so, how? The description of 
events runs until end December 2011, with some references to evolutions in the first 
months of 2012. Part 4.4 draws some interim conclusions. 
 
 
4.1. THE FLEMISH WASTE SYSTEM UNTIL 2005  
 
Human societies have always had to find solutions for their waste. In pre-modern 
times, the waste problem was predominantly local, situated in or near a city, a river, 
a dumping ground or a mine. Because most human and animal excrements, carcasses, 
daily waste and the pollutants of early forms of industry (tanneries, textile dyeing, 
sugar refineries, breweries etc.) ended up in the streets and in watercourses, the main 
concern was hygiene and the supply of safe drinking water (Ponting, 1992, p. 377-386, 
392). In the Middle Ages, cities were not exactly waste-free spaces, yet they already 
tried to deal with the problem by collecting organic waste and trading it with the 
countryside, where farmers often struggled with a lack of manure to fertilize the land. 
In this way, for almost 500 years, agriculture would function as a (partial) kind of 
vacuum cleaner for society (Feys, 2011, p. 14). With the Industrial Revolution, new 
forms of waste and emissions emerged that resulted mainly from two sources: the 
burning of fossil fuels and the development of heavy industry (iron and steel, 
different metals, chemical products) (Ponting 1992). From the second half of the 19th 
century onward, a chemical industry on the basis of petroleum derivates started 
developing and cheap chemical fertilizers put an end to the chronic shortage of 
fertilizers in agriculture. The severing of the link between city and countryside from 
the pre-industrial circular economy, also formed one of the elements of the modern 
waste problem. City waste changed from a source of income to a cost and urban 
governments sought for the cheapest ways of disposing of the problem: dumping in 
rivers, in landfills, or incineration (Feys, 2011, p. 22).  
 
After the second World War, the booming economic activity and the rise of the 
consumer society were accompanied by an enormous increase in the volume of 
waste, while also the nature of waste changed drastically (e.g. through the 
introduction of plastics). Like other industrialised countries, until the late 1960s early 
1970s Belgium had a waste system that was still locally organised. Waste collection 
was the responsibility of municipalities and most waste was carried off to landfills or 
incinerated.  
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During these years, different kind of influences converged that together induced the 
start of new waste policies. First, the system with its locally limited storage and 
processing capacity could no longer handle the growing amounts and the more 
diverse types of waste. One of the main problem areas was the province of Antwerp 
with its industrial development and important chemical sector around the Antwerp 
harbour. A notorious example of how waste became an environmental and health 
issue was the Rupel area of the province, where after centuries of clay exploitation 
the remaining clay pits attracted massive loads of legal and illegal waste dumping. 
Second, this period saw the start of the environmental movement. Local groups 
organised in protest against planned waste dumps and contamination of soil, water 
and air, with e.g. after 1972 in the Rupel area the action committee Actiegroep 
Leefmilieu Rupelstreek as one of the most vocal critics of (non)-existing waste policies 
(ibid., 46). Third, international developments in particular at the level of the 
European Community, put pressure on national governments to take action against 
pollution through the introduction of different Directives, mainly in the area of water 
and waste. Of great importance for the development of waste policy was the 
introduction of an EEC Directive in 1975 (C75/442/EEG) that obliged member states 
to create authorities for control of waste, planning, policy coordination and granting 
of permits. This Directive should also have stimulated the Belgian authorities to 
initiate waste policies. However, Belgium was in the midst of discussions about the 
restructuring of the Belgian state and environmental competences were meant to 
become regional competences. The continuing stalemate in the constitutional reforms 
during the 1970s and the unstable national governments thus prevented the 
implementation of vigorous waste policies. It took until 1980 before the Belgian 
Parliament approved the creation of autonomous regional governments with 
decision-making powers over cultural and personal welfare issues (community 
competences) and over territorial issues (regional competences) (Witte et al., 2009) 
(see also Box 4.1). By then, Belgium had already been warned several times by the EC 
for its failure to implement the Waste Directive. 
 
4.1.1. 1980s till mid 1990s: from waste removal to early steps in selective 
collection and recycling 
 
The form waste policy was to get in Belgium was decisively influenced by the reform 
of the Belgian state structure in 1980, which transferred a lot of environmental and 
nature policy competences towards the regions (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels). Waste 
and water policy were the first domains of the new Flemish environmental powers to 
be developed (Loots et al., 2008). The basic rules of the new policy domain were laid 
down in the Decreet betreffende de voorkoming en het beheer van afvalstoffen (Decree 
Regarding Prevention and Management of Waste) of 2 July 1981, usually referred to 
as the Afvalstoffendecreet (the Waste Decree). It was the first environmental Decree 
approved by the Flemish Parliament. From the start of waste policy, the discourse on 
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waste mentioned the waste hierarchy30: in its Article 2, the Waste Decree states that 
its goal is to protect man and the environment against the harmful influence of waste 
by preventing waste, by stimulating the re-use, recovering and recycling of waste, 
and by organising the removal of waste. The Decree distinguished between two main 
categories of waste: household waste and industrial waste. The main political point 
of discussion during the preparation of the Waste Decree was whether waste policies 
should be centrally planned and organised at Flemish level in order to guarantee 
uniformity in policy (favoured by the socialists and their Minister of the 
Environment Marc Galle) or whether they should be organised in each province 
(favoured by the christen-democrats, who had a strong local base). The urgency of 
resolute action finally convinced all parties that the local and provincial level were 
too small scale to tackle the waste problems (Geeraerts et al., 2005, Feys, 2011). The 
Waste Decree of 1981 thus established a new actor at Flemish level, the Openbare 
Vlaamse Afvalstoffenmaatschappij (OVAM, Public Waste Agency of Flanders). OVAM 
became the central government player in the waste system, but municipalities 
retained an essential role for implementation at the local level. 
 
In spite of the intentions of the Waste Decree with is waste hierarchy, during the 
1980s policy in practice almost exclusively focused on waste removal and processing. 
The priority during the first five years was “creating order out of chaos” (Bachus et 
al., 2007, p. 50): Flanders had more than 400 landfills of which a lot were illegal and 
badly exploited; municipalities followed their own rules; infrastructures such as for 
incineration installations were spread unevenly over the territory and were far from 
sufficient. One of the first tasks of OVAM was to gather data that could inform the 
regularisation and cleaning-up of legal and illegal landfills, the planning of 
processing capacity and the regional distribution of infrastructures. All producers of 
industrial waste were for the first time obliged to declare the amount and 
composition of waste they produced (meldingsplicht or “duty to report”) and all 
owners of processing installations were obliged to demand permits. This kind of 
information allowed for the start of a new permits policy for installations and 
companies. By the end of 1983, 220 of 455 listed dumping grounds had been sealed 
and 190 had been renovated (Loorbach, 2004, Feys, 2011). In line with the Decree, the 
Flemish government developed a first Waste Plan 1986-1990 (published in 1987). This 
plan continued the systematic collection of data in order to get waste removal under 
control. It focused on household as well as industrial waste, and it introduced the 
principle of environmental levies on landfilling and incineration.  According to Loots 
et al. (2008), in that way “the waste sector got its own legislation, its own 
organisation, and its own rules and procedures for policy development and 
implementation: institutionalisation in a nutshell.” 
 
                                                  
30 In Flanders and the Netherlands, the waste hierarchy is often named “Lansink’s ladder”, 
referring to a motion from the Dutch politician Ad Lansink that was passed in the Dutch 
Parliament in 1979. 
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Even though the absolute priority was waste removal, the mid eighties also saw the 
introduction of so-called containerparken (container parks), where citizens could bring 
selected fractions of household waste. This bringing method not only implied a break 
with the age-old pattern of waste collection by the municipality, but it was also one 
of the first successful measures to involve citizens in waste sorting and recycling 
(Feys 2011, p. 85-89). This orientation was strengthened in the second Waste Plan 
1991-1995, where the waste problem is framed more broadly and the discourse on 
problem analysis and objectives shifted from the end of the waste chain towards the 
beginning. 
 
Context Box 1. The federal Belgian state and Flemish Ministers 
 
Since its foundation in 1830, Belgian politics and society have been confronted with three 
intertwined areas of conflict: a socio-economic, a religious-philosophical and a language 
conflict. In particular the combination of the socio-economic development of the country 
with the cultural and language dispute lie at the basis of the structure of the current 
Belgian state. In the 19th century, the country was dominated by a French-speaking elite, 
French was the ruling language and Wallonia formed the industrial backbone of the 
country. With increasing political democratisation and the growing Flemish economy, the 
Flemish emancipation movement also began to win strength in the early 20th century. 
The collaboration of part of the Flemish nationalists during both wars temporarily led to a 
setback of Flemish demands. But in the first decades after the Second World War, socio-
economic developments and cultural demands made structural changes to the state 
unavoidable. Because of its booming economy and demographic growth (implying more 
seats in Parliament) Flanders outweighed Wallonia politically and economically by the 
end of the sixties, which also strengthened cultural selfconsciousness. Terminating the 
political and cultural inferior position of Flanders in the Belgian state combined with a 
desire for greater autonomy in cultural and socio-economic matters. On the Walloon side, 
the fear of domination by the Catholic conservative majority in Flanders also sparked 
demands for more economic autonomy in a predominantly anti-clerical, left-wing 
Wallonia. 
At the end of the 1960’s, Belgium was still a unitary state, but five consecutive 
constitutional reforms later (in 1970, 1980, 1988, 1993 and 2001) – and with the sixth 
currently underway – the state has been completely restructured. Belgium has been 
divided in three Regions (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels) that have been assigned the 
autonomy over large parts of socio-economic policy, and three Communities (Flanders, 
Francophone Belgium, German-speaking Belgium) that have been assigned autonomy 
over cultural and personal welfare policy. In the course of the constitutional reforms, 
more and more powers have been transferred to the Regions and Communities. An 
important principle of the Belgian federal state is the principle of equal legal force, which 
means that national laws and regional decrees are on an equal footing (but within the 
content and scope of the powers that are attributed to them). According to Van den 
Wijngaert (2011) almost half of the powers have been transferred and a further 
regionalisation will lay the centre of decision-making at regional level. Powers that still 
remain at the federal level include the judicial system, the army, the federal police, social 
security, public debt, monetary policy, prices and incomes policy, foreign policy (partially). 
This means that the powers that are central to my case studies fall fully or partially under 
the authority of the Flemish government. These include environmental policy (including 
waste policy), spatial planning, housing, energy policy, innovation policy, sustainable 
development policy. 
(continued next page) 
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(Context Box 1 continued) 
Since 1980, Flanders has chosen to group all its powers under one Flemish government 
and one Parliament, originally supported by one Ministry, but since 2006 by 13 Policy 
domains (see Context Box 2). I list here the governments and the Ministers for the main 
powers in my cases. 
Gov’t Period  Minister-
President 
Minister 
Environment 
Minister 
Housing 
Minister Spatial 
Planning 
Geens I 1981-
1985 
Gaston Geens 
(CVP) 
Marc Galle 
(SP) 
Jacky Buchman 
(PVV) 
Paul Akkermans 
(CVP) 
Geens II 1985-
1988 
Gaston Geens 
(CVP) 
Jan Lenssens 
(CVP) 
Paul Akkermans 
(CVP) 
Jean Pede (PVV) 
Geens III 1988 Gaston Geens 
(CVP) 
Jos Dupré 
(CVP) 
Paul Breyne 
(CVP) 
Ward Beysen 
(PVV) 
Geens IV 1988-
1992 
Gaston Geens 
(CVP) 
Theo 
Kelchtermans 
(CVP) 
Louis Waltniel 
(PVV) 
Louis Waltniel 
(PVV) 
Van den 
Brande I 
1992 Luc Van den 
Brande (CVP) 
Norbert de 
Batselier (SP) 
Norbert de 
Batselier (SP) 
Theo 
Kelchtermans 
(CVP) 
Van den 
Brande II 
1992 Luc Van den 
Brande (CVP) 
Norbert de 
Batselier (SP) 
Norbert de 
Batselier (SP) 
Theo 
Kelchtermans 
(CVP) 
Van den 
Brande III 
1992-
1995 
Luc Van den 
Brande (CVP) 
Norbert de 
Batselier (SP) 
Norbert de 
Batselier (SP) 
Theo 
Kelchtermans 
(CVP) 
Van den 
Brande IV 
1995-
1999 
Luc Van den 
Brande (CVP) 
Theo 
Kelchtermans 
(CVP) 
Leo Peeters (SP) Eddy Baldewijns 
(SP) 
Steve Stevaert 
(SP) 
Dewael I 1999-
2003 
Patrick Dewael 
(VLD) 
Vera Dua 
(Agalev) 
Bert Anciaux 
(VU) 
Johan Sauwens 
(VU) 
Paul Van 
Grembergen 
(VU) 
Jaak Gabriëls 
(VLD) 
Dirk Van 
Mechelen (VLD) 
Somers I 2003-
2004 
Bart Somers 
(VLD) 
Ludo Sannen 
(Agalev) 
Jef Tavernier 
(Agalev) 
Marino Keulen 
(VLD) 
Dirk Van 
Mechelen (VLD) 
Leterme I 2004-
2007 
Yves Leterme 
(CD&V)* 
Kris Peeters 
(CD&V) 
Marino Keulen 
(VLD) 
Dirk Van 
Mechelen (VLD) 
Peeters I 2007-
2009 
Kris Peeters 
(CD&V)* 
Hilde Crevits 
(CD&V) 
Marino Keulen 
(VLD) 
Dirk Van 
Mechelen (VLD) 
Peeters II 2009-
2014 
Kris Peeters 
(CD&V)* 
Joke 
Schauvlieghe 
(CD&V) 
Freya Van den 
Bossche (sp.a) 
Philippe Muyters 
(N-VA) 
CVP/CD&V: Christian-democrats; SP/sp.a: social-democrats; PVV/VLD: liberals; Agalev: 
greens; VU: Flemish nationalists; N-VA: Flemish nationalists 
* Since 2004, the Minister-President has the power over sustainable development policy. 
 
Sources: Witte et al. (2009), Van den Wijngaert (2011), Belgium.be, Vlaanderen.be 
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Most measures were still directed at waste removal, but selective collection acquired 
a full place and the first traces of prevention and re-use policy appeared, although 
these remained vague in goals and implementation. OVAM’s communication and 
media campaigns focused increasingly on selective collection. This new focus on 
selective collection is not only a question of a well-considered policy to move up the 
waste ladder, but must also be seen in connection to the increasing incineration of 
waste: incineration still struggled with a limited capacity and with toxic emissions, so 
a strategy of increased selective collection yielded less residual waste, and thus less 
incineration (Bachus et al., 2007). It is precisely the incineration issue that was the 
most controversial part of the plan and received most political attention and media 
coverage. Minister Kelchtermans wanted a moratorium on dumping of household 
waste and comparable industrial waste by 1995, but this implied that investments in 
waste incinerators had to be stepped up. Protests from environmental and local 
action groups, concerned about emissions such as dioxins, accelerated the closure of 
problem ovens and the modernisation of others (Feys, 2011, p. 139-149). But in spite 
of the protests, incineration became one of the corner stones of Flemish waste policy. 
 
The implementation of this second waste plan was supported by an environmental 
covenant between municipalities and the Flemish government for the period 1992-
1996. Municipalities could subscribe to the covenant on a voluntary basis and when 
they did, they were subsidised for setting up specific initiatives. Although the 
covenants wanted to stimulate local environmental policy in general, most initiatives 
in the first covenant were related to selective collection of waste fractions, such as 
glass, paper and vegetables, fruit and garden waste.  
 
Meanwhile, specific attention was also devoted to industrial waste, inter alia because 
of the permanent need for disposal of industrial waste from industry around the 
Antwerp harbour and because of industrial waste imports from the Netherlands. 
Again, different influences converged that speeded up political action: on the one 
hand several scandals with toxic landfills and local protests, on the other hand 
international legislation that discouraged international transport of waste 
(Convention of Basel, 1989) and waste dumping and incineration at sea (OSPAR 
Treaties, 1992) (Loorbach, 2007, Feys, 2011). Legal initiatives at Flemish level 
included amongst other things to a duty to report on industrial waste (1981) and a 
ban on landfilling for imported waste (1993). In April 1983, the Flemish government 
decided that a central installation was necessary for the processing of dangerous and 
toxic industrial waste in the Flemish region. The budgetary crisis of the mid-eighties 
ruled out the possibility of a pure government initiative. So, cooperation was sought 
with industry to set up a mixed project that resulted in INDAVER, the Industriële 
Afvalverwerkingsmaatschappij (Industrial Waste Processing Association). The 
cooperation for the NV INDAVER between the government (with OVAM as one of 
the leading partners) and fifteen big chemical companies, mainly located in the 
Antwerp region, was signed in Octobre 1985. The main activity of INDAVER was the 
start-up and exploitation of a new incinerator for industrial waste, alongside the 
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development of physico-chemical treatment technology for specific waste streams 
and the exploitation of a landfill at the infamous Hooge Maey site (Feys 2011, p. 71-
75).  
 
As different observers have noted (Geeraerts et al., 2005, Bachus et al., 2007), it can be 
concluded that during these first years of Flemish waste policy the discourse 
prescribed a waste policy that starts from prevention and moves down to 
incineration and landfilling, but in reality policy began at the lowest rungs of the 
ladder and tried to work its way up. Waste policy started by getting control over the 
situation through legislation, planning and organisation of infrastructure around 
landfilling and incineration. Selective collection and recycling were supportive of 
these policies. Once the basics were more or less in place, the next steps could be 
taken. All of this happened through a form of planning that was strongly top-down, 
with the Flemish government and its agency OVAM in control. The focus was also 
mainly on implementation and less on strategic long-term planning and coordination 
(Loots et al., 2008).  
 
4.1.2. Since the mid 1990s: further reorienting the system on the basis of the 
waste hierarchy  
 
The reorientation from the end towards the beginning of the waste chain that was 
already visible in the second waste plan, accelerated from the mid-nineties onwards. 
During the implementation of the second waste plan, several bottlenecks had 
surfaced (Bachus et al. 2007, 51-52): the efforts for selective collection were not 
efficient enough because there was insufficient processing capacity in Flanders and 
almost no market; there was still a too limited incineration capacity and a lack of 
category-1 landfills (for dangerous waste, mainly from industrial sources); the 
societal cost for removal of waste was higher than what was effectively charged; and 
there were not enough people and resources for developing a prevention and 
recovery policy. These kind of problems led to the conclusion at government level 
and in OVAM that the Waste Decree from 1981 had to be thoroughly updated. In the 
revised Waste Decree, approved by Parliament on 20 April 1994, the waste hierarchy 
not only becomes much more prominent in the discourse, but is also strengthened 
with concepts such as producer responsibility and the polluter pays principle. New 
formal rules under the form of new legislation and new policy instruments are 
introduced, including a series of sectoral implementation plans to tackle separate 
waste streams.  
 
This evolution ran in parallel to and was strengthened by another development, 
namely the growing consciousness that the fragmentation of environmental policy in 
Flanders and the available organisational and financial means were insufficient to 
tackle the increasing environmental problems. The first attempts at more strategic, 
integrated and long-term planning dated already from 1989 and 1990 when the then 
Minister of the Environment Kelchtermans launched two plans in a short period of 
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time31. On 5 April 1995, the Flemish government approved the Decreet Algemene 
Bepalingen Milieubeleid (DABM, Decree General Provisions Relating to Environmental 
Policy). The DABM stipulated that henceforth Flemish environmental policy would 
take its shape through a combination of environmental multi-year plans, 
environmental yearly programmes and environmental reports. The environmental 
reports (MIRA) were intended to provide scientific support for policy, while the 
environmental multi-year plan (MINA-plan) defined the outlines of environmental 
policy at Flemish regional level and at provincial and municipal level, in that way 
also enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency and internal congruency of policy at all 
levels. The environmental yearly programmes were the operationalisation of the plan 
in terms of timing, organisation and priorities. 
 
The consequences for waste policy were that the separate waste plans from the 
previous period were abolished, because the strategic lines of waste policy were now 
integrated in the MINA-plans. The MINA 2 Plan 1997-2001 continued the orientation 
towards prevention and stipulated as objective the reduction of the amount of waste 
to the unavoidable minimum, while the remaining waste streams had to reach a 
sufficient quality so that they could serve as a secondary material for the same or 
another product or production process (De Bruyn et al. 2003). Whereas the MINA-
plan formulated the strategic outline of waste policy, the operationalisation of waste 
policy henceforth happened through sectoral implementation plans, as already 
foreseen in the Waste Decree 1994.  
 
Of course, not only the events at the level of the Flemish waste regime explain the 
evolutions in policy. These are also a consequence of what – in terms of the analytical 
framework of this study – can be labelled landscape developments and processes of 
structural transformation. The mid nineties was the time when sustainable 
development policies increasingly received attention in the follow-up of the 1992 
UNCED-conference and, more importantly, the European policy level increasingly 
influenced environmental policy. Important for waste policy were amongst others a 
packaging directive in 1994, a directive concerning integrated pollution prevention 
and control in 1996, and a landfill directive in 1999. Between the start of the Flemish 
waste policy in 1981 and the years 2000, “more than 50 Directives, Decisions and 
Regulations have been adopted. They relate to a whole range of themes, from the 
landfilling, incineration or transboundary movement of waste to the selective 
collection and recycling of batteries, packaging waste, end-of-life vehicles and electric 
equipment. In addition, a number of thematic strategies and action plans on waste-
                                                  
31 The Mina-plan 2000 (February 1989) was mainly written by the Minister and his cabinet 
and had a rather internal government character. The Milieubeleidsplan en 
Natuurontwikkelingsplan (February 1990 – Environmental Policy Plan and Nature 
Development Plan) built on contributions from different administrations and for the nature 
part on the expertise of non-governmental experts. It was the first important document in the 
political and societal discussion on the headlines of environmental policy. See Loots et al., 
2008. 
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related topics have been developed at the EU level. Subjects covered in such action 
plans and strategies are waste prevention and recycling, sustainable consumption 
and production, sustainable use of natural resources and shipdismantling” (OVAM 
website). 
 
At Flemish level, starting from the basic logic of the strategic MINA-plans and the 
sectoral waste implementation plans, waste policy became more and more refined in 
its combination of rules and instruments to orient the system on the basis of the 
waste hierarchy. OVAM developed a system of plans that cover all relevant waste 
streams. These include sectoral implementation plans for sound materials use and 
waste management in the building sector (since 1995), household waste (since 1997), 
organic-biological waste (since 2000), small company industrial waste (since 2000), 
wood waste (2003), sludge (2002), high-caloric waste (2004). The actual realization of 
the plans is done through employment of different sorts of policy instruments at 
Flemish level. An acceptance obligation that is concretised through covenants with 
industry is one of the main instruments, alongside bans on landfilling and 
incineration for specific types of waste, environmental levies, and communicative 
instruments. Furthermore, the municipalities keep their supportive role through new 
municipal covenants and cooperation agreements.  
 
While it was the intention of the revision of the Waste Decree and the different 
sectoral waste plans to ascend the ladder of the waste hierarchy, Bachus et al. (2007) 
find in their study on waste prevention policy, that the combination of instruments is 
to a large extent responsible for the success of recycling in Flanders. But the effect on 
prevention is limited because the different instruments were never really conceived as 
instruments for prevention, only as steering instruments for moving from 
landfilling/incineration up the ladder towards selective collection and recycling. In 
practice, prevention policy has seldom made use of ‘hard’ policy instruments, but 
mainly of communicative instruments (sensitisation campaigns, information, 
seminars, websites…). 
 
This can be illustrated by two examples. First, most sectoral implementation plans 
build on covenants with industry, so-called voluntary Milieubeheersovereenkomsten 
(MBO, Environmental policy agreements). The evolution towards voluntary 
agreements with industry was part of a broader trend in the nineties towards more 
market-driven and multi-actor policies (Leroy and Loots, 2006). In Belgium and 
Flanders, this evolution was further stimulated by the threat of a possible ‘ecotax’ on 
amongst others things beverage packaging, batteries, disposable cameras, disposable 
razors. In 1993, the Green parties Agalev and Ecolo promised to support a new phase 
of constitutional reform of the Belgian state in return for the introduction of ecotaxes 
at federal level. Because industry wanted to avoid these taxes, they negotiated 
covenants with the federal and/or regional governments to selectively collect and 
recycle their products. On 15 June 1994, Flanders introduced the Decreet 
Milieubeleidsovereenkomsten (Decree Environmental policy agreements) that made it 
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possible to conclude agreements between the government and a representative 
organisation of industry. Such agreements were concluded for example for batteries, 
tires, packaging material, electrical and electronic equipment, cars, medicines 
etcetera. They are always executed through specific sectoral management organisms 
from the industry (such as Bebat for waste batteries, Fostplus for packaging waste 
from households, Val-I-Pac for packaging waste from industry, Recytyre for waste 
tires, Valorfrit for used frying fat and oil, etc.). While these covenants have 
enormously boosted selective collection and recycling, they have not prevented the 
growth in the total waste stream of these products. 
 
Examples of soft instruments for prevention can be found in OVAM’s policies 
towards industrial waste. Here almost all initiatives are geared towards some form of 
stimulation of companies to set up waste prevention policies. One of the first 
initiatives, PRESTI 1 in 1994, subsidised federations from small and medium 
enterprises to set up environmental management systems in their sector. PRESTI 2 
(1997-2001) aimed at demonstration projects in selected SME’s, PRESTI 3 (1998-2002) 
stimulated monitoring of waste and emissions in individual SME’s as a basis for 
prevention measures, PRESTI 4 (1998-2002) prompted branch organisations to 
formulate environmental charters that could be signed by companies and PRESTI 5 
(2003-2006) subsidised SME-projects focused on waste prevention and emission 
reduction. In another initiative, MAMBO, started in 1996, OVAM developed a 
software package that assists companies in calculating the full cost of waste. The 
STIP initiative, started in 2000, is an information centre that aims at documenting and 
distributing information, knowledge and experiences with emission and waste 
prevention in companies. 
 
The issue of prevention versus recycling is well visible in the figures and it would 
finally become one of the important reasons for OVAM to initiate a transition process 
around sustainable materials management. In a sense, the figures reflect the problem 
as well as the success of Flemish waste policies. At the beginning of the 21st century, 
Flanders had succeeded in creating a well-organised waste system and it was (and 
still is) considered top of the European class in selective collection and recycling. As 
figure 4.1 shows, the rate of separate collection of household waste increased from 
almost 18% in 1991 to 71% in 2006, at the start of the Plan C process. However, the 
total amount of household waste also rose from 400 kg per person in 1991 to around 
550 kg per person in 2000 and remained around that level since then. Landfill taxes 
and bans reduced dumping from almost 50% of total household waste in the early 
nineties to 3% in 2006. Of the total amount of household waste in 2006, 2% went to 
re-use, 2% to pre-treatment, 67% was composted or recycled, 26% was incinerated 
with energy recovery and 3% was landfilled (VMM, 2007, see also figure 4.2).  
 
Interesting from a policy point of view is that the prevention objectives of the 
different Implementation Plans Household Waste could not be reached. The Plan 
1997-2001 aimed at 6% reduction of total waste with regard to 1995. Since the amount 
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of waste kept growing, the objective was revised (and became less ambitious) in the 
Plan 2003-2007, which aimed at 13% prevention with regard to the year 2000. In 2006, 
it was clear that also this figure would not be reached and that the best that could be 
hoped for was a stabilisation of the amount of waste around the year 2000, or under 
560 kg per inhabitant (OVAM, 2008, p. 8-10) 32. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Amount of household waste collected 1991-2006. Source: VMM, 2007. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Processing of household waste 1991-2006. Source: VMM, 2007. 
 
The problem of prevention versus selective collection and recycling is even more 
serious in the segment of industrial waste. While the total amount of household 
waste grew from 2.3 million tonnes in 1991 to 3,2 million in 2006, the amounts of 
industrial waste increased from 17,3 million tons in 1992 to 34.2 million in 2006 (19,1 
million ton primary waste, 2.4 million ton from newly counted sub-sectors, 12,7 
                                                  
32 The Implementation Plans Household Waste 2008-2015 indeed takes 560 kg per inhabitant 
as a maximum (or a stabilisation around the year 2000 level. 
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million ton secondary waste)33 (see figure 4.3) (VMM, 2008). In the case of primary 
waste, 69 % comes from the industry, 25 % from trade and services, 5 % from the 
energy sector and 1 % from agriculture (figures for 2005, VMM, 2007). Industrial 
waste does not seem under control. Total amounts fluctuate a lot – a great variation 
in the amount of construction and demolition waste is an important reason – but 
remain constantly higher than in the beginning of the century. The MINA plan 3 
(2003-2007) set as objective a lowering of the amount of primary industrial waste 
below the 2002 level, and a decoupling from economic growth. Both objectives were 
not reached.  
 
 
Figure 4.3. Amount of industrial waste, including trade and services sector. Since 2000, additional 
sub-sectors have been taken into account (light purple block). Source: VMM, 2008. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Processing of primary industrial waste, including waste form the trade and services sector. 
Source: VMM, 2008. 
 
                                                  
33 Primary waste results at the moment when a product becomes waste for the first time, i.e. 
with the first producer. Secondary waste is the waste from waste treatment companies 
(VMM, 2008). 
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According to the VMM-report, “in 2006, 29% of the primary industrial waste went 
directly to recycling or used as secondary raw material, 3 % went directly to 
incineration and 4% went directly to landfills. The remaining 64% of the primary 
industrial waste was pre-treated or conditioned first. Examples of conditioning are 
sorting, compaction, compressing and thickening. The conditioned waste is 
ultimately also used as a secondary raw material, recycled, incinerated or landfilled. 
The distribution between the various processing methods is however not known” 
(VMM, 2008, p. 115). 
 
These kind of trends had already been visible for several years and led to a 
realisation with several OVAM officials that, in order to further reduce waste 
amounts, a new step in waste policy was needed.  
“The feeling was that there was a standstill in policy. We were not going to reach our goals 
by better selective collection and more recycling, but we had to work much more upstream 
in the chain (…) We realised we also had to look at production processes, at the design 
phase, and that’s how the idea of materials policy grew. You always want to see an 
evolution in your policy, you want to progress. That was one of the main factors, the 
conclusion that we needed new projects and a next step in policy. Unless of course you are 
satisfied with what you have: we are the best sorters in Europe and now we are going to 
rest on our laurels” (civil servant). 
 
This realisation became visible in the Strategic Plan of OVAM for 2005-2009, where 
alongside waste management and soil management a new policy field was 
introduced, namely “materials policy”. A transition management process was one 
of the ways to operationalise this policy. To fully understand this step to the 
introduction of a transition process, several other developments other should be 
added. I will further discuss this in part 5.2.  
 
4.1.3. The waste regime and its policy arrangement 
 
It is obvious from this brief history of waste policies in Flanders that the waste 
regime has changed enormously in the last 40 years. I now first summarise the main 
insights, using MLP-concepts. I then discuss in more detail the different dimensions 
of the policy arrangement of the waste regime around 2005. This defines the context 
within which Plan C had to find its place.  
 
The birth of the modern waste regime 
 
Until the seventies, the waste regime was locally organised with municipalities as the 
main actors and dumping in soil or water and incineration as preferred technologies. 
During the following three decades, its features changed completely. At the moment 
Plan C was initiated in 2006, the regime was organised at Flemish level with OVAM 
as coordinating organisation, recycling/composting and incineration with energy 
recovery as main technologies, and an active involvement of industry and consumers 
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(as selective collectors) in the system. The drivers for these changes came from two 
main sources: problems in the existing regime itself and landscape pressures.  
 
By the mid seventies, the existing waste regime could no longer cope with the 
growing amounts and the increasing differentiation of waste streams. The problems 
caused by the inadequateness of the regime itself – such as destruction of the 
landscape, illegal dumping of toxic waste, pollution of rivers – obliged policy-makers 
to intervene. Protests from local action groups and the early environmental 
movement were essential elements in the turn in policies. Simultaneously, the 
broader context – the landscape – was changing. There was a growing awareness of 
environmental limits (visible in publications such as Limits to Growth (Meadows et 
al., 1972)) and the need for environmental policies (even on global level as testified 
by the UN Stockholm Conference of 1972). But most influential was the starting 
European environmental legislation, with the 1975 Waste Directive as a crucial 
moment for the development of national waste policies. The analysis does not show 
high importance of niches that actively oppose the regime, present an alternative or 
try to influence it. On the contrary, in the 1960s and 1970s some municipalities 
experimented with different systems of waste removal, but the projects remained 
local and never made it beyond a few local experiments. It is only from the 1980s 
onwards, when OVAM itself intervenes, sets up studies and pilot projects and the 
responsible Minister decides to roll out the projects over the whole of Flanders, that 
they are successful and become part of waste policy34. It is thus the main regime actor 
that experiments and scales up the experiments when successful.  
 
In the decades between 1970 and 2000, this pattern is constantly visible: a regime that 
reorganises in response to the problems it encounters, influenced by European 
developments and societal debate in Flanders (often initiated by environmental 
groups, although contestation diminishes as the system gets better organised). 
                                                  
34 Several illustrations can be found in Feys’ study of the history of OVAM (Feys, 2011). For 
example, in 1976 the intermunicipal association IVIO in Izegem was the first to set up a 
rudimentary container park with the bringing method, but this remained an exception. In 
1983 OVAM organised model projects with the towns of Izegem and Eeklo and one pilot 
project in each Flemish province in order to develop the concept further. Already in 1984, 
Minister of the Environment Lenssens decided to offer the concept to all municipalities (with 
initially subsidies of 90% and later 60%). Within two years, 121 municipalities had applied 
for a container park and the concept is currently considered as one of the success stories of 
Flemish waste policies. Something similar can be found for another success story, namely 
composting. Already in the 1960s some towns experimented with composting (such as the 
city of Ghent), but the cost, the quality of compost and the demand on the market were a 
problem. In 1989, OVAM started a pilot project in the town of Diepenbeek and with the 
intermunicipal association IOK, as part of the preparation for the Masterplan Biowaste 1991-
1995. The experiences were useful in the setting up in 1992 of VLACO (Vlaamse 
Compostorganisatie, Flemish Compost Organisation), a cooperation between OVAM, 
municipalities and the composting industry, that would initiate a wide range of composting 
initiatives in Flanders and make composting one of the cornerstones of Flemish waste policy.  
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Niches are only successful when induced or supported by the central regime actor 
OVAM. I now discuss in more detail the policy arrangement that is part of the waste 
regime. 
 
Discourse 
 
As mentioned already, the basic logic of the regime and its policy arrangement is the 
waste hierarchy: policy should first focus on waste prevention, followed by re-use, 
recycling of products and materials or valorisation by conversion in compost, 
incineration with energy recovery, incineration without energy recovery, and finally 
landfilling. In a somewhat simpler version, this discourse was already visible in the 
EU Waste Directive of 1975 and in the Flemish Waste Decree of 1981. During the first 
decade, it was however snowed under because of the pressing need to get control 
over the existing waste chaos, so that priority went to waste removal and later 
selective collection and recycling. In the nineties, this prioritisation is legitimised by a 
storyline that says that Flemish waste policy is moving up Lansink’s ladder step by 
step. It is implied that when policy reaches the stage of prevention, the waste 
problem will be under control. By the first years of the 21st century, the idea that 
prevention should be the primary focus of waste policy is firmly installed, although 
in reality the system predominantly remains a selective collection, recycling and 
incineration system instead of a prevention system. The evolution in waste policy 
goes hand in hand with a changing interpretation of waste: while waste was 
primarily a societal and policy problem in the seventies and eighties, it has now 
become an economic good that forms the basis of the recycling industry. The vision 
on production, consumption and waste is mainly linear: waste is the unavoidable last 
phase of the production-consumption chain and should be dealt with as efficiently as 
possible. 
 
While the waste regime and its policy arrangement converge around the idea of the 
waste hierarchy, the discourse contains other elements as well, which are mostly an 
extension or a complement to the waste hierarchy storyline. These are often 
formulated as ‘principles’ and form in that way also the basis for legal rules. 
Examples are the principle of producer responsibility, which states that producers 
are co-responsible for the products they bring to market, also when these have 
reached the waste phase; the polluter pays principle which states that the actor who 
causes pollution should pay for its removal; or the principle of self-sufficiency with 
regard to final disposal, which states that Flanders should try to handle its waste 
within its own borders. These kind of discourse elements are of course not unique for 
Flanders and fit within the European discourse on waste, but the way they are 
translated in rules and actor involvement has an important influence on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the different national waste systems. Overall, the 
discourse is an example of the ecological modernisation discourse that since the 
nineties permeates a lot of (European) environmental policy (Hajer, 1995): existing 
institutions can internalize the care for the environment; economic growth and 
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resolution of environmental problems are not contradictory; technology, markets and 
business are central to solving environmental problems (see also chapter 1). 
 
Rules 
 
The chaotic state of the locally organised waste regime in the seventies, obliged the 
authorities to intervene. The preferred approach to environmental policies at the time 
was a planning approach, with detailed legislation for each environmental 
compartment (water, waste, air, etc.) and specialised administrative departments. It 
is the government’s task to address environmental problems, to set norms and to 
implement policies top-down (Hajer, 1995, Verbeeck and Loots, 2006). OVAM’s 
organisational structure and working procedures during the first years are guided by 
this point of view. Still, already during the first years enquiry procedures are set up 
to consult with municipalities, industry federations and environmental movement. 
During the eighties, doubts arise about the effectiveness of the sectoral approach in 
environmental policy and about the government’s capacity to keep environmental 
problems under control. Neo-liberal trends in general policy, with a call for a 
retreating government, are echoed in environmental policy: policy development 
opens up for societal actors, more market instruments are introduced and some 
public tasks are privatised (ibid.). In Flemish environmental policy, waste policy was 
at the end of the eighties one of the first to involve market parties in the design and 
implementation of the different sectoral implementation plans and of the 
environmental policy agreements with industrial sectors. This was still the working 
mode around 2005: actors were consulted and actively involved in the preparation 
and implementation of policy, but the government with OVAM as central agency 
held the reigns. On the basis of their research in target group policy, Verbeeck and 
Loots (2006) conclude that this involvement of societal groups in Flemish 
environmental policy has mainly an instrumental motivation, namely finding a 
support base for policy and preventing disruptive power games.   
 
On the formal side of rules, the Waste Decree of 1981/1994 was still the basis of 
waste policy35 in 2005. Since this is a framework decree, implementing orders were 
necessary that clarified definitions, regulations, recognitions, compliance rules. Since 
1997, these are bundled and regularly updated in VLAREA (Vlaams Reglement 
Afvalvoorkoming en –beheer, Flemish Regulation relating to Waste Prevention and 
Management). Changes in VLAREA often represent changes in thinking about waste 
and secondary materials. For example, in 2003 important changes were carried 
through in VLAREA, such as an extension of the acceptance obligation for industry, 
new rules on waste incineration and changes about which waste streams can be 
taken in consideration as secondary materials (Braekevelt, 2004, Claes et al. 2007).  
 
                                                  
35 On 14 December 2011, the Flemish Parliament approved the Materials Decree that replaced 
the Waste Decree. See part 4.3. 
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As mentioned in the historic narrative, waste policy was first formulated in separate 
plans, but became from 1995 onwards – with the approval of the Decreet Algemene 
Bepalingen Milieubeleid (DABM) – on a strategic level integrated in the MINA-plans 
that set out the policy lines for Flemish environmental policy in general. First the 
MINA 2-plan 1997-2001 and then the MINA 3-plan 2003-2007 continue the trend of 
increasing attention for waste prevention in the chapters on waste. Because policy 
and actions on household waste are relatively successful, MINA 3 pays more 
attention to prevention, re-use and recycling of industrial waste and to prevention 
through process and product policy (such as promotion of eco-design)36. While the 
MINA-plans formulate the strategic direction and the outline of waste policy, the 
policies related to specific waste streams are further detailed in a series of 
implementation plans (household waste, organic-biological waste, etc.). 
 
One of the main policy instruments in the implementation of these plans is the 
acceptance obligation, which is a translation in rules of the discourse element 
producer responsibility. Under the acceptance obligation, companies remain 
responsible for the products they bring to the market and they are thus obliged to set 
up a selective collection and processing system once these products have become 
waste. Instead of doing this on an individual basis, most companies participate in so-
called voluntary Milieubeleidsovereenkomsten (MBO, Environmental Policy 
Agreements), agreements between the government (OVAM) and an industrial sector 
that makes the sector collectively responsible for realising prevention, selective 
collection and processing. Such agreements exist for example for batteries, tires, 
packaging material37, electrical and electronic equipment, cars, medicines etcetera. As 
mentioned above, they are always executed through specific sectoral management 
organisms (such as Bebat for waste batteries, Fostplus for packaging waste from 
households, etc.).  
 
Another policy instrument that is characteristic of Flemish waste policy are bans on 
landfilling and incineration. In order to divert as much waste as possible to recycling 
or re-use, over the years several kind of bans have been installed. Waste that can be 
recycled and/or that has been selectively collected (such as paper; glass, metal and 
plastic packaging; vegetables, fruit and garden waste) may not be landfilled or 
burned. From unsorted waste, recyclable materials are removed before it is burned. 
In the last step, only waste that cannot be burned, will be landfilled. In addition to 
bans, the government also actively makes use of environmental levies on landfilling 
and incineration. Landfills and incineration installations pay a levy per ton of waste 
                                                  
36 MINA 3 also introduced the concept “capital stock management” and announced the start 
of a project to operationalise this concept as a framework for long-term environmental policy. 
This will provide the opportunity to initiate two transition management processes, one in 
sustainable materials management (Plan C) and one in sustainable housing and building 
(DuWoBo). See 4.2. 
37 For the packaging sector, the term ‘take back obligation’ is used instead of ‘acceptance 
obligation’.  
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that is landfilled or burned to the Flemish government. The sum of the levy is 
dependent on the kind of waste and the way it is treated. This levy is of course 
passed on down the chain, so that it is in the end the producers of waste (households, 
companies…) that pay the levy.  
 
In their study on waste prevention policy, Bachus et al. (2007) find that the 
combination of bans, levies and acceptance obligations are to a large extent 
responsible for the success of recycling in Flanders. But their effect on prevention is 
limited because they were never really conceived as instruments for prevention, only 
as steering instruments for moving from landfilling/incineration up the ladder 
towards selective collection and recycling. Prevention policy has mainly made use of 
communicative instruments (sensitisation campaigns, information, seminars, 
website…). 
 
Actors 
 
Government at several levels has always played a crucial role in the waste regime. 
Until the seventies, local authorities were central, but since the start of Flemish waste 
policy in 1981, the Flemish level dominates the waste regime. Waste policy is inside 
the competence of the Minister of the Environment with OVAM as the central 
government actor in the administration, responsible for policy preparation and 
implementation. Municipalities still play an important role in policy implementation, 
in particular for household waste, since they are responsible for the collection and 
processing of household waste. However, almost all municipalities (306 out of 308) 
cooperate in intermunicipal associations that have grown in importance over the 
years. When waste policy started in the early eighties, some municipalities already 
cooperated in the construction and exploitation of incineration installations 
(Geeraerts et al., 2005). Since then, this form of cooperation has spread over the 
whole of Flanders, with momentarily 25 associations. The relation between 
municipality and association differs between cases: sometimes the association 
dominates local waste policy, while in other cases the municipality still outlines its 
own waste policy. Since 1996, the associations in cooperation with the Vereniging van 
Vlaamse Steden en Gemeenten (VVSG, Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities) 
have formed their own representative coordination unit (INTERAFVAL) that 
functions as spokesperson for their interests towards OVAM and other political 
bodies.  
 
While originally the regime was dominated by government actors, from the nineties 
onwards private actors become more important and structurally involved in the 
waste chain. The sectoral plans of OVAM and the different MBO’s have created 
diversified waste streams, which in turn created a waste market and a specialised 
waste industry. Producers (of products, and thus of waste) play a role mainly 
through the series of management organisms that they have set up as part of their 
duties under the acceptance obligation. The waste industry sometimes participates in 
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the capital of intermunicipal associations and companies execute tasks such as 
collection, recycling or processing of household waste. But since the industrial waste 
stream is much bigger than the stream of household waste, it is more lucrative for 
business to be active in the industrial waste market. Although some municipalities 
still collect waste from small and medium enterprises, over the years collecting and 
processing industrial waste has become a sector for private enterprises. In the 
eighties, this market was dominated by a lot of small and local enterprises, but the 
development of waste legislation gave a form of legal security to bigger groups (such 
as WATCO, later renamed SITA) to buy up small enterprises and merge them in one 
industrial group (Feys, 2011). Furthermore, together with a growing integration of 
the Flemish waste market in a European market, international groups have entered 
the market. This combines with a strong tendency towards vertical integration, 
where operators offer a package of services covering each link in the chain, from 
waste collection to processing of waste matter (Claes et al., 2007). At Belgian level, 
the waste industry has set up two interest groups: recycling and recuperation 
companies are organised in the Confederatie van de Belgische Recuperatie (COBEREC, 
Confederation of Belgian Recuperation), while waste management and soil sanitation 
companies are organised in the Federatie van Bedrijven voor Milieubeheer (FEBEM, 
Federation of companies for Environmental Management). 
 
Resources 
 
When in the early eighties the Flemish policy level took control over the waste 
regime, it installed OVAM as agency to organise and implement policies. After its 
establishment in 1981, OVAM recruited around 76 staff members, with a priority for 
engineers in environmental sanitation, chemists, specialists in spatial planning and 
urban development. OVAM organised its competencies around four main 
departments: planning, engineering and research, inspection and permits, 
administration (Feys, 2011). By 2005, OVAM had a working budget of around 80 
million Euros (divided between waste policy and soil policy) and the total of staff 
members had grown to almost 400 people. The large majority of staff members had 
an academic degree with technical backgrounds, so that a lot of expertise is available 
in house. Its position as a separate agency, backed up by a growing body of 
legislation and legal competences, and with a capable staff has made OVAM a 
powerful government actor in the waste regime.  
 
Still, as said earlier, from the nineties onwards the role of the private sector in the 
waste regime grows, certainly in the industrial waste segment. This causes a shift in 
power to new actors, partly to individual large companies, but more importantly to 
the series of organisations that are set up, either to carry out the covenants with the 
government (such as Fost-Plus, BEBAT) or to represent the sector (such as FEBEM). 
Through the role they are attributed in the implementation of policy, through the 
resources they build up in that role (personnel, expertise), through the physical 
infrastructures they build and through their networks, these organisations have 
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grown in power and in influence on policy. Meanwhile, the Flemish government 
started making plans to withdraw from the private industrial waste market. This was 
accomplished when in December 2006, the Flemish government sold its majority 
share in Indaver to the Dutch group Delta Milieu.  
 
 
4.2. THE TRANSITION MANAGEMENT PROCESS PLAN C: HISTORY AND 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
As shown above, in the first years of the 21st century the Flemish waste regime had 
reached a point where closely involved observers doubted whether existing waste 
policies would be able to keep a grip on the waste problem. In 2005, OVAM therefore 
introduced a new policy line on “materials policy” and decided to start a transition 
management process in sustainable materials management to give content to the new 
policy. We should be careful, however, not to oversimplify this decision. It did not 
suddenly appear out of the blue, but materialised through a combination of three 
different and partly connected evolutions. I discuss the developments that led to the 
initiation of Plan C in 4.2.1. Next, in 4.2.2., I present a history of the Plan C process 
from its start in 2006 until the first months of 2012. The timeline of Plan C, with main 
activities and important moments, including those in the Flemish policy context, is 
schematically (and somewhat simplified) presented in figure 4.5 below. In 4.2.3., I 
use the  policy arrangement dimensions to discuss the discourse of Plan C, its actors, 
rules and resources. The main purpose of these paragraphs is to get a grip on the 
internal characteristics of the TM-process Plan C and how these compare to the 
existing waste regime: did Plan C succeed in creating a policy niche that significantly 
differed from the waste regime? What features does this niche have, how did it 
evolve and which main points of discussion influenced its internal evolution? In the 
next part (4.3), I will then analyse whether Plan C has played a role in the 
reorientation of the existing waste regime. 
 
4.2.1. The coupling of policy evolutions: how and why Plan C was introduced 
 
The shift to a new materials policy line in OVAM and next the introduction of Plan C, 
can be explained through a coupling of three evolutions: an evolution in thinking 
about waste policy, in thinking about general environmental policy, and in thinking 
about the organisation of government administration.  
 
The first evolution was already introduced above. Around the year 2000, it began to 
dawn on policy-makers that waste prevention and actually reducing the mountain of 
waste was no self-evident task. The confrontation with the mixed results of Flemish 
waste policies, combined with the influence of international policy ideas, brought 
policy officers in the waste agency OVAM to start discussing the waste problem in 
terms of the broader framing of sustainable development and the management of 
natural resources. At global level, the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable 
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Development (June 2002) had stressed the importance of conservation and 
management of natural resources. At EU level, thematic strategies were introduced 
on the sustainable use of natural resources (2005), prevention and recycling of waste 
(2005),  integrated product policy (2001, 2003) and the ecodesign directive (2005). 
These framed the waste problem as part of a broader natural resources problem. 
Meanwhile, at Belgian and Flemish level, green political parties had been one of the 
winners of the 1999 elections and for the first time a green politician, Vera Dua, 
became Minister for the Environment. With her Policy Note 2000-2004 (Dua, 2000), 
she was the first Flemish Minister to introduce sustainable development as the “new 
world view” for environmental policy and stressed the importance of saving 
resources and closed material loops (although her policy intentions in the domain of 
waste mainly related to the waste hierarchy, in particular strengthening of 
prevention policies).   
 
The political emphasis on sustainable development found its counterpart in a second 
evolution, namely a new development at the strategic level of Flemish environmental 
policy, the MINA3 plan 2003-2007. Even though the UNCED-conference dated from 
1992 and governments had been called upon by different UN-conferences to develop 
sustainable development plans, Flanders still had no specific sustainable 
development policy in 2002 (see also Context Box 4 in chapter 5). During the 
preparatory phase of MINA3 and the public consultation about the plan, the 
advisory councils SERV and MINA-raad warned that this led to a lack of a long-term 
perspective on societal development, a lack of urgency to promote profound change 
and a lack of integration with other policy fields, such as industrial and innovation 
policy. In their advice for MINA3, both councils SERV (advice 10 June 2002) and 
MINA-raad (advice 4 July 2002) referred to transition management as a potential 
solution for the problems. Both pleaded for radical innovations under the form of 
long-term system innovations and asked the government to study the possibilities of 
framing these as transitions and transition management.  
 
Around the same time, several studies were produced that all hinted at the potential 
of system innovation and transition management as anchoring points for sustainable 
development. This was no coincidence, because between 2002 and 2004, several 
researchers (such as Walter De Jonge at CDO/UGent), civil servants (such as Walter 
Tempst at OVAM, Ilse Dries at LNE, Jan Larosse at IWT) and policy advisors (such as 
Peter Van Humbeeck at SERV) had come in contact with the concepts of transitions 
and transition management through research reports or in the preparation of policy 
advice and had started regarding them as promising concepts for policy renewal. 
Although these studies were written in different fields and for different purposes, the 
researchers and civil servants involved were closely connected to the field of 
environment and/or sustainable development and usually knew each other 
personally. Between 2002 and 2004, several of them also went to visit Jan Rotmans 
and his team at ICIS Maastricht to discuss the new concept of transition management. 
The study of De Jonge (2003), a preparatory study for the MINA-plan 2003-2007, 
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discusses how environmental resource policy and capital stock management can be 
embedded in a wider framework that focuses on system innovation. Based on Dutch 
examples, he proposes an “ad hoc framework” to initiate system innovation and 
transition management in Flanders. Van Humbeeck (2003), in a paper for the Flemish 
socio-economic advisory council SERV on the relation between industrial policy, 
innovation policy and the environment, also points out the necessity of system 
innovation to tackle environmental problems and to simultaneously renew the 
economic system. He states that incremental innovations will not suffice to solve 
environmental problems and discusses the importance of radical technological 
innovations and transitions on a systems level. In 2003 and 2004, two papers from the 
Flemish innovation institute IWT, written in the context of an OECD project on 
horizontal innovation policies, both refer to innovation, transition management and 
sustainable development (Van Humbeeck et al. 2003, Larosse, 2004).  
 
Inspired by the political emphasis on sustainable development, the mentioned 
studies and the advice from the SERV and MINA-raad, part 1 of the MINA-plan 
2003-2007 framed the environmental question as part of a broader search for 
sustainable development. In its project 1, it identified voorradenbeheer (capital stock 
management) as an important track for developing long-term policy goals and 
realizing sustainable development. In 2004, this project was made operational in the 
Environmental Year Programme 2004, where “system innovation” and “transition 
management” were regarded as necessary for reaching goals such as factor 10. For 
the first time, “sustainable building” is mentioned as a possible case to test the 
approach of “system innovation”. This choice was reinforced when, after the 
elections of June 2004, the new Flemish Minister of the Environment, Kris Peeters, 
mentioned in his Policy Note 2004-2009 the need for an “innovative environmental 
policy” with as strategic long-term objective “preparing Flanders for transitions” 
(Peeters 2004, p. 81, published in December 2004). The note states that in the long 
term radical transitions may be necessary that go beyond system optimisation and 
that require system innovations. The Flemish Region should therefore identify long-
term and legislature-crossing objectives, which can then serve as orientation points 
for short and medium term policy. In its operational objectives (no. 4) the policy note 
then formulates the need to study the feasibility of the concept of transition 
management in a Flemish context “with sustainable housing and building as testing 
ground.” (ibid., 79). In 2004, a transition process started in sustainable housing and 
building (the DuWoBo process, discussed in chapter 5). Plan C followed two years 
later. 
 
This last decision is linked to a third evolution. The move to introducing materials 
policy as a new policy field for OVAM and starting a transition process was, perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, stimulated by a huge reorganisation of the reorganisation of 
the Flemish administration, called Beter Bestuurlijk Beleid (BBB – Better 
Administrative Policy), a reorganisation that the Flemish government started 
implementing in 2001. One of the main aims of this reorganisation, inspired by the 
principles of New Public Management, was to restructure the public administration 
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in thirteen homogenous policy domains. In order to overcome policy fragmentation, 
clearly defined tasks were assigned to departments and specialised agencies. This led 
to considerable nervousness within the various administrations about the division of 
these tasks and responsibilities. The OVAM management was concerned about the 
assignment of the competence ‘prevention of waste’. OVAM already had some 
activities around eco-efficiency and eco-design, but these and other prevention 
policies could also be interpreted as a form of  general environmental policy, focused 
on more sustainable production and consumption patterns. They could thus be 
assigned to the general environmental policy administration LNE instead of to the 
executive waste agency OVAM. 
 
Therefore, in mutual agreement with the cabinet of the minister of the environment, 
it was suggested that OVAM be assigned a new task, first called “stock 
management” and later “resource flow management”, which would include 
prevention. Nobody really knew what the exact meaning of these new terms was, but 
they were picked up from the above-mentioned scientific report of De Jonge (2003) 
that was written as a preparatory study for the MINA plan 2003-2007. An 
interviewee recalls that: 
“Frank Parent 38  was concerned that the BBB reform would lead to the loss of the 
competence ‘prevention of waste’, a concern that was apparently shared by the cabinet of 
the Minister. The head of cabinet opened up the report of De Jonge and encountered the 
term ‘resource flow management’. This seemed an appropriate steppingstone so as not to 
lose prevention”. (civil servant) 
 
In the following months, OVAM official Walter Tempst prepared a note in which he 
suggested to interpret the new terms as “materials policy” and to reformulate the 
new task as “development and management of the subsystem materials”. Tempst 
was one of the civil servants who had visited Jan Rotmans at ICIS and who had 
become intrigued by the concept of transition management and its potential for 
policy innovation. During 2004, under his impulse OVAM ordered an internal study 
from ICIS Maastricht because TM seemed a good framework for thinking about the 
long-term policy development of OVAM. In this study (Loorbach 2004) the 
evolutions in the waste system between 1970 and 2000 are framed as a transition in 
line with the S-curve from transition studies (see also chapter 2, 2.1.1), with a pre-
development phase in the 1970, a the take-off phase in the 1980s, an acceleration in 
the 1990s and finally a new dynamic equilibrium around 2000, with a refined waste 
system of institutionalised practices, rules and economic interests. It is suggested that 
the problems of the waste system (no absolute decoupling of waste and economic 
growth, a lack of long-term perspective) and ongoing developments at different 
levels (such as EU strategies) announce a new transition. OVAM is called upon to 
think to think about the long-term development of the system: either optimise the 
existing system with a risk of lock-in, or think about a new direction in which waste 
may become part of a broader materials system and waste policy could be 
superseded by sustainable materials management. The study was not simply a desk-
                                                  
38 At the time, Frank Parent was administrator-general of OVAM. 
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top study, but involved workshops with around 20 OVAM employees from different 
departments. In that way, not only was the analysis better informed, but it also 
created a shared understanding of waste history in transition terms. 
 
 
 
Context Box 2. The Beter Bestuurlijk Beleid reform (BBB) 
 
Initially, when the Flemish administration took a start in 1983, it was organised in one 
Ministry, divided in 9 vertical, 3 horizontal and 1 coordinating department, with 
furthermore different autonomous agencies for specific tasks (such as OVAM). The quick 
growth of the Ministry, in particular after the 1988 constitutional reform, and the need to 
answer to societal evolutions led in 1999 to the ambition of the Dewael government to 
introduce an organisation-wide reform of the Flemish administration, called Beter 
Bestuurlijk Beleid (BBB, Better Administative Policy). BBB also had a party political 
dimension. The Dewael government was the first Flemish coalition without Christian-
democrats and for the liberal party this seemed an ideal moment to place some top 
managers in the administration that were loyal to them. The reform was inspired by the 
principles of New Public Management, which pose that implementation of ideas and 
methods from the private sector can make the public sector more efficient, effective, 
transparent and client-oriented. Methods to do that include splitting large bureaucracies, 
competition within government, contracting out, more responsibility and accountability for 
top managers, performance norms with quantitative objectives for top management. 
 
Important objectives of BBB included: ensuring the primacy of politics, a clear distribution 
of tasks between administrations, better coordination between policy domains, better 
cooperation between politics and administration, slimming-down of ministerial cabinets*. 
The preparation of the implementation of BBB took several years, until the reform was 
formally introduced in 2006. The former single ministry was replaced by 13 homogenous 
policy domains, each with a policy department responsible for policy preparation and 
specialised, autonomous agencies responsible for policy implementation. The purpose 
was to have a one-on-one relation between a domain and a minister. Each domain would 
also have only one strategic advisory council. 
 
Several years later, it seems the reform is not an unqualified success: cabinets have 
hardly been slimmed down, the coordination and cooperation between domains has not 
been improved, also within domains the relation between department and agencies 
remains a problem. This is in particular a problem for societal challenges that cross 
traditional political and administrative boundaries. Increasing the efficiency and 
effectiveness remains a central concern of the government and has initiated a new 
project, slagkrachtige overheid (effective government) under the ambitious socio-
economic innovation programme of the current government, Vlaanderen in Actie 
(Flanders in Action, see Context Box 3). A new series of key projects is currently on the 
agenda, such as a modernised human resources policy, improved e-government, 
acceleration of procedures, benchmarking of performances. 
 
Sources: De Rynck (2006), De Schepper and Verlet (2010), Renard et al. (2011) 
 
* In Belgium, the term “cabinet” refers to the private office of loyal assistants and advisors working 
directly for the Minister. Cabinets usually count dozens of staff members that play a crucial role in 
policy preparation. The power of cabinets is since long a subject of criticism, but their role and size 
has hardly changed.   
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Next, under the coordination of Walter Tempst, an advisory note is prepared for the 
Board of Directors of OVAM where the study’s conclusions are extensively linked to 
the new OVAM tasks under the BBB reorganisation of the Flemish administration 
(Loorbach et al. 2004). Initiating and supporting the transition are defined as possible 
tasks for OVAM, while transition management is proposed as a promising concept to 
tackle sustainable materials management. Besides the substantial argument of a shift 
from a waste to a materials perspective, the advisory note also made the argument 
that transition management can be supportive of a new kind of policy, one in which a 
government is aware of its limitations in steering societal trends and takes on an 
active role in networks, uses multi-actor approaches  and stimulates learning and 
experiments. In June 2004 the Board of Directors adopted the conclusions of the 
report, even though there were some controversies about the necessity of starting a 
transition process. Not all members of the Board were convinced that a new stage in 
waste policy was necessary, nor that a new kind of policy approach for the long term 
– transition management – would be very useful. Still, the Board took several 
important decisions. It agreed to interpret the BBB task “resource flow management” 
as “sustainable materials management” and to develop this task along two tracks: a 
regular policy track focused on optimisation and a long-term track focused on 
transition. It also decided to anchor this task in the Policy Note of the new Minister 
for the Environment and to introduce it in the negotiations about the strategic plan 
for OVAM. This is also what happened. In July 2003, a new Flemish Government was 
formed with Kris Peeters as new Minister for the Environment. In his Policy Note 
2004-2009, published in December 2003, he introduces “the development of materials 
policy” as one of the operational objectives under the heading “innovative 
environmental policy”39: materials policy should stimulate eco-efficient production 
in Flemish companies, thinking in material flows should be introduced in economic 
and environmental policy, and materials policy should be supported by a 
harmonisation between environmental, innovation and energy policy. More than a 
year later, materials policy also entered the Strategic Plan 2005-2009 of OVAM. 
Alongside waste policy and soil policy, materials policy is introduced as a third 
policy line for OVAM: it is intended to lead “to an effective and far-reaching 
decoupling of economic growth and environmental pressure” (OVAM 2005, p. 20). 
One way of operationalising this goal is through the introduction of a transition 
management process. 
 
4.2.2. Plan C between 2006 and early 2012 
 
So, three interconnected developments converged that made the establishment of the 
Plan C process possible: reflections within OVAM and at political level about the 
developments of waste policy, the opportunity created by the BBB administrative 
reform to fill in a new task on “resource flow management” for OVAM, and the 
developments in environmental policy to start experimenting with new policy 
                                                  
39 This is of course the same Policy Note and the same heading under which transition 
management was introduced as operational objective number 4 (see above). 
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approaches. After the OVAM Board of Directors permitted to set up a transition 
management process, OVAM officials under coordination of Walter Tempst began 
the preparation in mid 2005 with the selection of two consultant agencies (Resource 
Analysis, Pantopicon) to coach the process. They first screen potential Flemish 
participants from government, business, knowledge institutions and NGO’s. Early 
2006, two group discussions are organised with potential candidates around the 
theme “broadening waste policy to materials policy”. The participants that seem 
most interesting and forward-looking are asked to participate in the first transition 
arena. There is some contingency in this selection. “Although we prepared it, the 
selection was not that methodical”, according to one of the interviewees: some people do 
not find themselves capable enough or they refuse because of lack of time, others are 
stumbled upon more or less by accident, but in the end a diverse group of fifteen 
people is composed from government (OVAM, LNE, IWT), business (Agoria, 
Indaver, Colruyt, Federplast), academia (KU Leuven, UGent), consultants (Sustenuto, 
Advizors), NGO’s (NBV40, Oxfam), and a representative from the Minister for the 
Environment. These people have backgrounds in amongst other things materials, 
waste, chemicals, environment, consumer affairs, distribution and innovation. In the 
terminology of transition management, the group can be said to consist almost 
entirely of forward-looking regime players. In line with TM theory, they are asked to 
participate as individuals and not as representatives of their organisations, but it is 
obvious from the group’s composition that it also respects certain equilibriums 
between stakeholder groups. 
 
Phase 1: The transition arena Plan C, June 2006 – May 2007 
 
In June 2006, the arena is officially installed. The representative of the Minister of the 
Environment and the Administrator-General of OVAM address the participants and 
urge them to develop a long-term transition vision for sustainable materials 
management that can also be translated in short-term actions. In explicit references to 
the rules of the game of transition management, the representative of the Minister 
tells participants that they are not chosen for their representativeness but for their 
ideas, and that they are provided space and time to deliver good work, away from 
the pressure of short time tangible results.  
 
In September 2006, the transition arena meets for the first working meeting. Karel 
Van Acker (materials scientist from KU Leuven) and Paul De Bruycker (industrial 
waste group Indaver) are chosen as presidents. OVAM has also reserved a limited 
budget for two experts in groups dynamics and multi-party collaboration (prof. 
Tharsi Taillieu, Marc Craps) to follow the process, draw lessons and when needed 
give advice on how to conduct the process. The management and coaching of the 
process is done by a transition secretariat made up of the consultants, OVAM 
officials (with Walter Tempst as central figure), the process experts and one of the 
presidents (Van Acker). Except for the president, these people try to stay clear from 
                                                  
40 Netwerk Bewust Verbruiken (Network Conscious Consumption) 
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substantive discussions during the arena meetings, so as not to mix different roles. 
“This was one of the lessons learned from the DuWoBo transition process: you create an 
enormous confusion when you wear two hats”, according to an interviewee.  
 
Who is who? Main bodies in the Plan C process and their roles 
Phase 1: June 2006-May 2007 
Arena 15 frontrunners in the 
materials system 
Development of problem 
analysis, future vision, 
proposal pathways 
President arena Karel Van Acker 
(KULeuven) 
Chairing arena, member 
transition secretariat 
Project leader  for OVAM Walter Tempst Managerial responsible at 
level waste agency 
Consultancy  Resource Analysis, 
Pantopicon 
Facilitation of process 
Transition secretariat Project leader, consultant, 
president 
Facilitation of process 
Phase 2 and 3: May 2007-early 2009 
Arena  Around 60 persons Development vision, 
network development 
Transition teams 5 groups of arena members, 
one for each pathway 
Development pathways and 
experiments 
Task force Members original arena and 
presidents transition teams 
Strategic coordination, 
preparation arenas  
President arena Karel Van Acker 
(KULeuven) 
Chairing arena, member of 
task force 
Project leader for OVAM Walter Tempst Managerial responsible at 
level waste agency 
Consultancy  Resource Analysis, 
Pantopicon 
Facilitation process 
   
Phase 4: early 2009-early 2012 
Plan C network Yearly meeting Sharing ideas and 
knowledge, networking 
SCIA  About 15 persons from 
different groups in the 
network 
Substantive development of 
network 
SCOO About 5 persons from the 
network 
Organisational development 
and preparation of 
autonomy of the network 
President Plan C network Karel Van Acker 
(KULeuven) 
Chairing arena, member of 
SCIA and SCOO 
Project leader for OVAM Walter Tempst Managerial responsible at 
level waste agency 
Consultancy  i-propeller Facilitation process 
 
Table 4.1. Main bodies in the Plan C process and their roles 
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The working pace is high: the transition arena meets five times between September 
2006 and January 2007. The meetings start from a preliminary system analysis, 
prepared by the consultants, which could partly benefit from the work that had been 
done almost two years earlier by Loorbach et al. (2004). The analysis is thoroughly 
discussed during the first two meetings of the transition arena. Problems identified 
include the environmental consequences of current production and consumption 
patterns, growing scarcity of resources and materials, social effects of these patterns, 
unequal North-South distribution, and the current culture of spending. These trends 
undermine welfare worldwide and necessitate the search for radical changes in the 
system of material use and management (Vincke e.a. 2007a, Vincke e.a. 2007b). 
 
Then the group moves on to the formulation of a future vision of sustainable material 
use (the term leitbild is used), selecting key themes on which to focus in Flanders, 
defining solutions and identifying levers for change. The leitbild sketches an image of 
how the Flemish society should ideally deal with resources and materials. Society 
will handle resources, materials and energy responsibly and with care, and resources 
and materials will be regarded as common goods. Materials are managed and 
controlled over the whole of the life cycle in cooperating networks or clusters of 
producers, processing companies and consumers. The materials system will function 
as a subsystem of a service economy: people do no longer measure their happiness 
on the basis of the property of material products, but on access to services that are 
embedded in the social and natural environment. Flanders is a trend setter in 
material management, with a high level of knowledge about wise material use and 
the development of new materials and services. These developments also offer new 
opportunities for the Flemish economy as the cradle of sustainable material 
management (Transitie-arena 2007). The central storyline around which the 
participants unite “in this picture of the future is a high-grade closing of the material 
loops. We will not use less material products, but the new resources needed have to 
decrease drastically. This can be realized either by closing the loop in the biosphere 
and/or in the technosphere” (Van Acker, 2009). 
 
The leitbild is more or less finished in January 2007. According to TM theory, the 
challenge is now to open up the original transition arena and invite new participants 
to align themselves with the process. The original arena members, as well as the 
consultants and OVAM draw on their networks to create this broadened arena. In 
order to facilitate discussions with the broadened group and to be able to start 
working groups that can develop transition pathways, the leitbild is made more 
concrete in the definition of five key themes for change. The transition arena defines 
these rather roughly. It is the task of the working groups to develop them further, to 
translate them into transition paths and then start formulating projects/experiments. 
The five themes around which working groups will be formed, are: 
• Smart Closing of Cycles: materials are managed as common property. Closing of 
circles becomes possible thanks to intelligent infrastructures which facilitate 
material flows. 
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• Tailor-made Materials: access to materials is guaranteed, but this is only possible 
when materials and products are drastically renewed (made from renewables, 
multifunctional and flexible in usage, easy to disassemble and to reuse or recycle, 
intelligent materials). 
• At Your Service: people do not measure quality of life on the basis of property, but 
on the basis of access to services. A service economy develops with completely 
new type of companies. New functions and services are integrated in products. 
• Alert Public: consumers take on responsibility for their consumption choices and 
take conscious and informed decisions. They evolve from unconcerned choosing 
towards conscious caring. 
• Green Synthetics: an important Flemish industrial sector which makes use of new 
opportunities to become market leader in sustainable synthetics. 
 
Phase 2: Broadening and deepening Plan C, May 2007 – May 2008 
 
After finishing the leitbild in January, it takes a few months to mobilise the networks 
of the different arena members and to compose the broadened arena. In May 2007, 
about 60 persons meet in Leuven, where the original arena members introduce the 
new members to the work that has been done and invite them to participate in one of 
the five working groups. In a video message for the broadened transition arena, Kris 
Peeters, the Minister of the Environment, tells the participants:  
“You are part of a unique process. You are offered a refuge to search, experiment and learn. 
Alternative, innovative solutions that contribute to sustainable management of materials 
in Flanders are central to this (…) We urgently need a radical alternative. A Plan B seems 
a logical name for this new step in the process. But we are more ambitious. We are 
convinced that we have to think further, dare to do more and that’s why we go for a Plan 
C”. 
 
The working groups are mostly headed by members of the original arena and start 
meeting on a regular basis until autumn 2007. Their first task is to flesh out detailed 
transition pathways for their themes: describe the desired future in a transition image 
and describe the transition pathway, the necessary steps between the current 
situation and that future. During two meetings in autumn 2007, the working groups 
present their first work to each other. In particular the meeting in October 2007 in the 
conference room of the Flemish Parliament is very lively and draws a lot of 
participants from business. At the end of the meeting, the new Minister of the 
Environment, Hilde Crevits, promises that the Flemish government will keep on 
investing in the process, while pointing out that a larger budget will be necessary to 
keep the process going. She also calls on other parties involved in the process to 
make explicit how they will translate the necessary changes in their own organisation.  
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Figure 4.5. A schematic, simplified reconstruction of the Plan C process and its Flemish context. Underneath the time line, the picture shows the main events 
such as transition arena’s and conferences. Above the time line, it shows important elements of the process (such as the policy bodies, strategic discussions, 
consultants) and elements of the Flemish policy context (such as environmental and socio-economic policy of the Flemish government). See the text for details 
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The coordination and management of the process has meanwhile been transferred to 
a Task Force. This Task Force is essentially a merger of most members of the original 
arena with the presidents of the working groups and it is intended to make it easier 
for the transition secretariat to keep an overview of the process, and to watch over 
the coherence between the vision developed in the original transition arena and the 
work in the working groups. In the Spring of 2008, the Task Force develops a mission 
statement for the Plan C network with high expectations for the process. This 
missions states that within 5 years, by 2013, the network should have become the 
reference in Flanders for sustainable material management, with a portfolio of 20 
talked-about transition experiments, of which at least half have been initiated by 
private actors. By then, Plan C must succeed in creating societal awareness for a 
materials transition, realise some institutional changes that support self-organisation 
of the process and Plan C should have become an esteemed partner in European and 
international networks (Van Lieshout 2008).  
 
Simultaneously, the working groups continue their work and try to define transition 
experiments that fit into the pathways. By May 2008, all working groups have 
succeeded in defining five transition pathways with 33 experiments linked to them. 
During a new collective meeting of all working groups in Leuven, the results are 
presented and discussed. At the beginning of the meeting, all participants get a 
document on paper of almost 185 pages, entitled the Reference document, that contains 
the system analysis, the leitbild, a mission statement, and the written down transition 
pathways and experiments. The Reference document is meant as an internal working 
document, later to be developed in different communication products. Apart from 
the substantive discussion that confirms the results so far, the meeting also devotes 
some time to how the arena members evaluate the status of Plan C as a network. The 
meeting supports the mission statement of the Reference document. 
 
During the meeting in May 2008, Henny De Baets, the administrator-general of 
OVAM declares that Plan C is very important for her organisation in terms of 
broadening the scope of work and for networking with innovative actors, but she 
also wishes for deliverance of concrete results and successes after the phase of 
envisioning. Plan C will get further support until half 2009, but she calls on other 
parties to contribute as well in order to transform plan C into an independent 
network of excellence. 
 
Phase 3: Going public and defining a business plan, May 2008 – early 2009 
 
With a complete transition agenda (vision, pathways, experiments) and support from 
the arena members for the mission of Plan C, the time is ripe to go public and present 
the work and the process to the public. In October 2008, the Plan C network goes 
public and presents its results to an audience of around 120 participants from 
different sectors. The moment is also used to collect new ideas for experiments and to 
connect people, organisations or companies. This results in a new series of ideas, but 
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“entrepreneurs” who can really initiate experiments are difficult to find. The 
participation of companies is relatively low and by now, the network seems to 
consist more of “thinkers” and “networkers” than of “doers”.  
 
Meanwhile, the Task Force is confronted with a series of tasks such as the 
development of a strategy for further extension of the network, the development of 
criteria for good transition experiments and the start-up of experiments. The process 
management becomes time consuming and the first members of the original arena 
drop out, often due to time constraints and different priorities. But within the group 
also differences of opinion become apparent about the strategy that should be 
followed: concentrate mainly on further development of the vision and the set up of 
experiments, or devote most time to organisation development. During these months, 
the Task Force has a series of discussions on criteria for projects and experiments, but 
in practice most energy goes into the development of a business plan for Plan C. 
With the business plan, the network wants to develop a governance structure that is 
able to function as a motor, a source of inspiration and a coach for far-reaching 
innovations in materials management. An important concern is to develop an 
organisation with a lot of flexibility and speed in decision making in order to be able 
to easily adapt to ongoing change processes. During the discussions in the Task Force, 
the conviction has grown that therefore it is necessary to develop Plan C as an 
autonomous network, which in point of fact means that it is not dominated by a 
government actor such as OVAM, nor by other institutional actors (such as 
companies). The draft business plan states that “Plan C is made up of active individuals, 
for Plan C departs from individual engagement instead of representativeness. Preferably, 
these individuals are (formally) backed-up by their organisations. This means that all 
members of the network, out of their individual involvement, also ensure to watch over the 
autonomous course of Plan C. Plan C is a self-organising network that offers a platform for 
radical renewal” (unpublished document). The business plan also poses that Plan C 
does not have the ambition to act as a financing mechanism for experiments, but that 
the network wants to work towards cooperation and a consultation platform with 
existing funding channels. The label “Plan C experiment” should become recognised 
as a value-added in evaluation procedures for funding.  
 
Phase 4: Desperately trying to keep developing, early 2009 – early 2012  
 
After Plan C had gone public and had presented its results at the end of 2008, it was 
without doubt the main voice in Flanders about sustainable materials management. 
No other actor or network had such an encompassing vision, such a broad support 
from a diverse set of actors, nor such a list of ideas to start experiments. However, as 
can be inferred from the story so far, the first problems were already showing up, 
something the Task Force was not unaware of: a lack of entrepreneurial individuals 
in the network, different ideas about strategic priorities, original members leaving 
the network because of other priorities, and a lack of clarity about how far individual 
involvement implied commitment of the individual’s organisation. In the next three 
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years, between early 2009 and early 2012, Plan C slowly starts to loose the position it 
had in 2008. This can partly be explained by the fact that it did not succeed in 
realising the tasks it had set for itself in the draft business plan: it proves very hard to 
develop talked-about experiments that show what the Plan C vision can signify in 
practice, and it proves very hard to develop a functioning organisational structure. 
As I will show in part 4.3., these difficulties are only part of the explanation: the fast 
evolving context around Plan C, where a shift from a waste to a materials regime is 
in the making, is as least as important. But first I will further concentrate on the 
internal developments of Plan C.  
 
As said, between early 2009 and early 2012, the Plan C process is confronted with 
two difficult challenges. The first is getting experiments off the ground: selecting 
suitable ideas, developing a methodology to bring these ideas to the stage of an 
actual experiment, finding funding and partners to start the experiments. The second 
challenge is developing a suitable governance structure for an autonomous Plan C, 
convincing actors to step into the new organisation, and finding financial means for 
the daily activities of the new structure. Several elements mark the beginning of this 
fourth phase: the administrator-general of OVAM who announces the start of the 
autonomy process, the appointment of a new consultant, and the instalment of a 
provisional structure that has to guide the process through the interim stage to full 
autonomy.  
 
For this provisional structure, the former coordinating body (the Task Force) is 
abandoned and replaced by two complementary bodies: the Strategisch Comité 
Organisatie Ontwikkeling (SCOO – strategic committee for organisation development) 
and the Strategisch Comité Inhoudelijke Afstemming (SCIA – strategic committee for 
substantive coordination). SCOO becomes responsible for the development of a new 
business plan and the preparation of all necessary steps towards an autonomous 
organisation. SCIA becomes responsible for the further realization of the transition 
vision through setting up of experiments. A new consultant, i-propeller, is selected to 
support the work of these two bodies and to develop a series of activities along these 
two paths. The start of the new structure also leads to further drop-outs of original 
arena members in the decision-making bodies, but a few new members enter, most 
notably Bond Beter Leefmilieu (BBL, the umbrella ngo of the environmental movement) 
and the Vlaamse Instelling voor Technologisch Onderzoek (VITO, Flemish Institute for 
Technological Research). No business representatives remain. 
 
The process of developing and starting experiments 
 
As described above, by the end of 2008 the Plan C process had produced a problem 
analysis of the current waste and materials system, a leitbild for a more sustainable 
materials system, different transition pathways towards this vision, and a lot of 
proposals for experiments. A first series of ideas for experiments was delivered by 
the working groups in May 2008; an additional series of proposals was gathered 
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during the public presentation in October 2008. Under impulse of the new consultant 
i-propeller, the substantive work now focuses on selecting the best and most mature 
ideas, finding suitable partners to help execute the ideas, and turning them into 
transition experiments. Over the course of two years, different initiatives are 
developed to bring the process further. While in the preceding phase 1 and 
particularly in phase 2, part of the work (such as writing texts, organising meetings 
and discussions) was done by the participants themselves, most of it is now taken 
over by the consultant.  
 
First, i-propeller in discussion with the SCIA develops a methodology to bring ideas 
to the stage of a feasible experiment. This methodology starts with a visioning 
workshop where the original idea is further elaborated. The workshop has the 
ambition to build a broad coalition around the idea by bringing together participants 
from business, research, design, public authorities, social movements. In a second 
step, a planning workshop develops an action plan and works towards a collective 
contract in which the initiator, other participants and Plan C engage in a cooperative 
partnership to realise the experiment. In a third step, the partnership assembles all 
necessary resources and makes sure all preconditions are fulfilled to start the 
experiment. Finally, the experiment is set up, striving for a ‘proof of concept’ that the 
experiment may be marketable. From step 3 onwards, experiments-in-development 
would also be allowed to carry a ‘Plan C label’. During 2009, this methodology is 
developed by coaching four project ideas (chemical leasing, leasing of comfort, 
sustainable festivals, closing of local production and consumption loops through 3D-
printing). However, it is difficult to bring the ideas further than step 1 or 2 and 
deliver a label. One of the main problems is finding the resources needed to convince 
partners to step into a project. And when resources are available, it seems that 
consortia do not need the methodology to start, as is proven by a project on enhanced 
landfill mining in which several Plan C members are involved (Jones et al., 2010). It 
takes until 2011 before the chemical leasing and the comfort leasing idea are 
translated in proposals for MIP3-projects41 by different consortia. Only the chemical 
leasing project is approved by MIP (as the TABACHEM project – Take Back 
Chemicals). By then, the more ambitious parts of the experiment methodology step 3 
and 4 seem to have been silently buried and abandoned.  
 
In 2010 and 2011, new workshops remain on the level of the first steps in the 
methodology, visioning and planning. They are conceived as multi-stakeholder 
platforms around a specific theme, where relevant actors are brought around the 
table and where ideas for projects are exchanged. The themes include re-use of wood 
waste, tailor-made local production and consumption, internet of things and 
sustainable materials management, exchange of materials and tools. The funding for 
                                                  
41 MIP (Milieu- en energietechnologie Innovatie Platform - the environmental and energy 
technology innovation platform) is a funding programme that was launched in October 2010 
and that provides 5 million Euro for research institutes and companies that want to develop. 
sustainable technologies and products. 
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most of these workshops comes from a common project with DuWoBo, the ISSI-
project (‘Innovation System for System Innovation’), that is financed under the 
European EFRO-program aims at developing common instruments to upscale 
experiments and at positioning both TM-processes as part of the growing green 
economy and clean technology sector. Besides the thematic stakeholder workshops, 
ISSI provides an opportunity to connect with and visit other existing Flemish 
innovation networks (‘ISSI on tour’) and to organise an ‘ISSI Academy’ to exchange 
on methodology development and application with diverse innovation networks. 
The hope is that these different activities will attract new people and form a basis on 
which new projects can grow. However, the same essential problem remains: Plan C 
is good at developing ideas and bringing people around the table, but funding for 
potential projects is dependent on funding mechanisms that are not under Plan C’s 
control. This discourages the involvement of entrepreneurial actors. 
 
Searching for a link to socio-economic and innovation policy 
 
Apart from all the work on experiments and network building, Plan C also 
undertook a few attempts at positioning itself in the Flemish innovation landscape, 
and in particular at presenting itself as an interesting partner in the so-called 
Vlaanderen in Actie  project (ViA – Flanders in Action). ViA is an ambitious program 
of the Flemish government to rejuvenate the Flemish economy and society and 
position Flanders in the top 5 of Europe by 2020: make it more competitive, growth-
oriented and technologically at the front of Europe, but also greener and more social 
(see Context Box 3). In a position paper for ViA in Octobre 2009, Plan C asserts that it 
can fulfil a role in the breakthroughs that are envisaged by ViA, not only through its 
leitbild and assorted pathways and experiments, but also because of its systemic 
approach to societal problems and its experience with new forms of governance. The 
interaction with the ViA-process never fully develops, but when in the Spring of 2011 
all Flemish Ministers have to propose one “flagship initiative” for the ViA-process, 
the Minister of the Environment proposes the theme of sustainable materials 
management. This results in a Round Table on Sustainable Materials Management (6 
June 2011) where government, industry, knowledge centres and other stakeholders 
discuss a whole series of aspects of the shift to a materials economy (for more on this 
evolution, see 4.3.). During the Round Table, Plan C tried to underline its position as 
an innovation partner by presenting an ambitious new project, i-Made. Its goal is to 
turn Flanders into the first experimental garden worldwide of local custom-made 
production, using 3D-printing and rapid manufacturing. It took several months to 
find funding for i-Made, but when this succeeded, it became in the Spring of 2012 the 
first project of the autonomous non-profit organisation Plan C (vzw Plan C). 
 
The process of organisation development 
 
The road to this autonomous non-profit organisation Plan C, was however a rocky 
one. It began in January 2009 with a meeting for all participants in Plan C at the 
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OVAM offices in Mechelen, where the administrator-general of OVAM formally 
announced the start of the autonomy process. Over the following three years, the 
different aspects of this process will absorb considerable time of the members of the 
SCOO and from mid 2010 onwards also from the SCIA. Two main questions guide 
the work: first, which juridical structure fits the new organisation best and what is it 
relation with government authorities? Second, what will the business plan of the new 
organisation consist of in terms of members, funding and activities?  
 
 
 
Context Box 3. The ambitious Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA) programme 
 
In the past, different Flemish governments had their own strategic future plans, such as 
Vlaanderen-Europa 2002 (Flanders-Europe 2002), launched in 1993, and Kleurrijk 
Vlaanderen (Colourful Flanders), launched in 2000. This last plan resulted in the Pact 
van Vilvoorde (Treaty of Vilvoorde, 2001), a commitment between the government and 
Flemish social actors to realise 21 socio-economic goals by 2010 (also been inspired by 
the EU Lisbon strategy). In 2006, the Leterme I government launched a new strategic 
initiative, Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA, Flanders in Action). Some 300 Flemish “captains of 
society” were mobilised to discuss the realisation of the Pact van Vilvoorde and in the 
follow-up the government launched around 30 projects to reach the goals.  
 
When the Peeters I government took office in 2007, the ViA-programme was continued 
but with more ambition and a longer time-frame, not in the least under the impulse of the 
Minister-President himself. His head of cabinet (Koen Geens) headed the ViA-team and 
a highly esteemed business leader (Karel Vinck) presided over the steering group. A 
series of ateliers and forums, this time reaching some 2000 participants, led to an 
ambitious program to rejuvenate the Flemish economy and society and to position 
Flanders in the top 5 of Europe by 2020. Flanders had to become more competitive, 
growth-oriented and technologically at the front of Europe, but also greener and more 
social. The ambition was caught in the catchword doorbraken (breakthroughs): not 
incremental change but productivity and quality gains of 25 to 30% had to be realised. By 
January 2009, the process had formulated five breakthroughs for Flanders. In the 
following years, some were reformulated and some added, so that by 2011 ViA focused 
on 7 breakthroughs: the learning Flemish, the open entrepreneur, innovation centre 
Flanders, smart mobility axis of Europe, green and dynamic city region, warm society, 
effective government 
 
One of the prominent results of the ViA-process is the so-called Pact 2020, signed on 20 
January 2009 by the government, social partners and civil society organisations. Pact 
2020 is a formal engagement between these partners for a long-term strategy for 
Flanders, aimed at turning the region “into a trend-setting knowledge economy with 
strong entrepreneurship and a strong international orientation that can create welfare in a 
sustainable manner” (Vlaamse Regering 2009b, p. 8). The Pact focuses on five principal 
domains: greater prosperity and welfare; a competitive and sustainable economy; more 
workers gainfully employed, in more suitable jobs, and for longer average career terms; a 
high quality standard of living; an efficient and effective administration. Although it has a 
strong emphasis on growth and competitiveness, it also announces big steps towards a 
cyclical economy and “a transition towards a sustainable energy system, sustainable 
materials management and sustainable mobility” (ibid., p. 6, 16). 
 
(continued on next page) 
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On the juridical front, a legal consultant (Stibbe) is contracted to help analyse 
different possibilities. After a comparison of different legal forms, the decision is 
taken to develop the autonomous Plan C as a so-called vzw structure (non-profit 
association). The most difficult puzzle to solve is how government bodies (such as 
OVAM itself) should be involved. On the one hand, Plan C members do not want to 
be dominated by government actors and want to develop a flexible organisation, but 
Plan C is also in need of a stable source of funding and this can be provided by 
government. On the other hand, although OVAM supports autonomy, internally in 
OVAM discussions start about its own involvement because it does not just want to 
loose all control and let Plan C drift away. In the discussions during the months that 
follow the idea of a double structure arises.  
 
The non-profit organisation vzw Plan C is the first component of this structure and is 
intended to group the existing actor network, with the organisations of the original 
arena as founding members. There is a notable switch here in the point of view about 
membership: instead of individuals organisations will now become members, a 
move which is meant to strengthen the legitimacy of the vzw Plan C while it 
simultaneously opens more possibilities for developing an income model for the vzw. 
The core business of the vzw Plan C is defined as the further development and 
dissemination of the vision, definition and management of experiments, maintenance 
and animation of the learning network. Financial receipts will come from member 
contributions and specific support and consultancy of innovation trajectories with 
members. The receipts should allow for the appointment of an operational director. 
The proposed business plan departs from a yearly budget of around 200.000 Euro. 
 
(Context Box 3 continued) 
 
With the start of the Peeters II government in July 2009, ViA and Pact 2020 became the 
cornerstones of in the Governmental Declaration 2009-2014 and thus gained even more 
strategic importance. The Declaration uses several terms to refer to the needed 
transformation of the Flemish economy and society, such as “breakthroughs”, “a renewal 
of the dna of the Flemish economy”, “green economy” and “big projects for societal 
renewal”. In the following months, the government defined 337 projects that should be 
carried out by 2014 to further the realisation of the objectives of the Pact 2020. However, 
by mid 2010 it was obvious in government circles that the ViA-process had trouble in 
keeping its dynamics and funding a suited policy approach that fitted the high ambitions. 
In the Flemish Parliament, the opposition labelled ViA as “not a strong brand”. The series 
of projects were mainly an internatl administrative affair to realise the governmental 
declaration, but the connection with activities from and involvement of societal partners 
had been lost.  During the search to reinforce ViA, transitions and transition management 
surfaced as a potential policy approach and in July 2011 the Flemish government 
initiated 13 transition management projects. Sustainable materials management and 
sustainable housing and building are two of them. This remarkable evolution will be 
treated in detail in chapter 6.   
 
Chapter 4. Transition management in Flanders: Plan C 
 120
The second component of the double structure is a (seldom used) legal public 
structure called Eigen Vermogen, a structure that is intended to coordinate the 
involvement of different public authorities and administrations. The Eigen Vermogen 
Plan C will be legally added to OVAM and its core business is the support of the Plan 
C network, through process support and facilitation of organisational matters. 
Participating public authorities will group their financial contributions in the Eigen 
Vermogen Plan C, thus allowing for the employment of several people that will be at 
the service of the vzw. The structure Eigen Vermogen will itself become a member of 
the vzw Plan C, with OVAM as its representative. The proposed business plan for the 
Eigen Vermogen departs from a yearly budget of around 465.000 Euro, a budget that 
has to come from participating public authorities. 
 
Obviously, the coordination and arrangements between the two organisations will be 
of crucial importance: the vzw Plan C is meant to take the lead and define the 
strategic objectives, while the Eigen Vermogen is supposed to aid in the 
implementation of the plans. A memorandum of understanding between the two 
organisations should put the cooperation on the right road.  
 
In the autumn of 2010, the implementation of the revised European Waste 
Framework Directive (2008/98/EC) opens up a possibility to give this double 
structure a legal basis. The Minister of the Environment and OVAM propose to 
translate the Directive into a Materials Decree, instead of a Waste Decree, thus taking 
it a few steps further than strictly demanded in the Directive42. As part of this new 
orientation, the proposal of Materials Decree also provides for the double structure 
vzw Plan C / Eigen Vermogen Plan C. However, it is exactly this part of the proposal 
that encounters opposition from the Financial Inspector of the Flemish government, 
and thus also from the Minister for Budget. They state that the proposal for an Eigen 
Vermogen looks like an unnecessary proliferation of public bodies. The advice is to 
bring the proposal more in line with the principles of the BBB-reform of the Flemish 
administration and to investigate whether the institutions created during this reform 
are not better suited as legal structure. Early 2011, Plan C and OVAM make a 
comparison of different alternative structures with support of legal consultant Stibbe. 
They conclude that, although typical BBB-structures such as IVA’s and EVA’s43 are 
not to be excluded as legal structure, the Eigen Vermogen structure is best suited for 
Plan C’s ambitions, mainly because of its higher flexibility in seeking cooperation 
with the vzw Plan C44.  
 
                                                  
42 See 4.3.2 for more details on this evolution. 
43  IVA’s are internal autonomous agencies (Intern Verzelfstandigd Agentschap), EVA’s are 
external autonomous agencies (Extern Verzelfstandigd Agentschap). 
44 For example, it does not require proof of a substantial amount of tasks, no management 
agreement with the Flemish government is needed, and it does not have to follow the 
personnel statute of the Flemish administration. 
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However, the negotiations do not seem to make any progress and severely hinder the 
deployment of activities. In fact, by mid 2011, the process has to rely almost 
exclusively on initiatives from consultant i-propeller to keep activities going. By mid 
2011, the feeling prevails with SCIA members that a crucial time has arrived. If the 
autonomy process does not succeed and if no structural funding becomes available, 
it will be very hard to keep the process alive. The prevailing analysis is that the 
informality of the network has become an obstacle for further development, on the 
one hand because it hinders ownership of the process and in that way undermines 
the responsibility for the dynamics of the network. On the other hand because the 
informality and the associated lack of a legal structure also hinder the acquisition of 
stable funding. 
 
Meanwhile, several advisory councils have pronounced themselves in favour of the 
inclusion of Plan C in the Materials Decree, although they are not always explicit 
about the legal structure. The VRWI45 advice is in favour but does not mention the 
legal structure. In a common advice, the SERV and MINA-raad mention the need for 
a specific, suited structure for transition processes, but do not make an explicit choice, 
seemingly due to lack of information on the exact consequences. In a remarkable 
advice from the advisory council on administrative matters (VLABEST, Vlaamse 
adviesraad voor bestuurszaken) it is stated that the council regrets the fact that a 
structure outside BBB is chosen, but VLABEST understands the motivation for the 
choice because “new societal challenges, in particular in the field of sustainability, require a 
policy domain exceeding approach (…)  Such new policy challenges demand flexible frames 
for policy support and financing (…) These possibilities do not exist in the current BBB 
Decree and they oblige sectoral policy domains to set up legal structures that are strange to 
BBB. Consequently, the BBB-structure has to be broken up so as to be able to embed the way 
of dealing with this complex problem in a legal structure that provides space for flexibility, 
experiment and the contribution of different partners” (VLABEST 2011, p. 2). 
 
When the Minister of the Environment Schauvlieghe brings the proposal of Materials 
Decree to the government’s table on 24 June 2011, the Eigen Vermogen Plan C has been 
removed from the Decree. The opposition within the government coalition of the N-
VA ministers46 could not be overcome: they stuck to the view that the Eigen Vermogen 
would have created a kind of shadow agency outside the BBB-structures and that 
this was not in line with government policy for the development of its public 
administration. An additional argument was that such a construct could also 
possibly circumvent the stop in recruitment of personnel that the Flemish 
government had approved of in these times of budget austerity. Instead of a formal 
legal structure such as the Eigen Vermogen, the Flemish government approves the 
Materials Decree with a Chapter 6 that installs an informal cooperation between 
                                                  
45 VRWI, Flemish Council for Science and Innovation (Vlaamse Raad voor Wetenschap en 
Innovatie) 
46 N-VA, Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance), one of the three government 
parties in the Flemish Government. 
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OVAM, the departments EWI and DAR, and VITO47. OVAM takes the presidency of 
the new cooperation; other government agencies can later be included. The 
cooperation has three tasks: operational support for Plan C (but in principle also 
other organisations with a similar goal can be supported), stimulating information 
exchange and cooperation between government agencies with similar goals, and 
participating in projects where the expertise of OVAM and the other agencies can be 
useful.  
 
Even after the government has agreed with a combination of a vzw Plan C and a 
supportive cooperation under the direction of OVAM, the problem of organisation 
development is not immediately solved. First, OVAM has to get commitments from 
the other agencies that they will effectively participate and contribute financially. The 
negotiations start in the autumn of 2011, but go slowly because agencies are 
unwilling to contribute financially, not in the least because when all money is pooled 
and invested in the vzw Plan C, they lose the direct control over ‘their’ money. 
Second, several potential founding members of the vzw have made their further 
participation in Plan C and the establishment of the vzw dependent on a firm 
engagement of the different public authorities. Since on the side of the government 
agencies progress is slow, this causes a deadlock. Third, several founding members 
have to be convinced of the future potential of a renewed Plan C, in particular 
because they are not only asked to simply become a member, but also to delegate one 
of their senior men (or women) to the management board of vzw Plan C. The 
deadlock is broken when in a small meeting in December 2011 several of the key 
actors – OVAM itself, Plan C president Karel Van Acker (KU Leuven) and consultant 
i-propeller – decide to found the vzw Plan C without further waiting for an 
agreement about the cooperation. Their analysis is that further delay bears the risk of 
definite cancellation because interested organisations start losing faith in the project, 
while creating a fact by simply announcing the decision to establish the vzw, may 
persuade doubters. OVAM also guarantees that it will support vzw Plan C 
financially, independent of the decision of other government agencies. The strategy 
works because in the first months of 2012 they succeed in convincing enough 
relevant actors to join the vzw. The vzw Plan C is founded on 28 March 2012 with as 
founding members from the government OVAM; from industry Essenscia  
(federation of the chemical sector), FEBEM (federation of environmental companies), 
Colruyt, Indaver; from knowledge institutes  KU Leuven, UGent, VITO; from the 
NGO-sector Bond Beter Leefmilieu, Netwerk Bewust Verbruiken; from consultancy 
Sustenuto and Advizers. Karel Van Acker remains president and Frans Dieryck 
(Essenscia) becomes vice-president. A remarkable absentee is Agoria, the federation 
                                                  
47 EWI, department Economy, Science and Innovation (departement Economie, Wetenschap 
en Innovatie); DAR, Services of General Government Policy (Diensten Algemeen 
Regeringsbeleid), is the administration that is directly accountable to the Minister-President. 
DAR contains a Team Sustainable Development that is involved in the Plan C process and 
that also provides a partial funding. VITO is the Flemish Institute for Technological Research 
(Vlaamse Instelling voor Technologisch Onderzoek). 
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of technological and metals industry. Even though it had from the beginning an 
influential participant, Agoria considered the new VZW and its anticipated activities 
– such as system innovation workshops – as a potential rival for the activities itself 
offered to its member organisations. Furthermore, the idea of having to share the 
decision power in vzw Plan C with NGO’s seemed a bridge too far. Simultaneously, 
at the level of regular policy, the Vlaams Materialenprgramma (Flemish Materials 
Programme) was taking shape, and Agoria decided that participation in the Steering 
group of this programme better suited its objectives (see 4.3.2)48. 
 
I stated above that the relative decline in Plan C’s position since 2009 can partly be 
explained through internal difficulties of the network, in particular its lack of visible 
and influential projects/experiments and its problems in developing a stable 
organisational form. Evolutions in the context around Plan C are the second 
important factor. Something similar can be said for the final relative success of 
founding the vzw Plan C. This is not only due to the efforts of some key individuals 
in Plan C, but is closely linked to that same context and developments in Flemish 
waste/materials and socio-economic innovation policy. I will elaborate on that in 4.3 
further down. 
 
4.2.3. The characteristics of Plan C as a policy niche 
 
With the start in 2006 of a TM-process in sustainable materials management, OVAM 
aimed at innovating its policies and creating a network of frontrunners that could 
help support a transition process and carry it forward. As said in chapter 2 (2.5.3), a 
TM process such as Plan C can be framed as a policy niche, set up alongside regular 
policies with the ambition of introducing a new style and practice of governance that 
aims for innovation in the policy field on the level of substance as well as 
organisation. The different dimensions of the policy arrangement approach then 
allow us to describe in more detail the policy characteristics of Plan C.  
 
At first glance, when comparing Plan C as a policy niche with the characteristics of 
the policy arrangement of the waste regime at the beginning of the 21st century, 
several distinctions seem obvious. In contrast with the waste regime, in the Plan C 
discourse waste has become a small part of an overarching materials system. 
Production and consumption activities and related policies are reoriented towards 
closing of material loops and a life cycle approach. The involvement of frontrunners 
– actors that are usually not in the driving seat when policy is developed – is an 
essential element in this reorientation of the discourse. The time and space they were 
allowed to develop as an arena in the shadow of regular policy, was instrumental in 
formulating a transition agenda (with leitbild, transition pathways, proposals for 
experiments). In the first two years, financial means were more or less adequate for 
coaching the process. The legitimacy of the process seems high with the participants 
(around 60 persons mid 2008) and they side with an ambitious mission statement for 
                                                  
48 Other vzw Plan C members participated in both, such as Essenscia and BBL. 
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the further development of Plan C. Thus, during the first two years the transition 
management approach was successful in creating a policy niche with some clearly 
distinctive characteristics: a new discourse, based on the contributions of 
frontrunners working under new interaction rules between government and societal 
actors. Nevertheless, by 2009 the tensions within the new policy niche were growing 
and during the following years turned into problems that seriously hampered its 
further development. 
 
To better understand Plan C’s characteristics and the tensions that surfaced, I now 
delve deeper into the different dimensions of Plan C as an embryonic policy 
arrangement. The analysis remains largely restricted to the inner workings of Plan C, 
but it is impossible to completely ignore ongoing changes in the broader context. 
These will be further discussed in part 4.3., but I will regularly refer to them here 
already. 
 
Discourse  
 
Does Plan C’s discourse differ from that of the waste regime? Plan C was introduced 
as a process that had to contribute to a reorientation of waste policy towards 
sustainable materials policy. The discourse dimension defines the substantive side of 
that renewal. When analysing the discourse, it is striking that two kinds of storylines 
intertwine: the first are storylines about what transitions are and how they can be 
influenced, the second can be interpreted as an attempt at translating transition ideas 
for the waste and materials system.  
 
I have already discussed the transition and transition management discourse in 
chapter 2. It contains elements such as ‘system failures’, ‘radical change’, ‘system 
innovation’, ‘frontrunners’, ‘envisioning’, ‘experimenting’, ‘learning-by-doing and 
doing-by-learning’, ‘new roles for government’, ‘network building’ etcetera. This 
terminology permeates the Plan C process and guides a lot of actions and decisions, 
in particular in the first years of the process when participants need guidance on how 
to conduct transition management in practice. In fact, a lot of these ideas function as 
informal rules to steer the process and I will therefore return to further down (under 
‘rules’). What is interesting from a discourse point of view is that at the time when 
Plan C had difficulties in translating its long-term vision in short-term experiments 
(mainly the period 2010-2011), a partial shift in discourse can be noted, with more 
emphasis on the process aspects of Plan C and TM instead of on the substantive 
aspects of the vision. This is best visible in the initiative ISSI Academy, where under 
impulse of consultant i-propeller, the two TM-networks Plan C and DuWoBo 
presented their approach to other innovation networks and exchange experiences 
with them. Here, Plan C and DuWoBo tried to position themselves as processes that 
had a unique expertise and a methodology for generating, selecting and developing 
ideas towards marketable experiments and projects.  
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The second kind of discourse elements in Plan C are of course the substantive ideas 
about waste and materials. An analysis of the problem analysis, the leitbild and the 
transition pathways of Plan C that were developed in phase 1 and 2 (between 
September 2006 and  May 2008) shows that these can be characterised as a mixture of 
what can be called ‘ecological modernisation’ elements and ‘transformation’ 
elements. The overarching storyline that holds everything together is well expressed 
in the citation that I already referred to above. Plan C stands for “a high-grade closing 
of the material loops. We will not use less material products, but the new resources 
needed have to decrease drastically. This can be realized either by closing the loop in 
the biosphere and/or in the technosphere.” This is in fact a typical ecological 
modernisation ideal, with confidence in reaching a more sustainable society through 
market mechanisms, technological innovation, industry, and without fundamentally 
challenging economic growth or consumption (see chapter 1). The majority of 
storylines in Plan C are in this vein, such as: getting the prices right, fast technology 
development and diffusion, new types of materials and products (renewable, 
reusable, modular), product-service combination, closed materials loops, not less 
consumption but better consumption, strategic availability of resources for the 
Flemish economy, Flanders as expertise centre in sustainable materials management. 
However, some elements of the leitbild refer to more radical change and can be 
characterised as ‘transformational’: they seem to require changes in the economic and 
power structures of our society and also in cultural attitudes (Hopwood et al., 2005, 
Paredis, 2010, Crivits et al., 2010). Elements of this transformational vision include: 
materials as a commons with new property regimes, integrity and common 
responsibility for materials, materials and technology development as functional for 
societal needs, absolute decoupling of economic growth from resource use, common 
knowledge infrastructure, no social or ecological burden shifting worldwide.  
 
Bouwen et al. (s.d.), who studied the group dynamics during phase 1 and 2, find that 
in the formulation of the leitbild “there is a careful crafting of a shared image, so that as 
much elements as possible could be included”. However, “the ultimate discussion between 
radical societal reform versus innovative industrial flexibility as mechanisms to reach 
material management sustainability went under-explored. Most participants expressed their 
regret of this afterward” (p. 11). This becomes a pattern in the following months. 
Because the process has to constantly move forward and show interim results, there 
is a lack of time and space to discuss fundamental differences. People who join in 
during phase 2, 3 or 4 are asked to brainstorm on ideas that can further develop the 
already formulated vision and transition pathways, but the essence of the vision is 
fixed. At the end of 2008, the substantive part of the discussion process is temporarily 
“frozen” – as it is formulated by the process consultants – in order to be able to move 
to the phase of experiments and organisation development.  
 
Several years later, looking back at this situation, different participants formulate this 
as a problem. However, the reasons for their criticism vary. For some, in particular 
proponents of a more transformative approach, the lack of a continuing discussion 
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about the vision and such elements as compatibility with economic growth and 
consumerism, reveals a post-political attitude, in which debate and conflict are 
sacrificed to consensual thinking and managerialism, in that way inhibiting “real 
change” (Kenis and Mathijs, 2010). For others, in particular business participants, 
Plan C was at the front of the discussion on materials in 2007-2008, but things have 
changed rapidly since then. As I will discuss more thoroughly in part 4.3., more and 
more companies, in particular multinationals, have become aware of the pivotal role 
that materials, strategic materials availability and the environmental impact of 
materials are going to play in the next decennia and are adjusting their strategies 
accordingly. The European Commission is quickly launching new initiatives around 
resource efficiency, raw materials and ecodesign. The OECD is also working on 
sustainable materials management. The discourse of ‘green economy’ and ‘low 
carbon economy’ is rapidly gaining ground and seems to become one of the 
spearheads of innovation worldwide. Several participants think that if Plan C wants 
to preserve a place in this rapidly moving environment, it will have to reposition 
itself and create a more distinct profile for itself49, and more in particular, it will have 
to keep business actors on board and translate its vision to concrete actions.  
“What I find positive about Plan C is that it has developed a good vision, it’s relatively 
strong with good concepts, but I’m not sure Plan C will be able to realise its vision because 
the business sector is absent. (…) the big problem is that you need a translation from vision 
to concrete actions, and that’s not self-evident (…) Momentarily, it doesn’t have enough 
links to reality, because Plan C does not have enough information about the economic 
reality.” (societal actor) 
 
It is far too early to assess the direction the vzw Plan C, created in March 2012, is 
going to take. It continues to work with the original Plan C vision as basis, but the 
composition of its Board and the first project (iMade) at the very least suggest a 
strong influence from important business actors and a further turn to ecological 
modernisation. As I will argue later on, while Plan C’s discourse initially clearly 
diverged from the waste regime discourse – both in its stress on ‘transitions’ and in 
its ‘materials’ component – in the situation end 2011/early 2012, when the research 
for this dissertation ended, significant differences were much harder to detect. The 
main reason are the ongoing changes at regime level where, at least on Flemish level, 
a sustainable materials discourse has become the central orientation. 
 
Actors 
 
What about the actor dimension of the Plan C policy niche? Do we find an actor 
coalition that  differs from the main regime actors, and if so, in what sense? And how 
has this coalition evolved? Transition theory usually draws a sharp distinction 
between regimes, competing niches, and their respective actors. The Plan C case 
shows how the central government actor in waste policy, OVAM, initiates the 
                                                  
49 For the role that the Plan C discourse itself may have played in some of these evolutions, I 
also refer to part 4.3. 
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transition process. The regime actor creates the policy niche and strategically uses it: 
on the one hand to help revive and reorient its own policies, on the other hand to try 
and initiate a broader innovation movement around materials, with new networking 
with actors that may become essential in the future materials economy.  
“That’s an added value of Plan C, because without Plan C some of these contacts would 
not have existed. It does not only create more contacts with the business world and ngo’s, 
but also between public services. It’s a kind of meeting place for people that look and think 
forward, also within government (…) I think that OVAM will have to make maximum 
use of Plan C as a network, in order to find partners that want to go further than current 
policies.” (civil servant) 
 
The transition arena of Plan C that was composed in 2006 consisted of forward-
looking regime players and some niche actors, mainly from outside the ‘old’ waste 
regime. Between 2006 and 2008, this group succeeded in creating a dynamic process 
and engaging around 60 people that enthusiastically shared in the work of visioning, 
formulating transition pathways and experiments. This broader group consisted of 
representatives from government, business, science, NGO’s (people from labour 
unions were not present). Except for employees of OVAM itself, this group contains 
only a few participants that can be considered actors in the waste regime (such as 
someone from Indaver and from the umbrella of recycling centra) All other regime 
actors (such as the waste and recycling industry, municipalities and intermunicipal 
organisations, sectoral management organisms of  waste) are left out. Instead, we 
find actors that are active within the five themes of the transition paths that were 
formulated: companies from the technological, metals and chemical industry or their 
sector organisations; service providers and consultants; NGO’s working on 
awareness raising and with consumer groups; environmental and materials 
knowledge centres. Once Plan C has publicly been launched in December 2008, it 
succeeds in attracting several hundreds of people during network days and 
conferences. These are also overwhelmingly actors that are connected to the broad 
materials theme and the transition paths, while traditional waste actors are only 
sporadically present. 
 
However, while Plan C initiatives reach several hundreds of people during one-day 
events such as conferences, simultaneously the core group of actors that has to carry 
the process forward – in essence the Task Force and after 2009 the SCIA and SCOO – 
starts falling apart. One of TM’s working principles – that the enthusiasm and the 
alignment of visions should be enough to create a self-organising process – does not 
seem to work from that point onwards. Different priorities and different strategies of 
members become visible. As mentioned, some think Plan C has a technocratic edge 
to it, and they want to devote more time to civil society networks that act as a 
countervailing power to current policies50. Others can reserve time in their agendas 
                                                  
50 One of the results is a Transitienetwerk Middenveld (transition network of civil society) that 
was established mid 2010. 
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only as long as the potential added value of Plan C is obvious for them. In particular 
business representatives seem to have a problem here after 2008.  
“We created a momentum with industry during 2007, but seemed to lose it during 2008. I 
find it difficult to say what the exact problem was, a lack of action and a lack of a clear 
business case that led to questions about added value (…) At a certain moment, the 
question becomes: do I need Plan C for what I want to do? Is Plan C the right channel or 
can I reach my objectives through other means, other platforms?” (societal actor).  
 
Several interviewees mention that since 2009 it is difficult to speak of a stable actor 
coalition and/or lead actors that actively take the process forward. Without the 
involvement of OVAM, the personal engagement of a few SCIA and SCOO members 
(such as arena president Karel Van Acker) and the activities of the consultant i-
propeller, the process would have been very low profile over the last two to three 
years. Internal documents that argue for the creation of an independent vzw Plan C 
speak of “an untenable situation. Lack of ownership through informality undermines the 
responsibility for the dynamics” of the Plan C process.  
 
Again, understanding this situation demands looking at inside and outside factors. I 
will discuss outside factors in 4.3., but the quote above that actors ask themselves 
whether they can reach their objectives through other platforms, already provides an 
important hint: there are developments in the context around Plan C that suggest 
that it is not or no longer the only actor in the sustainable materials field.  
 
When it comes to inside factors, one of the main factors seems to be the diverging 
interpretations and expectations of the role different actors should play, and in 
particular the role of the government actor (OVAM, but also the Minister and her 
cabinet). When end 2010 early 2011, Plan C has trouble in defining its role and 
position (including a stable funding base) in the context of the new Materials Decree, 
the ministerial cabinet takes the position that it wants to continue the Plan C process  
“but it has always been our point that it is not the task of the government to pay fully for 
such a process. It also makes no sense that the authorities would impose this from above. 
It’s something that has to grow from below (…) I think we waited somewhat to see: what 
will come out of this group? But saying ‘stop, it makes no…’ that has certainly never 
happened. 
Q: But has it been a conscious choice to say ‘we keep it somewhat experimental’? 
A: For me certainly, in the sense that this is not something that the government alone must 
do and pull forward; it has to grow bottom-up.” 
 
This resembles the self-organisation logic that is present in the TM steering 
philosophy. It is also the main logic behind the autonomy process such as formulated 
in the business plan of the Task Force at the end of 2008. One driver for the plan was 
a concern for balance between different actors involved, and in particular a wariness 
of a too dominant position for government actors. On the other hand however, 
societal actors were simultaneously looking for support, guidance and legitimacy of 
the process through the involvement of OVAM and the cabinet. Several interviewees 
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express this as the responsibility of the government to guarantee a structural funding 
base on which the process can build.  
“You need that structure. According to me, we should at least expect the government to 
support something like that, for the simple reason that such support is about the long-term 
perspective of the initiative, with high societal relevance, but also with high risks. You can 
only do something like that when you tap a collective source of funding, and that’s the 
government.” (knowledge actor) 
 
The search for a suited form of interaction between government and societal actors is 
a leitmotiv in the process. The positioning of OVAM itself and the internal OVAM 
discussions about its role are illustrative of this search. As described in the Plan C 
history, the OVAM Board of Directors gave its approval for Plan C in 2004 and the 
transition process is mentioned in OVAM’s Strategic Plan 2005-2009. Still, for several 
years, it remained hard work for the proponents of Plan C within OVAM to defend 
the process and create room for its development. Two factors seem to play a role here. 
First, OVAM needs other actors to make Plan C a success, but this creates a tension 
between providing space and “letting others score points” on the hand, and on the 
other hand keeping enough control over the process so that its results are useful for 
OVAM’s purposes and some of the results can be claimed. Second, the fact that a TM 
process is a goal-seeking process, where results cannot be defined exactly beforehand, 
creates considerable nervousness. In a public agency in its working and 
accountability influenced by New Public Management principles (see also Context 
Box 2), this leads to a lot of uncertainty about the added value of the process. “’When 
does it deliver concrete results?’ was internally one the most heard questions”, according to 
an OVAM official.  
 
These doubts about the added value of Plan C and the difficulty in reaping its results, 
make it easier for the OVAM management to approve early 2009 of an autonomy 
process in which OVAM will not keep a leading role. However, this position starts to 
change in the course of the following year and around mid 2010 Plan C has not only 
acquired more legitimacy within OVAM, but OVAM also wants to remain in the lead. 
Interviewees mention different, complementary reasons for this shift in attitude, but 
it is striking that all of them relate to evolutions and events in the context of Plan C. 
Although these will be more extensively discussed in part 3.4, I mention some 
important evolutions here already. First, the broadening from waste policy to 
sustainable materials policy and Plan C are mentioned in the coalition agreement of 
the Flemish government (2009-2014) and in the so-called Pact 2020 (see Context Box 
3). This formal recognition raises the strategic importance of Plan C and opens up 
additional possibilities for OVAM to link materials policy to the Flemish socio-
economic agenda. Simultaneously, OVAM has also become aware that the input of 
Plan C creates possibilities on the international level, such as in EU and OECD 
forums (see also 4.3.2). Second, the shift also has to do with a learning process about 
sustainable materials management within OVAM as a result of internal discussions 
on positioning and policy priorities during of formulation of a new Strategic Plan 
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2010-2014. In contrast with the previous strategic plan where waste policy and 
materials policy where developed alongside each other, in the new plan waste policy 
has become part of a broader materials policy. Third, other government actors and 
initiatives (such as VITO, MIP3 and i-Cleantech51), launched and/or supported by 
the domain of innovation policy, started using a transition discourse and assertively 
positioning themselves. This in turn led to a consciousness within OVAM that it 
should safeguard its own accomplishments, assert its ambitions in the materials 
domain, and strengthen its position as a partner in innovation for a green economy. 
Plan C can play a role in support of this ambition. 
 
Plan C thus succeeded in building an actor coalition that clearly differed from the 
waste regime actors, but after 2009 this coalition started to break up. It seems 
particularly difficult to keep two, rather differing groups on board: on the one hand 
the business world that can act as entrepreneurs for experiments, on the other hand 
actors that saw Plan C as a space for building countervailing power to regime 
institutions. The declining participation in the lead of the process is partly 
accommodated by a switch in role of the consultants involved, from “facilitating” 
until end 2008 to “carrying” by 2011. Also, after a time of hesitation about the role of 
Plan C, OVAM itself seems to have made up its mind that it wants to invest in Plan C 
as a vehicle that can be useful in furthering the transition to sustainable materials 
management. This is visible in the efforts that were put in creating vzw Plan C and 
the Eigen Vermogen structure (in the Materials Decree replaced by the cooperation 
agreement). Anticipating the discussion in the next part 4.3, it can be observed that 
the vzw Plan C that was created in March 2012 mainly consists of the kind of players 
that are expected to play a regime role in the coming materials regime.  
 
Rules 
 
The preceding discussion of the interaction between the government and the societal 
actors involved in Plan C can also be interpreted as a discussion over the rules of the 
‘TM game’.  TM defines itself as a governance approach, where it is not the 
government that is steering the process, but where the government is just one actor 
in a network of change-minded actors. What the exact relationships should be within 
this network is not predefined, and is in a sense a question of error and trial, 
although terminology such as government as “initiator”, “coordinator”, “facilitator” 
or “partner” abound. The discussion about the autonomy process, the role of vzw and 
Eigen Vermogen, and the internal discussions in OVAM about its role testify to that. 
 
Although TM does not have formal rules of how interactions should be organised, 
Rotmans’ and Loorbach’s formulation of the theory does contain relatively detailed 
guidelines. Important guidelines (or ‘informal rules’) include: “work with 
frontrunners from niches and regime”, “develop and grow in the shadow of policy”, 
                                                  
51 The i-Cleantech initiative aims at coordinating all initiatives in the Flemish cleantech sector. 
See also the discussion in part 4.3.2. 
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“use the network, vision development and experiments to learn about direction and 
about what works”, “develop as a network with government as one player among 
many”, “make the arena an empowering environment so that the process becomes 
self-organising”. These kind of rules obviously differ from the working procedures in 
the waste regime. How have these rules been used in the Plan C process and what 
can we learn from the experience? 
 
I have already commented in the part about Plan C’s actor dimension (4.2.3.2) on the 
last two of these rules. In both cases the application in practice caused tensions that 
the process  struggled with. There was some form of self-organisation in what I 
called phase 2 and 3 of  Plan C (between May 2007 and early 2009), when participants 
were actively taking on tasks to move the process forward (although support from 
consultants was important). This disappeared completely in the course of 2009 and 
later. The problem was partly accommodated for by a switch in role of the 
consultants involved, from “facilitating” until end 2008 to “carrying” the process by 
2011 (even in so far that one interviewee is of the opinion that “the tail is wagging the 
dog”), but this in turn caused a problem of ownership in the involved organisations. 
Concerning the role of government, I showed how not only OVAM was searching for 
its role, but how also participants expected different, not always easily compatible 
functions of the government and its waste agency. From mid 2010 onward and in 
particular during 2011, OVAM took again firmer control of the process in the run up 
to and after the approval of the Materials Decree. The instalment of vzw Plan C again 
introduced the government actor as one among many, at least at the level of the vzw.  
 
What about other rules? In fact, almost each TM guideline carries its tensions with it. 
Working with frontrunners was an explicit choice of the initiators and also the 
minister of the environment was aware that this was a departure from the 
stakeholder engagement rules that are usually followed in a policy preparation 
process and that rely on representation of interest groups. During the installation 
meeting of the Plan C arena in June 2006, the representative of the Minister stated 
that  
“finding the proper discussion partners, the right participants, is a crucial part of the 
transition approach (…) That’s among other things the difference with thinking in terms of 
‘representation structures’, which until now has usually been dominant in other processes. 
Status, position or representativeness is not our first concern. The idea is that a ‘commando 
approach’ should also be more effective: bringing together small teams with people that 
trust each other and that succeed in combining courage and perseverance with creativity 
(…) Because of its ‘strike power’, this may work better than existing organisation 
structures”. 
 
The idea of individual frontrunners still permeated the draft business plan of end 
2008 that introduced the autonomy process, but it became increasingly untenable 
during the next year. As explained above (4.2.2.4), two main reasons motivate this 
change: an organisation made up of organisations is judged to have more legitimacy 
to play a role in the transition towards sustainable materials management, and it will 
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probably also be easier to find stable funding (from government or private sources) 
for such an organisation. Of course, this fundamentally changes the Plan C process 
itself and the statute of potential participants that are now regarded as 
representatives of their organisations. It causes some curious discussions when one 
of the business participants of the first hour sticks to his initial intention of 
participating as an individual and remains unclear about the possible commitment of 
his organisation (Agoria), while other actors expect him to fully try and engage his 
organisation. Since Agoria is a powerful organisation and its participation would 
highly increase the legitimacy of Plan C, this power to withhold commitment and/or 
to keep others in uncertainty about commitments, works destabilising and creates 
tensions and misunderstandings between actors. It not only constantly reminds 
engaged actors about the possible fragility of the process, but also testifies of the 
constant weighing up of pros and cons that actors make in deciding between 
commitments to different processes. 
 
Another informal rule concerns the relation between the TM process and regular 
policy. TM theory usually advises that TM processes function for some time “in the 
shadow of policy”. The hope is that this provides some mental space to think freely, 
not hindered by stringent deadlines and touchy political discussions. From the start, 
this has been one of the working principles of Plan C. During the June 2006 meeting, 
the representative of the then Minister of the Environment Peeters explicitly hinted at 
it when he declared that  
“there will always be pressure to present tangible results in a relative short time, or because 
outsiders want to interfere in the process. To keep pressure away from the transition arena 
the minister wants to provide space and time to deliver good work. You cannot speed up the 
growth of a plant by pulling it, because that’s when it breaks.”  
 
Later on, in May 2007, the Minister repeats this message in a video message, stating 
that participants “are offered a refuge to search, experiment and learn” (see also 4.2.2.2.). 
However, by 2011 not all interviewees were convinced that it was a good idea to 
stick to this strategy after 2008. With the 2008 business plan and the start of the 
autonomy process, the task force wanted to guard over the power balance between 
participants 
“because the fear was that if we involve the political world too early in the process, they 
will try to capture it, and it will overshoot the mark, and then it stops. Looking back, I 
think it was a mistake that we involved politicians so late in the process (…) I think we 
would have been more exposed to attempts at claiming Plan C. But that moment comes 
anyhow. I hope you don’t think that at the moment they do not try to lay their hands on 
it.” (knowledge actor) 
 
One of the main challenges seemed to be that it was difficult to communicate the 
philosophy and logics behind the whole process, in particular the interaction 
between government and societal actors that has grown during the process and the 
need for a double structure to revive the dynamics of it.  
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Finally, the informal rule that learning processes should be an explicit part of the 
agenda of TM-processes, has been a point of attention from the start of Plan C, at 
least as an intention. Very early in the process, two social scientists were engaged to 
document the experiences of the original transition arena and to reflect on them. The 
analytical frameworks that they used were based in multi-actor and inter-
organizational collaboration theories (Bouwen and Taillieu 2004). This led to several 
interesting conference papers that were also co-authored with some of the involved 
participants, but the results never really served as discussion material for the group. 
In 2009, one of the consultants wrote a short report on the usefulness of the method 
of “learning histories”, but time and money constraints hindered further use. Later, 
in 2011 the ISSI-project in 2011 organised three meetings of an “ISSI Academy” that 
aimed at sharing experiences of Plan C and DuWoBo with other innovation networks. 
Again, it never served as material to thoroughly discuss the Plan C experiences and 
learn from it within the group of most engaged actors. Participants are aware of this: 
“Learning is an aspect that’s been underexposed , to say it euphemistically”, as an 
interviewee expresses it. Still, reserving time for learning never gets enough priority 
to make it to the agenda.   
 
Resources 
 
Several tensions that have been discussed in previous points, have a link with the 
resources problem of Plan C. What are the main resources that Plan C has at its 
disposal to develop as a transition management process?  
 
I mentioned that when the Flemish government decided in 2004 to start transition 
processes, these were set up as experiments in “innovative environmental policy” 
(Peeters 2004, p. 81). The financial means available for the two processes that started 
– Plan C and the housing and building process DuWoBo – have always been quite 
limited. In the case of Plan C: a part-time official from OVAM to support the process, 
and money to pay for consultants to do the daily process management and to set up 
activities. The yearly support is estimated at 250.000 Euro direct costs, minimum 
60.000 Euro indirectly through OVAM personnel and around 25.000 Euro indirectly 
through personnel from other administrations. Since 2011, an additional subsidy of 
around 80.000 Euro is available from the division sustainable development of the 
Diensten Algemeen Regeringsbeleid (DAR, administration of general government 
services.  
 
This means that almost all actors have been engaged in the process on a voluntary 
basis, often as a sideline of the activities in their jobs. This worked relatively well in 
phase 1 and 2 of the process when the main task was to develop a transition vision 
and a network that could support that vision. But the results of these phases raised 
high expectations from participants on the substantive as well as on the process side. 
On the substantive side, participants hoped for a quick launch of the first 
experiments under the different transition pathways. On the process side, the hope 
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was that the network would grow and turn into a dynamic and influential 
movement that could set the agenda for sustainable materials management. From 
my interviews in 2011 and from the discussion in the SCIA, it is obvious that most 
involved actors agree that the build-up of financial means since mid 2008 has been 
inadequate for the management of such a complex and ambitious process as Plan C.  
 
On the management side, the operational means for maintaining daily activities and 
coaching the process hardly increased between 2008 and 2011, even though Plan C 
became more demanding from mid 2008 onwards. Finding a structural basis for 
operational means was the main reason behind the original Eigen Vermogen Plan C 
construction and still is the goal of the current cooperation inscribed in the Materials 
Decree. It should allow the involved government actors to group their financial 
contributions and in that way ensure the permanent employment of 3 to 4 civil 
servants working for Plan C. As mentioned above, the proposed business plan 
departed from a yearly budget of 465.000 Euro, which is more or less equal to the 
yearly government funding between 2008 and 2011. Additionally, the vzw Plan C 
hoped to gather a budget of around 200.000 Euro yearly on the basis of member fees 
and other revenues. When in December the decision was taken to establish the vzw 
Plan C without further waiting for the results of the negotiations about the 
cooperation agreement (see 4.2.2), this scenario changed somewhat. It was decided 
not to ask for member fees and to start with the means that OVAM would provide  
and await which other government agencies could be convinced to provide support 
in the months leading up to the vzw’s establishment in March 2012. When vzw Plan C 
was established, for its first year the new organisation could count on 150.000 Euro 
from OVAM, 80.000 Euro from DAR and a half-time staff member delegated from 
VITO.  
 
While its operational means are limited, Plan C does not have funding for transition 
experiments either. From 2008 onwards, the option has been to try to mobilise 
existing innovation funds. This option is in fact a necessity, because the 
environmental policy domain (and OVAM) does not have specific funding available 
for investing in transition experiments, which are often some form of innovation 
projects. The consequence is, however, that criteria of existing innovation funds may 
influence potential experiments. There have been a few contacts between Plan C 
members and administrators of innovation funds to discuss the possibility of a 
specialised transition fund or specific criteria for transition experiments in existing 
funds, but these have not yielded results. The MIP3 Fund, that was launched in 
October 2010, explicitly uses transition terminology to frame its call for projects, but 
it does not make a difference however between ‘regular’ innovation projects and 
transition experiments, and it only contains ecological modernisation elements of the 
discourse. Interviewees indicate that the lack of specific funding for experiments is 
an essential reason why business involvement has diminished after 2008. 
“For me, Plan C stands  in relative isolation. Not because its vision is wrong, on the 
contrary, I find that very strong, but fundamentally the reason is that there is no funding 
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mechanism behind it. The reason why MIP succeeds in mobilising 300 people and 
companies is simply because money is being distributed. That’s what attracts companies. 
Plan C doesn’t have that and companies come once out of curiosity, but not twice (...) I 
regret that immensely, the fact that we don’t succeed in coupling Plan C with a funding 
channel (…) Coupling is enough for me; Plan C does not necessarily need its own means. 
But those who receive them should link with Plan C or DuWoBo, so that the limited 
resources that we spend on innovation are at least directed towards sustainability in a well-
founded manner” (societal actor). 
 
One interviewee explicitly linked the attempts at developing a specific methodology 
during 2009-2010 with the aim of labelling ‘Plan C experiments’ to the failure to 
attract funding and interested project developers. He proposed a more pragmatic 
approach of connecting with starting or ongoing MIP-projects.  
“[The Plan C experiment approach] is a lot of effort for too few results (…). While MIP 
gets 12 applications for research projects and 30 for feasibility studies, Plan C keeps on 
thinking about how are we going to generate ideas, and what are the criteria for fixing a 
Plan C label to it, and watch out ! – if it does not pass the whole circuit, we are not going to 
give this label. Then I think “come on, guys, go to MIP” and use of course your criteria list, 
but those projects that fit the vision, why don’t you connect to them (…) I see a knot in too 
much sticking to principles of ‘we must let our own ideas grow into experiments’ (…) It is 
a rather protectionist vision that it can only be Plan C if it fits our criteria” (knowledge 
actor). 
 
This more pragmatic approach installed itself more or less out of necessity when it 
became obvious during 2010 and 2011 that coaching projects from ideas to the stage 
of labelling them as “Plan C experiments” was untenable.  
 
It can be concluded that Plan C’s financial means were sufficient to coach a visioning 
process during the first two years, but when the ambitions of the network grew and 
the management of organisation and substance became more complex, the financial 
means for daily operations were inadequate to manage the network in its different 
dimensions. Besides, Plan C had no resources available for what according to TM 
theory is the main task after formulating a transition agenda, namely developing and 
carrying out experiments. This created a huge problem in attracting entrepreneurs 
and convincing them to risk the step to investing in transition experiments.  
 
Of course, there are other resources on which a network can build. Knowledge is a 
resource that is needed in different forms in transition processes such as Plan C. One 
is the technical expertise on new and more sustainable materials, closing of 
production and consumption cycles, replacement of materials by services etcetera. 
This is partly available and growing fast, in the business world, in OVAM as well as 
in the academic world. Still, the needed expertise is not always easy to mobilize. In 
essence, Plan C has chosen to be a platform of open innovation, treating commonly 
build knowledge as ‘open source’. However, business representatives have indicated 
that this may hinder participation of industry, either because they have no 
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experience of working under such an intellectual property rights regime, or because 
they are afraid of sharing expertise with potential competitors. In practice, the 
problem has not arisen because until end 2011 no experiments had yet been 
developed under this approach.  
 
Another aspect of knowledge relates to expertise on transition governance, on the 
level of the process itself as well as on the policy level. At the process level, it 
demands for example knowledge of managing multi-party collaboration, group 
processes, functioning as a learning network and learning from experiences. At the 
policy level, it demands knowledge of integration between policy fields, connecting 
between different policy streams, decision-making processes, coping with interest 
politics etcetera. Most of this kind of knowledge is tacit: it is built up through years of 
experience, but rarely shared or made explicit. Process knowledge is mainly 
mobilized through the expertise of consultants, policy knowledge is available within 
OVAM. In both cases there has been some cooperation with academics (including 
myself), but there has rarely been time to learn about the insights in a broader group.  
 
Finally, a crucial resource is the legitimacy that transition processes such as Plan C 
are able to build. Formal legitimacy is relatively well covered. From the start of the 
process, the Minister of the Environment has politically supported the creation of an 
“experiment space” for Plan C, Plan C is part of OVAM’s strategic plans and the 
process also found its way into the Flemish government agreement and the Pact 2020. 
Paradoxically, in spite of this growing formal legitimacy, the ‘informal’ legitimacy 
with closely involved individuals and organisations was doubtlessly dwindling 
during 2010 and 2011. An important cause is the slow and uncertain development of 
the process, its low level of activities and in particular the problem of autonomy and 
organisation development since 2009. This diminished the trust in the creation of a 
dynamic network and undermined legitimacy, something that was also visible in the 
lack of active business involvement in the decision-making bodies SCIA and SCOO. 
In 2011, the active proponents of Plan C were convinced that only a firm engagement 
of the government could break the deadlock.  
 “I fear that some people have become reticent. They say: we see the potential, it’s a good 
initiative, but it’s new, we will have to stick our neck out, and there’s always the danger 
that politics says ‘well, in the end, let’s just forget it’. (…) There are several actors that say 
‘if it has been established, we absolutely want to be a member, preferably a member of the 
Board, or co-finance it’, but first they want to see that green light” (knowledge actor). 
 
With the creation of the vzw Plan C in March 2012 and after the engagement of 
OVAM to further support the process, it seems that some have seen the light. A 
crucial factor is that during the preparation of the Materials Decree, sustainable 
materials policy has become part of the socio-economic Vlaanderen in Actie agenda. 
Here, OVAM forwards Plan C as the long-term governance line of materials policy, 
while OVAM itself is responsible for the short- and medium-term policy 
development, and the newly created policy research centre SuMMa (Sustainable 
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Materials Management) provides scientific back-up. These developments will be 
more thoroughly discussed in the next part 4.3.   
 
 
4.3. FROM A WASTE REGIME TOWARDS A MATERIALS REGIME? 
 
In 4.1., I ended my history of the existing waste regime around 2005 with an analysis 
of the policy arrangement of the regime. Building on the observation that its waste 
policy had more or less come to a standstill, OVAM introduced a transition 
management process in 2006 to experiment with a different governance approach of 
it hoped that it could play a role in defining materials policy, the new task that had 
been assigned to OVAM in 2005. In 4.2., I discussed what happened between 2006 
and 2012 in this small transition management process Plan C. The frontrunners that 
were gathered under Plan C succeeded in formulating a new discourse on a 
materials economy and then started building a network around it, which later tried 
to start up experiments and find an autonomous position. The lens of the policy 
arrangements approach clarified that Plan C has characteristics that make it as a 
governance arrangement different from the waste regime arrangement. The analysis 
also showed that Plan C’s development and positioning was not an easy and 
straightforward trajectory, but that it was accompanied by considerable tensions and 
difficult decisions, even to the point that by 2011 Plan C was in a serious crisis. It 
seems that the TM approach worked fairly well to start developing the policy niche, 
but after 2008 the guidelines (such as “start experiments”) and working procedures 
(such as “work with individual frontrunners”, “make it a self-organising process”) 
became increasingly problematic to maintain the niche, not in the least because 
adequate funding was lacking and because different actors saw other possibilities to 
realise their objectives. Only when OVAM took firm control, ensured financial back-
up and provided Plan C with a task in the developing field of sustainable materials 
policy, was the deadlock broken and could a vzw Plan C be installed in March 2012. 
What this will lead to lies open, but as will become clear in the following pages, a 
first analysis shows that the new organisation is nested within the regular regime 
policy, with a discourse and actors that are practically similar to the regime. 
 
My interest in studying transition management as a governance approach does not 
finish with the analysis of Plan C as such. After a few years Plan C may have 
experienced difficulties in functioning well as a process, but did it in the mean time 
succeed in influencing the existing policy regime? Does transition management lead 
to policy renewal, and if so, can we explain how this influence happens and why? In 
terms of my analytical framework the question is whether the waste regime and its 
policy arrangement change and what influences these changes.  
 
The following analysis tries to understand the changes that have been going on in the 
Flemish  waste regime over the last 5 to 10 years. Since I am interested in policy 
innovation, the focus is on how the policy arrangement of the regime is changing. In 
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4.3.1, the MLP is used to group pressures for change according to landscape, regime 
and niche pressures. Part 4.3.2. tries get a grip on what is happening in the policy 
arrangement and on the role of Plan C. 
 
4.3.1. The waste regime under pressure: driving forces for change 
 
As will be shown below, Plan C has had influence in the changes that are currently 
taking place in the Flemish waste regime towards what seems to be a starting 
sustainable materials regime. However, Plan C is only one of the influences and the 
changes that can be observed result from an interplay between different levels and 
different driving forces. This paragraph 4.3.1. gives a concise overview of important 
developments at landscape, regime and niche level. The overview is meant to 
introduce and better understand changes in the different dimensions of the policy 
arrangement that will be discussed in 4.3.2. 
 
Landscape pressures or processes of structural transformation 
 
Part 4.1 showed how the Flemish waste system was built up during the eighties with 
a strong focus on waste removal and on cleaning up the most visible excrescences of 
landfilling. During the nineties the system was reoriented on the basis of the waste 
hierarchy, with most attention going to selective collection and recycling. These 
developments are of course not specific for Flanders but can in different degrees be 
observed in other industrialised countries as well. In spite of this focus on recycling 
and even growing attention for prevention, the prevailing logic in current modern 
economies in relation to materials still is a linear one: resources are extracted and 
transported, materials manufactured, products designed, assembled, distributed and 
consumed, and the materials finally end up as waste. Over the last few years, this 
logic has come under pressure from different kind of developments. What is typical 
of all the mentioned developments, is that they can be mobilised by actors to support 
their cause, but that these actors themselves have hardly any grip on them. 
 
First, probably the most important development is the fast rise in demand for 
resources worldwide. Global resource extraction was at 40 billion tonnes in 1980, in 
2002 at 55 billion tonnes and is expected to rise to 80 billion tonnes by 2020 (OECD 
2008). At the moment inhabitants of the EU still consume three times as many 
resources as inhabitants of Asia and more that four times as much as an average 
African (this rises to 10 times more for the US) (SERI 2009, p. 21). However, while 
over the past decennia the rise in resource consumption was mostly due to OECD 
countries, for the future the impact of fast-growing economies, rapid 
industrialization and urbanisation of emerging countries such as China, India and 
Brazil will be the major factor.  
 
Second, import dependency of OECD countries and in particular the EU is 
increasingly perceived as problematic. According to OECD-figures, the supply-
Chapter 4. Transition management in Flanders: Plan C 
 139 
dependency of the OECD area on the rest of the world is rising for all commodities 
and groups of materials. OECD net imports have increased by 80% since 1980 (OECD 
2008, p. 38). In particular for the EU-27, there is a “massive asymmetry” in trade in 
fuels and mining products with the rest of the world (EEA 2010, 16). In 2008 the EU 
imported six times more materials than it imported and this dependency seems a 
long-term structural trend, because EU-27 imports in tonnes increased by 30% during 
the period 1999-2008 (ibid.). 
 
Third, the distribution of reserves. Reserves of resources are where they have always 
been, but the growth in resource consumption coupled with import dependency, 
have fuelled an alarm over the availability of resources for national economies and 
over easy access to the proven reserves. The EU, the US and China do not possess 
large domestic deposits of fossil fuels and metals (SERI 2009). The EU has even listed 
14 raw materials as “critical” because they are in risk of supply shortage due to the 
fact that a high share of world production comes from a handful of countries such as 
China, Russia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Brazil (EC 2011a). China has 
already limited exports of some raw materials in order to ensure privileged access for 
its domestic industry (EC 2008b).  
 
Fourth, as a result of rising demand and growing competition for access, the prices of 
a lot of resources have been increasing during the last decade. The prices in markets 
for energy, metals and minerals, agriculture and food reached a peak in 2008, 
declined sharply in the second half of 2008, but have been increasing again since the 
summer of 2009 (EC 2011a). The markets have also seen a growing interdependence 
of commodity markets and financial markets, with a surge of flows into commodity 
derivative markets. 
 
Fifth, there is an increasing interference between systems of materials, energy, food 
and water. Awareness is growing that solving problems in one system has impact on 
others. High performance batteries and photovoltaic cells in the energy system 
require specific materials which may be in short supply or not easily accessible. 
Renewable biomass energy policies may hinder the development of a bio-based 
materials economy, or may have impact on food security. This nexus between 
systems and its policy impacts is labelled by the OECD as “one of the greatest 
challenges of policy assessment” in sustainable materials management (OECD 2010, 
p. 10). 
 
As a result of these kinds of pressure, during the past years we have witnessed a 
rapid rise in attention for resources and materials at international policy level. An 
example is the working group on Sustainable Materials Management of the OECD. 
The initiative started in 2005 with a workshop in Korea, a second workshop in 2008 
in Israel and a third workshop in 2010 in Belgium that was organised by OVAM. 
Based on the observation of a “fundamental tension” (OECD 2010, p. 11) between 
environmental protection and the increasing demand for materials associated with 
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economic growth, the OECD tries to clarify the meaning of Sustainable Materials 
Management and the policy principles on which it can be based.  
 
Since this dissertation is interested in the changes in the Flemish waste regime, the 
developments at EU level are particularly important. The general framework for 
current European policy-making is the Europe 2020 strategy, adopted in March 2010 
as a follow-up to the Lisbon strategy. This strategy was launched as an answer to the 
economic and financial crisis and must “turn the EU into a smart, sustainable and 
inclusive economy delivering high levels of employment, productivity and social 
cohesion” (EC 2010, p. 3). “Smart” refers to an economy based on knowledge and 
innovation, “sustainable” to promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more 
competitive economy, and “inclusive” to fostering a high-employment economy 
delivering social and territorial cohesion. The Commission formulated seven flagship 
initiatives to translate the goals into action. One of these is a flagship initiative for a 
“Resource efficient Europe”. In January 2011, European Commissioner for the 
Environment Potocnik presented the initiative that aims at boosting economic 
growth and competitiveness, and creating new opportunities for innovation while 
simultaneously reducing resource use, fighting climate change and ensuring security 
of supply of essential resources. Over the following years, the Commission will 
propose resource efficiency strategies in areas such as energy, climate change, 
research and innovation industry, transport, agriculture, fisheries and environment 
policy (EC 2011b) 
 
A few years ago in 2008, the European Commission had already launched the Raw 
Materials initiative (EC 2008a). This initiative grew out of anxiety over the 
availability of resources for the European economy and has three pillars: ensuring 
access to raw materials on international markets under the same conditions as other 
industrial competitors; fostering sustainable supply of raw materials from within 
Europe; and boosting overall resource efficiency and promote recycling to reduce the 
EU’s consumption of primary raw materials and decrease the relative import 
dependence.  
 
A series of other EU initiatives are of importance for understanding the shifting 
landscape and the impact these policies have on shaping national and regional policy 
regimes. In the case of the waste system, these include the thematic strategy on the 
sustainable use of natural resources (2005), the thematic strategy on prevention and 
recycling of waste (2005), the action plan on sustainable consumption and production 
(2008), the ecodesign directive (2005), the integrated product policy (2001, 2003). A 
common characteristic of most of these initiatives is that they depart from a broad 
vision on resources and materials and in that way try to guard over the linkages 
between the different strategies and plans. 
 
Of particular significance for the developments in the Flemish waste system is the 
Waste Framework Directive (EU 2008). As part of the thematic strategy on 
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prevention and recycling of waste, the existing EU legislation was revised, simplified 
and clarified. The revision of the Waste Framework directive included: introducing 
life cycle thinking, clarifying when waste ceases to be waste and the definitions of 
recovery and disposal, introducing a definition of recycling, and solving overlaps 
between different pieces of waste and other environmental legislation (EC 2005). In 
general, the aim is to strengthen the waste hierarchy in the waste policies of EU 
member states and to reduce the discrepancies in waste policies between member 
states. As will be shown below, the implementation of the Waste Framework 
Directive is seized at in Flanders to reorient the existing Waste Decree to a Materials 
Decree, in that way anchoring the first rules of a new materials economy.  
 
Regime tensions 
 
Although landscape factors such as the growing global demand for resources and the 
concern over access to reserves, call into question the linear throughput model of the 
economy and the related current waste policies, these factors were not the main 
drivers behind Plan C when the first ideas for such a process were formulated in 
OVAM in 2003.  
“The theme of scarcity of resources is something of the last five years (…) A few  years ago, 
for example when the thematic strategy on natural resources was prepared, the discourse 
was still different: ‘scarcity of resources is not a topic; it is impact that is most important’. 
(…) But during the last five years, the industry has noticed an enormous shift in resource 
flows towards China and other growth countries, India is also an important player. I don’t 
think that was the most important impulse for an orientation towards materials policy here 
at OVAM. Our concern was more ‘we have to reduce impacts, we have to reduce the 
amount of waste, and therefore materials policy is necessary.’ In fact, resource scarcity is 
an opportunity we have used to say ‘look, this is not just an environmental story, it’s 
obviously also an economic story.’” (civil servant) 
 
As was already observed in part 4.1, the Flemish waste systems ranks amongst the 
top of Europe. Dumping of household waste is low, recycling rates are high, but on 
the other hand,  the total amount of household waste has remained virtually constant 
at the high level of 550 kg per person since 2000. Furthermore, industrial waste is 
difficult to get under control. Total amounts fluctuate but remain constantly higher 
than in the beginning of the century (VMM 2010). This kind of tensions at regime 
level are even much more obvious when looked at from a European point of view. 
Although the waste hierarchy has been the basis of EU waste policy for years, and 
although recycling and incineration are increasing, “overall waste volumes are 
growing (…) and the absolute amounts of waste landfilled are not decreasing 
because of the growth in waste generation” (EC 2005, p. 5). Even though waste 
management is improving, 51,5% in the EU was still landfilled in 2006, 43,6% 
recovered and recycled and 4,9% incinerated (EEA 2010, p. 24).  
 
While the global demand for materials is growing, several features of the waste 
system may hinder closing of material loops. Incineration, more and more combined 
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with energy recovery, may be leading waste streams away from recycling, in 
particular when incineration counts as green electricity and is favoured through tariff 
systems (such as green electricity certificates in Flanders). Since the recycling 
industry does not receive these kind of subsidies, it is structurally put at a 
disadvantage. Furthermore, to keep incinerator ovens profitable they have to 
function at optimum level, which necessitates a guaranteed flow of waste. Until end 
2010, EU waste policies were based on self-sufficiency and treatment of waste 
streams within national borders. This principle determined planning of incinerator 
installations within Flanders. However, since 2011, the new Waste Directive 
determines that incinerators all over Europe that conform to a so-called R-1 status 
(mainly based on energy-efficiency of the installation) can attract industrial waste 
from other European countries. Again, this may lead materials away from recycling. 
Flanders seems particularly vulnerable because of overcapacity in incineration in the 
Netherlands and Germany. This leads Dutch and German waste incinerators to 
attract waste flows with favourable incineration tariffs. Furthermore, a decision in 
June 2011 of the Flemish Minister of the Environment Schauvlieghe to grant a licence 
to a new incineration installation of Bionerga in Houthalen-Helchteren and to extend 
the license of the ISVAG installation in Wilrijk, attracts criticism because it also 
threatens to install overcapacity in Flanders. Overcapacity as well as incentives for 
renewable electricity thus potentially threaten a further closing of material loops. 
Meanwhile, economic growth and consumption continue inducing growth of overall 
waste volumes. 
 
 Niche developments 
 
In chapter 2 of this paper, I defined Plan C as a policy niche where a network of 
frontrunners develops alternatives for current policies. In transition studies it is 
however more customary to look for technological niches that challenge the regime. 
The niche that over the past few years has probably been most challenging for the 
waste regime is the Cradle to Cradle approach (C2C), defined by Braungart and 
McDonough (2002). The approach not only wants to replace linear logics in materials 
management by closed cycles, but questions the resource efficiency approach at heart. 
Being efficient in a bad system makes no sense. The goal should not be to be less bad 
by minimizing resources and waste, but to be “eco-effective”: designing products 
from materials that have a positive impact on the environment. According to 
Braungart and McDonough, this can be done by creating two materials cycles: a 
technical cycle where non-renewable materials are kept in a closed loop, and a 
biological cycle where at the end of their lifecycle products can be discarded and 
serve as a nutrient for nature. The famous “waste equals food” maxim refers to this 
continuance of cycles. In 2010 and 2011, under impulse of Walter Tempst, OVAM 
was one of the partners in the European Interreg IVC- project Cradle to Cradle Network. 
The project brought together EU regions to share and capitalise on regional good 
practice in implementing C2C principles in relation to waste prevention and 
management. 
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4.3.2. The birth of a sustainable materials regime in Flanders?  
 
The foregoing paragraphs show how over the last five to ten years the linear 
materials economy and the waste systems that have been developed in OECD 
countries during the eighties and the nineties, have come under pressure. Transition 
studies teach that a combination of pressures from landscape, regime and niche 
levels may initiate a transition towards a new regime. In the next paragraphs, I will 
analyse how during these last years the policy arrangement of the Flemish waste 
regime has started to change towards a sustainable materials policy arrangement. A 
transition implies of course a lot more than a change in a policy arrangement: it 
demands new industrial practices, different technologies, new consumer routines 
etcetera, and such a change will not be a purely Flemish affair either. However, the 
least that can be said, is that the different kind of pressures have set in motion 
changes in discourse, rules, actors and resources at Flemish policy level, although it 
is too early to evaluate whether and in how far we are witnessing the start of actual 
large-scale practices where materials are no longer passing through our societies in a 
linear way, but where closed loop economies and sustainable materials management 
become the new norms. I now discuss the evolutions in the Flemish waste/materials 
policy arrangement in more detail and try to deduce Plan C’s role in it. 
 
Evolutions in discourse 
 
The changes we are currently witnessing – with a change from a waste oriented 
policy arrangement towards a materials oriented policy arrangement – have been set 
in motion by changes in ideas about the effectiveness of existing waste policies 
around the turn of the century. I have mentioned the most important ones when 
discussing the introduction of Plan C in 2006 (4.2.1.). Around that time, it began to 
dawn on policy-makers that waste prevention policies were difficult to implement 
and only brought mixed results. Policy officers in OVAM started discussing the 
waste problem in terms of a broader framing of sustainable development and the 
management of materials and natural resources. The first traces of a materials 
discourse can be found in internal OVAM documents as early as 2003 in the context 
of the BBB administrative reform. The idea is then picked up in Loorbach’s study for 
OVAM about the historic development of waste policy, where a materials system is 
defined as the next step in transition. It then appears in the Policy Note of Minister of 
the Environment Peeters and next in the strategic plan of OVAM for 2005-2009 – 
around the same time that the Plan C process is prepared – as a third policy line for 
OVAM alongside waste and soil management. In 2006, the Plan C process started 
and in parallel to that process, again under the impulse of Walter Tempst, OVAM 
installed an internal learning forum during 2007-2008, called The fifth floor52, where 
                                                  
52 The OVAM office in Mechelen has only four floors. The idea of a fifth floor was that the 
initiative did not belong to a specific OVAM department, but tried to form a bridge between 
departments where the new concept of sustainable materials management could be 
discussed. 
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the new developments and the results of Plan C were discussed and where the 
insight grew that materials management should not be regarded as a third policy line, 
but that the waste system should be regarded as part of a ‘higher’ system, the 
materials system. This meant that OVAM officers started to realise  
“that materials policy was not something completely new for us: we were already doing it 
under the form of waste policy, we just had to change our perspective. We also started to 
understand that this meant an evolution within the organisation itself that was going to 
take some time” (civil servant). 
 
A crucial breakthrough is the realisation within OVAM that this line of thinking 
implied that the obligation coming from the EU-level to translate the Waste 
Framework Directive (2008/98/EC) into new Flemish legislation, should not simply 
lead to a new Waste Decree, but that the new Decree should somehow reflect the 
materials storyline. The idea first enters the Governmental Declaration of the new 
Flemish Government in 2009, where it is stated the that the new government will  
“broaden waste policy to sustainable materials policy (…) The translation of the new 
Waste Framework Directive will amongst other things anchor the evolution from waste to 
integrated materials management” (Vlaamse Regering 2009, p. 58-59). 
 
The Directive’s main goal is to strengthen the waste hierarchy in the waste policies of 
EU member states and to reduce the discrepancies in waste policies between member 
states. Although it introduces a few new elements such as life-cycle thinking and 
extended producer responsibility, conceptually it starts from the idea of management 
of waste streams, not material chains and cycles. So, the Flemish Government and 
OVAM were not obliged to introduce a materials perspective and go beyond the 
waste hierarchy. But during the preparation of the Decree in 2010 and 2011, a 
discourse coalition grows among government actors (the Minister, OVAM), 
industrial actors, NGO’s, knowledge actors and advisory councils (where these 
actors are present of course) around the concept of “sustainable materials 
management”.  
 
Three factors converge that form the basis of this coalition: the need to go beyond a 
waste approach because of the problems in waste policy and the growing pressure 
on resources, the chance to connect the materials discourse to ongoing European 
policy developments, and the chance to connect the materials discourse to the socio-
economic innovation debate in Flanders. The first factor has already been discussed 
in the MLP-analysis in 4.3.1. It is predominantly an ecological imperative that fits in 
the environmental policy domain and should be a typical line of argumentation for 
an environmental minister or a waste agency such as OVAM. The two other factors 
have however strengthened the conviction that the choice to push a materials 
orientation was not only sensible from an environmental point of view, but that it 
was also politically viable and defensible. The main elements of the discourse are 
well summarised in an interview with the Minister in June 2011: remaining 
frontrunner gives the opportunity to reap ecological and economic benefits. 
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“In Europe, we are the champion in selective collection and recycling. It is important that 
we remain frontrunners. Sustainable materials management provides a perfect springboard. 
We no longer focus only on waste, but on the whole life cycle of products. If our economy 
can take that step, we win on two fronts. By reusing materials and waste we close the circle 
and reduce our ecological footprint. The economic advantages are equally obvious. We use 
too much resources that are scarce and expensive and that make us dependent on foreign 
countries. We can counter that by turning our waste into new resources. Furthermore, the 
knowledge that we build up, can be marketed internationally” (Martens, 2011, p. 28). 
 
The political importance of the link with European evolutions became prominent 
during the Belgian presidency of European Union in the second half of 2010. Joke 
Schauvlieghe, Flemish Minister for the Environment became responsible for the 
presidency of the EU Environment Council. It is a tradition at European level that 
each presidency formulates a few own priorities, so during the preparations for the 
environmental presidency at Flemish level, OVAM proposed materials policy as one 
of the priorities. Together with climate and biodiversity, this was accepted.  
“I think that this can be attributed to two things. First, OVAM has a good reputation for 
its European policy work. That has strengthened the confidence when we brought up a 
theme for the presidency, ‘okay, when it is assigned to OVAM, it will run well’. Second, 
materials policy is mentioned in the government declaration, it is in the policy note of the 
minister, it is mentioned in ViA, so the cabinet was willing to put the theme in the 
picture.” (civil servant) 
 
The Belgian presidency formulated “sustainable materials management” as one of its 
environmental spearheads and in July 2010 an informal Environment Council in 
Ghent was devoted to the theme. A background study for the informal council 
(Rossy et al. 2010), ordered by the Flemish government, situated sustainable 
materials management against a broad background of respecting ecological limits 
and the need for “breakthrough system-level innovations” (ibid., p. 5). It explicitly 
mentions the need for knowledge networks for transitions and uses Plan C as an 
example. It recommends the establishment of “a multi-stakeholder European SMM 
Transition Platform, similar to the Flemish ‘Plan C’” (ibid., p. 65)53. OVAM served as 
penholder for preparing the conclusions of the informal council and of the formal 
Council of December 2010. These mention inter alia the need of system innovation 
for a sustainable and resource-efficient Europe and they invite the Commission to 
“consider how the objectives on resource efficiency can be supported and 
implemented by the creation of a multi-actor transition platform on resource 
efficiency”, in that way making the link with the flagship initiative on resource 
efficiency from the EU 2020 strategy. 
“It is partly thanks to Plan C that this reached the conclusions. The line is very direct: 
OVAM prepared the conclusions, we are penholder, so we put these concepts in there. You 
                                                  
53 One of the authors of the study, Peter Tom Jones, was a member of the Plan C transition 
arena in phase 1 to 3 (see 4.1.2-4.1.4). 
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can see a clear causal link between what lives in Plan C and what was discussed at the 
Council (…).” (civil servant). 
 
In the Autumn of 2010, OVAM kept the theme on the Flemish policy agenda by 
organising an OECD workshop on Sustainable Materials Management that during 
three days (25-27 October 2010) brought a series of international experts in contact 
with Belgian policy-makers and representatives from industry, ngo’s, academia.  
 
The successes at European level convinced the cabinet of the Minister of the 
Environment of the political potential of the sustainable materials agenda. The 
second factor that made sustainable materials management politically viable was the 
possibility to link it to what is currently the most important initiative for innovating 
the socio-economic web of Flanders, namely the Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA, Flanders in 
Action) agenda and the Pact 2020 (see Context Box 3). When early 2011 all Flemish 
ministers had to propose a flagship initiative for the ViA-strategy, Minister of the 
Environment Schauvlieghe proposed sustainable materials management, with that 
positioning materials as an essential part of the transformation and innovation of the 
Flemish economy. This resulted at 6 June 2011 in a Round Table on Sustainable 
Materials Management where industry, knowledge centres and other societal partners 
signed a Materials Declaration in which they engage themselves to work towards a 
Materials Pact and an operational plan on sustainable materials by June 201254. In 
July 2011, sustainable materials management also became one of the thirteen 
transversal projects that were introduced by the Flemish government to reinforce the 
ViA programme and that were asked to make use of a transition approach 55 . 
Meanwhile, important advisory councils such as SERV, MINA-raad and VRWI had 
all expressed their support for the Materials Decree and urged the government and 
OVAM to use it as an instrument in the greening of the economy.  
 
                                                  
54  On 6 June 2012, a Vlaams Materialenprogramma (Flemish Materials Programme) was 
presented that contains 10 levers to make “a transition to sustainable materials management” 
possible through an “interactive and participative search and learning process in which 
several societal actors play a role”. The 10 levers are : sustainable design, transparent 
materials cycles, smart cooperation, smart investment, better regulation, sustainable housing 
and building, sustainable chemistry and plastics in a permanent cycle, biobased economy, 
critical metals in a permanent cycle, new materials in a permanent cycle. See 
www.ovam.be/vlaamsmaterialenprogramma  
55 I cannot discuss this remarkable evolution here because it would break the flow of the 
argument. I will however return to it in more detail in chapter 6. Suffice it to say for the 
moment that the idea of “transitions” and “transition management” as such first became the 
structuring concepts of the second Vlaamse Strategie Duurzame Ontwikkeling (VSDO, Flemish 
Strategy for Sustainable Development) in June 2010 and next – and much more importantly – 
found their way into ViA as concepts to revive ViA in July 2011. The combined experiences 
of Plan C and DuWoBo have played a role in this evolution, but there is a lot more to this 
evolution than just these two processes. See chapter 6. On the VSDO, see also Context Box 4 
in chapter 5. 
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When the text of the Materials Decree reached the government table in June 2011, the 
well-known language of the waste hierarchy is extended with language on materials 
and material cycles. The explanatory memorandum explicitly refers to the need to 
develop a sustainable materials economy in the decades to come and to capitalize on 
upcoming trends at EU and OECD level.  
“Apart from the framework directive, there is a trend at Flemish, European and 
international level to situate waste policy in a broader context. To reduce the 
environmental effects of the waste phase, it is necessary to look at decision taken before the 
material has become waste (…) The final goal is to design material cycles that stay within 
ecological carrying capacity and generate wellbeing for current and future generations. 
This requires a far-reaching integrated policy that is known as ‘sustainable materials 
policy’ or ‘sustainable management of material cycles’” (Vlaamse Regering 2010). 
 
As a departure from the EU Framework Directive, the Materials Decree introduces 
terminology such as “materials”, “material cycle” and “life cycle thinking” that 
should make it possible in future to anchor materials thinking.  
 
All in all, the change in discourse from waste to sustainable materials management is 
undeniable. It is not only taken up in the Materials Decree and propagated by 
OVAM as main government actor, it also seems to find support with all actors 
involved in the waste/materials system: advisory councils, different sectors of the 
industry, knowledge actors such as universities and VITO, and NGO’s (see further). 
Politically, the build up of the discourse coalition benefited from the possibility to 
link it to ongoing developments at European level and to the innovation and green 
economy debate at Flemish level. Plan C was during 2006-2008 the first to fully 
develop the materials discourse and its influence shows throughout the case, first at 
the level of OVAM, later in the translation to different actor and processes.  
 
There is of course an important caveat to be made. While the Plan C discourse was 
still a mixture of transformative and ecological modernisation elements, the 
transformative elements have been filtered out in the new regime discourse. This is 
best visible in the Flemish Materials Programme. In the new materials discourse, 
Plan C has of course been but one factor. The combined influence of developments 
such as the new European Waste Directive, the EU 2020 strategy, the concern of 
industry and policy-makers over the worldwide competition for resources, and the 
innovation discourse for the Flemish economy were stronger, and these discourses 
present here, often co-shaped by agendas of competitiveness and liberalisation, 
supplanted the transformative ideas of Plan C’s agenda. 
 
Evolutions in actor configurations 
 
Does the materials orientation lead to a change of actors in the existing policy 
arrangement? Or do we notice changes with the actors that are already involved? 
And is there a connection with the Plan C process?  
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When examining the main government actor OVAM, it quickly shows that the 
materials discourse has had its impact on OVAM during the past years. The 
discourse change is obvious and is not only translated externally such as in the 
Materials Decree, but also has internal consequences, with as outstanding examples 
an internal reorganisation of the OVAM departments and a strategic plan 2010-2014 
with an explicit materials orientation.  
 
“In a sense, the plan is a consolidation of all preceding developments, such as those around 
the reorientation towards sustainable materials management”, says an OVAM official. In 
the strategic plan, waste and materials are no longer regarded as separate policy lines 
but “in order to reach a green closed loop economy, the classic waste policy will once 
and for all be turned into a sustainable materials policy” (OVAM 2009, p. 7). The plan 
formulates four strategic objectives: reducing the use of primary resources in 
production and consumption, maximally limiting total materials dissipation, 
maximally limiting the use of materials per unit of production or unit of 
consumption, maximally limiting the total environmental impact of materials use. 
While in the past, the focus of attention was on households, OVAM now wants to 
target industry in a double track approach: first, set up ambitious experiments in 
chain management56 with frontrunners; second, optimise eco-efficiency and use of 
secondary materials in the rest of industry.  
 
Meanwhile, OVAM has gone through an internal reorganisation process that is 
meant to prepare the organisation for its role in the coming materials economy. Since 
2010, the former department waste management has been reformed into the 
department waste and materials management. While the old department was 
organised around seven specific waste flows (such as organic waste, household 
waste etc.), the new department is organised around two chain services (“chain 
management and companies” and “chain management and local government”) and a 
policy innovation service. Within each chain service, specific teams are created that 
have the ambition to do the follow-up of a whole production and consumption chain, 
such as a team chemistry and a team biomass that try to cover the chemical and 
biomass cycle respectively. The reorientation is not complete, because the focus 
partly remains on target groups (such as local communities) where the waste 
perspective still dominates. The objective of the policy innovation service is to 
evaluate the policy instruments OVAM currently employs and to formulate ideas for 
innovating instruments in such a way that they contribute to the waste-materials 
shift. It is interesting to note that the head of the new policy innovation service, John 
Wante, has played an important role in Plan C (he was amongst others the OVAM 
member of the first arena in 2006). 
 
In its communication, OVAM has always stressed that it wants to act as an initiator 
of the materials transition in Flanders, but that it cannot be the only one responsible. 
                                                  
56 Chain management (‘ketenbeheer’) is an approach that tries to minimise material use and 
environmental impact throughout the life cycle of a product. 
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Still, there does not seem to be a lack of interest for the new orientation. Established 
actors as well as newcomers are adopting the sustainable materials discourse. Such 
an established actor in the waste system is the private waste management industry, 
grouped in FEBEM. This sector is rapidly repositioning itself from “handlers of 
waste” to “suppliers of materials and fuels from secondary processes”. The sector 
demands its place in the new industrial policy that is being developed at European 
and Flemish level.  
“Europe has its limits regarding primary resources. Therefore, the horizon has to be opened 
to secondary materials of which our region has large quantities available. Environmental 
companies can become the connection between companies that produce waste and side 
streams and those that need resources and fuels. Closing the loop is the core business of our 
environmental companies” (Annaert and Gimmelprez 2011, p. 11).  
 
It is not only government polices that are causing this shift, although they play an 
important role. There is on the one hand a growing demand in the market for 
secondary materials such as recycled plastics, while on the other hand producers are 
starting to cooperate with these environmental companies to design products that 
may be better recyclable and collectable. An interviewee confirms that the mindset of 
the sector has changed profoundly over the last years, but that actual practices are 
presently particularly a case of larger companies in the sector. A lot of companies still 
mainly focus on waste collection and sorting out of waste. Although they do not 
deliver final products under the form of secondary materials, they are part of the 
chain towards that final product. 
  
Perhaps the most important development that is taking place in the actor setting is 
the entrance of actors that were not really part of the waste system, but that will play 
a major role in a new materials system. Two federations and their members are 
currently playing an active role. One is Agoria, the federation of the Belgian 
technology industry, the other is Essenscia, the federation of the chemical and life 
sciences industry. 
 
The technology industry (with sectors such as metals and materials, automotive, 
construction products, automotive, aerospace, plastics and composites) uses ferrous 
metals, non-ferrous metals and plastics as one of its basic ingredients. The use of 
materials in the sector is mainly driven by  economic incentives such as the 
competitiveness of companies.  
“Most companies do not lose sleep over sustainability but over their competitive position. 
One aspect of competitiveness is the cost of materials: if I can sell a product with less 
materials but with the same functionality, then my company acquires a competitive 
advantage. So, economic incentives are the triggers, and the effects, such as using less 
materials, are regarded as an economic added value. For most companies, this is a part of 
their overall strategy” (societal actor). 
 
Still, some parts of the sector, in particular in the non-ferrous metals are being 
confronted with a possible future shortage of materials, partly because of strategic 
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control and increasing competition over scarce resources by countries such as China, 
and partly because most of these metals are not recycled and either end up as waste 
or are illegally exported. This ‘leakage’ of materials and precious metals that could 
be recycled is a growing concern, because if Europe does not have access to them, it 
will seriously hamper the development of new (and green) technologies and 
products. The industry has formulated the concept of urban mining: the city and its 
waste heap of electronic devices as a mine of all kind of metals. An iconic example 
for Flanders is Umicore, which has the world's largest recycling facility for complex 
precious metals and is able to recover around 20 non-ferrous metals. These kind of 
frontrunners show which crucial role industry can play in redesigning the materials 
system and in making visions such as the Plan C leitbild tangible. Although he was 
present as an individual and not as a representative of Agoria, the participation of 
Patrick Van den Bossche (director at Agoria) in the first transition arena of Plan C 
was important for the process and its link with the concerns and aspirations of the 
technology industry. As explained above (4.2.2.), the link between Plan C and 
Agoria broke up and Agoria did not become a member of vzw Plan C, but the 
federation and its member companies have an important voice in the current 
development of materials policy in Flanders.  
 
The chemical industry is traditionally an important sector in Flanders. Members of 
Essenscia got involved in Plan C through the transition pathway Green Synthetics. 
The Plan C discussions capitalised on dynamics that were already playing within the 
chemical industry. The European chemical industry (Cefic) had launched the 
European technology platform SusChem in 2005, with the aim of strengthening the 
innovation potential of the chemical industry. At Flemish level, in 2006, a Roundtable 
of the chemical industry called for the start of new initiatives to strengthen the 
position of Flanders as a top region in chemistry. Plan C and its transition thinking 
then created a frame to bring together frontrunners from the industry and speed up 
thinking. The discussions in the working group that formulated the Green Synthetics 
transition pathway inspired an initiative by Essenscia, called Flanders Strategic 
Initiative for Sustainable Chemistry (FISCH). The FISCH-project tries to combine two 
goals: strengthening the competitive position of the Flemish chemical industry, while 
simultaneously acting as a catalyst for the transition of the chemical industry 
towards sustainable chemistry. The initiative is organised as an open knowledge 
organisation where industry and knowledge centres cooperate in what are intended 
as “new innovative breakthrough collaborative programs”. Consortia are formed 
around projects such as micro alga, microtechnology, separation technology, 
renewable chemicals and valorisation of waste and side streams. Essenscia has 
decided to become a member of the vzw Plan C. Further, just like Agoria, the 
federation and its member companies aspire to an important role in developing 
materials system.  
 
Not only the industry is claiming its place in the new materials economy, the role of  
knowledge actors is also important to support the waste-materials shift. One of the 
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most important actors on clean technology in the Flemish knowledge system is the 
Vlaams Instiuut voor Technologisch Onderzoek (VITO, the Flemish Institute for 
Technological Research), set up in 1991 by the Flemish government as a strategic 
research centre. In September 2008 VITO was restructured in three groups (Industrial 
Innovation, Quality of the Environment, Energy). This last group contains a specific 
unit “Transition Energy and the Environment”, which employs amongst others two 
researchers that investigate the potential of the transition approach for VITO. With 
the announcement in April 2010 of the establishment of a new organisation i-
Cleantech Vlaanderen vzw, intended to coordinate all initiatives in the Flemish clean 
technology sector, the Flemish Minster of Innovation, Ingrid Lieten, assertively 
positioned VITO as actor in the Flemish green economy. The Minister announced 
that i-Cleantech would consist of three organisations, in which VITO plays a central 
role.  Flanders Cleantech Association (FCA) is meant to strengthen the networking in 
the cleantech industry and provide business opportunities for the sector, to create an 
inventory of the Flemish cleantech sector and boost its international image. The 
Environmental and Energy Technology Innovation Platform (MIP) is a funding 
institute for research in cooperation between companies and knowledge actors (see 
also 4.3.2.3). Flanders Transition Arena (FTA) should inform the public about 
significance of the transition to a sustainable economy. I-Cleantech vzw stirred the 
political debate in February 2011 because the Financial Inspection suspected that the 
initiative was merely an umbrella organisation that unnecessarily created new, high-
paid jobs. More important for this analysis is that below the surface and away from 
the media, in particular the FTA caused unrest within circles of Plan C and DuWoBo 
because one of its original objectives was to coordinate all transition initiatives in 
Flanders. Most involved actors feared the dominance of VITO over their processes57. 
 
Meanwhile, VITO and OVAM signed a cooperation agreement on 4 May 2011 to act 
as partners for a green, cyclical economy in Flanders, in particular for stimulating 
sustainable material use. The cooperation focuses on improving eco-efficiency and 
eco-effectiveness in business, through common projects and the creation of platforms 
to stimulate business initiatives. These projects and platforms are primarily aimed at 
frontrunners that are willing to  work with innovative materials, products, services, 
business models.   
 
Other knowledge actors such as the universities are also seeking their position in the 
starting materials transition and the green economy. Important examples include 
KULeuven, that has a front position in materials research with its Materials Research 
                                                  
57 After intense debates about the added value and role of i-Cleantech vzw, the organisation 
was founded on 27 January 2012 and presented to the public on 1 October 2012. Its aim it to 
be a catalyst for the development and deployment of clean technologies in Flanders. It 
focuses on four themes (energy, mobility, materials and water) and has five tasks of which 
one is: supporting existing transition processes in their relation to the clean technology sector, 
and helping to initiate new transition processes.  
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Centre, Ghent University has its Bio-Energy Valley (for bio-based products and bio-
energy) and Hasselt University has created its own Cleantech platform.  
 
So, in the shift to a sustainable materials discourse, we notice different movements in 
the actor configuration. OVAM wants to stay in the lead and is backed up by the 
Materials Decree for claiming that position, but it has to search for support in a 
suddenly broadened field of action that goes beyond its traditional capacity. Industry 
actors see in the materials discourse an opportunity to reposition themselves in a 
way that is in line with how they perceive market opportunities and international 
evolutions (such as competition over scarce resources): the traditional actors in the 
waste sector try to reposition themselves as suppliers of secondary materials; the 
traditional technology and chemical industry wants to reposition itself as a partner in 
a more sustainable, circular economy. Knowledge actors (universities, knowledge 
centres such as VITO) also claim their role in the new orientation. Here, the link with 
the innovation domain is most obvious, and this also a cause of potential tensions, 
e.g. because government agencies such as OVAM and VITO encroach on each other’s 
terrain. Still, all in all, there do not seem to be any major voices that oppose the shift. 
Furthermore, most of these actors cannot be categorised as small players or niche 
actors. The new entrants such as the technological and chemical industry represent 
important sections of the Flemish industry. Their entrance gives the new materials 
orientation more strategic importance. When we compare the composition of vzw 
Plan C with the actors in the materials regime, both are almost interchangeable, 
another proof of how the policy niche has become embedded in the regime 
arrangement. 
 
Evolutions in resources 
 
New actors that enter a policy arrangement automatically imply a change in 
resources that are available and in the balance between different actors. Since the 
transition to a new materials system is only just starting, it is too early to make a 
detailed analysis of the new distribution of resources but some elements can be noted. 
 
The most important change in resources comes from the new actors, such as the 
technology and chemical industry. These companies and their federations are very 
influential in the Flemish and Belgian economy as a whole, as well as in the decision-
making surrounding socio-economic political priorities. Furthermore, they can count 
on the growing budgets from innovation funds. An example is SIM, the Strategisch 
Initiatief Materialen (Strategic Initiative Materials) that was initiated by Agoria in June 
2009, in cooperation with universities and research centres and the major materials 
producing and materials processing companies (including AGC Flat Glass, Agfa 
Gevaert, Arcelor-Mittal, Bekaert, Recticel, Solvay, Umicore). As part of the Flanders 
in Action strategy, the Flemish government invested 15 million Euro in SIM in 2009, 
and 20 million Euro yearly from 2010 onwards. Its aim is to strengthen the 
competitive position of the Flemish materials industry through basic materials 
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research and the establishment of knowledge platforms that should support 
industrial valorisation of findings.  
 
Another example form the innovation sector is the MIP3 fund that was launched in 
October 2010. It provides 5 million Euro for companies and research institutes that 
want to develop sustainable technologies and products. The manual for writing 
projects under the MIP3-project call explicitly situates the projects in a transition 
framework: “Within transition thinking MIP-projects are considered experiments in 
the transition to a more sustainable economy. These experiments help us to make the 
abstract concept of a sustainable economy more concrete” (MIP, p. 4). Projects in the 
materials sphere have to take closing of materials cycle as starting point and the 
concept of Cradle to Cradle is promoted as guideline for projects. 
 
In the framework of its new industrial policy, the Flemish government created the 
TINA-fund (Transformation, Innovation and Acceleration Fund), that is operational 
since 30 March 2011 under the Participatie Maatschappij Vlaanderen (PMV), and that 
has a capital of 200 million Euros at its disposal. The fund invests in industrial 
projects of consortia of companies, with the spearhead clusters of the governmental 
agreement 2009-2014 as priorities. Of the six spearheads, at least three can be of direct 
relevance for the transition to sustainable materials management: “logistics, transport 
and supply chain management”, “new materials, nanotechnology and processing 
industry” and “energy and environment, including smart electricity grids”. 
 
So, new actors such as (the members of) Agoria and Essenscia bring in important 
financial and lobbying power. Furthermore they succeed in attracting support from 
traditional innovation funds. This seems less the case with the actors that until now 
dominated the waste system. In particular OVAM, which is currently taking the lead 
in the materials orientation, cannot count on extra financial means for the moment, 
even though its tasks are expanding and getting more complex under a sustainable 
materials orientation. Further, it is obvious that Plan C with its hoped for yearly 
budget of around 465.000 Euro in the cooperation structure and 200.000 Euro yearly 
in the vzw structure, will be a small player in the materials system that is taking 
shape.  
 
On the other hand, the sustainable materials discourse has acquired legitimacy 
through interlinked policy initiatives at different levels and OVAM has been 
recognised as one of the Flemish initiators and frontrunners. The legitimacy for 
developing initiatives and policy around sustainable materials management and a 
greener economy seem high. All important policy documents in this respect mention 
the materials transition. It furthermore increases its legitimacy through interlinked 
policy initiatives at different levels, in particular the above mentioned European and 
OECD policies. 
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The growing legitimacy also shows in the decision of the Minister of the 
Environment to support the creation of a Policy Research Centre on sustainable 
materials. As part of its science policy, the Flemish government finances so-called 
Policy Research Centres since 1999. These centres are collaborations between 
research groups from different universities and are expected to deliver policy 
relevant research in a wide range of policy fields. In July 2011, the Flemish 
government launched a call for a third generation of Policy Research Centres for the 
period 2012-2016, that also contained a research centre on sustainable materials 
management. This idea had originated in OVAM, after which OVAM had been able 
to find support with the Minister. The new research centre SuMMa will do research 
on themes such as a system innovation approach to materials management, 
monitoring and evaluation, the link with socio-economic development, legal 
conditions and multi-actor governance. It is headed by Karel Van Acker, who is also 
president of Plan C. The research themes of the centre will be a welcome addition to 
current research in materials that is almost exclusively technologically oriented (such 
as in universities, VITO or SIRRIS, the research centre of Agoria). 
 
Evolutions in rules 
 
Under what form does the materials discourse find a reflection in rules and do these 
rules differ from the waste regime as it existed around 2005? The most visible form 
has been mentioned a few times already: the Materials Decree, which is the Flemish 
implementation form of the Waste Framework Directive, and replaces the former 
Waste Decree (dating from 1981 and several times renewed, see 4.1.). The Materials 
Decree provides a legal basis to broaden waste policy to materials policy. The Decree 
is again a framework decree that has to be further specified in a set of definitions, 
rules etc. The former VLAREA, that bundled all implementing orders for waste (see 
4.1.3), has therefore been updated to VLAREMA (Vlaams Reglement voor het duurzaam 
beheer van Materiaalkringlopen en Afvalstoffen, Flemish regulation for the sustainable 
management of material cycles and waste). VLAREMA was approved by the Flemish 
government on 17 February 2012 and contains all definitions, rules such as those for 
end of waste and extended producer responsibility, regulations for collecting and 
recycling of waste, environmental levies and taxes. 
 
As discussed, the discourse in the Materials Decree goes several steps further than 
the Directive. However, this does not imply that the rules immediately go a lot 
further than Europe requires, but the Materials Decree has conceptually been built in 
such a way that it provides a legal basis not only for the management of waste, but 
also for the management of materials and material chains. For example, under its 
Article 4, the waste hierarchy is reformulated as a materials hierarchy in such a way 
that it has the potential to focus policy instruments not only on waste streams, but 
also on non-waste materials streams. This means that it becomes possible to define 
conditions for the use of materials. Another example is that the extended producer 
responsibility has been relaxed so that it becomes possible to go beyond the current 
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acceptance obligation. Under the acceptance obligation, producers are only 
responsible for waste that has been collected through their collection system. The 
system stimulates separate collection and recycling, but is unsuccessful in 
stimulating greener products or ecodesign. The new proposal creates the possibility 
to make producers and even each actor in the chain between the extraction of a 
resource and its end-use, responsible for all waste that results from products they 
bring to the market. It also allows the introduction of new instruments to stimulate 
prevention of waste and materials use. But as an OVAM official remarks:  
“However, when you look at the hard obligations, then [the Materials Decree]  is restricted 
to traditional waste policy. You cannot say that the Materials Decree will contain more 
stringent rules than the Waste Framework Directive. So, on the level of hard rules we just 
apply what Europe says. But conceptually, the philosophy with which it has been made and 
the potential it contains, go a lot further than the Directive” (civil servant). 
 
The real impact of the Materials Decree will thus depend on how over the following 
years the legislation and policy instruments are formulated and implemented. In 
dialogue with relevant stakeholders, OVAM wants to invest in a reformulation of 
policy instruments such as implementation plans, a revision of economic instruments 
such as environmental levies or a different implementation of extended producer 
responsibility. To develop proposals for the renewal of these policy instruments 
OVAM has set up a new division within OVAM, the division Policy Innovation (see 
also 4.3.2.2). 
 
An element that is repeatedly stressed by the involved actors is that the broadening 
from waste to materials requires more consultation and harmonisation between 
different policy domains, in the first instance with domains that belong more or less 
to environmental policy, such as renewable energy policy, extraction of minerals in 
Flanders, and environmental permits policy. OVAM officials expect that this process 
of cooperation will lead to a reformulation of several policies, but that it can also 
create new fields of tension where a solution will have to be sought. 
 
For example, in the cooperation with ALBON (the division that is amongst other 
things responsible for policy on extraction of minerals in Flanders), the possibility for 
the use of alternatives for primary minerals extraction in Flanders is an important 
theme. The policy of the Flemish government is to make minerals extraction in 
Flanders more sustainable and to extract no more than absolutely necessary. This 
means that alternatives for primary materials, so-called secondary minerals, become 
more important. The new Materials Decree can have an impact on the availability of 
these alternatives, more in particular: it broadens the potential for deployment of 
certain waste streams as secondary minerals. For example, the Materials Decree 
introduces the concept of a “materials declaration” that can be granted to a producer 
and states that a particular material is no or no longer waste, thus providing the 
opportunity to bring it back into the materials cycle.” 
 “When they ask us for alternatives to primary extraction, we automatically end up with 
OVAM, because alternatives means either recycled waste, excavated soil or dredged 
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materials, and all these fall under the competencies of OVAM. They are also responsible for 
the legislation. The new Materials Decree is a very good evolution for the sections waste 
and dredged materials. You have this materials declaration, the whole philosophy changes, 
the change from what is considered waste to what is materials will come earlier according 
to the legislation (…) In fact, the Decree has led to a better understanding of each other’s 
needs.”  (civil servant) 
 
In another example, the cooperation with VEA (Flemish Energy Angecy), the 
question of the role of biomass and of waste as a materials source or as an energy 
source has a central role. Under the European Directive on the use of energy from 
renewable resources (2009/28/EC) Belgium has an objective of producing 13% of its 
energy from renewable sources by 2020. Since this is being regarded as an ambitious 
objective, input from all possible sources will be necessary. This implies possible 
interference with materials policy on several levels. A first level is the use of biomass: 
in order to fulfil its obligations on renewable energy, Flanders counts on 70% 
production of renewable energy from biomass. However, biomass will also be 
necessary as a resource in a bio-based chemical industry, or it is needed as resource 
in the manufacturing industry (such as the wood industry). A second level is the 
incineration of waste to produce energy instead of recycling the waste as materials, 
which threatens to undermine the recycling industry. In both cases, the subsidy 
system for the production of green energy – such as the green electricity certificates – 
attracts biomass or waste as a resource for energy production instead of a resource 
for closed material loops.  
“Current policy already tries to take account of some of these aspects. The Flemish 
legislation gives priority to material recycling and to wood as an industrial resource, which 
cannot qualify for green electricity certificates. We are currently working on an action plan 
for green warmth, but will follow the same line there. The problem is less a Flemish one, 
because of our specific legislation that prohibits support for these uses, but the problem is 
rather Europe and also Wallonia, where they do not have these bans. Our fear is that these 
flows will be exported abroad or to Wallonia to use it as renewable energy. In that case it 
cannot be used for our wood sector, nor for energy, so we lose twice.” (civil servant)  
  
From the discussion so far it can be concluded that, in general terms, with the 
Materials Decree a framework is in place for formulating new formal rules from a 
materials perspective, but that the rules themselves are still under discussion and 
construction. The way they are made concrete will be one of the determinants in how 
far and how fast a materials regime can develop that differs in its practices from the 
existing, but changing waste regime. 
 
As far as the rules of policy-making are concerned, there were by the end of 2011 no 
major differences with from what until then had been the case in the waste regime. 
As discussed earlier (4.1.3.3), in the development of Flemish environmental policy 
government has generally held control, although it draws in stakeholders and target 
groups to create more involvement and develop a better founded and supported 
policy. OVAM has developed a tradition of stakeholder consultation and has a good 
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reputation as to how it conducts its consultations. This was confirmed again during 
the preparation of the Materials Decree. In their common advice, the SERV and 
MINA Councils “find that OVAM has treated the process transparently and that 
there has been consultation with the involved stakeholders” (MINA/SERV 2011, p. 
12). An interviewee mentions that “OVAM has given a lot of room for input (…) OVAM 
plays that game earnestly” (societal  actor). 
 
Although the government and OVAM stay in control, there are indications that they 
are looking for a broader approach. The aforementioned Materials Declaration of 
June 2011 uses terms such as “multi-stakeholder processes”, “support for 
frontrunners”, “government as partner and facilitator”, terminology that is familiar 
from transition language. More importantly, in the second half of 2011 OVAM was 
more or less obliged to consciously reflect on the governance model for the evolution 
towards a materials regime. First, the Materials Decree and its discourse introduced 
new actors and new rules and thus new relations in the arrangement. Second, 
sustainable materials management became one of the transversal projects to revive 
ViA and thus part of the socio-economic innovation domain, where it should 
contribute to the ambition to make Flanders one of the top 5 regions in Europe. Third, 
Plan C had remained in the Materials Decree (even though not in the Eigen Vermogen 
form, but as a coordination structure) and OVAM had to decide what to do with it in 
the light of the previous two points. And fourth, the new research centre SuMMa that 
started in January 2012 also had to be given a place. The ideas about how to structure 
the governance of the starting materials system had taken shape by early 2012. The 
intention is that OVAM takes the overall lead and focuses in particular on short- and 
medium-term policy development. Plan C gets the task of further developing ideas 
for the long-term development of the system and starting experiments that are 
translation of that vision. SuMMa should through knowledge development support 
the whole. The coordination structure that was originally intended for Plan C should 
ease the communication and fine-tuning with the innovation department EWI, the 
general policy department DAR and VITO.   
 
In sum, it can be said that the change in discourse finds a translation in the formal 
rules of the Materials Decree, at least potentially. The hard legal requirements of the 
Decree still stick to the requirements of the Waste Framework Directive, but several 
openings have been made in the Decree that allow for the development of policy on 
the basis of a materials orientation. The actual form governance will take in the new 
materials system is still under formation. The well-known approach of government 
taking the lead and searching for back-up from stakeholders through consultations 
seemed to prevail until 2011. However, the developments around waste/materials 
and innovation obliged OVAM to rethink the governance of the system. The general 
idea of how that governance should be structured, differs from the old regime. Most 
obvious is the task division between short- to medium term policy development 
(OVAM), the intention to involve Plan C in long-term development, the support by a 
new research centre, and the coordination structure that should ease cooperation 
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with other departments. Simultaneously, in June 2011 consultation with relevant 
stakeholders was set up through the Roundtable on Sustainable Materials 
Management, that since June 2012 has been followed by the Vlaams 
Materialenprogramma (Flemish Materials Programme), which contains amongst other 
things a steering group of government and stakeholders. 
 
 
4.4. INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 
 
The analysis in this chapter shows that the waste system, such as it developed during 
the eighties and the nineties, is under pressure. A series of developments at 
international, European and national/regional level indicate that we may be 
witnessing the start of an orientation where materials are no longer passing through 
our societies in a linear way, but where closed loop economies and sustainable 
materials management become the new norms. Current practices in almost all 
countries, in industry, with consumers and in policy plans are however still far from 
that new norm. Over the last decennia, Flanders has been a trendsetter in the waste 
regime and it seems willing to take on a leading role in the new materials economy 
as well. With the start of Plan C in 2006, OVAM showed its early awareness of these 
new upcoming developments. The transition management approach that was used to 
initiate Plan C succeeded in creating a new discourse for Flanders about sustainable 
materials management and in starting a network of frontrunners that, certainly until 
2008, was the main voice in Flanders on sustainable materials management.  
 
Over the last years, Plan C has not been able to keep that position. This can partly be 
explained by problems in the internal functioning of the network: the trial-and-error 
process of organisation and substance development has been hindered by problems 
such as a lack of funding to support the process and the development of experiments, 
a search by involved actors to define their role and position vis-a-vis each other, the 
difficult translation of the discourse into action, and uncertainty about the future 
status of the network. Most of the informal rules of transition management only seem 
to work temporarily or are difficult to apply for longer periods of time, given the 
existing relations between actors as well as the policy context in which the process 
had to function.  
 
At least equally important for explaining the current position of Plan C are 
developments in the context: pressures at landscape, regime and niche level lead to a 
situation where different kind of actors (government, industry, knowledge sector, 
ngo’s) in different policy domains (waste/materials, socio-economic innovation) are 
catching up with Plan C. It can in fact be argued that in particular after 2009, political 
and (international) societal dynamics in the materials system have accelerated and 
have more or less overtaken the TM-process Plan C. The result of these dynamics is 
that a lot of actors have moved towards Plan C’s position and also occupy part of the 
SMM-terrain, invariably supported by more financial resources and organisational 
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capacity. From the lone player on a previously almost unoccupied field, Plan C has 
become one small player among many in a field that quickly gets crowded. As long 
as the environment did not change too much, Plan C had its role for the involved 
actors. But the crisis in actor involvement that Plan C went through during 2010-2011, 
seems to indicate that once the game gets serious and regime incumbents enter the 
playing field, the role of a multi-stakeholder platform that cannot answer the 
question “what’s in it for me”, may quickly be played out. 
 
The mentioned dynamics are clearly visible in the waste and materials system, in 
first instance in its policy arrangement. At Flemish level, the discourse has in a few 
years changed from waste and the waste hierarchy towards sustainable materials 
management and it is adopted by all main actors in the system. The sustainable 
materials discourse is no longer something reserved for a niche actor such as Plan C 
but is adopted by all regime actors. However, only the ecological modernisation part 
is present at regime level. In the actor dimension change is clearly visible, in 
particular in the repositioning of the existing waste industry and the entrance of 
newcomers from the technological and chemical industry. As important actors in the 
Flemish industry, these newcomers change the distribution of resources in the 
system. Meanwhile, although its tasks are expanding and getting more complex, 
OVAM, the main government actor until now, cannot count on extra financial means. 
Obvious signs of change are also visible in the rules dimension of the policy 
arrangement: although no new ‘hard’ rules have yet been installed, the Materials 
Decree creates openings that allow for a renewal of policy on the basis of a materials 
orientation.  
 
Plan C has been a factor in these evolutions on Flemish level. It has in particular had 
influence on the discourse and on the orientations of different actors. However, as 
amply demonstrated, Plan C is just one influence among many. In particular 
structural transformation processes at the landscape level, such as EU policy 
initiatives on resource efficiency and raw materials, and the growing competition 
worldwide for resources, are hugely influential for current and future system 
developments. 
 
Under influence of these dynamics, the governance structure is changing in order to 
be able to cope with the challenge of the starting materials regime and the fact that 
the sustainable materials theme has become one of the spearheads in the socio-
economic innovation programme ViA. In the structure that is taking shape, OVAM is 
the leading government agency and concentrates mainly on short- and mid-term 
policy development, vzw Plan C should develop the long-term orientation, SuMMa 
should accelerate knowledge development, while cooperation with other 
government agencies is organised through the cooperation agreement with EWI, 
DAR and VITO. Cooperation with societal actors is sought through the Vlaams 
Materialenprogramma (Flemish Materials Programme), where an agreement has been 
signed between the government, industry, knowledge centres and other societal 
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partners. Plan C seems to have become nested within a broader regime arrangement, 
with a discourse and an actor composition that is very similar to that of the policy 
regime. 
 
After the analysis of DuWoBo and the evolutions around sustainable housing and 
building in the next chapter, I will in chapter 6 return to a discussion and a 
comparison of the kind of policy renewal that has taken place in Plan C and DuWoBo, 
and go more thoroughly into the processes and mechanisms that have been at work 
in the two case studies. 
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5.  
Transition management in Flemish 
housing and building policy.  
The role and experiences of DuWoBo. 
 
 
 
 
 
If there is one expression that is repeated over and over again when it comes to 
Flemish housing and building practices, it is without any doubt “De Vlaming heeft een 
baksteen in zijn maag” (A Fleming has a brick in his stomach). The expression refers to 
the fact that the ultimate dream of the Flemish population seems to be to build an 
own house or at the very least be the owner of one, if possible in the countryside or 
on the outskirts of cities and towns. Recent figures show that almost 75% of the 
houses in Flanders is privately owned (De Decker e.a. 2010). Moreover, houses in 
Flanders are spread all over the territory so that the country is characterised by a 
high degree of sprawl, suburbanisation and ribbon development. The ecological 
consequences of this housing model, such as the associated high use of energy, 
materials and water, were one of the important reasons why the Flemish government 
and more in particular its environmental department introduced a transition 
management process in sustainable housing and building, known as DuWoBo. 
 
This chapter analyses the experiences of the DuWoBo transition management process 
in the context of the historical and current evolutions in the housing and building 
system and its policy arrangement. As discussed in chapter 3 (3.2.4), to delineate the 
analysis I build upon the system analysis that the participants of the DuWoBo 
process themselves agreed upon in the first phase of the process. This implies that 
‘delineation’ should still be interpreted very broadly, because the array of themes 
and policy domains that DuWoBo deems relevant ranges from spatial planning, 
housing and housing culture, energy, environment, health to aspects of economic, 
social and innovation policy. I start in part 5.1. with an analysis of the historical 
growth of the housing and building system and its policies. Keeping in mind the 
broad array of themes, I paint the outlines of the historical evolution of the housing 
and building system in which DuWoBo was introduced in 2004. Part 5.2. then 
analyses the DuWoBo process itself: how and why was it introduced? How did it 
grow? What are its characteristics and how did it evolve and function as a policy 
niche? In part 5.3. the question is what the current evolutions are in the housing and 
building regime and its policy arrangement and what kind of interaction there has 
been with DuWoBo. The description of events runs until end December 2011, with 
some references to evolutions early 2012. Part 5.4. draws interim conclusions.  
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5.1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FLEMISH HOUSING AND BUILDING BEFORE 2004 
 
Although in relation to housing and building the Fleming is often characterised as 
possessing a brick in his (or her) stomach, this is of course no genetic feature, but the 
result of how over several decennia specific societal choices have been made, how 
the power relations behind these choices have played out, how regulation has been 
developed in this vein and how the resulting market has shaped behaviour and 
preferences of actors. Different historical accounts of Flemish housing and building 
that have been published over the last years (De Decker, 2004, De Decker, 2008, De 
Vos, 2012, Kesteloot, 2003, Loeckx and De Meulder, 2003, Van Herck and Avermaete, 
2006a) mention a very comparable set of “political choices and actions, cultural 
convictions and economic possibilities that reinforced each other in daily practice 
over and over again in the dominant direction” (De Decker, 2008, p. 155). 
 
5.1.1. The foundations: anti-urban policies from the 19th century onwards 
 
The outlines of the dominant direction in housing and building were laid down in 
the nineteenth century when the needs of the industrialisation of Belgium combined 
with responses to social unrest to initiate the first housing policies. The background 
of these policies was an “anti-urban policy and attitude” (Kesteloot, 2003, Loeckx and 
De Meulder, 2003). The Liberal and Catholic elites that ruled Belgium were afraid of 
the city for two reasons. First, cities were from old dirty and unhealthy places, 
something that was further aggravated by the effects of early industrialisation. 
Second, they were also politically dangerous as places of social unrest and political 
agitation, decline in moral standards and secularisation. Furthermore, the catholic 
power base was situated in smaller towns and in the countryside, while the socialist 
influence grew mainly in the cities. The class struggle was fought with a spatial 
strategy that followed two tracks: policies to bring workers to the city for working 
but keep them out for dwelling, and policies to promote home ownership to 
discipline the masses (Kesteloot, 2003, De Decker, 200858).  
 
The first influential measures to make industrial centres easily accessible, while 
workers could continue living in the countryside, were the development of a dense 
railway net and (after 1885) of a light rail net, combined with the introduction of 
cheap railway seasons through social tariffs (already in 1869). The possibility for 
maintaining a vegetable garden in the countryside and keeping some small live stock 
was also a kind of cheap unemployment insurance in natura (Kesteloot, ibid.). After 
the bloody workers revolt of 1886, the government approved several social laws, the 
first housing law of 9 August 1889 being one of the most important. This law gave 
workers the opportunity to become home owner with the help of tax exemptions and 
cheap social loans (Doms e.a., 2001). Owners and families who were saving for a 
                                                  
58 De Decker (2008) mentions a third track as a structuring feature of the Belgian housing 
model – absence of spatial planning policies that facilitate sprawl – but this is mainly a post-
WWII feature. See 5.1.2. 
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house were even given an extra vote. The law “prevented the construction of large 
quarters for workers and fostered the dispersal of the working class (…) The 
possession of a house of one’s own was, since the beginning of the 20th century, part 
of the grammar of living of a normal Belgian household” (De Decker 2008, p. 159). 
Individual home ownership was promoted as an ideal because it made the workers 
part of the owners class and because the obligation to pay a loan would diminish 
their appetite for strikes (Kesteloot, 2003). Also Witte et al. (2009), in their 
authoritative political history of Belgium, state that political and social concessions 
were granted out of self-interest of the ruling classes: the working class had to be 
turned into an ally of the establishment, without threatening economic liberalism and 
the essence of the Belgian state. By giving workers a chance to save some capital and 
own a modest house, they could become integral members of the liberal system (ibid., 
p. 118). The influence of the social doctrine of the Catholic Church – such as in the 
Papal Letter Rerum Novarum (1891) – should also not be underestimated, because it 
provided the ruling Catholic party with an ideology to promote individual 
ownership and family values as opposed to collective values and working class 
interests. Since the Catholic party had an absolute majority from 1870 till the First 
World War59, a different housing and building policy was never on the agenda 
(Kesteloot, 2003, De Decker, 2008).  
 
After the First World War, the introduction of universal single male suffrage obliged 
the Catholics to accept coalition governments with socialists or liberals, although 
they remained by far the dominant party. Still, this new power balance during the 
interbellum period allowed to introduce new accents in housing policies. In 1919, the 
Nationale Maatschappij voor Goedkope Woningen en Woonvertrekken (NMGWW, National 
Association for Cheap Houses and Living Rooms) was founded under socialist 
direction, with the goal of building cheap rental houses for low income families. 
Social housing policy during this period was dominated by the idea of garden 
neigbourhoods (‘tuinwijken’), neigbourhoods with modest houses, surrounded by a 
lot of green, where collective services had to prevail, financially and organisationally 
supported by tenants cooperatives. Although the model countered private home 
ownership, it is telling that also the socialists preferred to protect the workers from 
the vices of the city and house them on the outskirts of cities (Kesteloot, 2003). 
Practical and financial problems, as well as new catholic-liberal dominated 
legislation, started changing the social housing model from the early 1920s onwards, 
allowing and even stimulating the sale and ownership of social houses (Doms e.a., 
2001). Examples of initiatives that further stimulated the dominant ownership model 
are the 1922 Law Moyersoens that introduced a premium for home acquisition and 
the foundation in 1935 of a second social housing cooperation, the Nationale 
Maatschappij voor de Kleine Landeigendom  (NMKL, National Association for Small 
Land Ownership). While the NMGWW concentrated on social rental projects in 
urban environments, the NMKL constructed social houses for sale in the countryside 
and had the explicit aim of luring unemployed workers back to the countryside and 
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stimulating self-sufficiency, exemplified among other things in the fact that the 
NMKL loans were for houses with a vegetable garden and small livestock (De Vos, 
2012). After the Second World War, several of the central features that composed the 
housing and building system since the 19th century were retained and further 
intensified: private home ownership, a small social renting sector, anti-urban policies 
that promoted suburban living and the countryside, housing and spatial policy 
subservient to economic policies. But with the advancement of the welfare state and 
the consumer society, also new features were introduced. 
 
5.1.2. After the second World War: expansion, spatial chaos and economic 
weight  
 
After the war, housing shortage was a first order political problem in most European 
countries. In 1945, the shortage for Belgium was estimated at 250.000 dwellings, 
taking into account the expected demographic growth (Theunis, 2006). A large 
portion of the houses (67%) dated from before 1918 and were in bad shape (without a 
toilet in the house or connection to electricity or a sewage system) (Van Herck and 
Avermaete, 2006b). As can be expected from the preceding history, opinions 
diverged about what could count as efficient solutions for the problem. The 
Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP, Christian Peoples Party), the Christian-democrat 
successor to the Catholic party, favoured the building or purchase of single-family 
dwellings in the suburbs or in the countryside. The Belgische Socialistische Partij  (BSP, 
Belgian Socialist Party), that had become the second party after the war, wanted to 
build collective social housing projects in and around the cities, with high-rise blocks 
as one of the solutions. Apart from these differences, all three major political families 
– Christian-democrats, socialists, liberals – saw the building sector as a crucial factor 
in the post-war reconstruction of the country. In 1944 already, a social pact had been 
agreed between employers and a number of socialists and Christian democrats. In 
return for social peace, the employers agreed with a social security system set up by 
the state. “The state became an economic coordinator of the planned economy on the 
condition that it guaranteed social peace and promoted class reconciliation” (Witte et 
al., 2990, p. 227-233). Ownership of a building lot, a private house and later the 
purchase of a car and durable consumption goods formed an integral part of policies 
to boost purchasing power and the standard of living and to create a market for the 
mass production of industry. And just like in previous decennia, policy-makers did 
not only pursue socio-economic objectives through housing and building policies, 
but also political ones, such as the promotion of social stability through home 
ownership (Reynebeau, 1999). 
 
During the socialist-Catholic government Spaak (1947-1949), two pieces of legislation 
were approved that founded the post-war housing and building regime, namely the 
catholic Law De Taeye (29 May 1948) and the socialist Law Brunfaut (15 April 1949). 
The most influential one is without doubt the Law De Taeye, named after the 
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Christian-democrat Minister Alfred De Taeye60. The law promoted private initiative 
in the building of cheap, functional and hygienic houses for single families. It 
contained four important elements that together turned it into a successful piece of 
legislation (Theunis, 2006). First, a building subsidy for everyone that wanted to 
build a new house according to the criteria in the law. Second, a state guarantee for 
loans that encouraged banks to allow loans up to 100%. Third, norms for what a 
‘good’ house should be, such as norms for living area, layout, comfort and 
equipment of the house. Fourth, a purchase subsidy for families, often the less 
wealthy, that wanted to buy a house from a social housing cooperation (which in 
turn stimulated these cooperations to build less rental houses). The Law helped to 
solve the main housing shortage problem by the mid 1950s. In 1954, the 100.000th 
building subsidy was granted and by 1973 411.000 De Taeye houses had been erected 
(ibid., p. 71). Typical is that the majority of these were not built by large building 
companies, which are scarce in Belgium, but that private control over construction is 
the norm. In contrast with other European countries where post-war housing 
shortage was solved through social rental housing policies, in Belgium the solution 
was found in building new houses through private initiative of individual families, 
stimulated by premiums (Winters et al., 2007). 
 
The Law De Taeye is not only the cornerstone of the Belgian model of acquisition of 
property through individual building (Kesteloot, 2003), it is also generally recognised 
as one of the main foundations for the Flemish “wild dwelling” and the typical 
urbanisation model (Van Herck and Avermaete, 2006b, De Decker, 2008). Because 
spatial policy was lacking, there were almost no restrictions on where houses could 
be built. The government hoped for an even spread of the population over the 
territory and an even development of the country.  Municipalities were allowed to 
develop their own subsidies to attract builders, usually with as main objective to 
bring in as much wealthy tax-payers as possible. Furthermore, in particular the 
Christian-democrats still stimulated a decentralised housing policy because a single-
family dwelling on the countryside was still seen as a step to “moral uplift, social 
peace and happiness” (Minister De Taeye cited in De Vos 2012, p. 34). 
 
The combination of this specific housing and building model, with a lack of spatial 
planning and a mobility policy focused on car mobility caused from the fifties 
onwards a flight from the city and an enormous suburbanisation. The ongoing 
construction activity demanded new building plots that were found on the 
countryside or on the fringes of cities, where the plots were cheapest. Because of a 
lack of spatial planning until the early sixties, houses became spread alongside the 
access roads to town and on numerous new allotment schemes, resulting in sprawl 
and ribbon development. Without good roads and private transport, and 
consequently the purchase of a car, it is of course impossible to live in the 
countryside while working in the city. The need for a well-developed road network 
was already felt in the 1950s. In 1955, a Road Fund was founded for road 
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construction and in the late 1960s attention went in particular to motorways: between 
1969 and 1973, the kilometres motorway almost doubled from 420 to 997 kilometres. 
Meanwhile, car property grew from 735.000 in 1960 (35% of families) to 2.060.000 in 
1971 (60% of families) (De Vos, 2012, p. 204). Over the years, Flanders became the 
region with Europe’s densest road network.  
 
On the level of the individual house, this also initiated a need for parking and 
garages. Because in the 1950s cars were still regarded as a luxury for families with 
modest incomes, the Law De Taeye discouraged car property: a garage was not 
considered part of the basic comfort of a house and building applications with garage 
were refused. But by 1964 a garage could be subsidised in a De Taeye house (ibid., p. 
207). Meanwhile in the cities, parking facilities could not keep up with car property 
and streets became cluttered with cars. De Meulder (2006) remarks that Belgian 
policy has always been characterised by intensive infrastructure policies (railways, 
roads, tramlines) that until the second World War focused on the commuting of 
workers in order to contain migration to the cities. After the war, mobility policy also 
supported the opposite movement of the middle classes, namely suburbanisation 
away from the cities. 
 
On 29 March 1962, the Organieke wet op de stedenbouw en de ruimtelijk ordening (Law on 
urban development and spatial planning) was approved, that introduced a 
hierarchical system of plans between policy levels and procedures for obtaining 
building and allotment permissions. The law provided for a hierarchal system of 
plans at six different levels, but only the regional plans (gewestplannen) and allotment 
plans (verkavelingsplannen) became the determinants of actual developments (Voets et 
al., 2010).  The law formed the basis for 25 regional plans for Flanders, but since the 
approval of the regional plans with detailed and legally-binding allocation of 
functions for each parcel of ground took until the end of the 1970s, this could not 
stop the proliferation of building all over the territory. On the contrary, the long time 
lag boosted political clientship: politicians eagerly responded to the demand of 
municipalities and private individuals to approve new building lots. Meanwhile, 
since allotment permits were valid indefinitely, land became a lucrative investment, 
leading to an enormous land speculation (ibid.). When the regional plans were 
finally established, even in the most backward parts of the countryside areas were 
coloured on the map as housing zones, and these were also systematically opened for 
new allotment schemes. The result was the spatial sprawl that is so typical of 
Flanders and that has led to characterisations such as ‘nebula city’, ‘diffuse city’ and 
‘network urbanity’ (Loeckx and De Meulder, 2003). Reynebeau remarks that the 
positive flipside of the spatial and mobility problems is that “Belgium has hardly had 
any housing shortage and its inhabitants can live spaciously, each one like a lord in 
his castle” (Reynebeau 1999, p. 155). 
 
It took until 1997 before the Ruimtelijk Structuurplan Vlaanderen (RSV, Spatial 
Structure Plan Flanders) defined a vision for the spatial development of Flanders. 
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The RSV wanted to counter the ongoing fragmentation of the territory, amongst 
others things by introducing a distinction between urban areas and countryside. 
Cities had to be become attractive again for living and the remaining open space had 
to be protected. The vision of the RSV was formulated as “Flanders, open and urban”, 
and one of the main structuring principle was gedeconcentreerde bundeling 
(deconcentrated bundling). This principle is based on the pragmatic observation that 
over the decennia, Flanders had experienced a deconcentrated development that 
could not just be reversed. Henceforth, however, development had to be bundled 
around existing centres and economic knots and gates. This had consequences for 
housing. The RSV projected that between 1992 and 2007 400.000 new houses were 
needed in Flanders. Concentrated bundling required that at least 60% of the new 
houses had to be realised in cities, while maximum 40% can be built in the 
countryside. This 60-40 division was the actual situation in 1991 and the RSV hoped 
to be able to maintain it. Other norms were introduced as well: the minimum 
housing density was set at 25 houses per hectare in city areas and 15 houses per 
hectare in the countryside. The RSV formed the basis of a new Decree on Spatial 
Planning (18 May 1999) that formalised new instruments and procedures.  
 
In spite of the intentions of the RSV, dynamics that have taken shape over several 
decennia cannot easily be reversed. Even with new investments in cities and a new 
attractiveness of cities, by the start of the 21st century, suburbanisation continued and 
policy initiatives had not yet succeeded in reversing the trend. Furthermore, after 
1999 the new government with a liberal minister of spatial planning – Minister Dirk 
Van Mechelen – already started weakening the spatial ambitions of the RSV. Instead 
of sticking to the appointed housing zones, he made a fast utilisation possible of 
reserve zones, and he followed a tolerant policy towards out-of-zone houses and 
companies. 
 
Still, meanwhile on the terrain a combination of trends started to have new effects. 
The somewhat stricter spatial policy combined with land and housing speculation, 
demographic growth and smaller families, low interest rates, increasing purchasing 
power and inflation. This combination initiated a continuous rise in the price of 
building lots during the 1990s. This in turn began changing the balance between the 
choice for building a new house versus buying an existing house and renovating it. 
While at the end of the 1980s newly built houses made up 75% of Flemish 
construction activity, this had decreased to 65% by 2005 (VCB, 2005). To counter the 
scarcity of building plots and to comply with stricter spatial norms, building 
contractors started to offer smaller plots, built less detached houses and more semi-
detached houses, row houses or apartments on allotments. While in the early 1980s, 
single-family dwellings made up more than 80% of newly built houses, they were at 
less than 50% in the first years of the 21st century. Instead, more apartments were 
being built (VCB, 2005). 
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These recent evolutions should however not lead to a distorted view of the general 
picture: of all Flemish houses, almost 80% are single-family dwellings and 20% 
apartments or apartment-like buildings. 42% of the houses are detached houses, 26% 
are semi-detached and 32% are row houses. In the cities the percentage of row 
houses is higher and in cities like Antwerp and Ghent more than 50% of rental 
houses are apartments (De Decker et al., 2010) (Table 5.1). 
 
 % 
Housing type 
Single family dwelling 
Apartment 
Caravan 
Others  
 
79,5 
19,8 
0,1 
0,6 
Housing type 
Single family dwelling with garden 
Single family dwelling without garden 
Apartment with garden 
Apartment without garden 
 
75 
7 
3 
15 
Building type 
Detached housing 
Semi-detached housing 
Row housing 
 
42 
25,9 
32 
Urbanisation degree 
Urban area 
- single family dwelling 
- apartment 
Countryside (‘buitengebied) 
- single family dwelling 
- apartment 
 
 
67 
33 
 
92,6 
7,4 
 
Table 5.1. Characteristics of housing in Flanders, 2001/2005 ( De Decker et al., 2010). 
 
All these construction activities during the last decennia have of course created an 
important economic sector for the Belgian economy 61 . Flanders counts around 
2.600.000 houses, with an average annual growth in dwellings of 32.400 between 
2001-2006 (De Decker et al., 2010).  In 2004, the construction sector accounted for 
4,5% of Belgian BBP; its turnover was around 30 billion Euros. In 2002, it employed 
234.000 people directly, and 272.000 people indirectly (suppliers), which made it the 
second sector in Belgium after health care and public services. The sector has always 
been characterised by a huge diversity in company types and company sizes. With 
more than 70.000 companies, it is obvious that a lot of them are small scale 
contractors. When we look only at the Flemish figures, around 60% of Belgian 
turnover is realised in Flanders, 145.000 people work in the construction sector 
(100.000 workers, 16.500 clerks, 30.000 self-employed) and it has around 45.000 
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companies. The bigger ones are gathered in the Vlaamse Confederatie Bouw (VCB, 
Flemish Confederation Construction), while the smaller ones are represented by the 
Bouwunie (Construction Union)62.  
 
5.1.3. Social, environmental and cultural aspects of housing and building in 
Flanders 
 
In contrast with the overwhelming policy attention for private construction and 
home ownership, the attention for social housing and the private rental market has 
always been minimal. The Belgian laws on private rent are based in the liberal 
philosophy of the Civil Code, which means that principles such as a strong 
protection of the right of ownership, contractual freedom of the parties, the 
(supposed) equality between parties and the supplementary character of rent acts are 
central features (Pannecoucke et al., 2003, Winters et al., 2007). The legislator has 
always been reluctant in intervening in the private rental market, mainly restricting 
himself to watching over the conformance of financial and contractual aspects of 
house rental agreements with the legislation. It took until 1991 before a new federal 
House Rent Act introduced better protection and housing security for the private 
renter, e.g. by a legally guaranteed rental agreement for nine years and a system to 
control the increase of rents. In 1997 a new Act was introduced to mend some of the 
deficiencies of the previous one, but even then several basic problems remained, such 
as the fact that short-term contracts remain possible, and the fact that with each new 
contract free price-fixing is the norm (Pannecoucke et al., 2003). 
 
What about social housing? As mentioned above, in 1949 the Law Brunfaut was 
voted as the socialist counterpart of the Law De Taeye. The law made the funding 
possible of social housing projects and infrastructure works in social housing 
neighbourhoods. In the period 1950-1995, the social housing associations represented 
16% of new housing constructions in Belgium, while 83% was carried out by private 
individuals (Winters and Elsinga, 2008, p. 218). However, two-thirds of these social 
houses were intended for sale and only one-third for letting, a situation that leads De 
Decker to the conclusion that social housing institutions mainly reinforced the 
foundations of the housing regime (De Decker, 2008). Figures of Doms et al (2001) 
show that government expenditures between 1950-1979 to support home ownership 
were significantly higher than those for rental policy or housing improvement policy 
(respectively 60%, 37% and 5% of the available budget). After the regionalisation of 
housing policy in 1980, this changed somewhat because the Flemish government 
complemented the classic funding instruments for social housing policy with new 
subsidy programmes (ibid.). 
 
An important year is 1997, when the Vlaamse Wooncode (Flemish Housing Code) gave 
the Flemish housing policy a legal base and decreed the main principles of housing 
                                                  
62 The Confederatie Bouw (Confederation Construction) is a Belgian employers organisation 
with a Flemish, a Walloon and a Brussels branch. Bouwunie is only active in Flanders. 
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policy. The Code is in fact the judicial endpoint of the regionalisation process in the 
domain of housing (Winters et al., 2010). It bundles all Flemish competences and 
aims at the realization of the constitutional right to housing. It states that everybody 
must be able to live in decent circumstances and it aims to promote “the disposal of a 
well-adapted house, of good quality, in a proper living environment, for a reasonable 
price and with housing certainty” (VWC, art. 3). New policy instruments were 
introduced that shifted the emphasis in social housing policy “from promoting 
property acquisition to supporting tenants. Whereas, in 1994, expenditure on behalf 
of tenants and owners was approximately the same, in 2003, the rented sector 
accounted for approximately three times as much” (Winters and Elsinga, 2008, p. 
218). While this may true for the expenditures within the social housing budget, 
overall the federal and Flemish policy instruments, such as the tax system and 
premium systems, benefit home owners a lot more than tenants. 
 
The historical choices in the housing market have caused an enormous dichotomy. A 
survey from 2005 shows how the preference of the Flemish for a house in private 
property, if possible detached and on the countryside, is visible in the figures: 74,4% 
of houses is privately owned, 5,6% is social rent and 18,5% is private rent. These 
figures have diverged systematically over the years, as shown by the fact that the 
private rental sector that still had a segment of 30,7% in 1976 (see figure Table 5.2). 
With a social housing market of below 6%, it is in particular the private rental market 
that has become problematic “because it has evolved into a residual sector for 
households that do not have the means to become home-owner or that get no access 
to social housing (even when they are part of the target group)” (Afdeling 
Woonbeleid 2011, p. 5). It is also in the private rental market that the quality of 
houses is lowest. Meanwhile, the waiting list for social rental houses was around 
70.000 families at the turn of the century (VCB, 2005). 
 
In % 1976 1992 2001 2005 
Owner-occupier 65,3 67,7 72,6 74,4 
Private rent 30,7 26,9 22,1 18,5 
Social rent 4,0 5,4 5,3 5,6 
 
Table 5.2. Share of owner-occupier and tenants in the Flemish housing sector (VCB 2005, Winters 
and Elsinga 2008). 
 
De Decker lucidly remarks that one of the reasons for the robustness of the 
Belgian/Flemish housing model is the complete lack of a reasonable alternative. 
“Since the start of housing policies in Belgium, all governments have promoted one 
model and neglected or ignored alternatives”. With its low shares, “the social rental 
housing sector is hardly a suitable safety net (…) private renting was never seriously 
regulated (…) no serious housing renewal programme was ever set up” (De Decker, 
2008, p. 162). Moreover, a lack of investments in cities and of urban renewal policies 
also meant that the reality of city life often presented a bleak image, with poor-
quality housing areas, a lack of open space, play areas, greenery. Suburbanisation 
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was thus also socially selective: young middle-class families with children left the 
cities, while poorer families remained. 
 
Still, during the nineties there was a growing realisation that more attention for the 
problems of cities was needed. An important political trigger was the first huge 
victory of the extreme right Vlaams Blok in particular in the cities in the elections of 24 
November 1991, and their electoral growth in consecutive elections during the 1990s 
and the first decennium of the 21st century. After several policy initiatives during the 
1990s – such as the Sociaal Impulsfonds (SIF, Social Impulse Fund) targeted at cities 
with a large underprivileged population – in 1999 the Flemish government initiated 
for the first time a full cities policy, including a coordinating minister and a 
Stedenfonds (city fund) to support urban renewal projects. A small administrative cell 
coordinated the development of new policy instruments, such as the Stadsmonitor 
voor leefbare en duurzame steden (2004, City Monitor for Liveable and Sustainable 
Cities), intended to monitor developments in and around cities, and the Witboek De 
eeuw van de stad (2003, White paper The century of the city), a long-term vision about 
the future of Flemish cities. Both were developed through an intensive consultation 
and cooperation process between politicians, civil servants, academics and civil 
society groups. They were the first expressions of a new discourse about cities in 
Flanders, namely no longer as dirty, dangerous and poor, but as the future way of 
living. The renewed city policy had the ambition to stop the flight from the city and 
make it an attractive place to live. 
 
What about the ecological consequences of this housing model with suburban living 
as the dominant form? Authors refer to it as the institutionalisation of a systematic 
wastage of scarce resources such as open space, energy and resources, and high costs 
to provide mobility, infrastructure and provisions (Loeckx and De Meulder, 2003, De 
Vos, 2012). The environmental performance of the housing and building regime was, 
nevertheless, hardly a concern until the early 1990s when the energy and waste 
problems initiated the first policy initiatives.  
 
Energy use was no concern until the early 1970s because fossil fuels were so cheap 
that low-energy construction was considered a waste of money (Hens and Janssens, 
2005). But even after the energy crisis in the seventies, Belgium did not take 
initiatives to stimulate rationale energy use in construction or indoors. It took until 
September 1992 before the Flemish Insulation Decree was approved, that installed a 
K-65 norm for newly built houses in its first year and a K-55 norm from September 
1993 onwards. However, there was hardly a difference in insulation quality 
noticeable before and after the decree, partly because technical knowledge was 
lacking and information for builders was insufficient, but also because there was no 
form of control or enforcement so that rules could easily be ignored (ibid.). Law 
enforcement became somewhat stricter by the end of the 1990s, but in 2004 the K-55 
norm was still the legal norm. 
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Waste policy was more successful. As explained in the previous chapter, the Waste 
Decree of 1981 was thoroughly rewritten in 1994 with a stronger orientation on the 
waste hierarchy and the introduction of sectoral waste plans with specific objectives 
for each waste stream. Since construction and demolition waste is one of the most 
voluminous waste streams, one of the first sectoral plans to be approved was the 
Implementation Plan Construction and Demolition Waste (1995). It had two main 
objectives: 1. confining the amount of waste; 2. ensuring that as much remaining 
waste as possible is recycled or used as secondary material instead of being 
incinerated of landfilled. Because of bans on landfilling and high incineration tariffs, 
the sector began to reorient its treatment of waste. By 2005, recycling and reuse as 
secondary material from construction and demolition waste had risen from 40% to 
85% and landfilling has been reduced drastically. Although this is generally 
evaluated as a success of waste policy that puts Flanders at the top of Europe, it 
remains a weak point that the reduction of total waste amounts and the composition 
of construction and demolition waste are insufficiently under control (OVAM, 2007). 
 
The Flemish housing model is not only a socio-economic, political or spatial model, 
but it also has cultural aspects. What had long been reserved for the elites, came from 
the fifties and sixties onwards within reach of the masses: home ownership, 
connections to water supply and a sewer system, central heating, a bathroom and a 
flush toilet, a garage (Van Herck and Avermeate, 2006b). The introduction of modern 
comfort technologies in kitchen, bathroom, etc. changed living and housing. Large 
portions of society were able to make a substantial leap forward in housing quality, 
but modern living also caused uncertainty and paradoxes. The housing and living 
culture is the domain were the paradoxes of modernity become visible: a longing for 
progress and emancipation combined with nostalgia for what was lost in identity, 
alignment, rootedness (Heynen, 2006, De Vos, 2012). In the deeply ‘pillarized’ 
Flemish society, the civil society organisations of the Christian and socialist pillar 
played an important role in familiarizing their members with the new times. In 
particular the women’s organisations were very active in educating and advising 
housewives about modern living, comfort, technologies63. Originally, they promoted 
a “tempered modernism” that advised housing models that were coupled to the 
liberation of the occupant, and in particular the housewife: simple, functional and 
maintenance-friendly equipment and rational organisation of kitchen and furniture 
would liberate women from household drudgery  (De Vos, 2012, p. 254-255). 
Moderation was promoted as a moral virtue and an element of good taste.  
 
But the taste of the population differed from what the socio-cultural organisations 
promoted: it considered the modernistic style ‘cold’ and ‘shabby’ and, also under 
influence of the upcoming consumption society and commercialisation of housing, 
opted for warmth, standing, cosiness and often classic and rural forms of expression 
                                                  
63 De Vos (2012) is a fascinating story of the role of the Katholieke Arbeidersvrouwen (KAV, 
Catholic Workers Women), the Boerinnenbond (Women Farmers Union), both Catholic, and 
the Socialistische Vooruitziende Vrouwen (SVV, Socialist Forward-looking Women). 
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(such as flowery curtains, a fireplace, oak beams, rustic furniture). The archetypical 
expression of the paradoxes of modernity is the fermette, the newly built house in 
mimicry of a farmhouse, omnipresent in the Flemish allotments. It is a house with all 
the comfort of the city (electricity, gas, TV distribution, postal delivery, easy access to 
the city with a car) but its style expresses rest and simplicity, warmth and intimacy, a 
flight from the hectic city life to a healthy life in the country (ibid., p. 250). It is the 
modern-day expression of the long-lived anti-urban sentiments that have taken hold 
of large parts of the Flemish population. 
 
5.1.4. A slowly growing niche of more sustainable housing and building 
practices, and some policy support  
 
From this history so far, it can be deduced that since the first World War there has at 
least been one discourse and a set of policies and associated practices that diverged 
from the mainstream housing and building approach, namely the socialist inspired 
social housing policy, with its emphasis on collective types of dwelling, collective 
provisions and (partly at least) social rental systems. This niche has however never 
developed into a real alternative for the regime practices and policies. Over time is 
has become embedded in the dominant model and functions as a supplement to 
absorb the most pressing social housing problems. 
 
During the seventies, another counter-discourse and assorted alternative building 
practices developed that form the roots of what is currently labelled ‘sustainable 
housing and building’. Just like in several other European countries64, a number of 
architects and activist started experimenting with different environment-friendly 
construction techniques and housing styles. The energy crisis from the seventies and 
concerns about health effects of used materials (asbestos, chemical paints…) were the 
direct reasons for experimenting with new construction techniques, but these 
practices were often part of a broader search for what an ecological society should be: 
small-scale, decentralised organisation, building on cooperation, ecologically 
adapted, employing so-called ‘soft’ technologies. In these years, a circuit of courses 
existed about different aspects of sustainable construction, organised by grassroots 
organisations such as the Volkshogescholen Elcker-Ik and Dialoog vzw. In 1977, Dialoog 
founded the journal De Koevoet that discussed themes that are still central to 
sustainable housing and building, such as energy use, materials and water. In 1981, 
the Genootschap Gezond Bouwen en Wonen (Society Healthy Building and Housing) 
was founded, a society of architects, that focused on the use of natural and healthy 
materials in construction. After the society was transformed into the Vlaams Instituut 
voor Bio-Ecologisch Bouwen (VIBE, Flemish Institute for Bio-Ecological Building) in 
1996, apart from environmental awareness and health four central components of 
sustainable building came to the front: spatial planning, energy use, water use and 
materials use. 
 
                                                  
64 See for example Smith (2005, 2007) and Lovell (2008) for the United Kingdom. 
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From the mid nineties onwards, small-scale initiatives for sustainable building 
multiplied rapidly. Dialoog starts with BouwTeams (Building Teams) in 1998, an 
educational model that teaches private individuals that are interested in sustainable 
building techniques about insulation, ventilation, choices in heating and sanitary 
warm water, water-saving and sustainable materials choice. Likewise in 1998, the 
Bond Beter Leefmilieu (BBL, Federation for a Better Environment), the umbrella 
organisation of the Flemish environmental movement, organised the first open house 
days in low-energy houses, an initiative that year after year would become more 
successful, thanks to its formula brings potential builders and renovators in direct 
contact with residents that have experiences with more sustainable houses. Another 
influential initiative follows in 2002, namely the foundation of the Passiefhuisplatform 
(PhP, Passive Housing Platform), that was inspired by the success of low-energy and 
‘Passivhaus’ building in German-speaking Europe and that has the ambition to raise 
the knowledge about passive building techniques, inform widely about the concept 
and guard over its qualitative application. 
 
In its practices of handling issues such as energy, materials and water, as well as in 
its involved actors, all these initiatives can be described as a niche that not only 
strongly diverges from but also wants to change the dominant housing and building 
regime. Nevertheless, there are several features with which this niche nicely fits into 
the regime, in particular in its spatial and mobility components. After all, these more 
sustainable houses are usually newly built single-family and detached houses, 
situated in allotments on the fringes of the city or the countryside. Still, the practices 
found some response elsewhere as well. For example, the social housing association 
De Zonnige Kempen is in the mid nineties the first that systematically started building 
low-energy social houses, even employing renewable energy technologies such as 
solar boilers. And in 1999, Oxfam Wereldwinkels attracted attention in the business 
world with its eco-industrial building in Ghent. 
 
Although around the turn of the century the regular building sector hardly paid 
attention to sustainable building, some observers in the sector began to see the 
importance of getting involved in the discussion and increasing awareness for the 
theme in the sector. The growth of sustainable building in the Netherlands and 
Germany also convinced them of the market potential of sustainable building. 
Therefore, the Wetenschappelijk-Technologisch Centrum voor de Bouw (WTCB, Scientific-
Technological Centre for the Construction Sector), the scientific institute of the sector 
that was well informed about the ongoing evolutions, took around the year 2000 the 
initiative to work towards a Centrum Duurzaam Bouwen (Cedubo, Centre Sustainable 
Building), that was finally founded in 2002. Cedubo was entrusted the task of 
informing building professionals, the government as well as private individuals 
about sustainable building, and also to develop ideas and viewpoints about the 
theme. 
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Political support for these evolutions was very limited. In the second half of the 
nineties, the Flemish provinces were the first political level to set up activities for 
sustainable housing and building. The engagement of the provinces before other 
policy levels can partly be explained by a felt need for stressing their role in the so-
called kerntakendebat (debate on core responsibilities), that surfaced around the turn 
of the century and in which the value added of the provincial policy level was under 
discussion. In 1998, the Flemish provinces published the first government brochure 
about sustainable building, entitled Tips op een rij over duurzaam en financieel haalbaar 
bouwen en verbouwen (Tips in a row about sustainable and affordable building and 
renovating). For contents and writing, cooperation had been sought with VIBE. This 
ensured that the discourse about sustainable building was relatively broad, fitting 
into VIBE’s vision, with themes such as energy, water, materials and spatial planning. 
In 2003, a second brochure followed, again written by VIBE but with feedback and 
support from a broader group (such as VVSG, Gezinsbond and Dialoog). After 
criticism from the materials and chemical industry, the passages about bio-ecological 
materials had been softened somewhat.  
 
As will become clear later on (see 5.2.1), at the Flemish level there had been some 
discussions about sustainable housing and building and the onset of a policy 
initiative, but nothing really moved until 2004. The presence of the Green party 
Agalev in government between 1999 and 2004, however reinforced the attention for 
environmental and sustainable development themes (see also Context Box 4). 
 
5.1.5. The housing and building regime and its policy arrangement 
 
From the discussion of the historical development of the housing and building 
system so far, it should be obvious why a system delineation is difficult and should 
necessarily be broad: relevant components and driving forces in the system not only 
comprise the house, the building process and all actors related to that, but fans out to 
themes such as spatial planning, mobility, energy, environment, and economic, social 
and innovation policy. In his PhD dissertation, in a brief discussion of his experiences 
with the DuWoBo TM-process, also Loorbach notes that “this transition arena 
focused on a national system without clear boundaries. Initially, the participants had 
some difficulty to conceptualize the Living and Building system” (Loorbach, 2007, p. 
238). I first use MLP-concepts to summarise the main evolutions in the system, and 
then I discuss the different dimensions of the policy arrangement around the time 
that the DuWoBo TM-process started. Since there is no policy domain ‘housing and 
building’, the policy arrangement is a construction of elements from different 
domains. The historical developments of the previous paragraphs combine with the 
next paragraphs to form the context within which the DuWoBo was introduced. 
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Evolutions shaping the housing and building regime 
 
The central features of the Flemish housing and building regime at the beginning of 
the 21st century, have surfaced throughout the history I presented: private home 
ownership; single-family dwellings that are privately constructed; a huge preference 
for suburban dwelling, with sprawl as a result; anti-urban mentality; spatial 
polarisation between richer groups outside the cities and lower social status groups 
in the cities; high energy- and materials-intensity.  
 
It is remarkable that several of the central features of the housing and building 
regime can be traced back to the 19th century and the economic, political and 
ideological logics that at that time began to shape the system. Most of these logics can 
be labelled as landscape pressures, outside the immediate influence of the housing and 
building regime. In the 19th century these included industrialisation and the resulting 
economic organisation, the resistance from the working classes against their living 
conditions, the reactions from the ruling classes to defend their privileges. These kind 
of trends combined to lay the ground for a housing model based on private home-
ownership, preferably away from the city but with easy access to it.  
 
After the Second World War, the model developed further, hugely influenced by 
economic priorities and a demand for better distribution of welfare. The fordist-
keynesian post-war economic model (Kesteloot, 2003, Van Herck and Avermaete, 
2006b) built on a combination of mass production and mass consumption. A 
predictable growth of wages in combination with substantial government investment 
created a market for consumption goods. The two pivotal goods of this mass 
consumption were the suburban house and the car, both making the production and 
consumption of other goods possible and necessary. “The spatial design of post-war 
economic growth is suburbanisation”, as Kesteloot (2003, p. 23) expresses it. The 
continuing trend of suburbanisation throughout the sixties and seventies also had 
social consequences because suburbanisation is socially selective: after the rich, also 
middle class families moved to suburbia, leaving a relative over-presence of weaker 
social groups in the city and thus causing a form of spatial polarisation. 
 
When in the second half of the sixties, markets for consumption goods became 
saturated, growth slowed down and economic crisis set in (with two oil crises in the 
seventies). The government reduced its investments in infrastructure and even in 
social housing. By the early 1980s, the Belgian construction sector had experienced a 
decline in employment from 250.000 to 160.000 employees (VCB, 2005). But by the 
second half of the eighties, growth resumed on the basis of new technologies that 
enabled more flexible production processes. Flexibility and globalisation initiated an 
intensified competition between regions for capital, production facilities, jobs and 
markets. The attention of policy-makers for cities revived, because cities play an 
increasingly important role in this interregional competition. Kesteloot (2003) argues 
that a lot of investments and interventions in cities from the nineties onwards can be 
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explained by this evolution: office buildings, reorganisation of public spaces, image 
building and city marketing, investments in different transport modes had to make 
the city attractive for investors. The other side of the coin is land speculation, starting 
in Brussels before 1992 in view of the European market, and from there spreading 
out over Flanders, causing a doubling of house prices in cities. This in turn locked the 
poorer city inhabitants into the 19th century worker quarters and strengthened the 
separation between city and periphery, causing not only socio-economic, but also 
demographic and ethnic segregation (ibid.).  
 
The picture is not completely bleak, however, because some of the problems caused 
by the housing and building regime convinced policy-makers that policy change was 
needed. Visible signs were the approval in 1997 of the Ruimtelijk Structuurplan 
Vlaanderen and the Vlaamse Wooncode, that both aimed for renewal in respectively 
spatial and housing policy. This coincided with a growing realisation during the 
nineties that more attention for the problems of cities was needed and the start in 
1999 of a full city policy. However, political choices in these fields remained 
contested, as the ongoing debates about spatial planning testified. 
 
Alongside the dominant housing and building model, two niches with a counter-
discourse and diverging practices can be discerned. The first originated after the first 
World War, was socialist inspired and promoted social housing policy that 
emphasised collective types of dwelling,  collective provisions and a social rental 
systems. As said above, this niche has never developed into a real alternative for the 
regime practices and policies. Over time is has become embedded in the dominant 
model, where its function is to absorb the most pressing social housing problems. It 
has moreover from early on adopted some of the features of the regime model, such 
as the fact that even in this sector two-thirds of the houses constructed between 1950-
1995 were for sale and thus intended for private home ownership.  
 
During the seventies, another counter-discourse and assorted alternative building 
practices developed that was mainly occupied with ecological and health concerns. 
Here, the emphasis is on a different handling of energy, materials and water that 
translates in different building techniques and housing guidelines. Although it 
clearly diverges from the dominant regime in these aspects and can thus be 
characterised as a real niche, it does not counter other dominant features of the 
regime such as its spatial and mobility components. Most of these ecologically more 
sustainable houses are privately owned, newly constructed homes, with a private 
garden, usually situated in the countryside or on the fringes of cities. Although this 
niche forms the inspiration for what is currently called “sustainable housing and 
building”, it did not counter the suburbanisation of Flanders. 
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Discourse 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, the image of the Flemish with the brick in 
his/her stomach was still omnipresent and dominated popular thinking about 
housing and building. Several of the features of the housing and building regime did 
indeed find continuing support in the policy discourse. Although it remains often 
unspoken, one of the guiding ideas behind policy initiatives is still that the 
construction sector is a crucial sector for the economy. “In the field of employment, 
the adagio is still: when the construction sector performs well, the whole economy 
performs well” (VCB, 2005, p. 4). Several authors refer to a second implicit starting 
point of policy, namely the strong protection of the private right of ownership that 
permeates Belgian civic law since its inception in 1830 and that is grounded in the 
even older Code Napoleon (1803). Van den Broecke et al. (2010, 2012) find that the 
ownership logic permeates the system of allotment permits and construction permits, 
and thus inhibits the realisation of collective policy objectives in spatial planning. 
Pannecoucke et al. (2003) observe that the policy development in the private rental 
market has always been geared towards the interests of the landlords, although the 
federal laws of 1991 and 1997 and the Flemish housing Code of 1997 have tried to 
restore the balance. 
 
The promotion of private home ownership has been a constant in housing policy 
since the 19th century. At the time the DuWoBo transition management process 
started in 2004, private home ownership remained a central goal of Flemish housing 
policy, not only for Christian-democrats, but it had also become a core feature of the 
ideology of the Liberal party and even of the social-democrats who advocated home 
ownership as a guarantee for living well and for pension saving (De Decker, 2005). 
The Governmental Declaration 2004-2009 gives a good idea of the prevailing 
discourse at the time that the DuWoBo-process started (Vlaamse Regering, 2004). 
“An affordable house for everyone” is the title of one of the main chapters of the 
declaration. The first sentences of the chapter set out the analysis and the solution: 
“The right to decent housing, as set down in the Flemish housing code, is under 
pressure from a decreasing supply of living accommodations, rising rents and rising 
building prices and an unacceptable low quality in some segments of the housing 
market. We want to reverse this trend. We want a policy that gives even more 
Flemish the opportunity to acquire a house” (ibid., p. 26). Private home ownership 
remained the central policy objective and the main strategy to promote it is, either, to 
stimulate the marketing of building plots in zones (in particular in the countryside) 
that have been delineated as housing zones but of which the plots have not yet been 
brought to the market, or to create new allotments in zones that in the RSV have been 
labelled as extension zones for housing. A second strategy to stimulate ownership is 
through facilitation of the purchase and renovation of a house, such as by the 
introduction of a renovation premium for the first family dwelling. Although in the 
social housing sector the government wanted to stimulate the construction and 
renovation of houses for sale as well as for letting and although it wanted to prevent 
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a decrease in the number of social rental houses, also here purchase remains an 
important policy objective: the government will investigate how it can remove 
obstacles that prevent tenants from exercising their right to purchase the house they 
rent (ibid., p. 29). 
 
While these aspects of the decennia old policy discourse are still standing firmly, 
there is some movement visible in others parts. The first evolution was the approval 
of the RSV that introduced new concepts as a guide for development of the territory, 
including for building and housing. It introduced the idea that spatial policy should 
not just passively follow the ongoing developments, but that it should be offensive 
and steer towards a long-term vision of spatial development Henceforth, spatial 
planning should be based on principles of sustainability, quality and spatial carrying 
capacity (AROHM, 2000). This implied investing in cities, bundling of activities, 
protection of open space, and specifically for building the ambition to break the 
“wild dwelling” and stop suburbanisation and sprawl. The 60-40 division for  
building in the city versus the countryside was intended as the new guiding 
principle in housing and building policy. The RSV rested on compromises between 
on the one hand economy and open space, and on the other hand nature and 
agriculture. Each sector was ensured of its claims to land and this ruimtebalans 
(spatial balance) formed the basis of the compromise. But the government did not 
succeed in maintaining a persistent discourse. After 1999, with the liberal party in 
charge of spatial planning and under pressure of economic groups and real estate 
developers, the new concepts were undercut with new legislation and with 
exceptions to existing rules, tuned to the private building entrepreneur and 
developer (Van den Broeck et al., 2010). 
 
The second new evolution was the start of a serious city policy in the late 1990s, with 
the explicit aim of making cities more attractive by “investing in a reinforcement of 
urban culture, the quality of urban space and urban solidarity (…) we support the 
cities as carriers of the knowledge economy” (Vlaamse Regering, 2004, p. 55, 57). This 
continues the policy intentions of the Flemish government since 1999 to stop the 
flight from the city and attract middle class and richer families. The stay and/or 
return of the “middle class family with children” is an almost iconic image of the 
success or failure of city policy. Between 2000 and 2004, Flanders had a relativele 
intensive debate about the role and future of its cities. The two most important 
results from a discourse point of view are the already mentioned White Paper The 
century of the city (2003) and the City Monitor (2004). Both contributed to a renewed 
self-consciousness of the cities, where the central message was: the city is not the 
problem, but the solution. “From complaints to strengths”, “from problems to 
potentials” were the slogans (De Rynck 2012, p. 136). Cities were presented as 
creative, dynamic environments where the seeds for the solutions of many social, 
economic and ecological problems can be found. 
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A third evolution followed from the approval of the Flemish Housing Code (15 July 
1997), which aims at realizing the constitutional right to decent housing. It anchored 
core concepts in housing policy such as affordability of housing, availability of a 
diversity of houses adapted  to the needs of different groups, quality of houses 
(technically, level of comfort), housing certainty, integration and equal opportunities 
for residents (Winters et al., 2010). The Housing Code has in particular been 
important for the further development of social housing policy. A principle that is 
often referred to in this context is “social mix”: the idea that the living quality of 
neighbourhoods increases when there is a good mix between inhabitants of lower 
and middle classes, unskilled and highly-skilled inhabitants, different ethnical 
backgrounds65. The 2004 Governmental Declaration mentions several times that the 
realisation of “a suited and good” or “a better social mix” is one of the objectives of 
its social housing policy (ibid., p. 29, 47). 
 
It should be mentioned that around this time also the first intentions for the 
promotion of more sustainable housing and building came to the fore in policy 
circles. As discussed above, the Flemish provinces were the first to promote the 
theme. And The 2004 Flemish Governmental Declaration stated in just one sentence 
that “Sustainable building will be stimulated” (ibid., p. 26), and also announced the 
intention to introduce energy performance certificates and premiums for measures in 
energy, water and materials. I will return to this evolutions in parts 5.2 and 5.3. 
 
Actors  
 
Who are the actors that are part of the housing and building regime and its policy 
arrangement? Due to the integrating character of housing and building, the list of 
relevant actors is quite impressive. In the system analysis that was prepared for the 
DuWoBo TM-process (for more, see 5.2.2.1), the relevant actors are divided in nine 
groups, that are partially overlapping: 
• occupants: owner-occupants or tenants 
• building professionals: designers and planners, building contractors, producers of 
materials, advisory agencies, control and certification agencies. Somewhat apart 
are do-it-yourselfers that are a relatively active group in Flanders 
• house providers: private customers that organise the building or renovation of 
their own house (an important segment of the market), project developers that 
provide turnkey homes, real estate investors, private landlords, social housing 
agencies 
• civil society organisations: organisations representing designers and planners, 
real estate owners, (social) tenants, contractors, materials producers, employers, 
labour unions, consumers, environment, provinces and municipalities 
• organisations providing information and sensitization about more sustainable 
housing and building 
                                                  
65 In fact, this plea for social mix is only heard in relation to deprived neighbourhoods. 
Nobody sets social mix objectives for rich neighbourhoods. 
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• research and development: organisations with technical or socio-economic 
specialisation 
• education: from vocational schools to different specialised colleges 
• media: general and specialised, different sorts of media 
• government: politicians and administrations, covering a large amount of 
competences belonging to different levels (European, federal, Flemish, provincial, 
local) and different domains (spatial planning and urban development, housing, 
environment, energy, finance and economy, social affairs and health, mobility etc.) 
 
Even though the amount of actors in the housing and building regime is impressive, 
not all of them have a central role in the policy arrangement. When we take a closer 
look at the government actors, the Flemish level is undoubtedly central. After the 
consecutive steps in the Belgian federalisation process (see Context Box 1), Flanders 
has acquired most relevant powers, although the federal level retains some 
important ones, such as a lot of financial and taxation policies that are relevant for 
housing and building. Also the powers of the local level should not be 
underestimated. In particular in spatial policy and social housing policy it has 
important powers and a coordinating role. The Flemish level sets the conditions, 
however, and determines the policy principles and priorities. As the above history 
shows, political ideology has been an important factor in the development of the 
regime and its policy arrangement. Some aspects – such as the obviousness of 
promoting home ownership – have become shared over the decennia by all political 
parties. That something had to be done about the sprawl has also become a common 
point of view, but how exactly and also how stringent principles and rules should be 
interpreted and implemented, is a cause of considerable tension. At the start of the 
DuWoBo process, the competent minister, Dirk Van Mechelen, was from the liberal 
party VLD and had after 1999 started to mitigate the rules of the RSV that had been 
approved a few years before. 
 
Of the administrative departments that play a role in the policy arrangement, the 
central one is the department of spatial planning and housing (in 2004 AROHM, 
meanwhile RWO) and the different agencies that form part of it. They group 
competences such as spatial planning, ground and building permits, social housing, 
housing policy, renovation premiums and so on. In practice the two domains in this 
department – spatial planning and housing – have only a limited integration and 
coordination in working structures and practices. Since the two domains fall under 
the authority of different Ministers that are usually from different political parties, 
harmonisation of policies is very difficult. 
 
From the non-governmental actors, most influence on the policy arrangement comes 
from organised groups, and because of its economic weight, organisations 
representing the professional building sector and real estate developers are 
particularly influential. The Vlaamse Confederatie Bouw, representing the bigger 
construction companies, is generally considered to be one of the more influential 
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ones. Other important professional sector organisations include the Bouwunie that 
represents mainly small and medium constructors, the Beroepsvereniging van de 
Vastgoedsector (BVS) that represents real estate developers, the Algemeen Eigenaars 
Syndicaat (AES) that represents landlords and real estate owners, and different 
organisations that represent architects (such as the Vlaamse Architectenorganisatie, 
NAV).  The construction sector also finances its own scientific and technical research 
centre, the Wetenschappelijk en Technisch Centrum voor het Bouwbedrijf (WTCB), that 
often carries out studies for the government to prepare regulation and 
standardization.  
 
Of course, in the different domains that make up the housing and building 
arrangement specialised actors play a role. In the social housing sector, social 
housing agencies play an important role. They have a recognition of the Flemish 
government and are under supervision of the Vlaamse Huisvestingmaatschappij (VHM, 
Flemish Housing Agency). The interests of weaker groups in the private rental 
market are defended by tenants federations, grouped in the Vlaams Overleg 
Bewonersbelangen (VOB, Flemish platform for residents interests). The influence of 
actors and actor coalitions also differs over time. The analysis of Van den Broeck et al. 
(2010, 2012) for spatial planning shows how during the 1990s – when pieces of 
legislation were approved such as the RSV and the Vlaamse Wooncode – this was 
promoted by a coalition of on the one hand two consecutive centre-left governments 
(Christian-democrats, social-democrats) and on the other hand groups such as town 
and country planners (from academia, study bureaus, government), the 
environmental movement, the Christian workers movement ACW, defenders of 
public transport, and the advisory councils SERV and MINA. However, when after 
the 1999 elections for the first time since 1958 governments were formed without 
Christian-democrats and under direction of the liberal party (VLD), the tide turned. 
In housing and building policy, a coalition of the liberal party with the construction 
sector, real estate owners and developers, right-wing Christian-democrats and local 
Christian-democrat mandataries, the extreme right wing Vlaams Blok, 
parliamentarians and lawyer’s offices linked to infringers of spatial law, began to 
undercut the idea of collective planning in favour of a renewed emphasis on private 
initiative in spatial development and housing and building. 
 
Rules 
 
Because of the numerous policy fields that are relevant for housing and building, it 
needs no explanation that the rules dimension of the policy arrangement is also very 
complex. If we look at it from the perspective of the private owner who wants to 
build, buy or renovate (75% of families) he/she is usually first confronted with 
regulation from spatial planning and urban development that regulates where can be 
built and under which conditions. With the Decree of 18 May 1999, the Flemish 
government reorganised the legislation of spatial planning that forms the legal basis 
for the strategic orientations of the RSV. The Decree introduced new planning 
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instruments: structural plans at three levels (region, province, municipality) to 
describe the strategic policy intentions, while ruimtelijke uitvoeringsplannen (RUP’s, 
spatial implementation plans) have to ensure the implementation of that policy.  The 
Decree installs ‘subsidiarity’ as an important policy principle: each policy level gets 
the responsibilities that fit its own tasks and challenges, starting from the lowest level. 
In reality, however, there is a hierarchal translation of the RSV to lower levels (Voets 
et al., 2010). An important reason is that in order to find a compromise between 
different societal groups, the RSV introduced a ruimtebalans (‘spatial balance’) that 
fixed the area reserved for each sector (economy, building, agriculture, nature, 
recreation, forest). Very fast, this was no longer interpreted as a strategic orientation 
for policy but as a judicial framework for control over the spatial balance between 
different spatial claims (Van den Broecke et al., 2010). Furthermore, as mentioned 
already, in particular pressure groups from the construction and real estate sector, 
were successful in reorienting rules towards more private initiative. 
 
In principle, private persons can only receive a building permit for houses in housing 
zones, but there are several exceptions. Rules are quite complicated and relate to 
topics such as desired spatial development of the municipality, mobility impact, 
building density, visual elements, cultural-historical aspects, environmental impact, 
health etc. Permits are required for a lot of building and renovation works and 
require a construction or allotment plan that has been drawn by an architect. Over 
the years, exemptions have been installed for all kinds of small works in and around 
the house. 
 
Building, purchasing, renovation and renting are hugely influenced by the financial 
construction that have been built around them, such as different kinds of tax 
deductions,  exemptions and premiums. These are for the most part oriented towards 
home-ownership. Some of them are still federal powers, but over the years a lot of 
powers have also been transferred to the regional level. The so-called Lambermont 
agreement of 2001 enlarged the fiscal autonomy of the regions and made them 
entitled for a series of taxes, including some that are important for housing and 
building, such as succession rights, registration rights and the property tax 
(onroerende voorheffing).  
 
The federal level still controls the kadastraal inkomen (KI, rateable value), the annual 
income a property would yield when let. Although the law obliges a revision every 
10 years, the last revision was done in 1980 on the basis of rents of 1975. Since 1991 
the KI’s are readjusted to the index of consumption prices. However, the lack of 
overall legal revision puts urban living at a disadvantage. Since KI’’s are still based 
on 1975 rents, they relatively overvalue urban property and undervalue suburban 
property, because all investments and building in the suburbanisation wave since the 
mid 1970s, that have increased the value of suburban property, are not accounted  for 
in the KI’s of suburban land. The KI’s also form the basis for a property tax, that since 
1992 is determined at regional level: it consist of a base tax from the Flemish level 
Chapter 5. Transition management in Flanders: DuWoBo 
 184
(2,5% of KI) and taxes from the provincial and municipal level that are determined 
annually by provincial and municipal councils and thus differs between 
municipalities. It is usually between 30 and 50% of the KI. 
 
Another important fiscal instrument is the personal income tax (that includes income 
from property, which for houses is determined by the KI). Income taxation is a 
federal power and it is the federal level that also decides on tax deductions. 
Mortgage loans for the building, purchase or renovation of private and only houses 
give a right to tax deductions for annually paid interests, for annually paid capital 
and for life insurances. As of 1 January 2003, the federal government also allowed 
income tax deductions for investments in energy-saving. Under condition of 
installation by a building contractor, investments in an efficient central-heating boiler, 
solar water heater, photovoltaic system, geothermal heat pump, thermostatic 
radiator valves or an energy audit could count for a tax reduction of maximum 40% 
of the invoice. Builders and renovators can also make use of premiums from the 
Flemish region, sometimes supplied by provincial or municipal premiums. These 
include premiums for renovation and for house improvement or adaptation (for 
elderly and disabled people). 
 
When Flanders became authorised (in 2002) to decide on the registration rights – a 
tax on the purchase of a house or a building lot – it immediately lowered these rights 
from 12,5% to 10% for normal houses, and from 6% to 5% for modest houses with a 
low KI. The intention was to ease the purchase of a private home (and also to raise 
tax incomes; taxes were previously often evaded). In 2003, also the gift taxes on 
building lots were lowered with as objective a stimulus for the construction market. 
The Flemish government also supports different kinds of social loans for low-income 
families (through agencies such as the Vlaams Woningfonds and Vlaamse Maatschappij 
voor Sociaal Wonen), that provide a better tariff than on the private market. 
 
After all these rules for home owners, what about the rental market? As said earlier 
(see also table 5.2), the private rental market housed 18,5% of families in 2005, the 
social rental sector 5,6%. The legislation of the private rental market is a federal 
competence and governs the financial, fiscal and contractual aspects of the relation 
tenant-landlord66. The federal House Rent Act describes the rights of the tenant (such 
as a house in good condition, privacy, maintenance and repair) as well as his/her 
obligations (such as paying the rent, liability for fire). It determines that the basic 
contract should have a term of nine years and regulates the readjustment of the rent. 
While these aspects are federal matter, the regional level is competent for setting 
quality standards for housing. Since 1997, the Vlaamse Wooncode plays a central role 
here. It brings together all aspects of housing over which Flanders has responsibility 
                                                  
66 The rental law is considered part of the civil law, which is a federal competence. Most 
Flemish parties are in favour of transferring the rental law to the regional level, because this 
would create a more homogenous competence package for Flanders in the domain of 
housing. 
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and forms a basis for the development of new policy instruments. Important for the 
rental sector is that it enables quality control through standard setting and different 
incentives and sanctions that should motivate owners to guard over the quality of 
their houses. Examples are the introduction of a list of protracted unoccupied houses, 
a levy on vacancy and decay, a conformity certificate that declares whether a house 
respects standards of safety and comfort. 
 
The Vlaams Wooncode is also important for the social housing sector because it aims at 
further development of the sector. The Flemish government and its department RWO 
are responsible for policy preparation and evalution, planning, setting of norms, 
financing of investments. Policy implementation is the responsibility of social 
housing agencies under the coordination of the Vlaamse Maatschappij voor Sociaal 
Wonen (VMSW). Municipalities get an important role as coordinators of policy 
implementation, and they even have the freedom to develop a housing policy suited 
to their needs. The Sociaal Huurbesluit (Sociaal Rent Decree) of the Flemish 
government (20 October 2000) regulates the renting of social houses. It determines 
admission conditions (mainly a maximum income limit), assignment rules (a 
chronological order from a register, allowing for some preferential treatment rules) 
and rent calculation (based on the cost price of the house and the income of the 
tenant). In the application of these rules, social housing agencies are expected to aim 
for a social mix of tenants, ensure an optimal liveability, support social networks, 
inform occupants and ensure participation in the operation of the agency, and have 
special attention for the most vulnerable families. 
 
Resources 
 
As a corollary to the complexity of the housing and building policy arrangement, the 
resources within it are distributed between different policy domains and a lot of 
actors. When we start at the level of the government, the foregoing analysis has 
shown that political ideology plays an important  role in the development of housing 
and building, so that consequently the relative weight of political parties and in 
particular government coalitions have an influence. After the centre-left governments 
of the 1990s, election victories of the liberal VLD gave them the legitimacy to also 
pursue a more liberal orientation in spatial planning at the time the DuWoBo-process 
started. Because of the subsidiarity principle in spatial policy, also local politics have 
always played a role. The capacity to prepare and implement spatial policy has 
increased after the RSV and the Spatial Planning Decree of 1999. The implementation 
of these policy decisions obliged different government levels (Flemish, provincial, 
municipal) to invest in planning capacity and in personnel, with e.g. the expansion of 
the spatial department in AROHM (now RWO) as a result. Housing policy also has 
its own Flemish department, but again local civil politicians and civil servants have 
manoeuvring room to forward own priorities. In the social housing sector, the 
VMSW plays an important role, with e.g. an investment budget of almost 430 million 
Euros in 2004 and around 250 FTE personnel.  
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Looking at the non-governmental actors, the renewed liberalisation of spatial 
planning was approvingly backed up by the professionals and professional 
organisations in the construction sector 67 . They also have a huge interest in 
construction activities as a result of social housing policy. Their economic weight – in 
terms of turnover and employment – gives them a lobbying power that can hardly be 
underestimated, certainly since some of them can build on an impressive 
membership, such as VCB (with a membership of 9000 construction companies, 
including the bigger ones) and Bouwunie (with 8000 members from SME’s and self-
employed).  Their networks are also impressive68. 
 
Over the decades, the actors in the system have built up a high degree of expertise 
about all kind of aspects, from technical and political, to spatial and social, but not 
always in an integrated form. Knowledge is distributed over a lot of organisations, 
companies, ngo’s, academia, often with their specific expertise. In the public 
authorities, knowledge is furthermore distributed over several levels, due to the fact 
that in spatial and housing policy the municipal level has a coordinating role. The 
discussion and knowledge about what a more “sustainable” system might be, was 
around  2004 mainly restricted to the niche of sustainable housing and building.  
 
 
5.2. THE TRANSITION MANAGEMENT PROCESS DUWOBO: HISTORY AND 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
The preceding pages served to describe the context into which the DuWoBo 
transition management process was launched in 2004. The history shows a system 
that began taking shape in the 19th century with dynamics that were influenced by 
socio-economic and political as well as cultural trends and choices. The resulting 
regime is deeply rooted in Flemish society, in its institutions, its physical 
infrastructure, the mind and lifestyle of its citizens – as a regime should be, of course. 
Due to the complexity of the system, the policy arrangement cannot be unequivocally 
determined, but currently spatial planning and housing policy stand out as its two 
central policy domains, with links to, influence from and consequences for socio-
economic policy and fiscal policy, urban policy, mobility policy, environmental 
policy. The transition management process DuWoBo was launched by the 
environmental department LNE, which is not exactly the central actor in the system.  
                                                  
67 In 2003, Minister Van Mechelen (VLD) received an award De Glazen Baksteen (the glass 
brick), from the Bouwunie and the Vlaamse Architectenorganisatie (NAV) for his efforts to 
support the construction industry and to reorganize spatial planning in a “modern, less 
patronizing way. Positive were his efforts to reduce the approval time for building permits, 
his faster utilization of reserve housing zones, measures to ease home ownership and his 
solutions for out-of-zone (‘zonevreemde’) houses and companies”  
(http://www.bouwunie.be/viewobj.jsp?id=51976).  
68 To give but one example. In 2001, the Bouwunie integrated with UNIZO (the union of self-
employed entrepreneurs), at the time that Kris Peeters, the current Minister-President of 
Flanders, was director of UNIZO.  
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In this part of the analysis, I first describe how and why DuWoBo was introduced 
(5.2.1.), which has some parallels with how Plan C was initiated. Next (5.2.2.), I 
discuss the history of DuWoBo from its start in 2004 until early 2012 when the 
decision was taken to try to revive and reorient the process. Figure 5.1 presents a 
timeline of the DuWoBo-process, with main events and steps in the process, as well 
as important elements of the Flemish policy context. In 5.2.3., I again use the policy 
arrangement dimensions to analyse DuWoBo’s discourse, actors, rules and resources. 
Just like in the previous chapter about Plan C, the purpose is to understand the 
characteristics of the TM-process DuWoBo and how they differ from the existing 
housing and building regime: did DuWoBo succeed in creating a policy niche that 
differs significantly from the regime? What features does this niche have, how did it 
evolve and which main points of discussion influenced its evolution? In the next part 
5.3., I will analyse the relation between DuWoBo and the ongoing evolutions in the 
housing and building regime. 
 
5.2.1. The coupling of policy evolutions: how and why DuWoBo was introduced 
 
When the DuWoBo-process started in October 2004, it had a double purpose, as 
mentioned in the Policy Note of the new Minister of the Environment, Kris Peeters: 
on the one hand developing a future vision for sustainable housing and building in 
Flanders and translating that vision in an agenda with long-term objectives and 
short-term actions, on the other hand testing the applicability of transition 
management in Flanders and investigating under which conditions such a policy 
approach could function (Peeters, 2004). The idea to initiate a TM-process emerged 
through the coupling of several evolutions in policy and in building practice. Some 
important ones have already been mentioned in 5.1.4.: the niche that since the 1970s 
had been developed by some convinced architects, activists and NGO’s; the first 
cautious initiatives in the regular construction sector with the formation of Cedubo; 
the policy support from the provinces.  
 
Then how did DuWoBo become a policy initiative of the Flemish government? At the 
Flemish policy level, the impulses for sustainable housing and building originated in 
the environmental policy domain. In fact, the first traces can be found in the mid-
nineties when the first Uitvoeringsplan Bouw- en Sloopafval (1995-2000) (UBS, 
Implementation Plan Building and Demolition Waste) was approved and OVAM 
was made responsible for its implementation. The point of the departure of the UBS 
was that construction activities generated a huge waste stream that at the time was 
either landfilled or incinerated. The objective of the UBS was to recuperate 75% of 
building and demolition waste by the year 2000. A few years later, the construction 
sector appeared as a target group in the Milieubeleidsplan 1997-2001 (MINA-plan, 
Environmental Policy Plan). The relevant actions of the plan aimed at dissemination 
of information about sustainable building and at an anchoring of the theme in 
regulation and in the tax system. The actions and ambitions were however never 
realised. 
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Meanwhile there had been some signals in the Flemish Parliament of interest in 
developing a policy for sustainable building. A group of parliamentarians 
formulated a proposal for a resolution in 1999 (Quintelier et al.) and under the next 
legislature in 2000 an identical proposal was submitted (Decaluwe et al.). The 
concerns behind these resolutions were mainly environmental pollution and health: 
they argue that housing and building causes substantive materials-, energy- and 
water flows and that some of the materials used pose considerable health risks. In 
order to deal with these environmental and health problems, the parliamentarians 
asked the government to set up information campaigns, educational training for 
professionals and private individuals, research programmes, and to investigate the 
introduction of a uniform labelling system of construction materials and an 
improvement of environmental legislation. 
 
Even before the resolution had been approved, the Flemish government decided on a 
proposal of Minister of the Environment Vera Dua (9 March 2001) to order a research 
project about sustainable housing and building. The project had to draw up a state of 
affairs of domestic and foreign knowledge, structures and networks and it had to lay 
the foundations for “the structural development of an integrated platform or 
expertise centre about sustainable housing and building”, including the goal of 
cooperation between all relevant policy domains and administrations. The decision 
remained unexecuted for several years until in February 2004, the then Minister of 
the Environment Ludo Sannen wrote a letter to OVAM and demanded that the 
government decision be integrated in the next implementation plan on construction 
and demolition waste. The OVAM management was however reluctant to execute 
the idea because they considered it as too far removed from their waste policy 
competence. Finally, it would be the environmental administration Aminal (now 
LNE, Leefmilieu, Natuur en Energie) that initiated the project. 
 
The link with LNE was made through a detour that we also encountered in the 
previous chapter about Plan C, namely the Environmental Policy Plan MINA 3 2003-
2007. In 4.2.1., I explained already how in the run-up to MINA 3, the advisory 
councils SERV and MINA-raad had expressed their concern over the lack in Flemish 
policy of a long-term perspective on sustainable development, and the lack of 
integration with policy fields such as industrial and innovation policy. In their 
advices for MINA 3 in 2002, both councils had asked the government to study the 
possibilities of transition thinking and transition management in this respect. More 
or less simultaneously, several studies had hinted at the same potential of transition 
management and several researchers and civil servants went to visit Jan Rotmans in 
Maastricht to learn about transition management. With a Minister of the 
Environment from the green party Agalev, this orientation towards sustainable 
development and long-term, integrated approaches was also actively supported.  
 
When MINA 3 was approved, its Project 1 identified voorradenbeheer (capital stock 
management) as a track to develop sustainable development policy. In the 
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Environmental Year Programma 2004, this project was further defined as needing 
“system innovation” and “transition management”, while “sustainable building” 
was mentioned as a possible case to test the approach.  Civil servant Ilse Dries, who 
at that moment was a member of the planning team of LNE and responsible for the 
development of interactive policy, got the task to further concretise the TM-part of 
project 1. In May 2004, she wrote a Statement of Work (‘bestek’) within the TWOL-
programme69 to find a consortium that could set up a TM-process. Dries had been 
involved in several of the studies mentioned above and she had also been one of the 
people to visit Jan Rotmans in Maastricht. With the agreement of her superiors, 
sustainable housing and building was chosen as the substantive theme for the 
Statement of Work, because linking sustainable building and MINA 3 through 
transition management was an opportunity that allowed to kill two birds with one 
stone: deliver on the call for a new kind of policy approach such as TM in the 
framework of MINA 3, and simultaneously implement the long-standing decision of 
the government of 2001 about a platform for sustainable housing and building. 
 
In that way several policy lines within the environmental domain were tied together 
to start the transition management process DuWoBo. DuWoBo would not only 
become the first Flemish TM-process, but also the first coordinated policy initiative 
for sustainable housing and building at the Flemish level, completely initiated and 
coordinated by the environmental department LNE. There was no prior consultation 
with the departments spatial planning or housing policy about the objectives, format 
or actors of the process.  
 
In late June 2004, the task was commissioned to a consortium under the direction of 
two Dutch research institutes, ICIS (with Jan Rotmans and Derk Loorbach) and TNO 
(with Martin van de Lindt), a logical choice since ICIS was one of the founders of 
transition management. The Flemish partners in the consortium were the research 
institute Centre for Sustainable Development 70  (UGent) and the consultant 
Pantopicon (with two managers, Michael Van Lieshout and Nicole Rijckens-Klomp, 
who also had an ICIS background)71. The consortium was approved on 19 July 2012 
during the last day in office of the Agalev Minister of the Environment Jef Tavernier. 
The contract was already several weeks at the cabinet of the minister, waiting to be 
signed, but the head of the cabinet was unwilling to take the decision because the 
Greens had just lost the Flemish elections of June 2004 and the fruits of the decision 
                                                  
69 TWOL, Toegepast Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Leefmilieu (Applied Scientific Research for the 
Environment) is a programme that LNE has at its disposal to demand policy-relevant 
research. In this case, ‘research” was broadly interpreted as a collective search process of 
societal actors. 
70 My own institute. At the time, colleagues Bruno Deraedt and Jo Van Assche were involved 
in the first two phases of the project as part of the consortium. Colleague Trui Maes became 
involved in the transition arena and working groups as expert in housing and spatial 
planning.  
71 Pantopicon was also one of the consultants and process coaches of Plan C. See previous 
chapter. 
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would be reaped by the next government. It was only during the very last day in 
office of Tavernier, and after several contacts between LNE and the cabinet, that the 
contract was signed. When the Greens did not return in the Flemish government 
after the elections, the Christian-democrat Kris Peeters became Minister of the 
Environment. There were some doubts whether Peeters, who had a centre-right 
profile and a background in the employer’s organisation UNIZO, would support 
transition management, but he retained the idea and introduced it in his Policy Note 
2004-2009 as an experiment in innovative environmental policy (published in 
December 2004). 
 
5.2.2. The DuWoBo-process between 2004 and early 2012 
 
In the following discussion, I have divided the process in four stages, such as they 
were also experienced by the participants. Phase 1 comprises the meetings of the 
original transition arena with as main anchor points the elaboration of the problem 
analysis and the formulation of a future vision along main lines. In Phase 2, the arena 
was expanded with new participants that were assigned the task of developing 
transition paths and proposing transition experiments. This phase ended with the 
presentation of the transition agenda Vlaanderen in de steigers (Flanders in scaffolds) 
in late 2006. This also finished the task and process coaching of the consortium. In 
phase 3 the first actions and experiment were set up to execute the agenda, with as 
an important moment the formal presentation of the agenda in November 2007 to the 
new Minister-President Kris Peeters. Meanwhile the first projects had started and 
participants tried to introduce the transition agenda in different forums. The fourth 
phase began in the Spring of 2009 when the political-administrative responsibility for 
the DuWoBo-process and sustainable housing and building policy were transferred 
to the Minister-President and his coordinating department Diensten Algemeen 
Regeringsbeleid (DAR, Department of general government policy). 
 
 Phase 1. Problem analysis and transition vision, October 2004 – December 
2005 
 
With the approval of the consortium by Minister Tavernier, there was however no 
need to wait with the initiation of the process, so even before the new Minister of the 
Environment Peeters published it in his Policy Note, the process had already started 
in October 2004. The task that was assigned to the consortium had all ‘classical’ TM-
ingredients: developing a transition agenda by the end of 2006 with a future vision 
for sustainable housing and building, transition paths between that vision and the 
present, and experiments to implement the vision in practices. Apart from the project 
team of the consortium, the process was guided by a steering group under the 
direction of project leader Ilse Dries. Although the purpose was to have 
representatives from the departments of spatial planning and housing in the steering 
group, this never succeeded. From the perspective of these departments, no need 
was felt to invest in the theme and it did not belong to any civil servant’s job 
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responsibilities. Since there was also no political pressure from Ministers of spatial 
planning or housing to invest in it, the DuWoBo process could not find no 
collaboration with these domains. In the end, the steering group consisted of two 
representatives from the environmental department (Luc Bas, LNE, Walter Tempst, 
OVAM) and one from DAR (Peter De Smedt). Once the arena meetings started, the 
group was presided by To Simons, director of Cedubo, after Simons was chosen as 
president of the DuWoBo-process in the Autumn of 2005. 
 
Who is who? 
Phase 1 and 2: October 2004 – December 2006 
Arena 22 people from different parts of the 
housing and building sector 
Development of vision, proposal 
transition pathways 
Working groups About 70 people during 2006 Development of transition 
pathways and experiments 
Project team  consortium DRIFT, TNO, CDO, 
Pantopicon 
Realisation and facilitation of 
project, research 
Steering group Representatives of departments 
(LNE, OVAM, DAR) 
Strategic overview 
Project leader for LNE Ilse Dries (LNE) Managerial responsible at level 
department 
President Arena To Simons (Cedubo) Chairing arena, member of 
steering group 
Phase 3 and 4: January 2007 – early 2012 
Arena+ Half-yearly meeting of everyone 
interested in DuWoBo 
Sharing ideas and knowledge, 
networking 
Platform  About 20 representatives from the 
housing and building system 
(business, ngo’s, ministries, 
science) 
Strategic steering of the process 
Executive committee About 7 members of the Platform Preparation Platform and 
executing decisions 
Secretariat 2 half-time persons at Cedubo Daily support of the process 
Working groups Fluctuating involvement Development of experiments and 
policy proposals 
Project leader for 
LNE/DAR 
Ilse Dries (LNE/DAR) 
Merijn Van den Eede (DAR) 
Managerial responsible at level 
department 
President Arena To Simons (Cedubo) Chairing platform and Arena+, 
member of executive committee 
 
Table 5.3. Main bodies in the DuWoBo process and their roles 
 
But first, in the Autumn of 2004, the project team started the preparations for a 
system analysis of the housing and building system by conducting a series of 
interviews with experts and representatives from the sector. The interviewees were 
simultaneously approached with the question to propose suited candidates for 
participation in a transition arena. In line with the theory of transition management, 
the Dutch research leaders expected that “frontrunners” from niches or regime actors 
would be chosen by the Flemish team members, but because of their lack of 
knowledge of the terrain, they could not judge whether this was the case or not.
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Figure 5.1. A schematic, simplified reconstruction of the DuWoBo process and its Flemish context. Underneath the time line, the picture shows the main 
events such as transition arenas and conferences. Above the time line, it shows important elements of the process (such as the policy bodies, strategic decisions) 
and elements of the Flemish policy context (such as environmental and socio-economic policy of the Flemish government). See the text for details. 
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From their side, the Flemish members did not just want frontrunners, but a group 
that was diverse enough to cover the whole sector. The rationale was the concern to 
build broad support in the sector, a goal that according to the Flemish members 
necessitated enough participants from industry and representative organisations. In 
the end, the first arena would consist of 22 people, representing the traditional 
construction sector as well as bio-ecological builders, real estate developers and 
social housing organisations, environmental movement and tenants federations, 
representatives of town and provinces. An interviewee:  
“An arena has to be more ambitious than normal practice, but it cannot just be people who 
think that currently everything goes wrong. For transitions it is absolutely necessary that 
the industry is involved and wants to cooperate constructively. But there is a diversity of 
frontrunners. Also WTCB and VCB support what we are doing, but not necessarily every 
individual building contractor or cabinetmaker does so. They understand that they have to 
be involved and in that way they have the role of pioneer. The mass market has to move and 
that’s what you need them for” (societal actor). 
 
The project team developed a system analysis during late 2004 and the Spring of 2005 
on the basis of the Integrated System Analysis approach of DRIFT72. This resulted in 
a detailed analysis of the housing and building system anno 2005 (Deraedt et al., 
2005), however with hardly any references to the historical growth and choices in the 
system. The main message is one of urgency to change policy and practices in the 
housing and building regime: “Without interventions in the system, the 
unsustainability and the associated societal costs will grow further. A radical, 
coherent and goal-oriented conversion is necessary. Such a conversion (transition) 
cannot be realised by one actor alone. On the contrary, participation between actors 
is required on different scale levels, in policy fields and societal domains. Some 
germs of the necessary transition may be found in currently ongoing 
experiments/projects in sustainable building, affordable housing, occupant 
participation” (ibid., p. 86). The system analysis also identifies 10 bottlenecks in the 
system: 
• An individualist and rigid housing culture focused on home ownership 
• A lack of affordable, qualitative, healthy and safe houses, in particular for low 
income families 
• Limited flexibility in the construction culture, directed towards short-term market 
demand 
• Limits to the space available for housing 
• Site choice mainly on the basis of price and facilities 
• Decreasing social networks in neighbourhoods 
• Increase in the need for care facilities in housing 
• A housing and building culture not adapted to the ecological carrying capacity 
• Lack of trust, participation and cooperation between actors in the sector 
                                                  
72 The analysis was based on the SCENE-model, developed at ICIS, in which a system 
consists of three capital stocks (social, economic and ecological capital) and flows between 
the stocks (Rotmans et al., 1998). 
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• No homogeneous policy 
 
When the first transition arena met on 27 April 2005, the system analysis was 
discussed and some amendments were made. Because the participants largely agreed 
with the description of the system, they did not really see the sense of discussing it in 
detail and considered it a waste of time.  The analysis was therefore “temporarily 
frozen”, a term used to indicate that the document was good enough to work with, 
but that it was the intention to further develop it during the process. This goes in fact 
against one of the “informal rules” of TM, namely that participants spend enough 
time to commonly develop a problem analysis so that they share a similar 
background. In practice, the system analysis disappeared in the background and was 
hardly ever used again.  
 
Between June and November 2005, the arena met four times more. During the second 
meeting, To Simons was chosen as president. As mentioned, Simons is director of 
Cedubo. He was generally considered as a good networker with good relations in the 
regular building sector, also acceptable for niche actors, knowledgeable about the 
different agenda’s in the sector and deemed capable of connecting them. During the 
Autumn of 2005, the transition arenas focused on the development of a future vision 
for the housing and building system with 2030 as time horizon. Principles and target 
images for the transition process were formulated and translated in transition paths 
between the current situation and the vision. Seven principles were formulated 
(DuWoBO, 2006): an integrated development and management of the sector; shared 
responsibility and transparent decision-making; high quality of the house and its 
environment; accessible and socially just housing; balance between private and 
collective use; closed material and energy loops: economically sound and socially 
responsible building sector. The target images formulated the ambitions for 2030 and 
they would become the central themes of the DuWoBo after January 2006: 
• Learning and innovation in the building sector: in 2030 social corporate responsibility 
has become normal practice in the construction sector. Houses are not just longer 
products, but they are regarded as services. Specialised and competent firms 
cooperate in networks where all actors have easy access to information about 
sustainability requirements. Government, business and knowledge institutes 
cooperate in an interdisciplinary knowledge infrastructure, which translates in 
education and training. 
• Closing of material and energy loops: construction materials are sustainable over the 
whole life cycle and materials that are unhealthy have been phased out. All 
buildings have been designed to save water, energy production is based on 
renewables. All newly built houses follow the passive house concept and even 
produce a net energy surplus, while existing houses have been refitted to a low-
energy standard. The government creates conditions for the closing of loops, 
ensures a control system and informs all actors. 
• Quality of the house and its environment: the housing market has become more 
flexible and the Fleming less fixed to his one house, but he/she searches in each 
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stage of life for the most suited dwelling. The consequence has been a shift from 
ownership to a higher degree of rent. Houses have a modular design, adaptable 
to the changing demands of their occupants. There is a high diversity of 
architectural solutions and space for new housing concepts. An integral tackling 
of neighbourhoods has created agreeable environments where people feel 
responsible for liveability and cooperate in maintaining it. A housing code guards 
over the quality of houses. 
• Housing environment and spatial planning: a new approach to spatial planning 
leaves more room for dialogue and creation of new public spaces. Housing and 
building start from respect for open space through more collective building 
processes and use of sustainability criteria. New forms of housing and a mixing of 
functions steer the development of city and village. Collective facilities have 
become much more important, while occupants have become co-owner of public 
space. The integrated approach of the living environment ensures the liveability 
and safety of neighbourhoods. There is a better balance between the different 
spatial functions.  
 
While these first results were achieved, also the first tensions surfaced in the project 
team and the steering group. DuWoBo was the first process in Flanders in which 
transition management was tried out and while the involved Dutch researchers 
assumed that the purpose was to implement the TM-approach the way it was 
developed in the Netherlands, some of the involved Flemish experts and civil 
servants were having doubts about approach and methodology. Since this can  be 
interpreted as a discussion about the rules of the TM-game, I will return to it in the 
discussion of DuWoBo as a policy arrangement (5.2.3). 
 
 Phase 2. Towards transition paths and experiments, January 2006 – December 
2006 
 
The second part of the DuWoBo-process started in January 2006 with a new meeting 
of the transition arena. In line with TM-methodology, the arena was opened up in 
this phase and extended with new people that were asked to participate in 
developing transition paths for the target images of the vision, and next to think 
about transition experiments that can translate the vision into experiments. Around 
60 new participants, invited through the original arena members, joined the process 
in four working groups for the four target images. During the Spring of 2006, these 
groups started meeting and finally presented their work to each other in June 2007. 
Next, during the summer, the research team in consultation with the steering group 
incorporated the different results in a transition agenda with the name Vlaanderen in 
de steigers (Flanders in Scaffolds), that was presented to the whole group on 23 
October 2006. The transition agenda contained a short problem analysis, the future 
vision, target images, transition paths with strategy lines, project proposals and 
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project germs73. In the next years, mainly the target images and the project proposals 
would serve as a guide for the process.  
 
One of the concerns during this phase was the drop-out of participants. At the start 
of phase 2 in January 2006 around 70 people engaged themselves in different 
working groups, but by the time Vlaanderen in de steigers was presented, the group 
had diminished to 20 to 30 people. While the Dutch researchers found it normal that 
a transition management process is somewhat chaotic and people drop out, the 
Flemish feared a loss of legitimacy and a noncommittal exercise. What is striking, is 
that most participants that were involved with the social and housing aspects of the 
system, dropped out of the process. They are often from small organisations that are 
already overburdened (such as the VOB, the Flemish platform for residents interests). 
“On the one hand, they find it necessary to be present, but this ‘soft’ sector just cannot find 
the time to send representatives, because they are already so few. They are subsidised for 
specific tasks and that’s were all effort goes. Opposite those are all kinds of professional 
federations that do representative tasks the whole day, that have an immediate line to the 
minister’s cabinet and are able to send delegates” (knowledge actor). 
 
One of the consequences is that the social and cultural aspects of the housing 
problem are less visible in the transition agenda. Certainly in its concretisation in 
projects, the discourse in Vlaanderen in de steigers is mainly inspired by economic-
technical and ecological aspects of housing and building. 
 
A second concern of participants was the link with the regular policy agenda’s of 
housing and building. The steering group did not succeed in structurally involving 
participants from the policy domains of housing, spatial planning or energy, even 
though these domains are highly relevant for further policy development. The other 
obvious links to policy were with environmental policy and the starting policy 
domain of sustainable development. Under the government Leterme (2004-2007) 
sustainable development had come under the authority of the Minister-President. As 
explained in Context Box 4, the Minister’s cabinet – with vice-head of cabinet Tom De 
Saegher – first started building a structure to prepare and implement policies. The 
idea was to ensure a small administration of five civil servants, prepare a Decree and 
develop for the first time a Flemish strategy for sustainable development (VSDO). 
While charting relevant initiatives, sustainable housing and building and DuWoBo 
appeared to be one of the only concrete policy initiatives relevant for sustainable 
development.  
“At the time, we consulted other political parties, we consulted with the sector, and there 
was at least some interest in doing something with this theme. That is why sustainable 
building was introduced as a point of attention in the policy note of Minister-President 
Leterme. When you write it in there, you also have to do something with it, because you are 
judged by the Parliament on the basis of the policy note.” (political actor) 
 
                                                  
73 The term “transition experiment” is not used. 
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Context Box 4. Flemish sustainable development policy 
 
Belgium was after the 1992 UNCED Conference one of the first to work on a full legal 
framework for sustainable development policy, at least on the federal level. By 1997, the 
federal level had installed a 4-yearly federal plan for sustainable development, a 2-yearly 
report, an advisory council and an interdepartmental commission. The regions were 
much slower. At Flemish level, when the green party Agalev entered the government 
coalition in 1999, it was the first time sustainable development received serious attention, 
but within the environmental department. The Rio+10 Conference in Johannesburg in 
2002 created a new momentum, when first, Belgium as EU president in the second half 
of 2001 became involved in the preparatory negotiations, and later a large Flemish 
delegation headed by Minister of the Environment Vera Dua was present in 
Johannesburg. In the follow-up, Flemish civil servants created an informal 
interdepartmental working group and the government started thinking about complying 
with international commitments. This timing coincided with the BBB-reform (see Context 
Box 2) and under influence of Agalev it was decided that sustainable development should 
become a horizontal policy task and anchored under the coordinating responsibility of the 
Minster-President. 
 
In 2004, the government Leterme I was thus the first where sustainable development was 
assigned to the Minister-President and his cabinet almost immediately started working on 
laying the foundations for the new policy domain. This included a small administrative 
team in the department Diensten Algemeen Regeringsbeleid (DAR, Services for General 
Government Policy), a small working budget, a specific Decree for the Promotion of 
Sustainable Development, an interdepartmental working group and the formulation of a 
first Flemish sustainable development strategy (VSDO I). In 2007, scientific support was 
foreseen through the creation of the Policy Research Centre for Sustainable 
Development (see also 3.2.1). 
 
Important features of the new domain are that it wants to be “holistic” (covering 
environmental, social and economic themes) and “inclusive” (the policy is transversal, but 
each Minister and department is itself responsible for integrating sustainable 
development, with only a minimal coordination from the Minister-President). In spite of 
the good intentions, by 2010 hardly any change to policy was visible. In practice, 
inclusiveness means making sure that no one trespasses on each other’s initiatives. The 
policy conclusions of the Policy Research Centre labelled SD policy as “symbolic 
politics”: the problem of the lack of Flemish SD policy has been removed from the 
agenda, but it has brought no solution to existing societal problems. SD policy is in the 
margin of all policy fields, instruments are weak and goals are recycled from already 
existing policy documents.  
 
The SD Decree obliges each new government to revise the VSDO within ten months of 
its establishment. After the start of Peeters II, the cabinet and the team SD took the 
initiative to revise the VSDO, in close cooperation with the Policy Research Centre. In the 
Spring of 2010, two stakeholder forums were organised where “transitions for sustainable 
development” was proposed as the cross-cutting theme for the VSDO II. When the 
VSDO was adopted by the government in April 2011, it diverged strongly from its 
predecessor. It contains a long-term vision for 2050 that recognises a need for transition 
in seven systems: housing and building, materials, energy, mobility, food, housing, health 
and the knowledge system. On the other hand, the strategy still reads like a compilation 
of a lot of existing plans and actions in different departments and no new enforcement 
instruments have been installed to coordinate between departments. 
 
Source: Happaerts (2011), Bruyninckx et al. (2012) 
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Except for the tangibility of the building theme, it also had a huge potential for 
integrating different sides of the sustainability problem, and furthermore, the 
transition approach attracted the attention of the cabinet 74 . Even though she 
belonged to the environmental department and thus was formally under the 
authority of the Minister of the Environment Peeters, Ilse Dries functioned as 
connection between Leterme’s cabinet and the DuWoBo-process. Since both 
Ministers belonged to the same political party, this did not cause a problem, and the 
link would prove important for the future development of the process. The first 
VSDO would finally be approved in July 2006 and consisted mainly of a general 
strategic frame with seven important themes for Flanders. The last part announced 
12 operational projects that would have to be developed in an integrated way 
between several departments. The first of these was a project for “more sustainable 
housing and building in Flanders”. However, the implementation of the first VSDO 
was so slow and partial that this link between DuWoBo and the VSDO did not have a 
lot of impact. 
 
 Phase 3. Trying to realise the transition agenda, January 2007 – Spring 2009 
 
So, by the end of 2006, two years after the start of the DuWoBo-process, there was a 
transition agenda on the table and a new network around sustainable housing and 
building had taken shape. Now it was time to start the real work: implementing the 
agenda, initiating experiments and reinforcing the network. Already during 2006 the 
decision had been taken to create a structure in which the arena’s were to become 
half-yearly meetings for exchanging good practices, presenting new initiatives, 
discussing policy results and problems, and stimulating new networking. The 
strategic choices would henceforth be made in the DuWoBo Platform. In principle the 
platform was open for everybody but it aspired to have a balanced representation 
from the business world, societal organisations, academia and government. The 
platform had to reinforce the dynamics that had originated in the first phases of the 
transition process, guard over and adjust the long-term vision when necessary, 
coordinate projects and experiments, follow up on the integration of the agenda in 
government policy, increase the innovation capacity in the construction sector and 
launch new ideas for cooperation and cross-fertilisation between the different actors. 
The ambition is to turn the platform into an instrument “to remove the bottlenecks in 
Flanders for sustainable housing and building, limit the fragmentation of knowledge 
and stimulate the cooperation between policy domains and actors” (DuWoBo,  2006, 
p. 30).  
 
                                                  
74  This interest also showed some time later when mid-2006 the Flemish government 
launched a call for interuniversity Centres for Policy-Relevant Research. For the first time, 
the call included a research centre about sustainable development that fell under the 
competence of the Minster-President and that contained research about system innovation 
and transition management.  
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The substantive work in the DuWoBo-process is delegated to working groups that 
are organised around the target images, while the general coordination is done by an 
executive committee and a small secretariat. The secretariat is housed with Cedubo, 
the organisation of president To Simons, and has initially a budget of 60.000 Euro, 
from 2009 onwards 90.000 Euro. There is no specific budget to finance the series of 
project proposals that are incorporated in the transition agenda. The whole remains 
under the responsibility of the environmental department LNE, with Ilse Dries as 
project leader. 
 
From 2007 onwards, the actors involved in the process followed different strategies 
to implement the transition agenda. The word “strategy” should be interpreted with 
some caution, because it suggests a well thought-out way of acting that has been 
determined beforehand and then systemically followed through. In fact, this was 
seldom the case. Instead, I use it here to point to different approaches that were tried 
out in daily practice and that can afterwards be reconstructed and recognized as 
different “strategies”. From this reconstruction, the role of Ilse Dries catches the 
attention, because as civil servant responsible at LNE, she has the opportunity – and 
also uses it – to couple different funding channels, policy agenda’s and actors75. 
Besides Dries, in particular members from the executive committee take up similar 
roles, such as To Simons (Cedubo), Trui Maes (UGent), Peter Van Acker (OVAM), 
Arne Danneels (LNE), Merijn Van den Eede and Marjolijn Gijsel (DAR). Although I 
discuss them here, neither these strategies nor the activities of the people mentioned 
are confined to this third phase of DuWoBo, but continue during the rest of the 
process. 
 
A first strategy is aimed at maintaining the relations with the politically responsible 
cabinets, in particular the cabinet of Minister-President, and bringing the transition 
agenda to the attention. In April 2007, Minister-President Leterme visited the offices 
of Cedubo and declared that he considered the transition agenda the long-term 
vision for his policy. Later on 17 November 2007, the new Minister-President Kris 
Peeters visited Cedubo to open an exhibition and during a short ceremony officially 
received the agenda. He repeated that the agenda would be used as a long-term 
vision, amongst other things in the VSDO. This interest for long-term thinking at the 
level of the cabinet stems from the understanding that Flanders is confronted with 
new long-term challenges (energy, demographic trends, European objectives) that 
require answers with foresight.  
“The ceremony at Cedubo was short, but symbolically important. All partners from the 
sector were present. Afterwards, I have heard the Minister-President repeat in several 
speeches that he had received an important document with a vision for 2030.” (civil servant) 
 
Another interviewee adds: “After Peeters had received the agenda, it was studied more 
closely, also within VCB. The sector approved of it, the academic world as well and the 
Minster-President wanted to use it as an orientation and inspiration for long-term policy 
                                                  
75 In this, her role is comparable to that of Walter Tempst in Plan C. 
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development. DuWoBo was also one of the first projects on the table for the VSDO because 
the arena was an interlocutor that consisted of more than one organisation. But as you 
know, this is a precious balance: should the political world become disinterested, then all 
players around the table leave.” (societal actor) 
 
In the following years DuWoBo regularly set up initiatives to keep the political world 
interested in its work. For example in November 2009, after the start of the second 
Peeters government, it organised a well-attended arena where different relevant 
cabinets (such as housing, spatial planning, sustainable development) were invited to 
present their policy plans for the next government period. Which was also a sobering 
experience in some cases: 
“At such a moment, you notice that the translation into policy lags behind. What some 
cabinets were telling us – I think about the cabinet of Muyters76 – that was pure intellectual 
poverty. I found that striking and afterwards, in the platform, everybody was thinking the 
same: we still have a long way to go.” (societal actor) 
 
A second strategy was concentrated around finding funding opportunities for the 
series of projects that had been proposed in Vlaanderen in de steigers. As mentioned, 
there was no specific budget set aside for such projects, so that funding had to be 
found elsewhere. Arena participants were stimulated to react to funding 
opportunities in the same policy domain (LNE) or in adjoining policy domains (DAR 
for sustainable development policy, innovation policy). In contrast with the approach 
in Plan C, DuWoBo did not have the ambition to formulate criteria to which projects 
should conform, but the transition agenda was smartly used in a different way: the 
civil servants that formulated project calls or that evaluated proposed projects used 
the transition agenda as a tool to prioritise between proposals. An example is how 
the ideas in Vlaanderen in de steigers were used to formulate several calls for the 
TWOL-funding of LNE, e.g. for a study on the implementation of sustainable 
building concepts in education and training (Arren and De Deckere, 2007), or for a 
study on a sustainable building standard and a green building council. These calls 
were written by Ilse Dries and she was also part of the jury. Another example is how 
for a European EFRO-call in 2009 specific Flemish application criteria have to be 
defined. Dries as well as Walter Tempst (OVAM) are part of the preparation 
committee and suggest to take up system innovation and transition proposals. This 
provides an opportunity for DuWoBo and Plan C to develop the joint ISSI-proposal 
and find additional funding for 2010-2011 (see chapter 4). Such examples show how 
entrepreneurial civil servants use opportunities (funding calls) and creatively couple 
them to transition ideas to find a solution for a (funding) problem. This coupling is a 
lot harder when there is no direct involvement. Since several years, Flanders has a 
fund – the MIP-fund – that supports sustainable technology development, but that is 
managed by the innovation policy domain. Although the 2011 MIP3-call explicitly 
used transition language, the criteria for projects did not match well with DuWoBo 
                                                  
76  Philippe Muyters from the nationalist, right-wing N-VA became Minister of Spatial 
Planning in July 2009. 
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and Plan C and only a few projects could explicitly be linked to them; only one – on 
chemical leasing – was finally approved. 
 
The third strategy aimed at inserting substantive elements of the transition agenda 
into other forums and agendas. An example is how Peter Van Acker (OVAM) used 
the DuWoBo-process to frame the new Uitvoeringsplan Materiaalgebruik en Afvalbeheer 
in de Bouw (Implementation plan Materials use and waste management in the 
construction sector) as part of the ongoing transitions in building and in material 
management. The plan joins “the dynamics in Flanders around sustainable housing 
and building and integrates the main goals and strategy of the specific transition 
agenda that the Flemish government is developing” (OVAM, 2007, p. 61). Another 
example is how the mentioned study of Arren and De Deckere (2007) about building 
education and training is used by the then Minister of Education Vandenbroucke to 
establish a task force that has to evaluate the competence profiles for the different 
trainings and courses (from secondary education to academic profiles). That this 
third strategy was not always successful is proven by one of the first initiatives taken. 
In early 2007 the executive committee of DuWoBo decided to translate the transition 
agenda in 35 points of attention for city renewal projects. As mentioned in 5.1.3 
above, the Flemish government had since 1999 developed a full city policy for its 13 
centre cities, including a subsidy scheme for city projects. But the Team City Policy  
(part of the Department Domestic Policy, Cities and Integration) did not appreciate 
the attempt at intervention from DuWoBo and the list was never used. It would 
afterwards serve as a source of inspiration for an advisory NGO-network, financed 
with DAR-subsidies, that during 2008 and 2009 would set up a service to advise cities 
about the development of new estates.   
 
Phase 4. Quest for influence under DAR, Spring 2009 – early 2012 
 
The main reason to delineate phase 4 is an important institutional change in the 
steering of the DuWoBo-process, namely a transfer from the minister and 
department of environment LNE to the Minister-President, who has sustainable 
development as one of his competencies, and the department DAR. This in turn has a 
series of other effects. Furthermore, during this phase we see a development of the 
DuWoBo-process that at first sight seems paradoxical. On the one hand, sustainable 
housing and building becomes better institutionally embedded, while also several 
projects begin to bear fruits and ease the further integration into policy of sustainable 
housing and building. On the other hand, the DuWoBo-process is losing its earlier 
dynamics in particular at the level of the platform – that had to set the strategic lines 
– and in the working groups: people and organisations stop participating or take a 
distant and controlling attitude.  
 
In the description of phase 4 that follows here, I take two steps to explain the internal 
evolutions in the DuWoBo-process over the last years. First, I discuss the relative 
political success of DuWoBo: the new institutional embedding in DAR under the 
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Minister-President, the insertion in the second VSDO, in the governmental 
agreement of Peeters II and in Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA), and the further 
institutionalisation of the sustainable housing and building theme through the 
creation of provincial centres, a sustainable building standard, the formation of a 
sustainable building council. Second, I discuss the problems that have arisen in 
stakeholder participation and engagement of previously central actors, and that by 
the end of 2011 led to the understanding in the executive committee that a 
reorientation of DuWoBo was requisite to rescue the process. 
 
It is important to understand that this paradoxical evolution in DuWoBo cannot be 
explained solely through the dynamics of the DuWoBo-process itself. Just like in the 
Plan C case, evolutions in the broader policy context and in the housing and building 
regime are essential for understanding what happened to the DuWoBo TM-process. 
Most of the broader discussion is reserved for part 5.3 (and chapter 6 for the cross-
case analysis), where I analyse the current evolutions in the housing and building 
regime and its policy arrangement77.  
 
The progressive integration of sustainable housing and building in policy, or the start 
of an embryonic sustainable housing and building policy domain 
 
The transfer of the theme sustainable housing and building from the minister of the 
environment and her department LNE to the Minister-President and the general 
department DAR, was associated with a growing consciousness that the policy 
theme sustainable housing and building is essentially integrating and coordinating. 
Ideally, it should integrate policy domains such as energy, environment, water, 
health, materials, housing, spatial planning, mobility. “Before you realise it, you’re on 
the lap of the whole Flemish government”, as one of the interviewees expressed it. But 
there is more to it: 
“We regularly received a bottom-up signal, in particular from the professionals in the sector, 
but also from political circles: as long as sustainable building is under the competence of the 
environmental Minister and department, it gives the impression that environmental themes 
are the basis of sustainable building. It would be better if it were situated at a coordination 
level, because we want environment to be a part of sustainable building and not vice versa.” 
(political actor) 
 
It took some time before the transfer was realised, because within DAR budgets had 
to be shifted in order to free financial means for a small team that could support 
                                                  
77  To give some indications already. Unlike in the situation of Plan C and the 
waste/materials policy arrangement, in housing and building it is not the policy 
arrangement as a whole that changes, but different sorts of changes are happening at 
different speeds, unevenly distributed over the components that make up the complex 
housing and building arrangement (spatial planning, housing, energy…). DuWoBo and the 
particular changes it has set in motion are not integrated in one umbrella arrangement, but 
seem to be one more relatively autonomous addition to an already complex regime and 
policy arrangement. 
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sustainable housing and building policy. Furthermore, the only civil servant that was 
really knowledgeable about the ins and outs of the DuWoBo-process, Ilse Dries, also 
had to be transferred from LNE. In April 2009, the existing small sustainable 
development team in DAR (SD-team) was enlarged with two extra people, Ilse Dries 
was transferred, and in February 2010 she became head of the whole SD-team. In 
LNE, only the specific environmental aspects of sustainable housing and building 
received further follow-up. 
 
The purpose of embedding a small team in DAR that could focus on sustainable 
housing and building, was not only to further the DuWoBo TM-process as such, but 
also to support initiatives that had arisen in DuWoBo and that were developing a life 
of their own, such as the creation of provincial centres, a sustainable building 
standard, and the formation of a sustainable building council (which I will discuss 
further down). Such support was politically necessary since the sustainable housing 
and building theme had been making its way into several important political 
declarations and policy programmes. As explained in Context Box 3, during the first 
government Peeters (2007-2009) a series of stakeholder forums of the socio-economic 
innovation programme Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA) had formulated “breakthroughs” 
for Flanders, amongst them the breakthrough Groen en dynamisch stedengewest (green 
and dynamic city region), which contained amongst other things the further 
development of sustainable housing and building in Flanders. Also Pact 2020, that 
built on the ViA-breakthroughs and that was signed in January 2009 by the 
government, social partners and civil society, contained several references to aspects 
of sustainable housing and building (although the term as such was not used). Next, 
the governmental declaration of Peeters II (2009-present) integrated ViA and Pact 
2020 and stated literally that “the transition arenas ‘sustainable materials 
management’ and ‘sustainable housing and building’ will be continued” (Vlaamse 
regering, 2009, p. 58). An interviewee about this references: 
“When you really want to push things politically, the governmental declaration is still the 
best way to do it. With the ViA-train that is in there, you know that ViA will be one of the 
most important places where things can be accelerated politically. Sustainable building had 
literally been written in the governmental declaration and that has been the merit of the 
Minister-President who wanted it that way. There was not a lot of discussion about that.” 
(political actor) 
 
So, the political attention for the theme necessitated support at the administrative 
level. The transfer of the theme to DAR, coupled to the extension of the SD-team 
seemed the best way to do that. In the following years, this decision was further 
legitimised when during the preparation of he second Flemish sustainable 
development strategy (VSDO, Spring 2010), “transitions” were chosen as central 
theme. When in June 2011 the Flemish Government approved the new VSDO, it 
included six transitions as central policy goals, housing and building being one of 
them. Even more important were the evolutions in ViA from early 2011 onwards, 
when the government decided to implement the transition approach in ViA and start 
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13 transition management projects, again with sustainable housing and building as 
one of them (see also Context Box 3, and 6.2).  
 
In short, from 2009 onwards, sustainable housing and building as a policy theme 
became increasingly institutionally embedded in policy plans as well as in 
organisation and personnel in DAR. It is important to realize that this implies that 
since 2009 sustainable housing and building as a policy theme is no longer restricted 
to DuWoBo-as-TM-process, but expands to the activities of the SD-team in DAR and 
several offsprings of the DuWoBo-process that have started a life of their own, but 
that have kept an institutional link through the DAR. In that way, a small cluster of 
activities, institutions and instruments has been growing that can be interpreted as 
an embryonic policy domain of itself. Since, as will become clearer in 5.3., by early 
2012 there was virtually no institutional connection with the other policy domains 
that make up the housing and building arrangement (such as housing or spatial 
planning), I interpret this as one more addition to the already complex arrangement. 
I will now briefly discuss three important projects that originated in the DuWoBo 
transition agenda, that have evolved into autonomous initiatives, and that thus have 
become part of an embryonic policy domain sustainable housing and building (of 
which DuWoBo is now one of the elements). 
 
The first project was coordinated by the Flemish environmental umbrella 
organisation Bond Beter Leefmilieu (BBL) in 2008 and 2009. It set up a network of 
NGO’s that advised private builders and renovators about their building plans, 
making use of a common advisory tool that they had developed around four themes 
(energy, materials, water, context). The network was set up in all Flemish provinces 
and BBL hoped that this initiative could grow into permanent  provincial advisory 
services 78 . This found a sympathetic ear in the SD-team and at the cabinet of 
Minister-President Peeters, and after several intermediate steps finally evolved into a 
cooperation agreement between the Flemish Region and the five provinces to set up 
provincial centres for sustainable housing and building. Something had changed, 
however, from BBL’s original idea: in BBL’s vision the NGO’s would be central and 
subsidized actors in the provincial centres. But the political logic decided differently: 
the Flemish government wanted stable and neutral partners that could provide part 
of the budget themselves. Also, a similar logic and lobby was at work as in the 
transfer from LNE to DAR described above: 
“We did not want to create the impression that we were only going to focus on the 
environmental aspects of sustainable building. Also, the professional sectors made the point 
that broad support was needed and that this can best be realised from the neutral role of the 
government, not from one segment.” (political actor) 
 
                                                  
78 In fact, something similar existed already in the Province of Limburg since 2005, where 
BBL had cooperated with the province and Cedubo. It hoped that a similar model could be 
transferred to other provinces. 
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In March 2011, Minister-President Peeters and five provincial representatives signed 
the agreement in which both Flanders and the provinces provide 50.000 Euro for 
each centre, so that they have a yearly budget of 100.000 Euro. The Flemish budget is 
provided by the DAR SD-team, which also acts as a general coordinator for the 
provincial centres. The management is organised at provincial level and draws in the 
province, sector organisations and NGO’s. “We look at these centres as small transition 
processes, that all try to form cooperating networks, based on a common vision”, according 
to a civil servant. 
 
The second and third project resulted from the ambition in Vlaanderen in de steigers to 
develop an instrument that could measure the sustainability performance of a house, 
integrating different impact categories such as energy use, materials use, water use, 
use of open space etcetera. Several actors had already been working on this idea 
around 2008, including LNE itself with a manual for the evaluation of offices and the 
architectural firm EVR Architecten with sustainability criteria for tourist youth 
infrastructure. This last instrument was inspired by the British BREEAM-
methodology, a tool to score the sustainability level of buildings and grant a 
certificate on that basis. If an assessment system could be developed for Belgium of 
Flanders that was compatible with these international standards, then this could also 
provide internationally acceptable labels. Keeping that in mind and after 
consultation with interested actors in the field, Ilse Dries wrote a Statement of Work 
in 2008 with a double task: develop the basis for a standard for the sustainability 
assessment of houses, and investigate the feasibility of the formation of a Green 
Building Council in Flanders, analogous to similar foreign deliberative bodies. 
Although there was only a small amount of funding available (60.000 Euros), the 
most important players (SUM, EVR, WTCB, Daidalos-Peutz) formed a consortium to 
cooperate in what they considered a strategically important assignment. After this 
study, a follow-up study, a consultation process with sector organisations and a test 
run in about ten houses, the Flemish government approved the Vlaamse maatstaf 
duurzaam wonen en bouwen (Flemish standard sustainable housing and building) in 
November 2011. The standard aims for compatibility with BREEAM and covers nine 
aspects of building and renovation: management; transport; water; land use and 
ecology; pollution; materials and waste; energy; health, comfort and social value; 
innovation. Its objective is to clarify what the government understands under 
sustainable housing and building and its use – on a voluntary basis – will be 
promoted with professionals and private builders, in houses and apartments, newly 
built or for renovation. The standard will also be used by the provincial centres for 
sustainable housing and building.  
 
Apart from the preparation of a standard, the Statement of Work that LNE 
formulated in 2008, also contained a study of the feasibility of founding a green 
building council that can certify buildings that confirm to the standard. However, 
this encountered serious opposition. Since the standard had to be compatible with 
the BREEAM standard, BREEAM as an organisation became involved in the 
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discussions and insisted on a Belgian initiative, because BREEAM labels are always 
organised at national level. The construction sector firmly urged for a Belgian 
solution as well because it feared to become confronted with different labelling 
systems in the three regions, and thus a possible lack of international compatibility. 
The logical step then was to try to set up a Belgian sustainable building council (BSBC) 
in cooperation between the Flemish, Brussels and Walloon Regions and relevant 
stakeholders. But this implied that the Belgian standard would become a 
compromise between the Vlaamse maatstaf  and other proposals. It is interesting to see 
how in such an operation different logics start intervening and lead to a drawn-out 
discussion that after two years, by early 2012 had not yet resulted in a compromise. 
One level of discussion is political in the sense that the Brussels Region – with a 
green Minister responsible – wanted a higher ambition level and more government 
steering than the Flemish Region that has a less ambitious environmental policy and 
wanted to leave more to the initiative of frontrunner-companies. Also the funding of 
the BSBC led to discussions: should this come from substantial contributions from 
members or mainly from government subsidies? Another level of discussion related 
to the balance between stakeholders. Originally, the idea was to have a fairly level 
construction with an open membership for federations, individual companies and 
other organisations (such as the environmental NGO umbrella BBL). However, this 
did not take into consideration the opposition from important federations – VCB (big 
building contractors), BMP (materials producers), ORI (engineers), VAB (architects), 
BVS (real estate owners) – that saw their representational function undermined. In a 
common memory of understanding they made clear that the big power blocks from the 
building sector needed to have an important position in the Board of Directors and 
that they were not willing to simply share it with smaller organisations that are not 
directly linked to the construction sector (which is an implicit reference to BBL). 
While the discussions were still ongoing, at the level of the DAR it had been decided 
that part of the working budget of the DAR SD-team would be reserved for support 
of and participation in the BSBC79. 
 
Meanwhile in the DuWoBo TM-process: difficulties in keeping the dynamics of the 
process 
 
So, after 2009 the institutional embedding of sustainable housing and building made 
progress on different fronts: insertion in important political documents and processes, 
a team and budget as part of the DAR SD-team, the creation of provincial centres, a 
sustainable building standard, the decision for the formation of a Belgian sustainable 
building council, and of course the DuWoBo TM-process itself with its platform, 
executive committee, secretariat at Cedubo, working groups, and semi-annual arena 
meetings. At first sight paradoxically and in contrast with the success of the 
institutional embedding, the DuWoBo TM-process increasingly experienced 
difficulties of participation and engagement, in particular at the level of the platform 
and the working groups. The semi-annual arenas, that are organised as conferences 
                                                  
79 In March 2012, when finishing this dissertation, the BSBC was still under discussion.  
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where good practices are presented or relevant themes discussed in detail, have no 
problem in attracting participants, which testifies to the growing interest for 
sustainable housing and building. But the platform, where the strategic choices have 
to be made, and the working groups, where policy proposals and new projects have 
to be developed, do not function adequately anymore. Participation becomes 
irregular (from niche- as well as from regime-players), some members seem to have 
pulled out, or after staff turnover in member organisations new people experience 
difficulties in connecting to the meaning and goals of the platform and working 
groups. The process is only kept afloat thanks to the efforts of the executive 
committee members; most other platform members take on a reactive and distant 
attitude and hardly propose policy initiatives or working group projects themselves.  
 
In Spring 2010, in the executive committee the understanding grew that it was 
necessary to start a discussion about the role of the platform in furthering DuWoBo 
as a transition management process. A first attempt at a common evaluation 
followed in May 2010, when the platform met during half a day to discuss how well 
it functioned as an initiator and stimulator of system innovation. According to the 
participants, on the positive side the main effects of DuWoBo were: the fact that over 
the years a large network of people and organisations had been reached, that a lot of 
knowledge and expertise had been built, that the future vision gave a good 
orientation to the work, and that in particular the policy domains sustainable 
development (Minister-President, DAR) and environment (Minister, LNE) had 
incorporated the theme. The bottlenecks that were identified included: a lack of 
impact on the policy domains spatial planning, housing and mobility; too many 
followers and not enough initiators; a lack of feedback about the ideas and results of 
DuWoBo in the sector; a lack of time to capture newly acquired knowledge, share 
and reflect on it; a lack of means to support the process and to set up new 
experiments.  
 
The conclusion of the evaluative exercise was that a further reflection meeting was 
needed to decide on follow-up steps and tackle the situation. However, because of a 
lack of enthusiasm with platform members, this meeting was never organised. By 
September 2010, there is a crisis atmosphere during the platform meeting: why do we 
not attract more people? Do we have to reinvent our added value? What should be 
the relation between DuWoBo and the initiatives the government is supporting 
through the DAR SD-team? The decision to organise thematic platforms in 2011 (e.g. 
about sustainable neighbourhoods, energy policy) attracted more attention, but it 
was obvious that a more thorough reflection about the role and position of DuWoBo 
as a transition management process was needed. In late 2011, the decision was taken 
to start a process during 2012, coached by consultant Pantopicon, to reformulate the 
future vision and bring it up to date with evolutions in the sector, to revise the 
management and the structure of DuWoBo and to reposition the process in the 
ongoing evolutions in Flanders. During a first meeting on 5 March 2012 of what is 
now called the DuWoBo 2.0 process, participants reflected upon past results and 
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obstacles 80 , and about the desired future. After a second meeting on 25 June, 
participants tended towards a renewed DuWoBo as a platform where the strategic 
lines for the long-term, integrated development of housing and building in Flanders 
are prepared in discussion between relevant stakeholders, and with a clear role in 
important policy programmes such as ViA (or its successor). Such an ambition would 
however demand a huge reversal of the situation of the DuWoBo-network81. 
 
My own interviews in Autumn 2011 showed where some of the problems lie. The 
cohesion and common purpose that existed between the participants in the early 
years of the process seemed to be lost. The then platform members that were not part 
of the executive committee were often hardly aware of the objectives of the DuWoBo-
process, nor of the contents of the transition agenda (Vlaanderen in de steigers) that 
guides the process. When asked to characterise the DuWoBo-platform, interviewees 
answer:  
“That’s the place where you get information about what goes on in energy policy and so on, 
and then you are informed when you leave.” (societal actor) 
“At the moment there are a lot of platforms where you continually meet the same people, so 
that it seems as if we are repeating ourselves. You are informed about interesting things in 
DuWoBo, but I do not know what I can bring in myself, what is suited in such a transition 
process? That’s not clear to me.” (societal actor) 
 
Some smaller non-business actors have the impression that they have lost influence 
in the process: 
“In the past, there were regularly arenas where we could tell our story. Now I see regime 
actors – such as WTCB – that take the situation in hand and sidetrack smaller actors. 
While at the start we had impact on texts and on the approval of projects, now I see how 
NGO’s such as BBL, Dialoog, VIBE and Passive House Platform disappear from view.” 
(societal actor) 
 
On the other hand, the big sector organisations also seem to have lost the connection 
with the original transition idea. For them, DuWoBo is just another platform 
alongside all the others that are organised by the government. This surfaces in a 
double way. First, representatives of professional organisations have adopted an 
rather passive attitude that departs from the original idea of a transition arena where 
participants search commonly for a direction and cooperate in the formulation of 
vision and strategies. They circumscribe themselves as “we are not the ones that can 
cooperate in defining a future vision for sustainable housing and building” and  “the 
expertise about sustainable building is not to be found with us” . Once the vision has been 
defined by others, however, “we are willing to communicate about it” and “help to 
                                                  
80 My working paper about the DuWoBo experiences (Paredis, 2012), an early version of this 
chapter, was part of that reflection.  
81 By March 2013, when finishing this dissertation, the DuWoBo 2.0 process was still not 
operational. One of the topics of my follow-up research, under the new Policy Research 
Centre TRADO, is the experience with DuWoBo 2.0. 
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implement it in practice”. Second, because the connection with the transition idea has 
disappeared, the added value of DuWoBo is no longer obvious and is constantly 
weighed against the value of other forums and platforms. “DuWoBo is one more 
channel to defend our interests” as someone expressed it. In fact, this foreshadows the 
discussion in part 5.3: the evolutions that DuWoBo went through in the last years 
and the participation and attitude of several of the member organisations cannot be 
explained solely by the dynamics of the DuWoBo-process itself. Evolutions in the 
broader policy context and in the housing and building regime are essential for 
understanding what happened to the DuWoBo TM-process. While from 2005 until 
more or less 2008/2009, DuWoBo was the only platform with the ambition to treat 
housing and building in an integrated way, now new processes have appeared that 
either have a similar ambition (e.g. in housing and spatial policy) or that treat themes 
that are perceived as more urgent, often with an assurance of more money attached 
(e.g. in energy, in innovation). Moreover, in the small and still embryonic policy 
domain sustainable housing and building that seems to be developing, DuWoBo is 
one initiative along several others. And in these other initiatives, more or less the 
same actors are involved.  
 
In sum, in contrast to the situation in 2005, DuWoBo now has to take into account a 
changing ‘immediate’ policy context where the DAR SD-team, the provincial centres, 
the Maatstaf and the BSBC set up activities for sustainable housing and building. And 
it is confronted with a fast-changing ‘broad’ policy context where other policy 
domains also initiate activities that are relevant for sustainable housing and building 
(see 5.3). The DuWoBo 2.0 process has the ambition to find a new role and position in 
this changed context. 
 
5.2.3. DuWoBo seen through the policy arrangement lens 
 
Does DuWoBo as a policy niche differ from the existing housing and building policy 
arrangement, and in which aspects? As in the case of Plan C, I answer that question 
through the lens of the policy arrangements approach: does it differ in the 
dimensions of discourse, actors, rules and resources? And what have been the 
evolutions and tensions in these dimensions since the start of the process?  
 
Discourse 
 
As discussed in 5.1., an integrated treatment of the sustainability of housing and 
building was not on the policy agenda in 2004. In particular environmental aspects 
were hardly a theme. Vlaanderen in de steigers tries to redress the balance: the 
transition agenda is an attempt at creating a discourse where economic, social, spatial 
and environmental themes receive equal attention. This is in particular the case for 
the guiding principles and the target images of the transition agenda. But the more 
concrete the agenda gets – in its strategy lines and proposals of experimental projects 
and germs – the more the economic-technical and environmental aspects of the 
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vision come to the front. The social and spatial aspects have more or less disappeared 
from view in the concretisation in projects, not in the least because the actors that 
were engaged in these topics did not participate or left the process. On that level, the 
agenda hardly offers a solution for some of the deeply engrained practices and 
features that I analysed in part 5.1. 
 
Then how innovative was Vlaanderen in de steigers? Opinions have always been 
mixed, something that was also visible in my interviews. Some arena participants 
regarded the result mainly as a compilation of the existing agenda’s of the different 
organisations around the table, so that according to these participants, the agenda 
contained only a limited set of breakthroughs. Looking back on the result, Loorbach 
thinks that the process “was not successful in producing a fundamentally new 
perspective on the issue and an associated alternative and inspiring vision” 
(Loorbach, 2007, p. 240), due to a lack of visionaries in the arena and too much 
pressure to deliver policy relevant results. People that are more positive have two 
arguments. One is that the agenda contained proposals that were not generally 
accepted in the traditional building sector (such as the ambition to construct all 
newly built houses in 2030 according to the passive house standard) and thus had a 
high ambition level for them. The fact that these regime actors accepted the agenda, 
was important. Only working with frontrunners would not have brought the theme 
to their agenda. Two is that most organisations around the table told part of the story 
of Vlaanderen in de steigers, but certainly not all of it. DuWoBo facilitated the coupling 
of agenda’s and produced a vision that transcended the individual organisations. 
This coupling, broadening and networking is invariably evaluated positively.  
Furthermore, most participating organisations did not regard the visioning as just 
another intellectual exercise, but attached strategic importance to it. 
“Organisations realised that this was a situation of agenda setting. They found it 
important enough to insert their own agenda’s and try to realise projects that were in there. 
For some smaller organisations, it was thanks to the arena that they had this opportunity.” 
(societal actor) 
 
The topics that over the years have been treated in the semi-annual Arena+ meetings 
have always been fairly broad, including themes such as energy, materials, spatial 
planning, social aspects, neighbourhoods, co-housing, education and learning. 
Nevertheless, this breadth has been reduced in the Maatstaf, that has been approved 
by the Flemish government as the standard and reference frame for sustainable 
housing and building, and thus as the main content on which the embryonic policy 
domain will focus. The Maatstaf is e.g. used by the provincial centres to advise 
private builders. The nine themes that the standard covers are predominantly 
environmental: these account for 73% of the points that can be scored. Within the 
themes “mobility” and “land use and ecology” some spatial aspects are covered, but 
spatial criteria have no separate category. The only more or less social theme “health, 
comfort and social value” accounts for 15%, but does not pronounce itself about for 
example affordability. The Maatstaf also focuses almost exclusively on buildings, and 
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hardly on their environment. One of the main explanations is the need of 
compatibility with the internationally used BREEAM standard, that defines which 
categories should be present and what their weight is (although the Maatstaf diverges 
somewhat in the weights). Still, several interviewees confirm that form them the 
standard is “a breakthrough” because it has been a chance to develop a common 
discourse between government and professionals about the meaning of sustainable 
housing and building in Flanders. Simultaneously, some doubt its impact in the short 
term, because certification systems are mainly interesting in the offices market, and 
in particular with buildings that can be let or sold on the international market. For 
individual houses it may be informative but whether it will reorient current 
commercial practices is doubted:  
“With energy-efficient houses  you know that you will save on the bill, but that is not self-
evident for the other themes. It is more difficult to sell: oh yes, it is sustainable, and so 
what?”(societal actor) 
 
Even though the Maatstaf has been instrumental in reaching a certain closure of the 
discourse around the interpretation of sustainable housing and building, this does 
not mean that all differences in meaning have disappeared. The closure is mainly 
around which different themes should form part of the sustainable housing and 
building concept, as well as within specific themes such as the energy performance of 
buildings (where the role of the government has been very influential – see part 5.3). 
For other themes, the discussion is in fact only starting. Such as how the physical-
technical solutions for sustainability that until now have attracted most attention, can 
be reconciled with social and cultural aspects of housing and building. And even 
within the more physical-technical aspects, some themes are still heavily contested, 
materials being one of them. One of the main discussion points in the interpretation 
of “sustainable materials” – whether synthetic materials can count as such – will 
certainly not be solved easily. Some actors in DuWoBo have an incompatible vision 
about this (VIBE that promotes bio-ecological materials, Federplast that represents 
the chemical sector), while others expect a lot from more research and have no 
definite position. An interviewee remarks: 
“Materials remain a touchy theme; it’s very difficult raise it, even in transition processes. 
Most still go up on their hind legs. I think this just needs time. The 1990s has been the 
period to rub in the energy problem. Then the 2000s will be for rubbing in the materials 
problem, no?” (societal actor) 
 
I should add, however, that by 2011 and early 2012 DuWoBo was not the place where 
these discussions were high on the agenda or where headway could be made, 
because as discussed above, the sense of the transition idea had been lost to crucial 
participants and the glue of the network was loosening.  
 
Actors 
 
The TM-process DuWoBo was set up in 2004 by the environmental department LNE 
as a form of innovative environmental policy: oriented towards the long run and 
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sustainable development, with a new kind of actor participation, in search of new 
forms of cooperation between actors and with the government. LNE was clearly an 
outsider in the housing and building policy regime around 2004. Different attempts 
have been made at drawing in the central policy domains housing and spatial 
planning, but this never succeeded, as explained above. When in 2009 the authority 
over DuWoBo shifted to the department DAR, this held the promise that things 
might change. 
“Sometimes it is bizarre, but there are still quite some partitions between policy domains. 
When people from the environmental department start arguing, you hear other domains 
say: ‘They always remark on limitations we have, you cannot do this or that because it is 
bad for the environment, but they never formulate solutions.’ The DAR is regarded more as 
a neutral partner and has easier access or can bring domains together.” (civil servant) 
 
Still, also after 2009 the situation did not change: DAR and LNE are involved in 
DuWoBo, but the most central departments in the housing and building regime are 
lacking. It should be added that, although the process as such has always been 
supported by the competent Minister and his cabinet, there has hardly been any 
steering from the cabinet or higher administrative echelons to realise a break-away 
from environment and sustainable development, and to try and force an integration 
with policy domains such as spatial planning or housing. Since such a move can be 
interpreted as an intrusion on another Minister’s authority, it is politically risky and 
only done when deemed politically important enough. In any case, the result is that 
from the point of view of the government actors, the DuWoBo-process differed (and 
differs) thoroughly from the regime arrangement, since it is mainly steered by the 
domains sustainable development and environment. 
 
What about other societal groups? What holds for government actors, is also true for 
research institutes and researchers that play an active role in discussions about 
spatial planning, housing or city policy: except for a chance presence, they have 
never played a role in DuWoBo. The situation is different for most other actors in 
housing and building. I mentioned in the history of DuWoBo that the composition of 
the original transition arena diverged from what the Dutch researchers that managed 
the consortium ideally had in mind for a TM process, i.e. frontrunners from niches 
and regime. Instead, the Flemish in the process had chosen for a mixed group that 
represented the important actors in the regime, regardless of whether they were 
niche or regime players. This was motivated partly by a concern over the legitimacy 
of the process, partly by a different appraisal of who should be involved to accelerate 
a transition. Although the vision that this group produced is not evaluated similar by 
everyone, there seems to be unanimity over the value of bringing together 
established actors with challengers. This networking, coupling and broadening of 
actors is evaluated most positively by those involved. 
“It was for the first time that there were partners around the table that previously did not 
meet, and that was important for those that were present (…) Thanks to the transition 
process, we were able to build better, broader networks in the building sector. It gave us the 
opportunity to bring our story to new people.” (societal actor) 
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From the projects of the transition agenda that were realised, several indeed involved 
cooperation between atypical partners, such as in a project “eco-building pools” 
where traditional architects and contractors were informed about principles of bio-
ecological building. In the embryonic policy domain sustainable housing and 
building that is taking shape, this kind of cooperation is also the ambition, but it is 
striking that NGO’s and niche players have to fight for their position when the logic 
of institutionalisation takes over. As shown above, in the BSBC, there is a struggle 
between stakeholders over who takes the lead in the development of a certification 
system and inextricably linked to that, what the composition of the organisation is 
and who has the power in the board of directors. Also in the provincial centres, the 
hope of the NGO’s to play a central role could not be realised in the institutional 
logic. Meanwhile, in the DuWoBo-process itself, the network has lost its original 
coherence and most participants have taken on a waiting, rather passive attitude. The 
DuWoBo 2.0 process that started in March 2012 should lead to a repositioning of 
DuWoBo, a reformulation of its role, and in line with that a renewed engagement 
and possibly different composition of participants. 
 
Rules of the game 
 
In chapter 2 as well as in the discussion of Plan C in chapter 4, I mentioned already 
that TM does not have formal rules of how interactions should be organised, but 
Rotmans’ and Loorbach’s formulation of the theory does contain relatively detailed 
guidelines. Important guidelines (or ‘informal rules’) include: “work with 
frontrunners from niches and regime”, “develop and grow in the shadow of policy”, 
“use the network, vision development and experiments to learn about direction and 
about what works”, “develop as a network with government as one player among 
many”, “make the arena an empowering environment so that the process becomes 
self-organising”. These kind of rules obviously differ from the working procedures in 
the housing and building regime. 
 
DuWoBo was the very first transition management process in Flanders and it was 
also the first time that such a broad group of people was confronted with the 
approach and concepts of TM. While the involved Dutch researchers assumed that 
the purpose of their involvement was to implement the TM-approach the way it was 
developed in the Netherlands, after a few months, several of the involved Flemish 
experts and civil servants were having doubts about approach and methodology. In 
his doctoral thesis, Loorbach presents his interpretation of the tensions. He states 
(Loorbach, 2007, p. 237-241) that he observed a lack of familiarity with long-term 
exercises and little structured creative processes, and an insufficient number of 
strategic visionaries and too many representatives from the field. A strict budget and 
time line obliged participants to move quickly from the strategic visionary phase to 
concrete actions, which hindered identification with process and results. He also 
thinks that the civil servants involved did not succeed in coping with the 
uncertainties and the lack of control that go hand in hand with transition processes, 
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so that they “continuously looked for ways to achieve more structure and control” 
(Loorbach, 2007, p. 240). 
 
This tension over how the TM-game should be played, is interpreted differently by 
others. The Flemish government even delivered a formal reaction to DRIFT, stating 
that their researchers were also seeking. “According to the Flemish members it is 
thus not ‘a lack of familiarity with long-term vision exercise of with little structured 
creative processes’ that caused criticism on the process approach, but the fact that 
nobody knew, not even the Dutch researchers, what we were doing exactly at certain 
moments”, according to the reaction. Supplementary explanations emerge from an 
evaluation at the end of phase 2 (Van Raak, 2006). Flemish participants point to an 
underrating of the fact that Flanders was not yet knowledgeable about transition 
thinking and its specific concepts and instruments. The participants were often 
people with their two feet in practice, participating on a voluntary basis, with limited 
time available and thus eager for quick results. The evaluation shows that the image 
participants have of themselves is “Flemish act, Dutch talk” (ibid., p. 5). The Dutch 
find it normal that the process is somewhat chaotic, that people pull out and the 
results are difficult to control, while the Flemish want to guard over the legitimacy of 
the process and fear a noncommittal exercise. The evaluation also teaches that there 
are doubts whether a ‘voluntarist’ approach that presupposes an active engagement 
in policy development from business and civil society is realistic in Flanders, where 
according to participants the government is usually expected to take the initiative.  
 
In spite of this grappling with the rules, DuWoBo produced results that enabled a 
relatively dynamic process during the first years, with several standing working 
groups and a number of new concrete projects. During these years, the interaction 
between regime and niche players worked and organisations brought in their own 
proposals and points of view. Although this remained possible, in 2010 and later the 
network hardly functioned as a transition management network is supposed to do: 
the interaction between niche and regime players had come to a standstill and 
organisations took on a passive attitude. Only the Cedubo secretariat and the 
executive committee, with a lot of support from the DAR SD-team, kept the process 
running.  
 
Furthermore, it proved extremely difficult to transfer these TM working procedures 
and attitudes outside the strict confines of DuWoBo. For example, after the working 
group on sustainable neighbourhoods had made an inventory of bottlenecks that 
prevent a fast introduction of new sustainable neighbourhoods, its members tried to 
negotiate with the departments of housing and spatial planning to solve some of the 
problems. But the integrated approach and the intervention from outside their policy 
domain, met with distrust and wariness. 
“Starting a conversation with a civil servant from another policy domain, say spatial 
planning or housing, about these bottlenecks proved very difficult. They seem to interpret it 
as if we blame them for something. If you ask them whether there are topics where we can 
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cooperate, they refuse to say so. Or they say ‘there is no problem’, while the people in the 
field say the opposite. And of course they will say: these and these points are not our 
business, they belong to another domain. They only read their bits, not the rest, while all 
these pieces are connected.”(knowledge actor) 
 
Even within what I have called the embryonic policy domain sustainable housing 
and building, it is not self-evident to transfer working procedures outside DuWoBo, 
even when a lot of similar actors are involved. The discussions over the membership 
and decision procedures in the BSBC show that in particular regime actors expect 
that the conventional patterns of decision-making in the building sector and/or the 
Belgian political structures are duplicated. 
 
Resources 
 
Since its start in 2004, the DuWoBo-process has been kept going on a small budget. 
As mentioned, Loorbach (2007) thinks that in the first phases the budget and 
associated time line were too strict for a strategic exercise. Until 2008, the budget for 
the secretariat at Cedubo and for working costs was at 60.000 Euros, since 2009 it is at 
80.000 Euros annually. There were no specific funds for projects or experiments 
available, but as explained, small projects could be funded through funding call from 
LNE and DAR. Almost all of them were limited to a budget of 50.000 to 60.000 Euro 
for maximum one or two years. During 2009 and 2010, DuWoBo and Plan C 
cooperated in the ISSI-project, which allowed for an additional staff member at 
Cedubo, and a working budget to develop an experiment methodology and set up a 
few multi-stakeholder forums about sustainable building logistics and about 
building teams. 
 
People that have been closely involved with the process usually hold the opinion that, 
taking into account its limited means, DuWoBo has performed well: it has not only 
developed a transition agenda and sprouted innovative projects, but several of these 
projects have also evolved into autonomous initiatives (provincial centres, BSBC, 
Maatstaf). However, because all financial means currently derive from the DAR-SD 
working budget, the paradox of institutionalisation that I discussed above, appears 
here as well. On the one hand, the success of the early stage of institutionalisation led 
to the political decision to provide structural financial support for the new initiatives: 
the provincial centres take quite a slice of the budget with a combined annual 
support of 250.000 Euro, support for the BSBC is at 80.000 Euro annually82, and the 
two transition processes DuWoBo and Plan C each receive 80.000 Euro. In 2011, the 
DAR-SD team itself had almost one full-time equivalent (91%) for sustainable 
housing and building, divided over several staff members.  On the other hand – and 
knowing that part of the DAR-SD budget was dropped because of crisis savings – 
                                                  
82 As long as the BSBC is not active, the money is invested in other projects such as a 
popularised publication about sustainable housing and building and the further 
development of a common advisory tool for the provincial centres.   
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this institutional success implies that no manoeuvring room is left to increase the 
general process support for DuWoBo, nor is there money available to support small 
projects or experiments, while these were exactly the kind of activities that proved 
fruitful in the past. Unless financial means can be increased in the future or found 
somewhere else, it can be argued that the success of the institutionalisation of 
sustainable housing and building stands in the way of the further development of 
DuWoBo (at the very least financially). This may prove to be problematic at the 
moment the process is confronted with the challenge to reinvent itself and find a 
place amidst current ongoing changes in the housing and building regime (see 5.3). 
 
As for the other resources on which the process can build, the question of legitimacy 
is a continuation of the problem of the paradox. There seems no lack of formal 
legitimacy when listing all the policy declarations and programmes where 
sustainable housing and building is mentioned. Again, “sustainable housing and 
building” has over the years become broader than solely DuWoBo, but the DuWoBo-
network is still regarded as the central link in the new, small policy domain. The 
paradox then is of course that the legitimacy with the participants in DuWoBo is not 
exactly at its zenith. While there is a recognition that policy efforts and coordination 
and a network for sustainable housing and building are needed, I have already 
shown several times how the present participation and attitude of a lot of actors 
undermines the relevance of the process83.  
 
Furthermore, learning about such aspects has never been a strong point in DuWoBo: 
learning about how transition processes work, how their influence extends to 
member organisations and how ownership is created, which kind of activities are 
most relevant to reach stakeholders and to attract political interest, what can be 
learned from cooperation between niche and regime actors in the projects that have 
been executed, how other policy domains can be approached and what works (or not) 
in cooperation. Time has never been reserved for these kind of questions, because the 
added value of investing in them is difficult to prove, and thus easily considered a 
waste of time 84 . Interviewees nevertheless mention that they are interested in 
learning and in exchange of information and experiences, but these demands are 
invariably formulated instrumentally and with a view on quick wins (such as 
learning about applications of specific building techniques).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
83 In fact, this situation is highly reminiscent of the situation of Plan C by the end of 2011. See 
chapter 4. 
84 This resembles the Plan C experience as well. 
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5.3. CURRENT EVOLUTIONS IN HOUSING AND BUILDING: THE TAKE-OFF 
STAGE OF A TRANSITION?  
 
Before continuing the analysis, let me first summarize some important insights from 
the previous parts of this chapter. The analysis in 5.1 showed how the housing and 
building regime and its policy arrangement have taken shape over the past 150 years 
and have been deeply influenced by political-ideological choices and economic 
trends. The resulting regime – with features such as a high degree of home 
ownership, suburbanisation and sprawl, spatial polarisation, and high energy- and 
materials-intensity – is not managed by one policy domain, but is characterised by a 
distributed form of governance over several policy domains with only a limited 
amount of coordination of policy goals, objectives and actors. Due to this complexity 
of the system, the policy arrangement that I described in 5.1 is in fact a construct that 
cannot be unequivocally determined. Spatial planning and housing policy stand out 
as its two central policy domains, with links to, influence from and consequences for 
socio-economic policy and fiscal policy, urban policy, mobility policy and 
environmental policy. 
 
The DuWoBo TM-process that I discussed in 5.2 was initiated by the environmental 
department LNE, a department that in 2004 was in the margin of the policy 
arrangement. With a mixed group of regime and niche actors, DuWoBo succeeded in 
formulating a future, integrated vision for the housing and building system, setting 
up a network of regime and niche actors, and initiating innovative projects. However, 
it did not succeed in drawing in central governmental actors such as the departments 
of spatial planning and housing. Although since 2010, DuWoBo has had serious 
problems in keeping its dynamics and actors involved, it has booked some 
interesting results from a policy point of view. Projects that were part of DuWoBo’s 
transition agenda evolved into autonomous initiatives that, together with DuWoBo, 
have come under the powers of the Minster-President and the general coordinating 
department DAR. In spite of this position and even though DuWoBo’s vision has 
integrating ambitions, this did not result in more coordination or some kind of 
overarching policy arrangement for the housing and building domain. Instead, under 
the responsibility of the Minister-President and with the DAR-SD team as 
administrative focal point, it can be argued that we have witnessed the start of a still 
embryonic, but relatively autonomous policy domain sustainable housing and 
building, which is thus one more addition to the already complex policy situation of 
housing and building. 
 
In part 5.2 during the discussion of the DuWoBo-process, I hinted a few times at the 
fact that the increasingly difficult positioning of DuWoBo since 2010 is not solely due 
to its internal functioning (secretariat, executive committee, platform, working 
groups, arenas, available financial means), but that an explanation for the problems 
should for a large part be sought outside DuWoBo. One element is its immediate 
environment, where in the embryonic policy domain sustainable housing and 
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building other initiatives attract some of the energy and means available. More 
important are the developments that have been taking place in the broader housing 
and building regime and its policy arrangement since 2005. These developments 
have been almost completely outside the grasp of DuWoBo, but influence the 
behaviour of its member organisations.  
 
In this part 5.3 I discuss the most influential trends that over the last years have been 
shaping the housing and building regime, and that form the new context in which 
DuWoBo finds itself. The discussion differs somewhat from my treatment of the 
changing context in chapter 4 in the Plan C case. The problem is again that there is 
not one (more or less) delineated policy domain that is changing – as was the case 
with the waste/materials regime and policy – but that different policies and practices 
are changing at different speeds, with hardly any harmonisation between them. To 
be more concrete: the most obvious change is visible in the energy part of the regime, 
a part that was until a few years ago in the margin but that is now increasingly 
influencing policies, practices and attitudes. Interesting is that it is mainly European 
policy requirements that are causing this change, something that is relatively new for 
the housing and building regime. Also in the use of materials, changes are imminent 
– not surprising given what we know from the discussion in the previous chapter. In 
the important policy fields of spatial planning and housing, future-oriented 
discussions have also started up the previous years, but the direction these will be 
taking and the influence they will have is as of yet unclear. Finally, the future of 
industry in general is a concern of the Flemish government (as it is of many 
governments) and in combination with the socio-economic ambitions of Vlaanderen in 
Actie (ViA), this has initiated a new industrial policy, where the construction sector is 
the first sector to be targeted. 
 
With all these different dynamics going on in different parts of the regime and its 
policy arrangement, it is almost impossible to present an analysis by nicely following 
the different dimensions of the theoretically constructed policy arrangement of the 
housing and building regime and discussing their evolutions one by one (as done in 
4.3 for Plan C). I will therefore proceed in two steps. In 5.3.1., I discuss the parts of 
the housing and building policy arrangement where changes are ongoing, what is 
happening and under which influence. I will look at evolutions in housing and 
building related to energy, materials, spatial planning, housing and socio-economic 
innovation policy. Then, in 5.3.2. I use MLP categories (landscape, regime, niches) 
and the dimensions of policy arrangements to summarize evolutions, particularly 
paying attention to what is new. Where relevant in all this, I will refer to the 
influence of DuWoBo, but as we will see, these references will be minimal. The 
reason why I have explained already: DuWoBo has hardly had any influence on the 
changes in the existing parts of the regime and its policy arrangement, although it is 
involved in some initiatives. As shown in 5.2, DuWoBo’s main influence is in the 
creation of a new part of the complex housing and building regime and arrangement. 
With that it has succeeded in broadening the discourse about what housing and 
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building should be and initiated instruments that can be useful in translating this 
vision. This has caused some ripples in other parts of the regime, and it may yet have 
more influence in the future, but the real drivers and actors for these changes are to 
be found elsewhere85.  
 
5.3.1. The housing and building regime under pressure 
 
Anyone who compared the Flemish situation in housing and building of 2012 with 
that of 2005 would probably have been struck by some of the changes that had taken 
place. While unimaginable in 2005, in 2012 there was a lively public discussion about 
the pros and contras of photovoltaic cells on roofs and a lot of people had become 
aware of the potential of passive houses. Some construction companies had started to 
specialize in passive building and offered turnkey passive houses. The Flemish 
government invested in passive schools and in more sustainable offices that are 
exemplary for what is possible in the technical-environmental aspects of housing and 
building (Vlaamse Overheid 2011). Signs of change were also visible with the 
important professional actors in the sector. In 2009, the Vlaamse Confederatie Bouw 
(VCB, 2009) devoted its annual study report to “a greener construction economy”, 
where in its treatment of themes such as water, soil, construction and demolition 
waste, spatial planning, energy and employment a lot of similarities can be detected 
with the transition agenda of DuWoBo. In 2010 it called for an “eco-keynesian 
approach” of policy (VCB, 2011). The annual report of Bouwunie in 2010 focused on 
the greening of the construction sector and the potential of that change (Bouwunie, 
2010).  
 
The most visible changes in housing and building derive from precisely these parts 
of the regime that were in the margin but that are originally at the basis of 
sustainable housing and building discourse and practices, namely environmental 
themes such as energy and materials. But in the more central policy domains spatial 
planning and housing, things seem to be moving as well.  
 
Energy as driving force 
 
There is no doubting the fact that the climate and energy question has speeded up 
some of the evolutions in housing and building. In particular European legislation 
has been of crucial importance.  As part of its strategy to meet the Kyoto objectives, 
the EU began in the late nineties issuing Directives and setting up programmes to 
urge member states to boost energy efficiency, decrease CO2 emissions and stimulate 
renewable energy. In 2002, the European Parliament and the Council approved the 
Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD, 2002/90/EC), which goal is to 
decrease the energy use and CO2 emissions of buildings. The Directive defines a 
methodology to calculate the energy performance of building, sets minimum 
                                                  
85 There are some obvious differences here with the role and position of Plan C, but that will 
be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 6. 
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standards for the energy performance of newly built houses and of renovation, and 
regulates energy certification of buildings. The Directive has meanwhile been made 
more stringent in the EPBD recast (2010/31/EU) that decrees that as of 2021 all new 
buildings in the EU have to be “nearly zero energy” and that the energy that is still 
needed, has to be largely covered by renewable energy. Governments are obliged to 
reach these goals for their own buildings from 2019 onwards.  
 
In Flanders, the EPBD was in 2006 translated in the Vlaams Decreet Energieprestatie en 
Binnenklimaat and adjusted in 2011 in function of the recast. The difference with the 
former Flemish Insulation Decree (see 5.1.3) is that not only the insulation level 
counts but the whole energy performance of a house. Furthermore, enforcement of 
the rules – previously non-existing – is now taken more seriously. In 2006, the legal 
norm for newly built houses was fixed at an E100 level, an insulation level of K45 
(previously K55) and specific U-levels per construction part. For building 
applications after 1 January 2010, the maximum level was fixed at E80. After the 
recast, in 2012 the norms were tightened to E70 and K40, and from 1 January 2014 
onward an E60-level. Later, norms will have to be further tightened to reach the 
“nearly zero energy” target. In general, the construction sector assumes that an E60 
level is achievable with established building concepts and techniques, but that a 
further lowering will require new techniques and concepts. 
 
While the EPB Directive is mainly applicable for newly built houses, there is a huge 
potential for energy savings in the existing housing stock: around 35.000 houses are 
built yearly, but there are more than 2,5 million existing houses in Flanders. Of the 
2.683.000 houses in Flanders, in 2011 around 15% had single glazed windows, 24% 
had no roof insulation and 10% only partial, 28% of natural gas boilers were out-of-
date, while this figure is at 66% for oil-fired central heating (VEA, 2011). Therefore, 
the Flemish government started the Energierenovatieprogramma 2020 (Energy 
renovation programme 2020) in order to make each house low-energy by 2020. 
Priority will be attached to roof insulation, double glazing and efficient central 
heating, but other action points include floor and exterior wall insulation, 
discouragement of air conditioning and replacement of electrical heating. For the 
building sector, these objectives are an opportunity as well as a challenge because 
that implies that annually 90.000 roofs have to be insulated, 40.000 houses equipped 
with double glazing and 80.000 boilers replaced. 
 
Since 2006, the preparation and implementation of energy policy is executed by a 
new agency, the Vlaams Energie Agentschap (VEA, Flemish Energy Agency), that in 
the Peeters II governments falls under the powers of Minister Van den Bossche (who 
is also responsible for housing policy and city policy). VEA oversees the different 
instruments that support the realisation of the objectives of the EPBD and of the 
energy renovation programme. The EnergiePrestatieCertificaat (EPC, Energy 
Performance Certificate), that registers how energy performant a house is, is obliged 
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since 1 November 2008 for the sale of houses and apartments, and since 1 January 
2009 for rental houses.  
 
Tax measures and premiums are of course influential as well. As mentioned above 
(5.1.5.4), in 2003 the federal government allowed income tax deductions for 
investments in energy-saving and renewable energy (efficient central-heating boiler, 
solar water heater, photovoltaic system, geothermal heat pump, thermostatic 
radiator valves or an energy audit) that could count for a tax reduction of maximum 
40% of the invoice. In 2005, the system was extended to tenants. Although it was a 
success and an important stimulus for energy savings and renewables at household 
level, the system was abolished as of 1 January 2012 as a part of budgetary austerity 
measures. At the Flemish level, a system of premiums is in place. The Flemish 
government obliged electricity grid operators in 2003 to support households 
financially with energy saving but in a system where each operator could chose its 
own measures. Since 2009, the system has been harmonised and the government has 
installed Flemish measures as well. Premiums cover insulation and glass, heating 
installations, sanitary warm water, newly built houses with low E-level, photovoltaic 
systems. In particular the last system – where green electricity certificates support the 
Flemish objectives for renewable energy – was so successful that it attracted different 
kind of criticism: only favouring middle class families, raising the electricity prices, 
privileging just one technology, discouraging energy savings. It was reformed in 
2011 through a fast decrease in the price of green electricity certificates (from 450 
Euro/MWh in 2009 for 20 years to 90 Euro/MWh in 2016 for 15 years). 
 
In general terms, it can be argued that one of the typical characteristics of the 
building system until a decade ago – the energy performance of a house is hardly 
important, neither for professionals, builders or renovators – is quickly disappearing. 
Under pressure of European requirements, the developments are even going so fast 
that the energy question currently reduces “sustainable building” almost to “low 
energy building”. This is of course accompanied by several bottlenecks, with tensions 
between old regime rules and new practices. 
 
An example is how the E-level is just a theoretical figure on the basis of a 
standardised calculation method that does not take into account the behaviour of the 
occupant. If s/he sticks to old habits and wastes energy, the actual energy saving will 
be a lot less than what the E-level predicts. Other potential bottlenecks are 
affordability and training. An interviewee about these concerns of the construction 
sector: 
“Currently, the main concern  of the construction sector is the lowering of the E-level. That 
has to be affordable for the owner and it has to be realisable without technical deficiencies. 
These are our two main problems. First, low-energy should not raise the costs to such a 
level that the market for newly built houses collapses. Second, all this has to be delivered 
without technical deficiencies. That makes high demands on competences and knowledge of 
techniques that the average plumber who is almost ready to retire does not possess. Extra 
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training courses are a necessity, but there will also be completely new kinds of jobs.” 
(societal actor) 
 
The different professional federations (VCB, WTCB, Bouwunie, NAV etc.) are 
organising courses for their members to retrain them, often with support from the 
government. The atmosphere in the sector is quite optimistic because in spite of the 
financial-economic crisis, the conversion of the sector offers opportunities and the 
federations themselves are aware of the fact that adjustments to the building regime 
are necessary to cash on these opportunities. The VCB argues for an “eco-keynesian 
approach” where the government corrects the market “by creating a frame with clear 
long-term objectives, by using levies to prevent activities that in the short term are 
problematic for the environment, by simultaneously stimulating eco-friendly 
techniques, through support of specific research and development projects and by 
taking the lead as principal” (VCB, 2010, p. 20). It is interesting to see that VCB, as 
one of the main regime actors, is searching for how typical regime rules can be 
breached. An example are its negotiations with Febelfin, the federation of the 
financial sector, to adjust the rules for mortgage loans. These are now based on the 
investment cost for the purchase or building of a new home, but when banks would 
take into account not only investment but also user cost, mortgage loans for low-
energy houses would become cheaper. VCB has developed a tool, the e-calculator, 
that is in particular suited for turnkey homes to calculate the lowest possible E-level 
for a particular budget.  
 
It is moreover in the turnkey market segment that a few traditional companies 
(Bostoen and Sibomat) are playing a frontrunners role in promoting passive houses. 
The experiences of these frontrunners – of amongst others Bostoen and Erzberg in 
the design and realization of sustainable neighbourhoods – have served as input for 
the inventory of bottlenecks that was drawn up by DuWoBo’s working group on 
neighbourhoods (cf. 5.2.3.3). In that way, there is an interplay between DuWoBo and 
building practices. 
 
Evolutions in materials 
 
I have indicated earlier in this chapter that the evolutions around materials in the 
building sector are going slowly and are a rather sensitive topic as well, perhaps 
unsurprisingly since it is literally the basis on which the sector builds. Nevertheless, 
the exhaustion of resources and the environmental effects of materials have seldom 
been a theme in the sector. Only the control over construction and demolition waste 
and a reorientation towards reuse have since the mid-1990s played a significant role 
in this respect. However, the previous chapter about Plan C, has shown how the 
developments in the waste regime seem to be setting in motion a broader 
development towards sustainable materials management. Elements such as the 
European Waste Directive, the resource efficiency flagship of the EU 2020 strategy 
and industry concerns about geopolitical developments around resources are 
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important influences in that reorientation. The Flemish government also expects that 
the building sector plays a role in this reorientation, as active partners in the 
Materials Decree and in Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA). OVAM has been involved in 
DuWoBo since the beginning, and as said above, the 2007 Uitvoeringsplan 
Materiaalgebruik en Afvalbeheer in de Bouw (Implementation plan Materials use and 
waste management in the construction sector) was already framed as part of the 
ongoing transitions in building and in material management. As part of its 
contribution to DuWoBo, OVAM has since 2010 also invested in the development of 
an LCA-based methodology with Flemish and Belgian data and scenario’s to 
quantify the environmental impacts of building elements.  
 
The most important regulation with an impact on the features of construction 
materials and products is the European Construction Products Directive, dating from 
1989 and implemented in Belgian law in 1998. The main goal of the Directive is 
stimulating the trade in construction products in the EU. When products meet a set 
criteria, they receive a CE marking and can be traded on the EU market. The 
Directive originally formulated 6 essential requirements for constructions: mechanical 
resistance and stability; safety in the case of fire; hygiene, health and the environment; 
safety in use; protection against noise; energy economy and heat retention. Although 
environmental aspects were part of the requirements, standards and technical 
specifications have always been minimal because of differences between member 
states and a lack of harmonised tests. In March 2011, the Council and the European 
Parliament approved the Construction Products Regulation (EU 305/2011) that will 
replace the old Directive as of 1 July 2013. Because it is a Regulation instead of a 
Directive, it will have to implemented similarly in all member states. The 
terminology is now basic work requirements and the requirements have been increased 
from 6 to 7. The new seventh requirement sustainable use of resources demands that all 
construction works use natural resources sustainably, in particular related to the 
recyclability of the construction and materials after demolition, the sustainability of 
the construction itself, and the use of environmental-friendly materials and 
secondary materials in construction. 
 
Meanwhile, the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) has also been 
working on standards in different technical committees, such as CEN TC 305 
(Sustainaility of construction works) and CEN TC 351 (Construction products – 
Assessment of release of regulated dangerous substances). CEN TC 350 has developed a 
standard procedure (EN 15804) to report consistently about the environmental 
features of products in the format of an environmental product declaration  (EPD). Here 
24 environmental indicator are used, on the basis of an LCA-analysis, to report about 
the whole life cycle of a product. Since end 2008, the Belgische Bouwmaterialen 
Producenten (BMP, Belgian construction materials producers) have a working group 
sustainable construction where the translation of the EPD is investigated for Belgium. 
To Simons, president of DuWoBo, has been one of the participants in this group. 
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While these kind of processes are part of policy developments that are in particular 
important for the reorientation of regime practices, there is a growing interest for the 
niche of bio-ecological building and the Nature Plus label that is part of it (in 
Flanders promoted by VIBE, since the start in 2005 an active participant in the 
DuWoBo process). Nature Plus uses an LCA-analysis to describe the environmental 
and health impacts of products in construction. Apart from the technical 
requirements for these products (according to CE-criteria), stringent norms and limit 
values are used for their environmental and health aspects. These include: a 
minimum of 85% of renewable raw materials or mineral based materials which are 
almost unlimited in their availability, prohibition of health-endangering substances 
(in practice for example synthetics), etc. During the important Belgian construction 
fair Batibouw 2009 the label made a breakthrough when it was granted to 
Wienerberger – as industrial producer of bricks a typical regime actor – for some of 
its products (such as the Porotherm brick, a mass product used in a lot of houses for 
inner walls). In 2010, the Nature Pluslabel was awarded to the Tessenderlo branch of 
Pittsburgh Coning Europe for its Foamglass, a thermal insulation system from 
cellular glass. 
 
Evolutions in spatial planning 
 
As discussed in 5.1.2, with the Ruimtelijk Structuurplan Vlaanderen (RSV) of 1997, the 
Flemish government wanted to counter suburbanisation and sprawl, amongst other 
things by delineating urban areas, determining how much could be built where (60% 
urban, 40% countryside) and bundling economic activities. The RSV had a planning 
horizon of 10 years. The 1999 Decree on Spatial Planning determined that every five 
years the RSV had to be evaluated, and if necessary updated or revised. As discussed 
in 5.1, the update in 2003-2004 under Minister Van Mechelen liberalised some of the 
rules in the RSV. By 2009, the different compromises that were part of structural 
planning, had broken up (Van den Broeck et al., 2010). The spatial claims of different 
domains (housing, business, mobility, agriculture, nature, recreation, energy) were 
increasingly under the pressure of new societal questions that were not or to a lesser 
extent relevant at the time when the RSV was approved: globalisation and European 
integration of economy, transport and agriculture; increasing transport flows; climate 
change and demand for renewable energy; protection of biodiversity; economic 
restructuring and innovation. Ambitious programmes such as Vlaanderen in Actie 
with its thematic breakthroughs also have a spatial component. Through these kind 
of developments, the need for a new long-term vision about spatial planning in 
replacement of the RSV became more pressing.  
 
An evaluation of the RSV (Voets et al., 2010) at the demand of the Flemish 
government, concluded in 2010 that the RSV process has been important for the 
growth to maturity of spatial planning in Flanders. From the Flemish to the local 
level, spatial plans have been realised.  But in spite of the plans, most RSV-objectives 
have not been attained, although there is some increase in building density and cities 
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have become more attractive. In contrast, suburbanisation continues, bundling of 
economic activities succeeds only to a limited degree, and congestion increases. The 
researchers find that the very complex spatial system exhibits a huge degree of path 
dependency, that there is a lack of planning capacity and a failure of implementation. 
Involved actors still subscribe to the necessity of a strategic spatial planning agenda, 
but the support for the RSV has diminished due to the slow planning and realisation 
process. In Flanders, where space is scarce, spatial questions and policy 
“automatically imply a never-ending struggle over influence and power. Spatial 
planning can never be a purely technocratic story” (ibid., p. 8). 
 
Let us look for a moment at the spatial trends for housing and building. As said, in 
spite of a greater appeal of the Flemish cities, no break in trends could be realised 
and suburbanisation and fragmentation of open space continued. Between 2000 and 
2010, the built-up area increased by 14%, mostly at the expense of agricultural land 
(VRIND, 2012a). According to prognoses, the amount of families will increase with 
250.000 by 2021 and a further 180.000 by 2041 (in relation to 2006) (De Decker et al., 
2011), so this implies a need for more houses. Is there space left on the available 
building lots? Different figures circulate, but on the building area that has been 
delineated in the RSV between 614.000 (Afdeling Woonbeleid, 2011) and 844.000 
houses can be built, when making use of reserve lots even 1.169.000 houses (De 
Decker et al., 2011). There is thus no shortage in building lots, but the problem is that 
they are spread out over the territory and using all of them would lead even further 
away from the RSV goals. “One fifth of the area is found in cities, 43% in the centres 
of the countryside, but also 31% in ribbon and dispersed building. This division does 
not fit with the objectives of spatial policy” (Afdeling Woonbeleid 2011, p. 26). 
 
The Governmental Declaration of Peeters II formulated the ambition to determine a 
new spatial plan during its legislature, or at least a draft. The Policy Note 2009-2014 
of Minister of Spatial Planning Muyters contained a process proposal that should 
lead to a draft for a Beleidsplan Ruimte Vlaanderen (Spatial Policy Plan Flanders) by 
Spring 201486. On 28 January 2011, the Flemish Government approved a starting note 
in which the intention is expressed to develop a long-term vision for spatial planning 
in co-production and partnership with all relevant stakeholders. In a first phase in 
Spring 2011 the population was invited to answer a poll about its spatial preferences. 
This input and several expert workshops led to a Green Paper in May 2012, 
Vlaanderen in 2050: mensenmaat in een metropool? (Flanders in 2050: human scale in a 
metropole?) (Vlaamse Overheid, 2012c). Half 2013, the Green Paper has to evolve 
into a White Paper where the future vision and strategic priorities have been 
crystallized out. By March 2014, a draft of the new Beleidsplan Ruimte should be 
available. The Green Paper states that it builds on the RSV and reconfirms the goal 
that Flanders has to “evolve to a spatial development where the total built-up area 
does not increase anymore” (ibid., p. 23). In the future, the use of space should be 
                                                  
86 This implies that the next government retains the freedom to determine what to do with 
the draft. 
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“careful”, “efficient”, “more intensive”, “creative”, “multiple”. The future image of 
Flanders is that of Metropolis Flanders, “a polycentric network of functional urban 
regions that together generate enough urban power to rise above the average of a 
small town” (ibid., p. 29). The ambition is threefold: 1. strengthening Flanders’ 
metropolitan status, 2. while keeping human scale in spatial development, 3. and 
increasing the spatial resilience of Flanders. According to the Green Paper, the urban 
centres have to guarantee international connectivity, innovation and creativity, high-
quality architecture, public space and city parks. But it is not the intention that 
Flanders becomes one unbroken city area. The numerous small Flemish cities should 
make it possible to continue developing at human scale. Moreover, this can be a 
competitive advantage, since it guarantees high living quality, social coherence, 
affordability of housing and open space in everyone’s reach. Resilience through a 
green-blue network and a stop to fragmentation, make Flanders less vulnerable for 
the consequences of climate change and the energy transition. In the open spaces the 
functions of  nature, agriculture, biodiversity and water have priority, but can be 
combined with tourism, energy production, carbon storage, recreation, forestry. 
 
Alongside these policy developments, from the point of view of sustainable housing 
and building, there is a remarkable growth in interest for the building of integral 
sustainable neighbourhoods. Some projects are large scale (certainly for Flanders), 
such as the Twee Waters project of real estate developer Ertzberg in Leuven, where 
1200 low-energy dwellings are planned and the neighbourhood produces its own 
green electricity and warmth. This was one of the projects of which the experiences 
served to inform the bottlenecks note of the DuWoBo working group on 
neighbourhoods. Other experiments are more small-scale such as the Ecopolis-
project – inspired by the Ecopolis approach of the Dutch planner Sybrand Tjallingii – 
that was coordinated by VIBE and where a handbook was developed for 
municipalities that want to experiment with this approach. The city of Ieper used the 
Ecopolis model for the development of its new neighbourhood De Vloed. 
Interestingly, VCB also referred to the Ecopolis-model in one of its vision reports as a 
promising model for urban development (VCB, 2009). 
 
Evolutions in housing  
 
The structural features of the housing market that I discussed in 5.1.3 above, have of 
course not disappeared a few years later: the dichotomy between ownership and rent, 
the lack of social housing, the private rental market as a rest market with grinding 
consequences for poorer families, the increase in real estate prices (building lots and 
houses). After 2005, the Flemish government has taken several initiatives to get more 
grip on the housing market and to steer evolutions. There seems to be a growing 
understanding of limited availability of space, the negative consequences of sprawl, 
but also of the fact that home ownership may not be attainable and affordable for 
everybody. I focus on three initiatives. 
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First, the Decreet Grond- en Pandenbeleid (2009, Decree Land and Premises Policy) has 
the intention of improving the affordability of housing by promoting the supply of 
social houses and modest houses. The Decree obliges local authorities to make an 
inventory of vacant building lots and their property status. After the inventory, a 
local action programme has to be drawn up to define which land will be built on 
over the next ten years. The Decree stipulates that by 2020 the supply of social 
housing must be increased with 43.000 social rental houses, 21.000 social purchase 
houses and 1000 social allotments. Each municipality is obliged to take part in the 
realisation of these objectives, the amount depending on its number of inhabitants. 
The Decree further defines several rules to reach the objectives. It states for example 
that minimum 25% of vacant building lots that are publicly owned should be 
assigned to social housing. All sizeable building projects, whether private or public, 
have to realise a certain percentage of social houses. Furthermore, at least 40% of new 
houses on municipally owned building land have to be reserved for “modest houses”. 
These are not social houses, but houses with a modest rent or sales price, and for 
which the Flemish government determines a recommended price. The Decree also 
contains stimuli to renovate vacant or run-down houses. 
 
Second, renovation as such gets more policy attention since the renewal of the 
renovation premium in 2007. After an investment of at least 10.000 Euro, owners can 
receive a premium of up to 30% of the costs (with a maximum of 10.000 Euro). 
Renovation not only improves the living comfort and physical quality of existing 
houses, but the premium also indirectly supports the purchase of existing houses at 
the expense of new building. VRIND-figures show that while in 1991, 14% of the 
houses did not have tap water, a water-flushed toilet and a bathroom or shower, this 
category had disappeared almost entirely in 2010 (3%). An important reason for this 
qualitative improvement is the shift on the housing market from newly built houses 
to purchase of existing ones: nearly half of the new owners renovates the existing 
house (VRIND, 2012).  
Third, to further strengthen housing policy and make it more future-oriented, Freya 
Van den Bossche, Minister of Housing Policy announced in her Policy Note 2009-
2014 the development of a Woonbeleidsplan Vlaanderen (Housing policy plan Flanders). 
The purpose is to develop a long-term vision on housing that fits in the legal frame of 
the Vlaamse Wooncode and takes 2020-2050 as its time horizon. The plan should ease 
policy harmonisation between actors in housing policy and other policy domains, 
and create a societal support basis for a new housing policy.  
The official start of the societal debate about the Woonbeleidsplan was on 29 
November 2011 87 . It is interesting to note that the preparatory paper of the 
                                                  
87 By then, the process had already yielded several documents, such as a pre-study of the 
department housing policy of RWO (Wonen Vlaanderen, 2012), an advice of the advisory 
council Vlaamse Woonraad about what the main features of a sustainable housing policy 
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department Housing Policy (Wonen Vlaanderen, 2011) takes a broad perspective on 
the choices that have to be made in the plan. According to the paper, these relate to 
the economic, social, ecological (only defined in energy terms), spatial and 
governance aspects of housing. One of the central questions in the paper is whether 
the Flemish housing model is tenable in the future: “Can the traditional housing 
model hold in the light of the numerous challenges that are facing us?” (ibid., p. 35). 
The suggestion is that it cannot because of different pressures on the model: the 
deployment of policy means favours ownership but this increasingly at the expense 
of other segments and target groups, the model uses too much energy and space, 
demographic changes require new answers, and more attention is needed for urban 
challenges. After several Round Tables, the Minister presented the main policy lines 
for the future vision in September 2012. That contains four big objectives: housing 
security with a lifelong guarantee of a suitable house; an enforceable right to 
affordability; an enforceable right to quality; and pleasurable housing. The vision 
also defines some necessary conditions to reach these objectives: policy for 
ownership as well as rent; spatial planning at the service of good housing; smart use 
of space and creative housing solutions; low-energy and sustainable housing is a 
must. It is the intention that the debate about the Woonbeleidsplan continues in 2013 
and leads to a definite plan by the end of 2013. 
Although a lot of these ideas and policy lines resemble the DuWoBo discourse and 
proposals, DuWoBo is only briefly mentioned in the pre-study of the department 
housing policy. And while a lot of organisations that participate in DuWoBo also 
participate in the Round Tables, there has been no attempt at harmonisation with 
DuWoBo as such. An explanation must be sought in a combination of factors: the 
ingrained logic of each Minister and department independently developing and 
pursuing its own policy, coupled to the many years’ lack (or refusal) of involvement 
in DuWoBo as well as the diminishing dynamics of DuWoBo itself. Nevertheless, 
there are some other overtures between sustainable housing and building and 
‘traditional’ housing policy. Affordability has become an important item in 
sustainable housing and building because of the fear that new energy performance 
requirements may raise the costs of building and renovation. On the side of housing 
policy, new quality requirement have been brought in. An adjustment of 29 April 
2011 to the Vlaamse Wooncode added the principle of “minimal energetic 
performances” to the list of elementary safety, health and quality requirements of 
houses. 
So, just like in the developments around energy, materials and spatial planning, the 
direct policy link with and involvement of DuWoBo as TM-process is very weak. On 
the other hand, also here, we see how DuWoBo has been supporting relevant niche 
projects such as a project about cohousing, a housing formula that promotes a more 
                                                                                                                                                          
should be (Vlaamse Woonraad, 2011), and a scenario exercise of the academic Policy 
Research Centre Ruimte en Wonen (Ryckewaert et al., 2010). 
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collective way of housing. Further, DuWoBo has always given the floor to 
sustainable practices in the social housing sector, such as the pioneering work of the 
social housing association De Zonnige Kempen and the projects of the VMSW. 
Evolutions in socio-economic innovation policy 
 
The construction sector has never been at the forefront of innovation, nor has 
innovation been a major concern over the years (VRWI, 2012). But two intertwining 
developments have brought the theme under the attention. One is the general 
question about the future of industry in a globalising economy and in the knowledge 
economy, where in the industrialised world ever more economic activity and value 
derives from the service sector. Two is the necessity to innovate under pressure of in 
particular European energy requirements (see also the energy section above). 
 
The link between (sustainable) housing and building and innovation policy is mainly 
visible through integration in Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA, Flanders in Action – see also 
Context Box 3), and that in two – again largely uncoordinated – ways. First, one of 
the 13 transition management projects that the Flemish government introduced in 
ViA in July 2011, is “sustainable housing and building”. Although it is called a “TM-
project”, the project is not restricted to the existing DuWoBo process, but rather 
refers to all activities that are set up around sustainable housing and building, and 
thus in fact to what I labelled as an embryonic policy arrangement. The renewal of 
DuWoBo in the DuWoBo 2.0 process is supposed to play an important role in this 
ViA-project88. 
 
Second, and completely alongside this evolution, the general question of the future of 
industry has been picked up by the Flemish government in the framework of 
Vlaanderen in Actie, where the search for a “new industrial policy” is an important 
theme. On 26 May 2011, the Witboek Een Nieuw Industrieel Beleid voor Vlaanderen 
(White paper A new industrial policy for Flanders) was published. The Witboek 
promotes a transformation of the Flemish industry along 4 pillars: a productivity and 
competition policy, an industrial innovation policy, a career and competence 
development policy, and an infrastructural policy. The different industrial sectors are 
expected to define their own objectives and strategy for transformation, and in return 
can count on different forms of support of the government, such as the TINA-fund, a 
fund with a budget of 200 million Euro to support industrial transformation.  
 
The elaboration of sectoral objectives and strategies is organised in Round Tables. 
The first of Round Table started on 11 February 2012 and is devoted to the 
construction sector. The meetings, under presidency of VCB, are reserved for 
professional organisations and government representatives – NGO’s and other niche 
                                                  
88 As mentioned above, DuWoBo 2.0 had problems in becoming operational during 2012 and 
early 2013. Because the research for this dissertation ended early 2012, this is however not 
treated here. 
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actors were not welcome. One member of the DAR SD-team, who also follows the 
DuWoBo-process (Merijn Van den Eede), attends the meetings. Although it is in fact 
the purpose that the Round Table discusses strategic orientations, most working 
groups that have been set up discuss rather concrete themes: financing of privately 
owned low-energy houses; public-private cooperation; water-robust construction; 
promotion of export; broadening recruitment and promotion of skills; and work, 
safety and wellbeing. 
 
The Round Table could make use of another attempt at strategic thinking for the 
construction sector, undertaken in the Autumn 2011 at the request of the Minister of 
Innovation, Ingrid Lieten, in the innovatieregiegroep Bouw (iRG Bouw, innovation 
direction group construction) (VRWI, 2012). This group of experts – amongst whom 
To Simons for DuWoBo – was brought together to formulate recommendations to 
support innovation in the sector. The main conclusion was that the sector is in need 
of “an economic and systemic transformation” to tackle all challenges with which the 
sector is confronted. The following actions are deemed necessary for such a 
transformation: a multidisciplinary platform that develops a holistic and strategic 
long-term vision89, a data observatory and open information platform, an investment 
plan, a detailed time-line for the realisation of nearly energy-neutral houses, 
objectives and an implementation plan for resource management and efficiency, a 
combination of newly built houses and renovation, affordability of initiatives, policy 
harmonisation on Flemish level. 
 
5.3.2. Summarizing through the lenses of MLP and policy arrangements 
 
The preceding overview of developments in the segments of the housing and the 
building regime, clarify why I argued above that it is virtually impossible to present 
a nicely delineated picture of the current policy arrangement of housing and building. 
The whole regime and policy arrangement are moving, but different segments are 
changing at different speeds, with hardly any coordination between them and with 
as of yet unpredictable outcomes. Nevertheless, I will use the MLP and the 
dimensions of policy arrangements to summarize some remarkable developments. 
 
It is possible to identify landscape pressures that are influencing several segments of 
the regime and the policy arrangement simultaneously. These include the climate 
crisis and the energy transition, different demographic evolutions (growth, ageing 
and greening, migration), economic integration and restructuring, increasing 
transport flows. An important novelty is the fact that these influences have taken on 
a more direct, international character. Climate and energy are typical examples here. 
When looking back at the history of the system, the big societal changes that shaped 
the system have always had international features: from the rise of industrial society 
                                                  
89 The text refers to DuWoBo’s transition agenda Vlaanderen in de steigers as a source of 
inspiration. Notice also the similarity between this proposal for a multidisciplinary, strategic 
platform and the ambitions that are formulated for the DuWoBo 2.0 process. 
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and the struggle for social justice, to the post-war reconstruction, the consumption 
society and the rise of neoliberalism. Yet, the thesis of close observers has usually 
been that the housing market is predominantly locally determined, mainly 
influenced by internal powers and dynamics such as the distribution of land 
ownership, the importance given to private property, or opinions about the 
desirability of state intervention. Flemish experts such as De Decker et al. (2011) use 
the term weak globalisation thesis to defend that although global trends play a role, 
they are strongly filtered by the historically grown institutional structures of the 
welfare state. Even for future dynamics, they claim that it is more relevant to look at 
internal powers: “This is certainly true for Flanders where the path dependency of 
housing policy is very high” (ibid., p. 82). This is somewhat surprising given the 
previous analysis and may well underestimate ongoing changes. It is for example 
obvious that European regulation as a result of climate policy has been crucial to set 
in motion the whole energy segment of the building and housing. It has even 
resulted in moving a previously marginal topic to the centre of attention in the 
construction sector. The effects of new regulation, industrial activities and housing 
practices around energy are already spilling over into other segments: it influences 
thinking about urban development, spatial planning, even quality requirements for 
social housing. 
 
In other words, these landscape pressures are already influencing regime practices, 
and rapidly so. The most visible change is in the energy segment of the regime where 
new standards not only introduce new construction practices, but have a cascade of 
effects, such as a demand for new professions and a reorientation of existing 
professions, a reorientation of schooling and training profiles, a reorientation of 
premium systems, new criteria for mortgage loans, and so on. In other segments of 
the regime – such as spatial planning and housing – old relations and practices are 
still standing, but are under increasing pressure. What at the very least can be said, is 
that the discussion has been opened. A continuation of spatial trends will irrevocably 
lead to an increase in built-up area of a third to 50% of the current area by 2050 
(Vlaams Overheid, 2012c).This seems incompatible with the realisation not only of 
spatial, but also of socio-economic, ecological and cultural ambitions Flanders 
pursues. In the realm of housing, the understanding has also grown that the 
ownership model is unfeasible for the whole population, and that social and urban 
needs require a rebalancing with a tenants model and social housing.  
 
Even though in some of its segments changes are visible, it is as of yet far from clear 
how fast and in how far regime change will be possible. There is thus still ample of 
room for niches to develop alternatives and gain influence. Niches diverge from 
specific technical parts of construction (e.g. bio-ecological materials), to houses as a 
whole (e.g. passive houses), to larger projects (e.g. sustainable neighbourhoods), to 
primarily social innovations (e.g. cohousing). Some of these – again the energy-
related ones such as passive houses – are on the verge of a breakthrough to normal 
regime practice. The success of others will depend on how societal debates will 
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evolve and whether these niches are deemed an acceptable solution. In the materials 
discussion: what will be the future of synthetic materials, will green chemistry offer 
alternatives and what is the place for the bio-ecological materials niche? Or in the 
housing discussion: is the cohousing niche an attractive alternative for young middle 
class families with children that otherwise would leave the cities; can it also play a 
role in other challenges such as the growing social and ethnic diversity and the need 
for taking care of an ageing population? It is interesting to note that these niches are 
not completely separated from what is happening at the regime level. Regime actors 
are aware of them, are regularly involved in them, cooperate with niche players or 
use niche features to profile themselves. Building sustainable neighbourhoods 
requires capital investments that cannot be mobilised by niche actors – see the real 
estate developer Ertzberg in the Twee Waters project in Leuven. Cooperating with 
niche actors may attract new customers or strengthen market positions – see the 
cooperation of the architects organisation NAV and SME-federation Bouwunie with 
VIBE for training about eco-biological materials, and the awarding of the NaturePlus 
label to products of Wienerberger and Pitsburgh Coning Europe. 
 
The ongoing changes have introduced some new actors and are changing the 
positioning of others. Again, this is best visible in the energy field, where the energy 
agency VEA has entered the field since 2006 and is responsible for the preparation 
and implementation of energy policy. The obligations flowing from European 
regulation have in turn obliged the construction sector to search for the economic 
opportunities in the coming changes, instead of only regarding them as threat. A 
regularly told anecdote in DuWoBo-circles is how at the time the transition agenda 
Vlaanderen in de steigers was finalised, VCB opposed its E-level and passive house 
ambitions. “However, during their congress a year later, their attitude had changed already. 
And nowadays, they promote a timing that is stricter than what we proposed” (societal actor). 
Legislation such as the EPB-norms creates new activity, new professions and 
specialisations and it seems to provide an opportunity for the sector to profile itself 
as one of the carriers of a more sustainable society. With that, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to draw a clear distinction between regime and niche actors, certainly if 
typical regime actors make niche activities and ideas the core of their business 
(Bostoen and Sibomat with passive houses, Wienerberger with the NaturePlus label, 
Ertzberg with sustainable neigbourhoods). 
 
Meanwhile, government actors are searching how to cope with the imminent 
changes. This is probably one of the reasons for the sudden increase in long-term 
vision exercises and multi-actor processes in different policy domains. While until 
2010 DuWoBo could claim to be the only process for housing and building with a 
long-term view and a broad pallet of actors, since then different domains have set up 
processes with comparable ambitions: spatial planning, housing, innovation. While 
there are links between these processes and often similar actors are involved, there is 
hardly any policy coordination or harmonisation of initiatives. Besides, it can be 
doubted whether the government will be able to cope with these kind of challenges 
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with the current structures and working procedures. As already discussed in Context 
Box 2, the BBB-reform of the Flemish administration followed a new public 
management logic and the resulting structures and working procedures are not 
suited for transversal questions that demand domain-crossing cooperation, flexibility, 
stakeholder involvement and experiment (VLABEST, 2011). In their respective 
domains, large government departments and agencies are in charge of policy 
preparation, development and implementation: RWO for spatial planning and 
housing, LNE and VEA for environment and energy, OVAM for materials, EWI for 
innovation. It can be questioned whether it is realistic to think that in this situation 
the DuWoBo 2.0 process, supported by the very small DAR SD-team, can claim a 
strategic role as a platform where long-term, integrated choices for more sustainable 
housing and building are discussed. Unless it is exactly this somewhat outsider 
position, yet situated at the coordinating DAR-level, that can be capitalised upon to 
open up such an opportunity. Coordination should however not be confused with 
the capacity to enforce decisions or even cooperation, because according to the BBB-
logic this remains with the competent departments. 
 
That there may be room and even a need for long-term coordination, can be deduced 
from the way the discourse of the long-term exercises in the different policy domains 
seems to be converging. Although they have of course there own accents, there is a 
convergence in relevant themes that appear in different domains: the need to stop 
spatial sprawl, the necessity to cope with energy questions and climate change, the 
affordability of housing, the economic as well as the opportunities for quality of life, 
the important role of cities, the fact that it is no longer a taboo to question the 
viability of the Flemish housing model. What in all this should not be 
underestimated is the interaction between discourse development and emerging 
practices in the field: the change is not just happening on the level of discourse, but is 
materialising, is visible and tangible. Anyone who wants, can visit a more sustainable 
house or walk into a more sustainable office buildings. It has become affordable to 
build more sustainable houses and the first sustainable neighbourhoods are rising. 
Foreign examples such as Freiburg are widely quoted and presented. This materiality 
gives an extra dimension to the sustainable housing and building discourse that 
makes it harder to stop the ongoing evolutions. At the same time, the transition is 
still in a very early stage and lots of choices have to be made the following years in 
crucial domains such as spatial planning, housing, energy, etc. The direction and 
speed of change can still be influenced by numerous factors. Which also implies that 
there is room for multi-actor processes that have the ambition to influence these 
choices.  
 
There are as of yet no major changes in rules visible, except once more in the energy 
segment of the arrangement. In the important segments of spatial planning and 
housing, the existing rules are still standing firmly and it remains to be seen whether 
the long-term vision exercises and the discourse development will translate into new 
rules. In the energy segment, the European influence is not only a new element, but it 
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also shows the strength of regulation and financial instruments for initiating change. 
Without the EPB Directive, its translation in Flemish Decrees, the systematic and 
announced tightening of the E-level, and the supporting subsidy system for energy-
efficient investments, the evolution would not have gone so fast, or would perhaps 
not have started. While a TM-process such as DuWoBo may contribute in future 
visioning, discourse formation and network organisation, it takes interventions of a 
different calibre to get a mass market moving. 
 
Also in the dimension of resources there are as of yet no spectacular shifts visible, 
although also here more means have become available for support of the energy 
segment of housing and building. In general, in particular the classic environmental 
themes of sustainable housing and building have required more legitimacy during 
the last years. Also, knowledge about the practical construction implications of these 
themes is quickly increasing, in particular of course through the experiences in new 
building and renovation practices. For the core domains spatial planning and 
housing, the results of different Round Tables show that the legitimacy with experts 
seems high to break with the existing housing model (see e.g. the results of the ViA 
Round Table about Flanders as a green city region, 3 December 2010 – RWO, 2011). 
The question is whether political decision-makers and the public at large will be 
willing to move into that direction90.  
 
 
5.4. INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 
 
Since the start of DuWoBo in 2004, the process has come a long way. Even though the 
first Flemish experiences with transition management did not always proceed 
smoothly, in its first two years the DuWoBo arena succeeded in formulating a 
common transition agenda for sustainable housing and building, and initiating a 
series of small scale projects to translate the vision into practices. Even though there 
was no specific budget to fund these projects, smart coupling to existing funds of 
mainly LNE and DAR created some experimentation room. DuWoBo’s vision and 
transition paths coupled and broadened the agendas of its members. For traditional 
sector organisations, this meant a breakthrough at certain points; for niche actors, it 
enabled them to find new platforms for their story. In particular during its first years, 
the broadened networks and the exchange of knowledge and information created a 
dynamic process. After the agenda was offered to Minister-President Peeters in 
November 2007 and by him accepted as the long-term orientation for his policy 
regarding sustainable housing and building, it acquired more legitimacy. Between 
                                                  
90 In October 2012, in an interview in the follow-up of his Green Paper, Minister of Spatial 
Planning, Philippe Muyters, suggested that in the future people on the countryside might 
have to reckon with more expensive building lots and higher contributions for postal 
delivery or public services. This was immediately greeted with horror in the social media 
and in the Flemish Parliament, where Muyters was accused of behaving like former 
Romanian dictator Ceausescu. 
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2009 and 2011, DuWoBo itself and the policy theme sustainable housing and building 
were incorporated in important political declarations or processes, such as the 
governmental declaration of the Peeters II government and the socio-economic 
programme Vlaanderen in Actie. The institutional embedment also made progress 
through the transfer to the coordinating DAR-department with a small DAR SD-team, 
and the fact that several of the projects initiated by DuWoBo developed into 
autonomous processes, but followed up by or under coordination of the DAR SD-
team, such as the provincial centres for sustainable housing and building, the 
Flemish Maatstaf (standard) for sustainable housing and building, and the Belgian 
Sustainable Building Council. I argued above that in spite of its position under the 
authority of the Minister-President and the coordinating departments DAR, and even 
though DuWoBo’s vision has integrating ambitions, this did not result in some kind 
of overarching policy arrangement for the housing and building domain. DuWoBo 
never succeeded in drawing in the two core policy domains, spatial planning and 
housing. Instead, a still embryonic but relatively autonomous policy domain 
sustainable housing and building has surfaced that is one more addition to the 
already complex policy situation in housing and building. 
 
While sustainable housing and building as a policy theme found more legitimacy 
and a form of institutionalisation, it seems paradoxical that simultaneously the 
DuWoBo TM-process itself had serious problems in keeping its dynamics and 
keeping its members involved. By late 2011, the lack of enthusiasm and participation 
obliged DuWoBo to start thinking about a repositioning and a new role. There are 
internal explanations for the problems: a limited funding that restricts activities, a 
vision that after several years has lost a lot of its binding power, member 
organisations that fall into a passive attitude, the fact that DuWoBo has never 
reserved time to learn from successes or problems (such as the changing attitudes of 
its members). In my analysis, external reasons are more important to explain 
DuWoBo’s problems (coupled to DuWoBo’s incapacity to learn about and react to the 
changes). One is the ‘immediate’ policy context of the embryonic policy arrangement, 
where several new initiatives are now also discussing sustainable housing and 
building and where partly the same actors are involved. Two, and most important, 
are the changes in the housing and building regime and its policy arrangement. 
 
The characteristics of the Flemish housing and building regime have a history that 
goes back at least 150 years. During this time, a regime has developed that is deeply 
rooted in Flemish structures, practices and culture. Its features are private home 
ownership; single-family dwellings that are privately constructed; a huge preference 
for suburban dwelling, with sprawl as a result; anti-urban mentality; spatial 
polarisation between richer groups outside the cities and lower social status groups 
in the cities; high energy- and materials-intensity. Although it is still standing firmly, 
some of these regime features are increasingly under pressure. The most obvious 
change is a result of climate and energy pressures, translated in European regulation 
such as the EPB Directive. What was previously a marginal concern – the energy 
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performance of houses – has now moved to the centre of attention of the construction 
sector and is fast changing  the policy discourse and, at least as important, building 
practices. Other core features of the regime such as the unlimited use of space and 
the ownership model are also being openly discussed, although here new practices 
are harder to discern. Alternatives are however visible in niches such as sustainable 
neighbourhoods or co-housing. The policy discourse in important domains such as 
spatial planning, housing and innovation is meanwhile paying more attention to the 
long term and to integrated, strategic thinking. This is invariably done by setting up 
all kind of platforms where future trajectories are discussed, usually in a multi-actor 
setting. While until 2010 DuWoBo could claim to be the only platform for housing 
and building with a long-term, holistic view and a broad pallet of actors, this has 
changed. Given the relatively weak institutional position of DuWoBo when 
compared to these other platforms and their domains, it is almost unavoidable that 
DuWoBo is confronted with members that are strategically looking where best to 
invest their time and energy. Even after 8 years of work, it appears that what a 
transition really entails, has not yet found its way into engaged commitment of a lot 
of actors. It can be questioned whether it is realistic to think that in this situation the 
DuWoBo 2.0 process, supported by the very small DAR SD-team and without 
resources for experiments or even a stable secretariat, can claim a strategic role as a 
platform where long-term, integrated choices for more sustainable housing and 
building are discussed. Unless it is exactly this somewhat outsider position, yet 
situated at the coordinating DAR-level and under authority of the Minister-President, 
that can be capitalised upon to open up such an opportunity. 
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6.  
The role of transition management in 
policy change  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation started from an interest in understanding and evaluating the 
potential of transition management as an approach for stimulating policy change 
towards sustainable development. The main research question is how TM influences 
existing policy, which characteristics this influence has, how the influence (or lack 
thereof) can be explained and what this implies for the further development of 
transition governance. I studied two Flemish transition management processes in 
depth and presented a within-case analysis of both processes in the chapters 4 (Plan 
C) and 5 (DuWoBo). In both cases, I followed the same procedure. Each chapter starts 
with a historical narrative of the development of the system that the TM-process tries 
to have impact on and makes a description of the policy regime at the moment the 
TM-processes started around 2005. Next, the chapter reconstructs the history of the 
TM-process until early 2012 and details how it differs in its policy dimensions 
(discourse, actors, rules, resources) from the existing policy regime. Finally, it 
examines the current state of the system and traces the influence of transition 
management versus other factors. After the within-case analysis in chapters 4 and 5, 
this chapters turns to the cross-case analysis. 
 
My experience in the two case analyses with my analytical framework – an 
integration of the multilevel perspective with the policy arrangements approach – is 
that it allows to map in detail the characteristics of a policy regime and of policy 
niches, as well as the changes that happen within them over time. It is a very 
extensive framework for analysing what the characteristics are of regimes and niches 
and what changes within them over time. It is however less suited for understanding 
in detail how change has happened and how the different dimensions or levels play a 
role in that change. Of course, the analysis in the previous chapters does give some 
clues about these how-questions. It is for example obvious that structural trends – 
such as the increasing role of the EU policy level – have played a role in the changes 
that are visible. Or that the discourse of the TM-processes has influenced 
developments. Or that the confrontation of new policy orientations with 
conventional rules of decision-making slows down change. But what I aim for in this 
chapter 6 is a more refined understanding of patterns that can be observed, what the 
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relation is between the different dimensions and sorts of influence, and which 
mechanisms are behind it all.  
 
I will therefore use the cross-case analysis in this chapter not just to compare the two 
cases on what their differences and similarities are, but to look for patterns that 
surface and mechanisms that explain how things have changed, in that way trying to 
contribute to a better understanding of the role of transition management vis-à-vis 
regular policy. In other words, research sub-question 3 is central to this chapter: what 
are the empirically observable similarities and differences between both cases? How 
can these be explained in terms of patterns and mechanisms in the relation between a 
transition management process and regular policy? As explained in chapter 1, 2 and 
3, it is one of the first times that the relation between TM and regular policy is 
systematically researched in empirical cases. My research is exploratory and I will 
use the patterns and mechanisms it brings to the surface to formulate tentative 
hypotheses about the relation between transition management and regular policy 
(see chapter 7). 
 
I start from a descriptive question (in 6.1), namely: which form has policy change 
taken in both cases? I draw on Arts and Leroy’s categorisation of renewal of policy 
arrangements (see 2.5.2) to compare the policy evolutions that happened under 
influence of DuWoBo and Plan C. This comparison shows amongst other things that 
there are at least three key processes necessary for a TM-process to realise change: 
establishment of the policy niche, institutionalisation of that niche, and gaining of 
wider influence.  It also shows that the influence of DuWoBo and Plan C is not 
restricted to the systems in which both are active, but that there is also an influence 
beyond these systems, namely on the socio-economic innovation programme 
Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA, Flanders in Action – see also Context Box 3) and on the 
Vlaamse Strategie Duurzame Ontwikkeling (VSDO, Flemish Strategy for Sustainable 
Development – see also Context Box 4).  
 
In the next parts of the chapter, I will take the three key processes as anchor points to 
systematically unpack how change has been realised. I do this in different steps, and 
in each step I introduce an additional interpretive frame to make a more detailed and 
refined analysis possible in the comparison between the two cases and to get a better 
grip on common patterns and mechanisms of policy change. The different steps are 
all related to a deepening of the concepts of my analytical frame. 
 
In a first step (6.2), I depart from the observation that both TM-cases show a huge 
degree of coupling of policy evolutions from different levels by a specific kind of 
actors. I therefore seek to understand the key processes in terms of coupling of policy 
streams and the work of policy entrepreneurs, by drawing on Kingdon’s policy 
streams framework (Kingdon, 2011 [1984]). This proofs in particular useful for 
explaining the establishment and the gaining of wider influence of Plan C and 
DuWoBo.  I briefly introduce Kingdon’s theory and then apply it to three episodes 
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from the cases: the establishment of TM in Flanders, the link between Plan C and the 
change to a materials regime, and the breakthrough of TM in the socio-economic 
innovation programme ViA.  
 
In a second step, I analyse the role that discourse has played in realising change (6.3). 
That ideas matter in policy change was visible in the previous chapters and it also 
surfaces from the streams analysis. Discourse seems to matter in two forms: as ideas 
about the kind of change necessary (transitions) and as ideas about the substantive 
change necessary (sustainable housing and building, sustainable materials 
management). I use concepts from Hajer’s discourse analysis (1995, 2006) to 
investigate how these ideas have mattered in the three key processes. It shows that 
while ideas do play a role in explaining policy change, some discursive concepts 
(such as “transition” or “transition management”) also have a high flexibility and can 
in certain contexts be moulded in such a way that they fit in the regime discourse and 
may prevent change. 
 
This phenomenon of the context that encroaches on the good intentions of TM-
processes and shapes them, also shows in the rules dimension (6.4). While it may be 
possible to observe substantive forms of policy change (such as new discourses), 
there is the question whether the process aspects of policy are also changing. And 
more in particular, how does the interaction between the rules that TM proposes and 
the existing rules in the policy regime have an influence on policy change? I will use 
Hajer’s concepts (2003a) of an institutional void and resulting new political spaces to 
clarify some of the dynamics that are at work in both cases. 
 
In the next part of the chapter (6.5), I use Grin’s adaptation (2010) of a power 
framework proposed by Arts and Van Tatenhove (2004) to examine how the change 
and stability in the cases can be understood in terms of power. Actors draw on the 
resources they can mobilise to try to realise or avoid change, and are helped in that 
endeavour by power that is present in the regime or that can be mobilised through 
landscape evolutions. 
 
In the last part (6.6), I make a brief comparison of the insights from the Flemish 
experiences with the literature review in chapter 2 and draw some interim 
conclusions. 
 
 
6.1. CHARACTERISING TM-IN-PRACTICE AS A FORM OF POLICY INNOVATION 
 
Has transition management in Flanders led to policy change, and what form has this 
change taken? In part 2.5.2. I described how Arts and Leroy (2006b) group the 
emergence of new policy arrangements in three types: 1. the full or partial integration 
of existing and originally juxtaposed policy arrangements; 2. the discursive and/or 
organisational renewal of existing policy arrangements; and 3. the introduction of 
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new arrangements that should then be able to perform autonomously and 
institutionalise. It is not always possible to strictly separate these types. What is 
meant as a type 3 renewal, may over time become integrated in a broader 
arrangement (type 1). Or it could fail as an autonomous arrangement but have a 
discursive or organisational influence on an existing arrangement (type 2). And 
perhaps other combinations are possible. Using this typology, I now compare the 
developments of DuWoBo and Plan C, and then add some observations on the 
breakthrough of transition thinking to the Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA, Flanders in 
Action) programme. The analysis here is meant to present a broad picture of the 
policy change that has taken place. In the next parts, I will go in detail as to how 
change was realised. 
 
6.1.1. Embedment of Plan C in a changing policy regime 
 
In the conclusions of chapter 4, I argued that the governance structure of the old 
waste regime is rapidly changing in order to be able to cope with the challenge of the 
starting materials regime and the fact that the sustainable materials theme has 
become one of the spearheads in the socio-economic innovation programme ViA. In 
the structure that is taking shape at Flemish level, OVAM is the leading government 
agency and concentrates itself mainly on short- and mid-term policy development, 
vzw Plan C should develop the long-term orientation, knowledge development is the 
task of SuMMa, while cooperation with other government agencies is organised 
through the cooperation agreement with EWI, DAR and VITO. Cooperation with 
societal actors is sought through the Vlaams Materialenprogramma (Flemish Materials 
Programme), where an agreement has been signed between the government, 
industry, knowledge centres and other societal partners. Plan C seems thus to have 
become nested within a broader materials regime arrangement. Its discourse and 
actor composition are moreover very similar to that of the policy regime. 
 
With this way of formulating the change that has taken place, I referred implicitly to 
the different types of policy innovation that have been identified by Arts and Leroy 
(2006). Are these types useful for understanding the kind of policy change in and 
around Plan C? What type of policy renewal be observed in the Plan C case?  
 
Plan C was launched in 2006 as an experiment in innovative environmental policy in 
a relatively simple policy context: the central government actor (OVAM) in the waste 
regime initiated the TM-process with the intention of innovating its policies. Plan C 
developed into a policy niche with characteristics distinctive from the then existing 
waste regime: a discourse where waste has become a small part of an overarching 
materials system, a group of frontrunners from various backgrounds that have the 
ambition to lay the foundations for a sustainable materials system, new interaction 
rules inspired by transition management. Mostly under impulse of the original arena 
members, in 2008 a business plan was developed that wanted to turn Plan C into an 
autonomous network of individuals that offers a platform for radical renewal and 
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far-reaching innovations in materials management. This created the possibility of a 
type 3 renewal: a new and autonomous arrangement alongside the existing waste 
regime. However, such a renewal never materialised. The main reason is that the 
existing policy arrangement at regime level underwent a drastic discursive and 
organisational renewal that reoriented the regime arrangement towards sustainable 
materials management (or a type 2 renewal). A new discourse was introduced, rule 
changes such as the Materials Decree were installed, new actors entered the 
arrangement and traditional actors repositioned themselves, new resources also 
entered the arrangement.  
 
In this situation, the strategic importance of Plan C for OVAM grew, but what the 
exact relation between both should be, how OVAM should play its role, and what the 
role of other actors should be, remained points under discussion. It took until the end 
of 2011, before this started to crystallize out, and meanwhile, the TM niche had lost 
nearly all of its dynamism. As said, in the anticipated task division, OVAM will 
occupy itself mainly with short and medium term policies, while the long term 
should be covered by the newly created Plan C vzw and a supporting cooperation 
structure of OVAM and several other administrations. Both are supported by the 
newly created Policy Research Centre on SuMMa. Cooperation with different 
stakeholders happens in the Flemish Materials Programme. The fact that the 
construction of Plan C with a supporting structure has a particular function (develop 
long-term policy lines and action from a transition perspective, serving as a societal 
experiment space) and a particular organisational structure (with selected actors, 
specific resources, an autonomous legal statute), but is situated within an 
overarching policy regime focused on sustainable materials management, is an 
argument for labelling it a type 1 form of policy innovation: the embedment of an 
existing policy niche, hierarchically nested under the broader policy regime. Or in 
other words, we have a combination of a type 2 renewal with a type 191.  
 
What can be further be observed from this general description of change in the Plan 
C case, is that there are at least three key processes that play a role in the route from 
transition management to policy change: the establishment of the policy niche, a 
form of institutionalisation of the niche (that was quite precarious between 2009 and 
2011), and the gaining of wider influence beyond what happens in the niche. The 
next sections of this chapter (6.2 till 6.5) will each contribute parts of the puzzle in 
answering how throughout these key processes the observed changes were realised, 
who was involved in them, what were key moments and important mechanisms. 
                                                  
91
 There is no doubt about the type 2 renewal and there is also no doubt that Plan C is 
embedded within it. But it could be argued that it is a bit early to label it a combination of a 
type 2 with a type 1 renewal, because the whole governance structure is still taking shape. A 
lot will depend on how in the coming years the materials arrangement as a whole will 
develop and in how far Plan C will be able to really create its own distinctive space within 
the overarching materials regime. 
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6.1.2. DuWoBo as an autonomous policy arrangement in a fragmented regime 
 
In chapter 5, I argued that the system of housing and building is difficult to delineate 
and that it is certainly not possible to reduce the policy regime to one clearly defined 
policy domain. In fact, if there is something as a “socio-technical system housing and 
building”, then it is made up of different overlapping systems and policies. The 
policy arrangement can then be constructed as a configuration of actors and rules 
from different policy domains such as spatial planning, housing, mobility, energy, 
economic and innovation policy, water, materials. The introduction of the DuWoBo 
process in 2004 was the first attempt at setting up a coordinated policy for 
sustainable housing and building at Flemish level. 
 
Just like Plan C, DuWoBo was also launched as an experiment in innovative 
environmental policy. Apart from the fact that the policy context was considerably 
more complex, it is also noticeable that it was initiated by the environment 
administration LNE, which is from a historic point of view certainly not a central 
actor in the housing and building regime. DuWoBo as a policy niche has some clearly 
distinctive features from what existed until then: it brings together a group of actors 
from government and society that covers the whole system, it develops a new 
integral discourse on sustainable housing and building, it tries out new working 
methods and rules for interaction between the involved actors, it searches for 
resources to promote the new vision, the new working methods and practices. From 
early on the Minister-President (Leterme, later Peeters), who since 2004 has the 
competence over sustainable development policy, was interested in the theme 
because of its integrating aspects. Furthermore, he and his cabinet regularly received 
signals from important sector actors, in particular from industry, that the 
institutional link of DuWoBo with environmental policy gave the impression that 
environment formed the basis for sustainable housing and building. This led to a 
decision to transfer DuWoBo to the coordinating level of the Minister-President and 
his administration (DAR).  
 
From the moment that in Spring 2009 DuWoBo became a power of the Minister-
President, the new policy arrangement further institutionalised under DAR. Within 
DAR, budgets were reallocated in order to enlarge the existing Team SD with civil 
servants specialised in sustainable housing and building, and with a working budget 
to support activities in this area. In 2011, the team had almost one full-time 
equivalent (91%) for sustainable housing and building, divided over several staff 
members. While originally the working budget served to finance several small scale 
projects, it is now divided into segments that structurally support different initiatives: 
the DuWoBo-process, the provincial support centres on sustainable housing and 
building, and the Belgian Sustainable Building Council92. As described in chapter 5, 
the latter initiatives are an offspring from DuWoBo. Ironically, by 2011 DuWoBo had 
lost most of its dynamism and it was deemed necessary to initiate a DuWoBo 2.0  
                                                  
92 Also Plan C receives 80.000 Euro annually from this SD-DAR budget. 
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process. Still, what started in 2006 as the DuWoBo transition arena, has now grown 
into a small policy arrangement in an early stage of institutionalisation that consists 
of the DuWoBo-process itself, the administrative SD team in DAR and a few flanking 
initiatives. This arrangement is not meant to coordinate the whole housing and 
building policy, nor is it hierarchically nested under an existing policy domain from 
the housing and building sector. It is in fact one more addition to the already 
complex housing and building arrangement. In the typology of Arts and Leroy, this 
is a type 3 renewal: the introduction of a new arrangement that institutionalises and 
tries to perform autonomously. 
 
However, this is not the only change that is taking place. As discussed in chapter 5, 
in the complex configuration of the housing and building policy regime, some 
segments are also changing  – in particular the energy part – while others show sings 
of change (such as in materials, housing, and spatial planning). This can be labelled 
as an organisational and discursive innovation of parts of the existing arrangement, 
or a partial type 2 renewal. It is possible to find some traces of the influence of 
DuWoBo in this innovation, but by far the main driving forces are structural trends 
such as climate change and the resulting EU legislation and plans. 
 
As in the Plan C case, also here at least three key processes can be identified that play 
a role in the route from transition management to policy change: the establishment of 
the policy niche (that just like Plan C became precarious after a few years), a form of 
institutionalisation of the niche, and the gaining of wider influence beyond what 
happens in the niche.  
 
6.1.3. Different forms of policy innovation. And one more important evolution. 
 
This part 6.1. tried to answer in broad lines the question what kind of policy renewal 
can be observed in the policy regimes of the housing and building system and of the 
waste and materials system. Although both DuWoBo and Plan C were initiated as 
experiments in innovative environmental policy and both followed the TM approach 
as designed by Rotmans and Loorbach very closely, the policy innovation to which 
they contributed, turned out differently.  
 
In the case of DuWoBo, two types of policy innovation can be observed. First, there is 
the introduction and early institutionalisation of a new, autonomous but still 
unstable policy arrangement around sustainable housing and building. Second, there 
is a partial organisational and discursive renewal of the existing housing and 
building arrangement, with some segments (e.g. energy) changing faster than others. 
The integration between the different segments of the housing and building regime is 
still very limited. They are partially overlapping segments, juxtaposed in a non-
hierarchal fashion. In the terminology of Arts and Leroy, I labelled this a type 3 
renewal, combined with a partial type 2 renewal. 
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In the Plan C case, the existing policy arrangement at regime level underwent a 
drastic discursive and organisational renewal, with a switch from a waste to a 
materials arrangement. This is a type 2 renewal in Arts and Leroy’s classification, 
although the governance structure of this new arrangement is still taking shape. 
After 2008, Plan C first sought to institutionalise as an autonomous policy 
arrangement alongside the existing waste arrangement. But when the policy regime 
changed, it became embedded and hierarchically nested within the new materials 
arrangement. I labelled this a combination of a type 2 with a type 1 renewal. 
 
So, the kind of policy renewal that was realised in both cases is clearly different. 
Before proceeding to the next sections of this chapter and delving deeper into how 
this change has been realised (and also forms of stability have been maintained), 
there is one policy evolution that absolutely needs mentioning, but that cannot be 
caught in my original analytical framework. The MLP/PAA framework focuses on 
what happens in a socio-technical system and its policy arrangements at regime and 
niche level. But what if the policy influence of DuWoBo and Plan C goes directly or 
indirectly outside this system? At that moment, the MLP/PAA framework is 
inadequate for describing and analysing. However, this “fanning out” of influence is 
exactly what happened when transition thinking and transition management entered 
the second VSDO during 2010 and found its way into ViA in 2011. These evolutions 
have until now not been the focal points of this study, they are nevertheless indirect 
results of the experiences in DuWoBo and Plan C and they are an important 
illustration of how transition thinking can have an impact on regime policies. My 
initial analytical framework cannot cope with them, but since I introduce additional 
frameworks in the next sections, it is possible to take them into account. To keep the 
workload manageable, I will mainly focus on the most important development, 
namely the breakthrough of transitions in ViA.  
 
Here, and to end this part, I want to add some thoughts on this development and 
what kind of policy innovation it is. As explained in Context Box 3, in July 2011, the 
Flemish Government decided to reinforce the ViA-programme by introducing 13 
transversal projects and prescribing transition management as the policy approach 
for the 13 projects. The reason for this move is twofold. First, while ViA is intended 
as a programme that mobilises the whole Flemish society and in particular important 
societal actors (business, labour unions, ngo’s), by 2010 ViA had lost the active 
involvement of these actors and had mainly become an internal administrative 
programme to realise the governmental declaration. Second, although ViA aspires to 
important “breakthroughs” in the Flemish economy and society, it lacked a policy 
approach to translate these aspirations in consistent policies and projects. 
Comparable to what happened in 2004 and 2006 with DuWoBo and Plan C, also here 
transition management was introduced as a method for policy innovation. 
 
The challenges are however formidable and relate to at least four big questions. One 
is the enormous diversity of the projects and the suitability of transition management 
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as an approach for all of them93. Two is the political willingness to go for deep 
changes that aim for more sustainability in all these systems (or parts of systems). 
Three is the willingness to involve new actors and work with frontrunners alongside 
regime actors. Four is the availability of organisational and substantial capacity to 
guide all these processes. 
 
Discussions with involved civil servants and other actors and results from my 
interviews, teach that people look at these developments with a mixture of 
expectation and scepticism. The way ViA has developed, leads some to the 
conclusion that the government’s ambition is less to initiate a structural transition 
process, but rather to initiate co-creation networks for the renewal of policy. In this 
interpretation, the use of the transition storyline shows how the government is 
searching for more flexible governance approaches (or new rules of the game), but 
not necessarily for transitions such as interpreted in transition studies, namely deep 
changes in structure, culture and practices. This interpretation finds support in the 
fact that some themes seem hardly translatable in transition thinking and/or 
sustainable development objectives. The fact that several themes have to work with 
limited means and that the transition idea is implemented top-down also feeds 
scepticism. Other observers follow an interpretation that stresses the felt need for 
breaking through existing deadlocks in regular policies and going beyond business-
as-usual. They notice in different domains a remarkable turn to long-term objectives, 
attempts at integration with other policies and inclusion of non-traditional 
stakeholders. Also the fact that the government has installed a coordination structure 
for the implementation of transition management in the different projects feeds a 
cautious optimism. The start of most projects happened between Spring and Autumn 
2012, so it is too early to comment on actual results94.   
 
 
6.2. THE HARD WORK OF POLICY RENEWAL: POLICY ENTREPRENEURS 
SEARCHING FOR COUPLINGS 
 
The previous paragraph 6.1. presents a broad picture of the kind of policy change 
DuWoBo and Plan C have realised or in which they have somehow played a part. It 
presents a fairly smooth picture of how change happened, and leaves out tensions, 
difficult decision, contingencies etcetera.  In this and the next paragraphs (6.2 till 6.5), 
I want to use several lenses to analyse from different perspectives and in more detail 
how change happened in practice, which kind of patterns are visible, what explains 
                                                  
93 The themes of the 13 projects are: 1. new industrial policy; 2. gazelles, fast-growing firms; 3. 
social innovation; 4. the learning Flemish, everybody active; 5. child poverty; 6. Flanders’ 
care; 7. renewable energy and smart grids; 8. sustainable housing and building; 9. sustainable 
materials management; 10. spatial planning; 11. smart mobility; 12. towards a sustainable 
and creative city; 13. acceleration of investment projects. 
94 The new Policy Research Centre TRADO is however involved in the follow-up of some of 
the projects and will publish on them over the following years. 
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successes and problems. In this paragraph 6.2, I focus on a particular form of agency 
and strategic actor behaviour that is essential for realising policy innovation: the 
work that has to be done by entrepreneurial individuals in TM processes to establish 
TM as a new form of governance and to gain wider influence for the results of TM 
processes, in particular through the coupling of different policy streams and the 
search for policy windows.   
 
From the empirical research in chapters 4 and 5, it is apparent that some of the most 
active proponents of the two processes have constantly been laying connections 
between the TM-process and different other policies, projects, actors and so on. In 
fact, one of the most important activities to get a transition management process on 
the agenda and diffuse its results, seems to be this coupling work. I therefore decided 
to make use of the multiple streams framework of Kingdon, developed in his famous 
book Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (2011 [1984]), to help in understanding 
what happens in the processes and which kind of work is being done. In 6.2.1, I 
introduce Kingdon’s theory of agenda setting and his most important analytical 
concepts. I then use this framework to analyse in detail three episodes of the 
experiences with transition management in Flanders. These relate to the 
establishment of TM and to the two clearest examples of gaining of wider influence.  
It did not prove useful to try to analyse the key process of institutionalisation with 
Kingdon’s framework. The first episode (6.2.2) is the establishment of transition 
management in Flanders as a new governance approach between 2004 and 2006. The 
second and third episode relate to how the results of the TM-processes DuWoBo and 
Plan C gained wider influence during 2010 and 2011. The second episode (6.2.3) 
recounts the shift in the Flemish waste regime to a sustainable materials orientation. 
The third episode (6.2.4) analyses the breakthrough of transition management in 
Vlaanderen in Actie. 
 
6.2.1. Multiple streams at work during policy formation 
 
Kingdon (2011 [1984]) tries to explain how policy issues reach the governmental 
agenda95. The governmental agenda is the list of subjects to which people in and 
around government are paying serious attention at any given time. In fact, Kingdon 
distinguishes between two agendas (ibid. p. 142). The governmental agenda we just 
defined and the decision agenda, which is the list of items that have become so 
pressing that they move into position for some sort of authoritative decision, such as 
legislative action or ministerial choice. He makes a further distinction between 
                                                  
95 Kingdon analyses decision-making at the level of the federal government of the United 
States. In our discussion of his theory, we have adapted some of his descriptions to the 
Flemish situation. For example, when he speaks of presidential decisions, I use ministerial 
decisions; Congress becomes Parliament. While some of his specific observations may be 
only applicable to the American situation – such as the role of the President – the conceptual 
framework is broad enough to apply it to other industrialised countries (see also Zahariadis, 
2007). 
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agendas and alternatives. The set of alternatives is the set of different policy proposals 
from which government officials can choose to address a certain subject or problem. 
Agendas and alternative specification are influenced by two kinds of factors: 
participants that are active in and around government, and processes that bring 
subjects to prominence (ibid., p. 19).  
 
Kingdon distinguishes between two broad categories of actors or participants (p.69): 
a visible and a hidden cluster. The visible cluster are participants that receive a lot of 
press and public attention, such as ministers, prominent members of parliament, 
media figures. The relatively hidden cluster consists of different kinds of experts: 
academics, civil servants, parliamentary staffers, and not in the least in the Belgian 
context the personal advisors (cabinet) of the Minister. Interest groups travel between 
the two, with some activities very public and other hardly visible. In his research, 
Kingdon found that in general the visible participants are most involved in agenda-
setting, while the hidden cluster mostly affects the alternatives. “To generate 
alternatives, some degree of expertise and willingness to concern oneself with minute 
details is required” (p. 70), so this is typically a task of specialists. In the visible arena, 
publicity and re-election are the main incentives. Politicians are therefore inclined to 
discuss general directions and leave details to their staff. “The broad-brush approach 
of such actors (…) is much better suited to agenda setting than to generation of policy 
alternatives” (p. 70). 
 
The second factor of influence on agendas and alternative specification are three 
process streams that flow through the system: a stream of problems, of policies and 
of politics. The problem stream contains all conditions that become interpreted as 
problems. There is thus an important interpretive element here. Conditions attract 
attention through all sorts of indicators, through focusing events (crisis, personal 
experiences, symbols) or feedback from experiences. But they only become perceived 
as problems when interpreted against the background of e.g. values of policy-makers, 
comparisons between groups of people and with other countries, or classification of a 
condition in a particular (problem) category. Agendas are influenced when some 
participants succeed in getting more attention for one problem than for another. In 
the policy stream, ideas, proposals and alternatives float around in what Kingdon 
compares to “a primeval soup” (p.117). Here, a community of specialists is active 
that interact and discuss a whole range of problems and solutions. Ideas surface, are 
rejected, mature, are recombined and evaluated against criteria such as technical 
feasibility, value acceptability, tolerable cost, anticipated public acquiescence, chance 
of receptivity among decision makers (p. 131). A viable alternative facilitates high 
placement on the governmental and decision agenda. With the functioning of the 
policy stream, Kingdon stresses the importance of ideas as an integral part of 
decision-making. Policy-making is thus not only a matter of interests, power and 
strategy, but also of ideas and their influence. The political stream  is determined by 
elections, changes in government, a new balance of power in parliament, swings in 
the mood of the public, interest group pressure campaigns. Developments in this 
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stream have powerful effects on agendas. When for example a government changes, 
new items move up the agenda more easily. 
 
The three streams develop and operate largely independently of one another, 
governed by different forces, different considerations, different styles, different 
people (p. 88). The governmental agenda is set in the problems or political stream 
(usually by the visible actors), while alternatives are generated in the policy stream 
(usually by the hidden actors) (p. 194). Then when do new items gain importance 
and how do agendas change? (or translated for this paper: when does transition 
management as such or when do the results of TM-processes reach the agenda). 
According to Kingdon, coupling of the streams is essential for moving items up the 
agenda. Often, partial couplings are possible, e.g. a problem demands attention and a 
policy proposal can be coupled to it as a solution, but it might well be that the 
political climate is not ripe to take a decision. But when the three streams can be 
coupled in a single package – a problem demands attention, a policy solution is 
available, and the political climate is receptive – then the chances are “dramatically 
increased” that an item rises on the decision agenda (p. 178).  
 
Figure 6.1. A schematic version of Kingdon’s multiple stream model 
 
Here, a particular kind of moment and a particular kind of actor play a crucial role. 
The moment and opportunity for pushing change, is called a policy window by 
Kingdon. A policy window is the period of time during which it becomes a lot easier 
for advocates of particular policy solutions or of particular problems to push their 
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ideas. Policy windows are relatively scarce and are only open for a limited time 
period. They are the result of developments in the political or in the problem stream 
(p. 174). A problem window opens when decision makers become convinced that a 
problem is very pressing and needs action. A political window results from political 
events such as elections or a change in government, when political actors are 
receptive for developing new initiatives. These kind of moments are indeed scarce, 
yet Kingdom also mentions other possible windows such as renewal of government 
programmes that expire, the budget cycle and regular reports or addresses (p. 186). 
Such windows are often relatively well predictable. 
 
During these windows, so-called policy entrepreneurs play an important role. Policy 
entrepreneurs are advocates of certain problems or solutions that are willing to 
invest resources (time, energy, reputation, money) to promote their cause, either 
because of their concern for specific problems, their policy values, or for personal 
benefits. Policy entrepreneurs can come from very different corners. Kingdon 
mentions elected officials, civil servants, lobbyists, academics, lawyers, journalists. 
No one type of participant dominates the pool of entrepreneurs, but in most cases it 
is often possible to pinpoint one or at most a few persons (p. 180, 204). Policy 
entrepreneurs can spend years in softening up the system for their ideas. More, they 
do not only push for their conception of problems or for policy alternatives, they are 
also central in the coupling of streams: “They hook solutions to problems, proposals 
to political momentum, and political events to policy problems (…) Without the 
presence of an entrepreneur, the linking of streams may not take place” (p. 182). In 
general, a policy window only opens for a short period of time, so entrepreneurs 
have to be ready with their ideas and act fast. If they miss their chance, they have to 
wait for another window to come along. In the second edition of his book, Kingdon 
has amended the role of policy windows somewhat. Although the time of an open 
policy window remains crucial, Kingdon concedes that “there are some links 
between these streams at times other than the open windows and the final 
couplings” (p. 229). Consequently , policy entrepreneurs may also be able to make 
couplings and force an item on the agenda outside policy windows. 
 
In general, Kingdon stresses that his model shows how policy change does not 
proceed neatly in stages or phases. There is some “messiness, accident, fortuitous 
coupling, and dumb luck” involved, so that “subjects sometimes rise without our 
understanding completely why” (p. 206). Still, it would be wrong to view the process 
as completely random: the different streams have their own internal logic (e.g. not 
every proposal will surface in the policy stream because selection criteria are at 
work), there are limits on coupling possibilities (e.g. because of timing) and various 
rules of the game and institutions provide a basic structure for the actors that are 
involved. 
 
I now use this framework to analyse in detail three episodes of the experiences with 
transition management in Flanders: the establishment of transition management in 
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Flanders as a new governance approach between 2004 and 2006 (6.2.2), the shift in 
the Flemish waste regime to a sustainable materials orientation (6.2.3), and the 
breakthrough of transition management in Vlaanderen in Actie (6.2.4). In order to turn 
the episodes into a coherent narrative, I will have to briefly retell some of the 
information that is already present in chapters 4 and 5. The difference is that the 
material of the two cases is contrasted here alongside each other through the lens of 
the multiple streams model, in that way illuminating similarities and differences of 
how in both processes coupling of streams, policy windows and policy entrepreneurs 
contributed to policy change. 
 
6.2.2. Episode one. Transition management becomes a new policy approach in 
Flanders 
 
Transition management in Flanders originated in the environmental policy domain, 
where since the late nineties there had already been some experimentation with 
innovative policy strategies. For example, in order to remedy some of the deficiencies 
of existing policies – in particular the lack of integration between environmental 
policy themes and the lack of participation in policy design and implementation –, 
the Environmental and Nature Policy Plan 2 (MINA-plan 2, 1997-2001) advocated the 
use of integrated region-oriented policies and target group policies (Verbeeck and 
Leroy 2006). When after the 1999 elections, the green party Agalev entered the 
Flemish government and provided the Minister of the Environment96 , the political 
stream became more supportive of a long-term orientation for environmental policy 
and of a broadening of the environmental discourse to thinking in terms of 
sustainable development. This found its expression amongst others things in the 
Policy Note 1999-2004 of Minister Dua. A few years later, during the preparations for 
the third MINA-plan 2003-2007, transition management surfaced as an approach that 
could remedy some of the problems in environmental policy-making, in particular a 
lack of a long-term sustainability perspective that meant a break with existing trends, 
and a lack of integration with industrial and innovation policies. These problems 
were not only felt at political level, but had also been mentioned in the advisory 
councils SERV and MINA-raad. However, in both cases – DuWoBo as well as Plan C 
– the link with the strategic policy plan MINA 3 was only one element. The 
breakthrough of TM became possible by additional links to domain-specific policy 
objectives, either for controlling the environmental and health consequences of the 
construction sector (for DuWoBo) or for controlling the waste problem (for Plan C). 
Plan C also benefited from the administrative BBB reform that seemed to assign 
                                                  
96 The green party Agalev was one of the winners of the 1999 elections at federal and Flemish 
level. Green ministers entered both governments, with minister Vera Dua at Flemish level 
responsible for Environment and Agriculture. However, during the 2003 federal elections, 
Agalev lost all its parliamentary seats. At Flemish level, Dua resigned and was succeeded by 
Ludo Sannen (26 May 2003 – 17 February 2004)). Early 2004, Sannen left Agalev and was 
succeeded by Jef Tavernier (18 February 2004 – 20 July 2004). After the Flemish elections of 
June 2004, Agalev did not return in the government. 
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OVAM a new task of resource flow management. This combination of factors shows 
how a new policy arrangement such as TM does not suddenly appear out of 
nothingness. Using Kingdon’s insights, we can see how for the start of DuWoBo and 
Plan C different streams had to be combined. I now treat them in more detail (for a 
schematic, somewhat simplified representation of the detailed account, see figure 6.2 
for DuWoBo and figure 6.3 for Plan C). 
 
Let’s first have a look at the problem stream. In the case of DuWoBo, there were three 
problems in the problem stream. First, there was a long-standing demand from the 
government to start a project on sustainable housing and building. In 1999 and 2000, 
the Flemish Parliament had already discussed two proposal for resolutions 
(Quintelier c.s. 1999, Decaluwe c.s. 2000) that demanded that the government take 
action to promote sustainable building. Before the resolutions were approved, the 
Flemish Government approved a proposal from Minister Dua (9 March 2001) to start 
a research project that was intended to lead to the establishment of a societal 
platform for sustainable housing and building. By 2004, this decision was still not 
executed. The two other problems were related to each other and circled around the 
need, first, to develop long-term sustainability policies for Flanders and, second, to 
promote the integration of innovation policy and environmental policy and set the 
Flemish economy on a path of ecological modernisation. Even though the UNCED-
conference dated from 1992 and governments had been called upon to develop 
sustainable development plans, Flanders still had no specific sustainable 
development policy in 2002. Sustainable development policy was always treated in 
the margin of environmental policy. During the preparatory phase of MINA 3 and 
the public consultation about the plan, the advisory councils SERV and MINA-raad 
warned that this led to a lack of a long-term perspective on societal development, a 
lack of urgency to promote profound change and a lack of integration with other 
policy fields, such as industrial and innovation policy. Because of the lack of 
connections between innovation and environmental policy, opportunities were 
missed to innovate the Flemish economy, create jobs and boost eco-efficiency. These 
problems  were also discussed in studies of SERV and of the innovation agency IWT 
(Van Humbeeck 2003, Van Humbeeck e.a. 2003, Boekholt (ed.) 2002, Larosse 2004). 
 
In the case of Plan C, there were two problems in the problem stream that demanded 
attention. First, since the turn of the century there was an ongoing discussion within 
OVAM about the long-term orientation for waste policy, in particular the further 
development of the waste hierarchy and prevention policies. At the beginning of the 
21st century, Flanders had succeeded in creating a well-performing waste system and 
it was (and still is) considered top of the European class in selective collection and 
recycling. However, the fact that the total amount of household waste remained high 
and that industrial waste was not under control, had led to a realisation at the 
political level and with several OVAM officials that, in order to further reduce waste 
amounts, a new step in waste policy was needed. Second, during the administrative 
BBB reform at Flemish level, OVAM had been assigned the task of “resource flow 
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management”. This was in fact a manoeuvre from OVAM supported by the Minister 
of the Environment to keep waste prevention policies in the task description of 
OVAM (under the disguise of resource flow management), instead of losing it to the 
general environmental department LNE. Of course, the new description initiated 
new expectations and it was unclear what the contents of the new field were to be, 
how it should be organised and what its relation was with existing waste policies. In 
the follow-up discussions, OVAM started interpreting the new task as “materials 
policy” and as a possible translation for its long-term policy.  But still, the contents of 
the new field remained unclear.   
 
 
Figure 6.2. A schematic, simplified representation of how coupling of streams led to the start of the 
DuWoBo-process in 2004. Different problem streams (in red) in Flemish environmental policy 
combined with the policy stream transition management (in green), with a political stream supportive 
of long-term and sustainable development policies (in orange). The policy window (in blue) consists of 
a combination of moments. See the text for details. 
 
So, in the problem stream several problems were waiting for a solution. What 
happened meanwhile in the policy stream? During the preparation of MINA 3, 
transition management had surfaced in several studies (De Jonge 2003, Van 
Humbeeck 2003, Van Humbeeck e.a. 2003) and in the advice of the advisory councils 
SERV (advice 10 June 2002) and MINA-raad (advice 4 July 2002) as a potential 
solution for the problems of long-term sustainable development policy and the 
integration of environmental and innovation policy. SERV and MINA-council 
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pleaded for radical innovations under the form of long-term system innovations and 
asked the government to study the possibilities of framing these as transitions and 
transition management. Between 2002 and 2004, several researchers (such as Walter 
De Jonge at CDO/UGent), civil servants (such as Walter Tempst at OVAM, Ilse Dries 
at LNE, Jan Larosse at IWT) and policy advisors (such as Peter Van Humbeeck at 
SERV) had come in contact with the concepts of transitions and transition 
management through research reports or in the preparation of policy advice and had 
started regarding them as promising concepts for policy renewal. In this period, 
several of them also went to visit Jan Rotmans and his team at ICIS Maastricht to 
discuss the new concepts. These civil servants and policy advisors actively promoted 
transition thinking as a policy option by bringing it up during the preparation of 
policy advice or the preparation of new policy plans (MINA 3, Environmental Year 
Programme 2004 and 2005, OVAM Strategic Plan 2005-2009). Specifically for the case 
of Plan C, under the impulse of Walter Tempst OVAM ordered a study from ICIS 
Maastricht (Rotmans, Loorbach) about the potential of transition management for the 
reorientation of waste policy. The study concluded that a sustainable materials 
perspective had potential to tackle the existing problems in the waste system and 
that transition management was a promising concept to initiate renewal of policy. In 
June 2004, OVAM’s Board of Directors adopted the conclusions of the report and 
decided to defend them with the new Minister of the Environment. 
 
What about the political stream? Here, over the years different political decisions 
were taken that in combination led to the start of the TM processes. As mentioned, 
the overall mood in environmental policy-making became more supportive of long-
term policy-making and sustainable development after green Ministers entered the 
Flemish government in 1999. The separate policy decisions that together would open 
up a space for TM, were all taken during the legislature of a Minister from the green 
party Agalev: the decision to start a platform on sustainable housing and building 
(minister Dua in 2001), the decision during the BBB-reform to allocate the 
competence ‘resource flow management’ in OVAM (minister Dua in 2003), inclusion 
of transition management in the Environmental Year Programme 2004 (minister 
Sannen 2004), the approval of the consortium with DRIFT that was to guide the 
DuWoBo-process (minister Tavernier in 2004). This last decision shows some of the 
contingency of policy windows, since it was only signed during the very last day at 
office of Tavernier, and at the insistence of LNE to take a decision. The Greens did 
not return to the Flemish government after the elections and the christian-democrat 
Kris Peeters became Minister of the Environment. He retained the idea of transition 
management and introduced it in his Policy Note 2004-2009 (published in December 
2004) as an experiment in “innovative environmental policy”. The specific wording 
of these parts of the Note is influenced by proposals from the environmental 
administration and advisory councils SERV and MINA-raad. The next year, Minister 
Peeters also approved the start of a transition management process in sustainable 
materials management. 
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Figure 6.3. A schematic, simplified representation of how coupling of streams led to the start of the 
Plan C process in 2006. Different problem streams (in red) in Flemish environmental policy combined 
with the policy stream transition management (in green), with a political stream supportive of 
innovative policy approaches for experimenting with TM and materials policy (in orange). The policy 
window (in blue) consists of a combination of moments. See the text for details. 
 
The coupling of the different streams happened in consecutive steps. In the case of 
DuWoBo, the approval of MINA 3 and in particular its operationalisation in the 
Environmental Year Programme 2004 opened a policy window to insert transition 
management as a potential solution for the three mentioned problems at once, 
namely by taking sustainable housing and building as the theme for the first 
transition management process. As said, under the green Ministers of the 
Environment, the political stream was supportive of a long-term orientation for 
environmental policy and a broadening to thinking in terms of sustainable 
development. The particular form that was eventually chosen for filling in this 
political choice was a transition management process in sustainable housing and 
building, which was mainly due to the preparatory groundwork of civil servants 
(such as Ilse Dries at LNE) and policy advisors in advisory councils (such as Peter 
Van Humbeeck at SERV).  Under the new government, this choice is also politically 
approved in Minister Peeters’ Policy Note. In Kingdon’s terms, this can be 
understood as the difference between the agenda-setting (choice for long-term and 
sustainable development), which is here mainly a case of political priorities from the 
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Minister, and alternative specification (choice for transition management), which is 
mainly prepared at the level of experts. 
 
Something similar happened in the case of Plan C. As mentioned a few paragraphs 
earlier, in June 2004 OVAM’s Board of Directors accepted the idea of materials policy 
and the potential of transition management as a policy approach. Half a year later, 
Minister Peeter’s Policy Note introduced “the development of materials policy” 
under the heading of innovative environmental policy. More than a year later, in its 
Strategic Plan 2005-2009 OVAM introduced a new and separate policy field 
alongside waste management, namely materials policy. The Plan takes as one of its 
operational goals the realisation of a transition process, and mentions that this choice 
is furthermore an execution of the Minister’s choice to test the implementation of TM 
in Flanders. The coupling of the streams is once more confirmed in the 
Environmental Year Programme 2005. Again, we notice how agenda-setting at 
political level (choice for materials policy and long-term policies for sustainable 
development) is translated under the form of transition management (alternative 
specification). The policy window opens in the combination of the Minister’s Policy 
Note, OVAM’s Strategic Plan and the operationalisation of MINA 3 in the 
Environmental Year Programme 2005. 
 
All in all, the introduction and establishment of TM in Flanders is thus not the story 
of a master plan of visionary politicians who initiate a grand new policy. It rather is 
the story of a bottom-up process, slowly growing and finding its way in small, partly 
informal and parallel networks between civil servants, researchers, policy advisors in 
advisory councils and others. On the one hand, these people saw the need for the 
development of long-term environmental and sustainable development policies and 
for system innovations in a broad societal perspective. In the discourse of transitions 
and transition management which had recently gained ground in the Netherlands, 
they found a conceptual and operational approach that could voice these concerns in 
a coherent storyline. On the other hand, this storyline also had to be made concrete in 
practical decisions to start experimental processes in transition management, such as 
the assignment of studies and consultancy tasks (where Ilse Dries at LNE took the 
lead for DuWoBo, Walter Tempst at OVAM for Plan C). In searching for political and 
administrative policy windows and translating them in operational policy decisions, 
the role of these different civil servants has undoubtedly been important, backed-up 
by the approving judgement of the advisory councils SERV and MINA-Raad. 
However, all this might have been futile without developments in the political 
stream, where we first saw an orientation favourable for and supportive of 
sustainable development and long-term policies (under Minister Dua), and later a 
support for innovative, experimental policies in thinking about long-term goals 
(under Minister Peeters). 
 
The emergence of TM in Flanders is not only an illustration of converging streams 
but also of the work that has to be put into connecting these streams by so-called 
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‘policy entrepreneurs’, people that recognize a possibility for change, see the 
opportunity to combine agendas, are in a position to do so and are able to convince 
others to go along. Simultaneously, it is obvious that the outcome of such initiatives 
is often hard to foretell. The “launch” and establishment of a new governance 
approach such as TM is in fact a construction in itself: it seems to be strongly 
dependent on potential connections between different streams and the work that is 
necessary for creating these connections.  
 
 6.2.3. Episode two. Plan C and the change from a Flemish waste regime to a 
materials regime. 
 
The relation of Plan C to the evolutions in the Flemish waste/materials regime 
presents a second interesting example of coupling of streams and policy 
entrepreneurship. This is no longer a question of establishing TM, but of gaining 
wider influence for the results of the Plan C TM-process. From the point of view of 
Plan C, it can be interpreted as a form of anchoring the ideas developed at the level 
of a policy niche to the regime level, making smart use of passing streams. From the 
point of view of the regime level, it looks more like a typical example of agenda-
setting. Since my focus is the influence of TM, I describe the evolution mainly from 
the perspective of Plan C (for a schematic representation of the following discussion, 
see figure 6.4).  
 
Let us start from the observation that Plan C succeeded in creating a new discourse 
for Flanders about sustainable materials management and in starting a network of 
frontrunners that at least until 2008 was the main voice in Flanders on sustainable 
materials management. Several OVAM policy officers (such as Walter Tempst, John 
Wante, Roos Servaes, Victor Dries) were not only participants in the Plan C process, 
but were also involved in internal OVAM discussions on the translation of the results 
and their implications for OVAM’s own policy orientation and organisation. As 
already mentioned, the first traces of a materials discourse can be found in internal 
OVAM documents as early as 2003 in the context of the BBB administrative reform. It 
then appeared in the strategic plan of OVAM for 2005-2009 – around the same time 
that the Plan C process was prepared – as a third policy line for OVAM along with 
waste and soil management. Parallel to the Plan C process and under impulse of 
Walter Tempst, OVAM installed an internal learning forum during 2007-2008, called 
The fifth floor 97 , where the new developments and the results of Plan C were 
discussed and where the insight grew that materials management should not be 
regarded as a third policy line, but that the waste system should be regarded as part 
of a ‘higher’ system, the materials system. 
 
                                                  
97 The OVAM office in Mechelen has only four floors. The idea of a fifth floor was that the 
initiative did not belong to a specific OVAM department, but tried to form a bridge between 
departments where the new concept of sustainable materials management could be 
discussed. 
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A crucial breakthrough was the realisation within OVAM that this line of thinking 
implied that the obligation, coming from the EU-level, to translate the Waste 
Framework Directive (2008/98/EC) into new Flemish legislation, should not simply 
lead to a new Waste Decree, but that the new Decree should somehow reflect the 
materials storyline. In fact, the EU Directive’s main aim is to strengthen the waste 
hierarchy in the waste policies of the EU member states and to reduce the 
discrepancies in waste policies between member states. But inspired by the 
experiences with Plan C and by similar discourses at EU and OECD level, OVAM 
proposed to the Flemish Minister of the Environment to translate the Directive into a 
Materials Decree instead of into a new Waste Decree, in that way going several steps 
further than the EU required (and than the ambitions of most EU member states). 
Although the ideas of how this should be done, were far from mature, this 
argumentation found a sympathetic ear at the cabinet of the then Minster of the 
Environment Hilde Crevits98, amongst others with political advisor Hugo Geerts, 
who has an OVAM history and who had closely followed the Plan C process during 
the first years. During the negotiations for the new Flemish Government in 2009, the 
cabinet succeeded in inserting the idea into the Governmental Declaration where it is 
stated that the new government will “broaden waste policy to sustainable materials 
policy (…) The translation of the new Waste Framework Directive will amongst other 
things anchor the evolution from waste to integrated materials management” 
(Vlaamse Regering 2009, p. 58-59). The coinciding streams of the EU-level and the 
Flemish elections thus opened a policy window where the sustainable materials 
storyline could be inserted. The preparatory work of OVAM’s entrepreneurial civil 
servants, including the translation of the discourse development in Plan C, shows 
throughout the case, but also here the combination with the adoption by the political 
level (such as during the governmental negotiations of 2009) was an essential factor. 
 
The shift from waste to materials policy had now reached the governmental agenda, 
but it took two more years to rise on the decision agenda and make it ripe for an 
“authoritative decision” (in Kingdon’s phrasing). What is interesting here, is that 
Flanders had no choice but to translate the EU Waste Framework Directive into 
regional legislation. So, the decision moment would come anyway, and could 
perhaps be interpreted as a kind of “enforced policy window” through the influence 
of a higher authority99. Flanders was however not obliged to take the step to a 
Materials Decree and go beyond well-known waste policies and the waste hierarchy. 
But after the Governmental Declaration of July 2009 and during the next two years, 
different opportunities arose and different streams could be coupled that 
                                                  
98 Kris Peeters became Minister-President of the Flemish Government in June 2007. In that 
capacity, he also became responsible for the coordination of sustainable development policy. 
Hilde Crevits succeeded him as Minister of the Environment. After the Flemish elections of 
2009, Joke Schauvlieghe became Minister of the Environment (July 2009 – present). 
99 This obviously differs from the cases on which Kingdon’s theory is built, i.e. agenda-
setting at US federal level. No higher authority can oblige the US federal government to 
adopt legislation. 
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strengthened the adoption of the materials discourse and anchored it further at 
political and administrative level.  
 
 
Figure 6.4. Plan C and the Flemish materials transition. A schematic, simplified presentation of 
coupling of problem streams (in red), policy streams (in green) and political streams (orange) during 
policy windows (blue). See text for details. 
 
One evolution is situated in the problem stream, where in the course of 2009 and 
2010 we see a fast rising awareness of the urgency of addressing the resources and 
materials problem. This can be labelled as landscape pressures, such as the rising 
demand for resources worldwide (e.g. from China), the import dependency of EU-
countries, and the rising prices of resources. Apart from OVAM itself and Plan C, 
important new players in the Flemish materials system such as the sector federations 
Agoria (technology industry) and Essenscia (chemical industry) actively drew 
attention to these problems and demanded government action. Also EU initiatives 
such as the Raw Materials Initiative (EC, 2008), which grew out of anxiety over the 
availability of resources for the European economy, increased the awareness for the 
problem. 
 
Another element, part of the political stream, was the preparation and development 
of the new Strategic Plan 2010-2014 for OVAM. Under coordination of OVAM’s 
strategic team, headed by Victor Dries, a broad consultation process with 
stakeholders was set up. This process deepened the understanding of a sustainable 
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materials orientation within OVAM. “In a sense, the plan is a consolidation of all 
preceding developments, such as those around the reorientation towards sustainable materials 
management”, says an OVAM official. In the strategic plan, waste and materials are no 
longer regarded as separate policy lines – as was the case in the previous Strategic 
Plan 2005-2009 – but waste policy has become part of sustainable materials policy. 
The new plan was accompanied by an internal reorganisation of OVAM, meant to 
prepare the organisation for its role in the future materials economy. 
 
A further opportunity was the Belgian presidency of the EU during the second half 
of 2010. Because Belgium is a federal state, the preparation of a task such as a 
European presidency requires a lot of coordination between the federal and the 
regional level. During the preparation process, the presidency of each EU policy 
domain is divided between ministers of the different Belgian policy levels. In this 
way, Joke Schauvlieghe, Flemish Minister for the Environment became responsible 
for the presidency of the EU Environment Council. It is a tradition at European level 
that each presidency formulates several own priorities, so during the preparations 
for the environmental presidency at Flemish level, OVAM proposed materials policy 
as one of the priorities. Because materials policy was already politically relevant with 
its introduction in the governmental agreement and because of OVAM’s good 
reputation for its European policy work – with John Wante, first-hour member of 
Plan C’s transition arena, as head of OVAM’s EU division – the ministerial cabinet 
was in favour of the idea and formulated “sustainable materials management” as one 
of the environmental spearheads for its Belgian presidency. In July 2010 an informal 
Environmental Council in Ghent was devoted to sustainable materials management, 
which gave Minister Schauvlieghe an opportunity to present herself nationally and 
internationally with the theme. During the formal EU Environment Council in 
December 2010, she succeeded in introducing language that links the EU 2020 
Strategy and its flagship initiative on resource efficiency to “system innovation” and 
“the creation of a multi-actor transition platform on resource efficiency.”  
 
Furthermore, exactly during the presidency, OVAM organised and hosted a high-
profile OECD workshop on sustainable materials management. The result and 
visibility during the EU presidency  together with the OECD workshop, contributed 
to a political confidence in the potential of the materials storyline. Early 2011 Minister 
Schauvlieghe proposed sustainable materials management as her flagship for the 
socio-economic innovation programme Flanders in Action (ViA), in that way 
positioning materials as an essential part of the transformation and innovation of the 
Flemish economy. This resulted at 6 June 2011 in a Round Table on Sustainable 
Materials Management where industry, knowledge centres and other societal 
partners signed a Declaration in which they engaged themselves to work towards a 
Materials Pact and an operational plan on sustainable materials. 
 
By the time the Materials Decree was approved by the government on 24 June 2011, 
the combination of all these streams had laid a solid political and administrative 
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foundation for the new orientation. Furthermore, the whole process and the different 
evolutions had also led to active involvement of all important stakeholders. This is 
confirmed by the approval mid 2012 of the Vlaams Materialenprogramma (Flemish 
Materials Programme), a collaborative programme between government, industry, 
science and civil society, coordinated by OVAM. 
 
6.2.4. Episode three. Transition management breaks through in the hard core of 
policy, ‘Flanders in Action’ (ViA) 
 
For the third final episode, I turn to the central socio-economic innovation 
programme of the last three Flemish governments, namely Vlaanderen in Actie (ViA, 
‘Flanders in Action’). This is an example of how it is not the substantive results of 
DuWoBo or Plan C that gain wider influence, but how the TM approach as such 
attracts attention and gains wider acceptance. During 2011, transition management 
as a governance approach found its way to the agenda of Flanders in Action (ViA), 
even in so far that 13 transversal transition management projects were introduced100. 
This breakthrough in the ‘hard’ policy core of the government, can also be 
understood through the coupling of different processes and streams. It furthermore 
resembles another of Kingdon’s concepts, namely “spillovers” (Kingdon 2011, p. 191-
194): the success of introducing a theme in one area and setting the agenda there, 
increases the chance of introducing it in adjacent area. When in a policy arena new 
principles are introduced, this can act as a precedent for other areas, for example 
because the coalition that introduced the policy change is transferred to the new 
policy environment, or because an analogous argumentation is built for that new 
environment. 
 
I explained already in Context Box 3 what ViA is. ViA was introduced in 2006 under 
the Leterme government, was revived under the Peeters I government (2007-2009) 
and gained with the start of Peeters II (2009-present) even more strategic importance. 
The ViA-process resulted amongst other things in January 2009 in the Pact 2020 
between the government and all important interest groups. Next, the major themes 
of ViA also structured the July 2009 Governmental Declaration of the current 
government Peeters II. Remarkably, transition language entered these two 
documents. Pact 2020 mentions that important steps are needed “for a transition 
towards a sustainable energy system, sustainable materials management and 
sustainable mobility” (Vlaamse Regering 2009a, p. 16). The Governmental 
Declaration mentions the continuation of DuWoBo and Plan C, but also uses related 
discourse such as “breakthroughs”, “economic and industrial transformation” and 
“big projects for societal renewal” (Vlaamse Regering 2009b). Interestingly, some of 
                                                  
100 The themes of the 13 projects range widely: 1. new industrial policy; 2. gazelles, fast-
growing firms; 3. social innovation; 4. the learning Flemish, everybody active; 5. child 
poverty; 6. Flanders’ care; 7. renewable energy and smart grids; 8. sustainable housing and 
building; 9. sustainable materials management; 10. spatial planning; 11. smart mobility; 12. 
towards a sustainable and creative city; 13. acceleration of investment projects. 
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this wording – such as the use of the word “transition” in Pact 2020 or the 
mentioning of DuWoBo and Plan C in the Governmental Declaration – can be traced 
back to the attentiveness of “policy entrepreneurs” such as Peter Van Humbeeck (at 
SERV, who was co-responsible for the drafting of the Pact 2020 text) or Tom De 
Saegher (vice-head of cabinet of Peeters, who was one of the negotiators of the 
governmental declaration).  
 
In spite of the intentions with ViA, by mid 2010 it was obvious in government circles 
that the ViA-process had trouble in keeping its dynamics and finding a suited policy 
approach that fitted the high ambitions. A lot of administrative processes and 
projects had been launched in particular on the level of planning and monitoring, but 
involving business and civil society was much more difficult than foreseen. By mid 
2010, ViA had mainly become an internal administrative process with the aim of 
realising the governmental declaration, but the connection with activities from and 
involvement of societal partners had been lost. Furthermore, the transformational 
changes that ViA aimed for, required more than business-as-usual policy, but the 
policy stream seemed to run into limits to formulate these new kind of solutions. 
 
Using the multiple streams model as an interpretive lens, there is in the problem 
stream a first problem of making Flanders Top 5 in Europe by realising 
breakthroughs and a second problem of keeping ViA dynamic and carried forward 
by a broad front of societal actors. In the political stream, the current Flemish 
government made the ViA discourse and ViA framework the centre of the 
governmental declaration. But in the policy stream there did not seem approaches 
available that were strong enough to tackle the ViA breakthroughs and create a 
broad multi-actor framework around them.  
 
Meanwhile, however, experiences with transition thinking and transition 
management were being built up with DuWoBo and Plan C, and the approach 
gained more and more acceptance as a promising policy approach for developing 
long-term policies for sustainable development. During 2010 the transition discourse 
became the central element of the second Flemish Sustainable Development Strategy 
(VSDO). Here already, several elements had converged that led to a decision to make 
“transitions” the central theme in the new strategy. These elements included: the past 
experience with DuWoBo and Plan C and the realisation that the transition discourse 
had a strong appeal for strengthening and reframing the sustainability debate, a new 
team leader (Ilse Dries) for the administrative Team Sustainable Development who 
was also project leader of the DuWoBo-process and was thus familiar with the 
transitions discourse, the input from the scientists of the Policy Research Centre on 
Sustainable Development who had amongst other things been working on 
sustainable development policy and transitions 101 , and the cabinet of Minister-
President Peeters that was supportive of a new approach for sustainable 
                                                  
101 Such as prof Hans Bruyninckx (KULeuven, promoter of the Policy Research Centre) and 
myself.  
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development policy. A lot of people that were involved in the participative process 
that led to the VSDO102, were also somehow involved in the ViA-process. “The ideas 
that were discussed during the VSDO process, have intellectually been picked up by a 
number of people present, on a kind of cognitive level, and the two [transitions and ViA – EP] 
have somehow become coupled”, according to an interviewee. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Transition management reaches Flanders in Action (ViA). A schematic, simplified 
presentation of coupling of problem streams (in red), policy streams (in green) and political streams 
(orange) during policy windows (blue). See text for details. 
 
The fact that the Flemish Government decided in July 2011 to strengthen the ViA-
process by introducing 13 transition management processes is the result of a complex 
process in which the different streams became connected and where the activities of 
policy entrepreneurs were again crucial. One element that played an important role 
in translating the transitions discourse between VSDO and ViA, is their institutional 
embedding. ViA and VSDO both fall under the competence of Minister-President 
Peeters and as a consequence are both coordinated from within the department 
Diensten Algemeen Regeringsbeleid (DAR, Department of General Government Policy). 
This has considerably simplified contacts, exchange of information and ideas, and 
                                                  
102 All administrative departments and all advisory councils were present in the preparatory 
workshops for the VSDO during 2010. 
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cooperation between ViA (with Brigitte Mouligneau as general coordinator of ViA) 
and the administrative Team SD (with Ilse Dries as head).  
 
Another element is the fact that the advisory council SERV and a coordinating body 
of civil society organisations (De Verenigde Verenigingen) had both advised to 
investigate whether transition management had potential to revive ViA. This idea 
had also been voiced in the so-called Raad der Wijzen (Council of Sages), an advisory 
body of stakeholders and scientists, with amongst others members of SERV, civil 
society organisations and scientists (Hans Bruyninckx being one of them). One more 
element is that the consultant (Jim Baeten of tri.zone) who supports the whole ViA-
process, is familiar with transition thinking and open to these kind of approaches. 
Several interviewees agree that a final breakthrough was realised during the “Away 
Day” of 25 March 2011, a moment that can be regarded as the “policy window”. The 
cabinet of the Minister-President had organised this full day to discuss the relaunch 
of ViA between ministers, administrative coordinators of ViA processes and the 
Council of Sages. During the day, in particular members from the Council of Sages 
stressed the potential of transition management. The main conclusions from the day 
were that ViA should strengthen its focus on big societal challenges in partnership 
with all interest groups, and that should be investigated whether TM is a way of 
taking on this challenge. The suggestiveness of “management” was important to 
convince the government. “I know that you have doubts about this word ‘management’, 
but that is what we need to sell it to the Ministers”, as one of the interviews and persons 
present said afterwards. 
 
 In the following months, a small team under coordination of Brigitte Mouligneau 
(with amongst others Ilse Dries and Jim Baeten) prepared a conceptual note for the 
government in which a two-track approach was proposed: one track of regular policy 
to strengthen the ongoing implementation of ViA under the governmental 
agreement, and one track for developing 13 transversal policy themes with transition 
management and working towards long-term policy options and partnerships with 
stakeholders (amongst the themes were also sustainable housing and building, and 
sustainable materials management). The note was approved by the government on 8 
July 2011. For each transversal project an “integrator” (usually a high-level official) 
and a “transition manager” (usually a mid-level official) were appointed by the 
Government. In the Fall and Winter of 2011-2012 the coordination team started the 
preparation for the start-up of 13 transition projects. As said above, the challenges are 
however formidable: the enormous diversity of the projects and the suitability of 
transition management as an approach for all of them; the political willingness to go 
for deep changes that aim for more sustainability in all these systems (or parts of 
systems); the willingness to involve new actors and work with frontrunners 
alongside regime actors; and the availability of organisational and substantial 
capacity to guide all these processes. 
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6.3. TRANSITION MANAGEMENT AS A FORM OF DISCURSIVE POLITICS 
 
Let me for a moment recapitulate the line of the argument in this chapter so far. 
Transition management presents itself as an innovative form of governance, but the 
question is: does it lead to actual policy change, and if so, what form has this change 
taken and how can it be explained? Drawing on the case studies of Plan C and 
DuWoBo in chapter 4 and 5, I showed in part 6.1 how in the systems in which both 
processes are active, different forms of policy change can be observed. In housing 
and building, different segments of the existing housing and building policy regime 
have started changing, but at different speeds and without any internal coordination. 
DuWoBo has mainly had influence through its contribution to the creation of a new 
small, autonomous but at present still instable policy arrangement around 
sustainable building and housing. This new arrangement is juxtaposed to and 
partially overlapping with the already complex housing and building arrangement. 
In the case of Plan C, we see how the original waste policy regime as a whole shifted 
to a sustainable materials orientation. With the policy regime as a whole changing to 
sustainable materials management, Plan C evolved towards an arrangement 
hierarchically nested within the broader materials policy regime, with the specific 
task of further developing the long-term orientation and transition of the regime. 
Finally, I brought to the notice in 6.1 that the experiences with DuWoBo and Plan C 
have also had effect outside their own policy domain and socio-technical system. 
During 2010 and 2011, transition thinking and transition management first became 
central concepts in the second VSDO and later found their way to ViA, where they 
were introduced as a method for policy innovation. 
 
The policy arrangement approach of Arts et al. is thus helpful for analysing which 
form of policy change is induced by transition management. This in itself, however, 
does not teach us a lot about how this change happened and which kind of 
mechanisms or patterns are behind it. In 6.2 I therefore introduced an additional 
framework, Kingdon’s multiple streams framework, to trace in more detail a 
particular form of agency and strategic actor behaviour that is essential for realising 
policy change, namely the work of policy entrepreneurs in the coupling of different 
policy streams and the search for policy windows. The framework helps in 
explaining how transition management was established in Flanders, how it was 
influential in the changes in the waste/materials system, and how it reached the ViA-
agenda. It shows a fairly complex picture where events do not neatly proceed in 
steps or stages. Instead, policy entrepreneurs in the two processes have to work hard 
to forward their problem interpretation, propose policies and couple them to political 
events, usually without a clear view of success. 
 
Since the role of discourse in the observed changes has already been hinted at several 
times in the preceding pages, in this part 6.3 I focus in more detail on transition 
management as a form of discursive politics. What has been the role of ideas in 
DuWoBo and Plan C and what have we learned about the role of discourse in policy 
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change? More particular, keeping my research question in mind about the relation 
between transition management and change in regular policy, I focus on the role of 
discourse in the three key processes from transition management to policy change: 
the establishment of the policy niche, a form of institutionalisation of the niche, and 
the gaining of wider influence beyond what happens in the niche. 
 
6.3.1. Analysing the role of ideas 
 
To enrich the discussion, I make use of central concepts from Maarten Hajer’s 
discourse analysis (Hajer 1995, 2006). Some of these have been touched upon 
throughout this dissertation and are familiar from the policy arrangements approach 
and the empirical analysis in the preceding chapters. These include storylines and 
discourse coalitions. Storylines are condensed statements that summarise complex 
narratives. People and organisations may use the same storyline, but that does not 
necessarily mean that they have exactly the same understanding of it. Hajer stresses, 
however, that even if they do not fully understand each other, sharing the same 
storyline can be very functional for creating a political coalition and producing 
meaningful political interventions. Discourse coalitions are then groups of actors that 
share the usage of a particular set of storylines over a particular period of time. Hajer 
adds that a discourse coalition is always related to particular practices in the context 
of which these storylines are used. This implies that in a different context and for a 
different set of practices, “actors might utter contradictory statements, or indeed help 
reproduce different discourse-coalitions” (Hajer 2006, p. 70). In general then, Hajer’s 
discourse analysis does not presuppose coherency (people always act on the basis of 
a coherent set of ideas and beliefs, independent of the context). On the contrary, 
actors can share a common storyline for a particular practice and context (without 
necessarily sharing the same values), while for another practice and context they may 
be opponents and adhere to a different discourse. 
 
Of particular interest for my research questions is how Hajer conceives of the 
influence of discourse on policy. Hajer uses a two-step procedure to assess whether a 
discourse becomes dominant and has influence on policy. The first step is to look for 
discourse structuration: the extent to which different actors adopt the discourse and 
conceptualise the world through it. The discourse becomes dominant when ever 
more actors have to rely on its ideas and concepts to be credible in policy debates. 
The second step is investigating discourse institutionalisation: the extent to which 
policy practices and policy institutions change because of the new discourse. 
Examples include the setting up of new organisations or the reorganisation of 
existing ones, introduction of new instruments (measurement system, taxes,  
subsidies…), new legislation, etcetera. Hajer argues that when many people use a 
particular discourse to conceptualise the world (discourse structuration) and if it 
solidifies into institutions and organisational practices (discourse institutionalisation), 
then a discourse has become dominant and changes policy (ibid.).  
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As explained above, I focus the discussion of the role of discourse on the three key 
processes and will thus for each of them examine whether discourse structuration of 
institutionalisation is visible. Furthermore, as was obvious from the case descriptions, 
there are in fact two kinds of storylines visible in both DuWoBo and Plan C: 
storylines that refer to what transitions are and how they can be influenced, and 
storylines about the substantive outlook of respectively the housing and building 
transition and the materials transition. So, that leaves us in fact with four elements in 
the analysis: the two TM cases DuWoBo and Plan C, the three processes at work in 
each of them, two kinds of storylines, and two forms of discursive influence. I 
organise the discussion starting from the key processes: establishment of the policy 
niche in 6.3.2, institutionalisation of the niche in 6.3.3, and gaining of wider influence 
in 6.3.4. For each key process, I investigate the influence of discourse structuration 
and institutionalisation through transition storylines or substantive storylines, and 
this for DuWoBo as well as for Plan C. 
 
6.3.2. The role of discourse for the establishment of TM 
 
For the establishment of the policy niches DuWoBo and Plan C, it is obvious that the 
transition and transition management storylines were of prime importance, simply 
because substantive storylines about sustainable housing and building and about 
sustainable materials management had not yet been produced by both processes. Yet, 
there were some substantive storylines around in the predevelopment phase of the 
processes (see chapters 4 and 5) that proved necessary for the establishment of the 
TM niches. 
 
Discourse structuration 
 
When comparing the two cases, the storylines on transitions and on transition 
management that were used to establish the processes are largely identical, and can 
be found in documents such the advices of SERV and MINA council, the 
Environmental Year Programmes of 2004 and 2005, the Policy Note of then Minister 
of the Environment Peeters, and different reports. In fact, they echo the theoretical 
ideas about transitions and transition management as they have been formulated by 
Rotmans and Loorbach. This is not surprising, given the fact that the transition 
management framework as developed by Rotmans et al. was followed almost 
literally in DuWoBo and Plan C. Flanders was a quite exemplary pupil in that respect. 
During several years thinking in Flanders about transitions and their influencing was 
simply equated with the transition management framework and realising transitions 
was equated with implementing TM103. The main storyline that is visible in the 
                                                  
103 This conviction was so strong that when I started my research about transitions and 
transition management in 2007, several key figures were of the opinion that the research 
project was in fact redundant: we knew in Flanders already how to realise transitions, 
namely through transition management, and this had been well researched in the 
Netherlands. Now, we just had to bring it into practice. 
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Flemish discourse before the start of the projects can be summarised as follows: “In 
order to set society on a path of sustainable development, transitions are necessary in 
important societal systems. Transitions are long-term radical changes of societal 
systems, that can simultaneously tackle environmental problems and renew the 
economic system. They can be realised through transition management, where 
frontrunners cooperate in innovative networks with a new role for the government.” 
 
As I stressed several times already, this line of thinking had to be coupled to existing 
problem framings and emerging discourses in the different systems in order to 
establish the processes. In the case of DuWoBo it was coupled to the problem of 
health and environmental pollution in construction and to the emerging niche of 
more sustainable building practices. For the establishment of Plan C, it was coupled 
to the need to start thinking about a broader materials perspective. The ICIS-study 
(Loorbach et al., 2004) ordered by OVAM that framed the evolutions in the waste 
system as moving towards a new transition, is a fine example of the linking between 
the two discourses. 
 
Discourse institutionalisation 
 
The transition discourse and the emerging substantive discourses found a practical 
translation in how the DuWoBo- and Plan C-processes were set up, or perhaps better 
in this phase of establishment: how they were designed to be set up. The substantive 
translation can be found in the selection of intended participants: in both cases they 
had to cover a broad spectrum, which was meant to ensure that the relevant themes 
of sustainability for the system were covered. The translation of the TM discourse can 
be found in several elements of the design as well: the choice to make the first arenas 
consist of a small group of frontrunners that are asked to participate as individuals; 
the choice to proceed in steps from system analysis, over transition vision to 
pathways and experiments; the choice to situate the processes in the shadow of 
policy. These kind of choices derive directly from the discourse about what TM is or 
should be.  
 
 
6.3.3. The role of discourse during institutionalisation of DuWoBo and Plan C 
 
After their establishment, DuWoBo (since 2004) and Plan C (2006) have developed 
their own structures and bodies, working procedures, funding, and so on. During 
this process of institutionalisation, the transition storylines as well as the substantive 
storylines played their role.  
 
Discourse structuration 
 
Discourse structuration refers to the extent to which actors adopt the discourse and 
conceptualise the world through it. In both DuWoBo and Plan C, the transitions 
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storyline has been central to the work since the beginning and the typical transition 
language is omnipresent: “sustainability”, “regimes” and “niches”, “radical change”, 
“frontrunners”, etcetera. The system analysis that is made in both cases speaks of a 
“sense of urgency” and in the system analysis as well as in the transition vision, 
regularly words are used such as “fundamental”, “profound”, “radical”, “far-
reaching”. The transition terminology seems to be distinct enough for the 
participants to differentiate the processes from “normal” networks. A Plan C 
participant summarizes the mood fairly well: “Plan C has an added value over other 
networks because of our way of looking: we have a systems perspective on materials, we work 
from an inspiring long-term vision and don’t restrict ourselves to technological-economical 
solutions.”  
 
Yet, the analysis in the previous chapters also showed that the radical element 
should not be overstated when we look at the substantive storylines. In both cases 
the transition agenda exhibits a mixture of eco-modernist and transformational 
elements. The DuWoBo vision aims at a balance between economic, social, spatial 
and environmental themes, but the more concrete it gets, the more weight the 
environmental and economic-technical aspects get.  It does not really offer a solution 
for the historically grown and deeply engrained practices in housing and spatial 
planning of the housing and building system. The Plan C vision has more 
transformational elements, that also require changes in cultural attitudes and in the 
economic and power structures of society, and it offers an alternative view on the 
system as a whole. This partly explains why there is less discussion in Plan C about 
whether the vision is new and diverges from the waste regime discourse. Another 
part of the explanation is of course that policies and practices around materials as a 
system did not exist before Plan C, while in the case of DuWoBo there was a dynamic 
and sizeable housing and building sector, and attendant policies. Consequently, 
almost any vision about sustainable materials management would be considered as a 
break with the past, while it is logical that DuWoBo incorporated a lot of ideas that 
were already part of somebody’s agenda.  
 
The transition agendas that were produced by DuWoBo and Plan C tell in essence an 
optimistic story about transitions. They both sketch an image of a dynamic and 
innovative Flanders, living well within ecological and social limits. The word 
“innovation”, usually specified as “system innovation”, is central to the language 
and is particularly important for bringing the industrial and business sector on board. 
Realisation of the agendas promises new opportunities and a new future for the 
sector. Interestingly, over the last few years and under influence of the Flanders in 
Action (ViA) programme, it has also become important for government agencies to 
present themselves as partners in innovation. Showing that Plan C and DuWoBo are 
part of the innovation movement, strengthens the legitimacy of government 
involvement in these processes. Sustainable housing and building was from early on 
incorporated in one of ViA’s breakthroughs (namely “Flanders as a Green and 
Dynamic City Region” – see Context Box 3). This was not the case for materials 
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management. OVAM and Plan C made considerable efforts to present the materials 
theme as an essential theme for an innovative, green economy and to position Plan C 
as an innovation partner who employs a distinctive approach to innovation. In the 
Autumn of 2009, the Plan C SCIA wrote a position paper where it focuses on 
characteristics of Plan C that can turn Plan C into a partner for ViA: a long-term 
vision that functions as a framework for groundbreaking experiments, sustainable 
materials management that is an essential precondition and an economic opportunity 
for realising most ViA-aspirations, and a new governance model in a learning 
network that supports experiments for system innovation104.  
 
It is necessary to stress that the discourse coalitions around “sustainable housing and 
building” and “sustainable materials management” in respectively DuWoBo and 
Plan C have been actively constructed. While the cooperation and discussion in the 
processes lay a foundation for a growing understanding of each other’s position and 
a common construction of a future vision, in both processes coalitions did not emerge 
spontaneously and divergence had to be actively controlled. At least four techniques 
can be observed: making an inventory, freezing the text, keeping results informal, 
and keeping the agenda broad.  
 
In DuWoBo, the system analysis was mainly developed by the scientists of the 
project team and briefly discussed during the first transition arena. Afterwards, the 
result was “frozen”, which meant that in theory the document could evolve during 
the rest of the process. In practice, it disappeared in the background and was never 
used again. In Plan C, the system analysis was prepared by the consultants and 
thoroughly discussed by arena members. The resulting document was defined as “an 
inventory of bottlenecks”, meaning that several persons indicated these points but 
not everybody was necessarily in agreement about their importance. Both techniques 
– freezing and inventory – are ways of coping with ambiguities and divergence 
between participants in such a way that a coalition remains possible105.  
                                                  
104 The influence of the “innovation factor” is even more visible in the ISSI-project in which 
DuWoBo and Plan C cooperated during 2010 and 2011. ISSI derives its money from the 
European EFRO-funding and was thus presented as a project focusing on stimulating the 
adoption of clean technology in Flemish SME’s. Although the need for radical system 
innovations remains in the texts, new wording such as “high potential for employment and 
economic growth” and “accelerating the speed-to-market of system innovations in the 
cleantech sector” entered the language. 
105  It is interesting to note, however, that there are even here diverging views. An 
experienced civil servant, looking back at the DuWoBo process, wonders whether a system 
analysis was really necessary, because in his view the knowledge of participants that are 
active in a particular system is high enough to have a common starting ground. In contrast, a 
participant from Plan C found it a useful way of getting acquainted with the views of other 
participants and “feeling what you have in common with these people that you are put around the 
table with”.  In my own observation, I noticed that even when participants have a relatively 
good working knowledge of the present condition of the system, they are often not 
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As for the transition vision, in Plan C, a shared and very broad image was crafted 
that contained the important elements that different participants brought in, without 
however an attempt at finalising the discussion between radical societal reform 
versus eco-modernisation. This is lamented by some, in particular by actors who aim 
for more radical change. But it guarantees that the coalition is not broken and that a 
mixed group of participants from governments, business, science and NGO’s keeps 
identifying with the process. Again, the technique of “temporarily freezing” the text 
is used: the discussion is halted in order to make room for more action-related 
concerns of defining and starting experiments. The suggestion is that the vision can 
later be further refined, but also here we notice that over the next years 
“temporarily” becomes “permanent”. Another technique is to keep the textual results 
informal: the Leitbild of Plan C and the results for the different transition paths and 
experiments were publicly not available before late 2011. They were only distributed 
on paper in an “internal working document” that contains almost 200 pages and that 
was intended as a “living document” to be adapted over time. This informality 
leaves the differences under the surface. 
 
In DuWoBo, the transition agenda was discussed with the intention of publishing it 
and using it publicly. As told in chapter 5, it was even officially handed over to 
Minister-President Peeters a few months after publication. The fact that the result 
would become a public document brought more discussions and demands for 
amendments, but differences were mainly bridged by keeping the agenda broad so 
that all participants could find their points in it. Frontrunners interpreted the agenda 
therefore as a compilation of existing agenda’s, without important breakthroughs. 
But others point out that it was exactly this coupling of agenda’s that made an 
ambition level possible that went beyond existing agenda’s.  
 
In spite of all this discourse coalition building and the use of different techniques to 
keep divergence under control, the history of both processes shows that these 
coalitions were temporary. When the gains from participation were not obvious 
enough anymore and when external developments made the processes less salient, 
participants strategically decided to follow other paths to reach their goals. Chapter 4 
and 5 have shown for example how during the last couple of years new platforms 
were created in the materials sector, in the building sector and in the innovation 
sector that have more money at their disposal and that are more focused on direct 
economic gains (almost invariably through technological innovation). Or how, in the 
case of DuWoBo, new visionary, multi-stakeholder processes in adjacent domains (in 
housing and in spatial planning) were discussing similar problems as the TM-process. 
And of course how, in the case of Plan C, the policy regime itself shifted. By early 
2012, DuWoBo as well as Plan C were trying to reposition themselves and form a 
refreshed coalition of actors to continue their transition work. 
                                                                                                                                                          
knowledgeable about historical evolutions and the origins of system structures, culture and 
practices. Both system analyses of DuWoBo and Plan C also have an a-historical perspective.  
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Discourse institutionalisation 
 
Did all this find a translation in new organisations, instruments or practices at the 
level of the two TM-processes? Both had of course their governance bodies (the 
Platform for DuWoBo; SCIA and SCOO for Plan C) but these do not differ 
fundamentally from such bodies in other organisations.  The main example of a 
different form of institutionalisation is the attempt at setting up an autonomous, self-
organising Plan C network, consisting of engaged individuals interested in radical 
renewal in the broad materials field. As explained in detail in chapter 4, this attempt 
failed however, but it was clearly inspired by the transition and the substantive 
storylines in Plan C. The vzw Plan C that was eventually founded in March 2012 is 
much more in line with other network organisations: its participants do not differ 
fundamentally from regime members, it is not intended to be self-organising, it has a 
traditional legal structure. Its mission is formulated as speeding up breakthroughs in 
material management, through visioning, experiments and networking.  
 
A similar drive to autonomy has never been present in DuWoBo. This has never been 
a demand from participants, nor did DuWoBo have a government agency behind it 
that had enough manoeuvring space and capacity to support such a move. Instead, 
the administrative coordination of DuWoBo was brought under DAR and integrated 
with the already existing Team Sustainable Development. Further, DuWoBo 
participants succeeded better in translating the ideas of the vision in projects and 
experiments. This would later on prove important, because several of these projects 
formed the basis of the small arrangement that has meanwhile taken shape around 
DuWoBo and the DAR team. 
 
6.3.4. The role of discourse when DuWoBo and Plan C gain wider influence 
 
Do the transition and substantive storylines of DuWoBo and Plan C also play a role 
beyond the niches in which they grew? The answer has of course already been given 
above, but here, I try to be more specific about how discourse had influence. 
 
Discourse structuration 
 
The first form of influence is again through discourse structuration, which happens 
when ever more actors rely on a discourse to state their position in policy debates. 
This effect is best visible in the waste and materials system. Before 2007, hardly 
anybody in Flanders talked about the need to think in materials terms. Plan C was 
the first concerted effort to develop a discourse on sustainable materials management. 
By early 2012, the sustainable materials discourse had become the dominant 
discourse for all actors that are somehow active in waste and materials. One of the 
most striking effects of the shift from a waste to a materials discourse is the entrance 
of a whole series of new actors in the system, while simultaneously the already 
present actors are redefining themselves and their position. Hajer has labelled this 
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mechanism “new storylines transforming interests”: a new discourse can redefine a 
policy problem and lead actors to redefine their interests. Terms like sustainable 
materials management, resource efficiency, urban mining, cradle to cradle, closed 
materials loops or materials life cycles have become common language. It has 
become unthinkable to discuss waste and the waste hierarchy without embedding 
the discussion in the broader materials issue. The discourse still uses the image of a 
hierarchy or a ladder, but the image has evolved from a waste to a materials 
hierarchy. From the broad discourse that was developed in Plan C, only the just 
mentioned eco-modernist ideas have been adopted in the new regime discourse, 
however. In this translation, the contribution of the Plan C discourse was but one 
element of influence. External developments (such as new European Waste Directive, 
the EU 2020 strategy, the concern of industry and policy-makers over the worldwide 
competition for resources, and the innovation discourse for the Flemish economy) 
were not only more important, but the discourses present here, often co-shaped by  
agendas of competitiveness and liberalisation, supplanted the transformative ideas of 
Plan C’s agenda. This was already shown in chapter 5, in the streams discussion in 
6.2, and it will surface again in the discussion of the influence of processes of 
structural transformation (see 6.5). 
 
Discourse structuration of the sustainable housing and building storylines is less 
obvious in the housing and building system. Although the word “sustainable” is 
often used by actors, the broad interpretation of sustainability is only used 
systematically in what I identified above as the new autonomous policy arrangement 
around sustainable housing and building. The contents of this discourse is well 
exemplified in the chapters of the Vlaamse Maatstaf duurzaam wonen en bouwen 
(Flemish standard sustainable housing and building) that is promoted in the new 
policy arrangement. Its chapters include: management, transport, water, land use 
and ecology, pollution, materials and waste, energy, health, comfort and social value, 
and innovation. Within DuWoBo itself even more themes are part of the discussion, 
such as affordability of building and renting, or collective structures and density (e.g. 
at district level). Although this broad interpretation gains some ground, most actors 
in the system stick to only a few of these aspects in their interpretation of 
“sustainable”. They rather talk about a “greener” or “more environment-friendly” 
housing and building sector, where attention goes in particular to aspects of energy, 
waste and materials, water. For a lot of actors, sustainable building is even largely 
equated to low-energy construction. On the other hand, I showed in chapter 5 how 
some policy domains that are investing in long-term policy planning are currently 
also trying to incorporate a broad vision of housing and building (in particular in 
housing policy and spatial planning). In fact, under influence of the current 
dynamics in housing and building, with pressures coming from different levels, the 
discourse about what housing and building is or should become, is in flux. Hajer’s 
observation that discourse coalitions are formed that are  bounded to time, place and 
specific practices, is of relevance in this situation. For the activities that relate to the 
strict policy arrangement of sustainable housing and building, the involved actors 
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promote a broad interpretation of sustainable housing and building. In other forums, 
they use an interpretation that is best suited for the specific circumstances. 
 
When talking about discourse structuration, there is further the general observation 
that the use of the word “transition” has multiplied in Flanders (and elsewhere) in 
the last few years. However, the meaning of the word differs when it is used in the 
transition towns movement, in the EU or Rio+20 discourse about a transition to a 
green economy, or in the sustainability transition research field. In particular the 
discourses of this last field have spilled over to the second Flemish Strategy for 
Sustainable Development (VSDO) and to Flanders in Action (ViA). It has anno 2012 
become impossible in Flanders to debate sustainable development policy without 
talking about transitions. And with the introduction of 13 transversal projects to 
revitalise ViA, transition management has also found its way to ViA and forms the 
core of the renewed ViA process. Transition language can also be found in some 
parts of the innovation domain, such as in the MIP funding programme. In particular 
in ViA and MIP, figure 6.6 has become popular to communicate what a transition is 
and how transition management works. It has been developed by researchers at 
VITO and shows on the one hand the well-known S-curve of how a transition is 
supposed to develop, and on the other hand the different steps of transition 
management: 1. analysing systems; 2. visioning; 3. defining pathways; 4. 
experimenting; 5. evaluating; 6. anchoring.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.6. The image of a transition and of transition management as communicated in ViA and 
MIP. The different steps in TM are labelled as: 1. analysing systems; 2. visioning; 3. defining 
pathways; 4. experimenting; 5. evaluating; 6. anchoring. 
 
As Kern (2009) has observed, the S-curve was also in the Dutch energy transition an 
essential discursive element, because its interpretive flexibility – it can be interpreted 
as a transition curve, but in the innovation world is also well-known as a product 
diffusion curve – “allowed different actors to agree on the graph without necessarily 
agreeing on the detail of what a transition would mean in practice” (p. 96). This 
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observation is important here. When DuWoBo and Plan C were established, the 
ambition was really to try out in Flanders the “pure” TM approach and, 
consequently, the typical transition discourse was omnipresent. The leading agencies 
(LNE/DAR and OVAM) and the responsible Ministers of the Environment were also 
willing to go along with these “experiments in innovative environmental policy”, as 
they were labelled. 
 
When looking at the recent breakthrough of TM in ViA, it is obvious that the context 
is much more ambiguous. ViA originated in the context of economic competition 
between European regions and has become the central socio-economic innovation 
programme of the current Flemish government, with powers for the 13 TM-projects 
distributed over all Ministers and departments. As I remarked above (6.1.3), involved 
actors look at this with a mixture of expectation and scepticism: are these mainly 
projects to freshen up existing policy in multi-actor networks, or is it the intention to 
break through existing deadlocks in regular policy and go beyond business-as-usual? 
The least that can be said, is that the idea of radical change for sustainable 
development remains below the surface in ViA in favour of a language about co-
creation, stakeholder involvement and long-term policy. The suggestion of 
management was important to couple TM to the government’s agenda. Of course, 
there is a chance that when the transversal projects are developed in practice, exactly 
such features bring sustainable development back in, but given the track record of 
the previous and current Flemish governments in the field of sustainable 
development, a major break with that past seems unlikely. In any case, the 
interpretive flexibility of the transitions storyline surfaces here once more: it allows to 
connect transitions with the ViA agenda, while leaving open the question whether 
the intention is competitiveness and innovation or deep, transformational change.  
 
Discourse institutionalisation 
 
The next question is whether discourse structuration also leads to new policy 
practices and policy institutions. In sustainable housing and building, the discourse 
institutionalisation is predominantly situated around the new policy arrangement. 
First, there is the small SD-DAR team of civil servants that has been installed to 
coordinate policy on sustainable housing and building. Second, there are the five 
provincial platforms that give advice to individual citizens and professionals. Third 
is the Belgian Sustainable Building Council (which early 2013 was still under 
construction). And there is the DuWoBo process with its platform and arena that 
already exist seven years, and even though it experienced difficulties in 2011/2012 in 
keeping its role and position, it is the intention of policy-makers to continue the 
process and turn it into a DuWoBo 2.0 version. The DAR team has a budget with 
which it subsidises these different initiatives. Furthermore, the Flemish government 
has approved the Maatstaf, a measuring system based on the BREEAM methodology, 
to give guidance to building projects. Meanwhile, in 2012 internally in the 
administration, a platform has been created that brings together all departments that 
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are involved in building projects and that is intended to exchange experience and 
information. 
 
In sustainable materials management, the best visible effect of discourse 
institutionalisation is the Materials Decree that was approved by the Flemish 
Parliament in December 2011 and that was complemented in February 2012 by a 
complete revision of the existing detailed regulation in VLAREMA106. This implies 
amongst other things new end-of-waste criteria, changes to the extended producer 
responsibility principle, and the introduction of a materials register. Simultaneously, 
in June 2011 consultation with relevant stakeholders was set up through the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Materials Management, that since June 2012 has been 
followed by the Vlaams Materialenprogramma (Flemish Materials Programme), which 
contains amongst other things a steering group of government and stakeholders. The 
other important change is a major reorganisation of OVAM, that is meant to prepare 
the organisation for its role in the starting materials economy. The reorganisation 
comes with a Strategic Plan 2010-2014 with an explicit materials orientation and 
includes the foundation of a policy innovation service that will evaluate OVAM’s 
current policy instruments and formulate ideas for innovative instruments to 
contribute to the waste-materials shift. 
 
In both systems, institutionalisation does not only show itself in other governance 
structures, but also the practices are changing. Some building companies – Bostoen is 
one of the best known examples – have even completely reinvented themselves and – 
in this example – henceforth only build passive houses. Also the Flemish authorities 
are investing in offices that are built more sustainable. These and other examples 
show that it has become relatively easy to simply enter and visit a more sustainable 
house or building. Sustainable houses and buildings are no longer restricted to just 
concepts or hidden away in niches. The material reality enforces itself on policy-
makers, so to speak. Hajer identifies this “need for sensory experience” and the direct 
contact with problems or solutions as a mechanism that facilitates policy change. The 
experience of direct, sensory contact generates credibility and trust and is important 
in processes of change and persuasion.  
 
In the materials system, actual practices are less developed and it is more difficult to 
see and touch sustainable materials management – although the iconic example of 
the Belgian company Umicore, the world leader in recycling of precious metals, is 
known by everybody in the sector. However, the “sensory experience”-mechanism 
does not only refer to direct sensory contact, but Hajer also includes the role of 
meetings, group discussions, symposia and face-to-face contact with experts. Face-to-
face interaction between policy-makers, stakeholders and different kind of experts 
can diffuse knowledge and generate trust. The intensive arena process during the 
                                                  
106 VLAREMA replaces VLAERA, the previous compilation of rules that was in existence 
since 1997. The Materials Decree and VLAREMA legally replace the Waste Decree and 
VLAREA since 1 June 2012 (see chapter 5). 
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early phases of Plan C was important for building the initial network of ‘believers’ in 
the materials storyline and it created trust within OVAM that the new discourse was 
robust enough to build policy on it. It also worked the other way round, namely 
stakeholders that previously only encountered OVAM in negotiations over for 
example new legislation, got acquainted with another side of OVAM and OVAM 
officials. An OVAM official recalls that “Plan C has been helpful here to talk in less 
traditional settings and from a less defensive position. It changed the attitude of some actors 
towards us”.  
 
Finally, a word on institutionalisation in VSDO and ViA. The evolutions in VSDO 
and ViA were less clear early 2012, when I finished the research for this dissertation. 
The VSDO does not directly install new policy mechanisms or new structures. In ViA, 
in order to implement transition management 13 “integrators” and 13 “transition 
managers” have been appointed, one for each transversal project (see Context Box 3). 
The ViA projects also get support from a learning forum that is intended as an 
exchange of experience between the transition managers. 
 
 
6.4. NEW POLITICAL SPACES BETWEEN NEW RULES AND PREVAILING 
MODES OF POLICY-MAKING 
 
With the transition management approach of DuWoBo and Plan C, the Flemish 
Government introduced an innovative form of governance in Flemish environmental 
policy. Throughout this dissertation, I have tried to understand what the policy 
characteristics are of this new form of governance and whether it actually leads to 
policy change. This chapter 6 discussed how policy renewal turned out differently in 
the two cases, what the role of policy entrepreneurs and policy windows was in 
realising this change, and how different discourse mechanisms contributed to the 
change. It also showed that a close look at these innovative processes and the context 
in which they are embedded, reveals a fairly complex picture: policy renewal can 
take different forms, changes do not neatly proceed in well-determined stages, 
discourses do not work unambiguously in one direction. 
 
This part 6.4 looks at the processes and the changes they have induced from yet 
another perspective that is part of my analytical frame: the rules of the game by 
which these processes proceed and their relation with the existing rules in regime 
policies. We may observe substantive forms of policy change (such as new 
discourses), but do the process aspects of policy-making – the rules of the game – 
also change? If so, then how does this work and what are the tensions? And do these 
changes have wider implications? I use again one of Hajer’s concepts, namely the 
idea of an institutional void and the resulting new political spaces, to help clarifying 
the changes that are going on. 
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6.4.1. Institutional voids and new political spaces 
 
As argued earlier (see chapter 2), TM as an approach to governance fits in well with 
the observation that the nature and topography of politics are changing (Hajer and 
Wagenaar, 2003). A transition arena is one of these places where the government and 
a range of societal actors are searching for new ways of doing politics, “in the 
shadow of policy” as TM-theory formulates it. Since TM had never before been tried 
out in Flanders, there were no clear and generally accepted rules and norms of how 
to interact, how to conduct policy-making and how to search for acceptable solutions. 
There were only some guidelines based on TM-theory and on the experiences of the 
ICIS-DRIFT researchers in projects such as Parkstad Limburg. This situation is 
strongly reminiscent of Hajer’s concept of policy in an institutional void. I use the 
concept and its implications here to enrich the discussion about rules.  
 
The classical view on policy is that the state is the central actor in policy formulation, 
decision-making and policy implementation. However, not only is the role and the 
power position of the state changing and often weakening, we also see the 
emergence of new problems that cannot be solved through government intervention 
alone. A consequence is that solutions for such problems have to be found in an 
institutional void because there are no suited institutions available with the power to 
provide a solution. In this void “there are no clear rules and norms according to 
which politics is to be conducted and policy measures are to be agreed upon”. (Hajer 
2003a, p. 175). More precisely, there are no generally accepted rules: each actor may 
have an idea of what he thinks the rules should be, but there is no a priori agreement. 
This should not be interpreted as a situation where state institutions have become 
meaningless, but rather a situation where the involved actors, including government 
agencies, “not only deliberate to get to favourable solutions for particular problems, 
but while deliberating they also negotiate new institutional rules, develop new norms 
of appropriate behaviour and devise new conceptions of legitimate political 
intervention” (ibid., p. 176). 
 
The institutional void thus leads to the creation of new political spaces: “mostly 
unstable practices that emerge in the struggle to address problems that the 
established institutions are – for a variety of reasons – unable to resolve in a manner 
that is perceived to be both legitimate and effective” (ibid.). According to Hajer, 
initially these new political spaces are marked by two conditions (Hajer and Versteeg, 
2005, p. 341). The first is institutional ambiguity: there are no agreed upon norms and 
rules; participants are insecure about their role and the setting they are entering. The 
second is multi-signification: actors bring their own meanings to the new setting; they 
may conceive of the world in different terms, or when they use the same terms, 
different interpretations may be attached to them.  
 
The networks that are formed in these new political spaces grow stronger and more 
coherent over time when they succeed in functioning as a discourse coalition, with a 
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shared identification of core problems, shared possible solutions and a shared 
understanding of the rules according to which decisions are made (ibid., p. 342, 343). 
Hajer stresses that the functioning of such new political spaces is not only a cognitive 
question. The experience of collaboration in the deliberation and negotiation process 
that goes on (about problems, solutions, rules) is key to building trust and 
understanding. The participants find that they are mutually dependent on each other. 
A central feature is that governmental agencies participate but do not dominate the 
deliberation (Hajer, 2003a, p. 187). “Those who were on top in the classical-modernist 
order, the elected representatives, now often occupy a more peripheral role” (Hajer 
and Versteeg 2005, p. 341). 
 
The practices in these lightly institutionalised stakeholder networks are examples of 
emergent forms of governance. According to Hajer, they show up most in relatively 
new political themes such as environmental politics or genetics and biotechnology, 
because the classical-modernist institutions were not designed to solve these new 
kind of problems. Consequently, institutional voids appear. He admits that these 
new practices are not unproblematic: they essentially use new processes to solve 
problems, but then what guarantees the quality of the result in terms of effectiveness 
and legitimacy (Hajer 2003a, p. 188-192)? Whether the new practices are to be 
assessed as a threat to democracy, whether they are captured by established political 
players, or whether they should be seen as an improvement in democratic 
governance, is for Hajer an empirical question. In any case, these new ways of 
organising policy processes demand careful attention: are the rules of the game really 
changing? In what way are they changing? And how does this have impact on the 
regular policy regime? Again, I use the three processes that play a role in the route to 
policy change (establishment of the policy niche, institutionalisation, gaining wider 
influence) to structure the discussion. 
 
6.4.2. The establishment of DuWoBo and Plan C: filling in an institutional void 
 
Can DuWoBo and Plan C be considered as new political spaces in answer to a 
political void? On a general level, the void was a result of the felt lack of a framework 
to develop a long-term policy for sustainable development in Flanders. Since 
Flanders did not even have a responsible Minister for sustainable development 
before mid 2004, the theme belonged informally to the environmental policy domain. 
But also here, it was treated in the margin. Yet, I discussed above and in previous 
chapters (see also Context Box 4) how from several places the pressure was growing 
to do something about long-term sustainable development policy: after 1999 the 
Green Ministers were in favour of such an orientation, the advisory councils SERV 
and MINA-raad demanded it, civil servants felt the need, studies also pointed to it, 
and in particular after the Rio+10 conference in Johannesburg it seemed time to live 
up to international agreements.  
 
Chapter 6. The role of TM in policy change 
 279 
At a more concrete level, in the case of DuWoBo there was no institutional space 
available to discuss sustainable housing and building. There was even hardly an 
interest in such a discussion in the dominating policy domains of the housing and 
building regime, namely housing policy, spatial planning policy, economic policy. So, 
the environmental policy domain took the liberty to create a space in the context of 
MINA 3, making use of the suggestion that had surfaced in the advisory councils and 
in scientific reports to set up a transition management process to start long-term 
thinking on sustainable development. In the case of Plan C, the felt need derived 
from the realisation with several mid-level OVAM administrators that a reorientation 
of waste policy would become necessary in the medium term and that OVAM was 
not capable of developing such a policy on its own. An ICIS-study (Loorbach 2004) 
was instrumental in getting permission from the OVAM Board of Directors to start a 
TM-process.  
 
From the beginning, the two coordinating policy officers (Ilse Dries, Walter Tempst) 
and the teams that surrounded them, succeeded in communicating the need for a 
free space. I showed in chapters 4 and 5 how the new Minister of the Environment, 
Kris Peeters, and his cabinet were willing to go along with that demand. During the 
installation meeting of the Plan C arena (June 2006), the representative of the 
Minister even announced explicitly that Plan C was not about “thinking in terms of 
‘representation structures’, which until now has been dominant in other processes. 
Status, position and representativeness is not our first concern (…) To keep pressure 
away from the transition arena the Minister wants to provide space and time to 
deliver good work” (see also chapter 4). In both processes, the way the participants 
were chosen, the small group of participants, the fact that they were asked to 
participate as individuals, the fact that they were guided by consultants experienced 
in group processes, and this combined with the fact that simultaneously they were 
also asked to contribute to long-term policy development: all these features showed 
that this were going to be unusual processes and indeed new political spaces. One of 
Plan C’s notes about the mission of the network even mentions explicitly: “Public 
authorities develop increasingly less policy for society, but increasingly together with 
and from society. New networks and new forms of cooperation where a diverse mix 
of people and organisations make connections, play an ever more important role in 
realising the needed change. Plan C fills a void that is not or insufficiently filled by 
the current management processes” (Van Lieshout (ed.), 2008, p. 1, emphasis in the 
original). 
 
6.4.3. Institutionalising the policy niches: grappling with new rules 
 
So, it can be argued that with DuWoBo and Plan C two new political spaces were 
created. Were these spaces where the rules of policy-making had to be invented from 
the beginning, characterised by what Hajer calls institutional ambiguity, with no 
agreed upon rules and participants insecure about the setting they are entering? Yes 
and no. Yes, because participants did not know of course what a transition 
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management process was and how they should function in it. No, because the 
particular situation of TM is that theorists claim to know how such processes should 
be run and that they have developed their own guidelines for them. I have referred 
to these guidelines already in previous chapters, for example: “work with 
frontrunners from niches and regime”, “work with individuals instead of 
representatives”, “develop and grow in the shadow of policy”, “develop as a 
network with a new role for government, as one player among many”, “trust in the 
self-organisation of the actors and the process”, “provide time and space for 
learning”, “use the network, vision development and experiments to learn about the 
desired direction and about what works”. So, in fact we have a situation where 
deliberation between participants about the rules of the TM-game develops in a 
prescribed framework, albeit that this prescription remained largely informal. 
 
From the very beginning, there is however a grappling with the rules of how the TM-
game should be played and rules are constantly adjusted. I briefly dwell on two 
examples: who exactly the participants in these TM networks should be, and what 
the role of the government is.  
 
At the time the processes started, TM theory stressed – more than in its current 
version – the crucial role of frontrunners, individuals with visionary ideas about 
change that are not part of the regime and that do not act as representatives of an 
organisation. However, as discussed in chapter 4, already in the very first Flemish 
process (DuWoBo), the Flemish team members that were involved in the 
organisation of the process, decided to depart from that guideline and compose a 
mixed group with niche and regime players, where everybody silently accepted that 
a lot of them also acted as representatives. The main rationale was that such a 
composition was necessary to guarantee support in the sector, and to make sure that 
in particular the building industry and its representative organisations (such as VCB, 
WTCB, Bouwunie) would not oppose the process, and preferably think along with it. 
DuWoBo hardly ever used the term “network of frontrunners”, but rather talked 
about a “societal renewal network” or “renewal platform” that is open for a broad 
number of entrants. The emphasis on frontrunners and individuals is much more 
outspoken in Plan C, particularly during the first two to three years107. The business 
plan that was developed early 2009 explicitly spoke of individual commitment for 
radical renewal instead of representation. The rationale here was that a network 
dominated by institutional actors, be they government or companies, would not be 
radical, inspirational and flexible enough. This position proofed to be untenable from 
mid 2010 onwards, once OVAM had decided that it wanted to keep a leading 
position in Plan C. Certainly the coordination of the network had to be in the hands 
of organisations, with people that are preferably frontrunners within their 
organisation, but that also have a position from which they can represent their 
organisation. 
                                                  
107 Often referred to with peculiar neologisms that originated in the Netherlands, such as 
“frisdenkers” (“freshthinkers”) and “durfdoeners” (“dare-doers”). 
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A second interpretation problem relates to the role of the government. The general 
consensus is familiar from transition thinking: transitions are such complex processes 
that they cannot be steered top-down by governments. “System innovation cannot be 
realised solely by the government, but of course the government should be involved in these 
processes”, according to one of the interviewees. Various words are used to describe 
the envisaged role. On the one hand, we find terms such as “one of the partners”, 
“network manager”, “facilitator of the process”, “guardian over cooperation between 
all actors”, mostly terminology that can also be found in typical governance literature. 
Simultaneous with the governance language, participants also seem to expect a 
government that “gives direction”, “sets out the lines”, that “provides leadership” in 
substantive and process terms and, not in the least, shows commitment by providing 
an adequate funding base for the processes and for transition experiments. What the 
actual interpretation of these terms should be and which balance should be sought 
between them, is usually left unspoken (which is thus an example of Hajer’s concept 
of multi-signification). The main exception is the period in which OVAM changes its 
position vis-à-vis Plan C. As said, until 2009 the Plan C discourse saw the role of the 
government rather restrictively and even had a negative view of it, fearing that too 
much government involvement would suffocate initiatives and kill creativity. Until 
2009, OVAM itself did not have the ambition of playing a leading role in Plan C. But 
when the network did not succeed in creating an autonomous status and when 
OVAM discovered the potential strategic importance of Plan C, the discourse about 
the role of government actors also became more positive. 
 
Apart from these examples, I showed in chapters 4 and 5 how several of the rules 
were not even brought into practice or did not work: time has never been taken to 
learn from experiences; self-organisation did not emerge. Yet, in spite of this 
grappling with and adjusting of rules, certainly during the first 2 to 3 years of both 
Plan C and DuWoBo, the new approach and the introduction of new concepts 
created a dynamism and a certain enthusiasm for thinking about long-term system 
innovation, that resulted in amongst other things a future vision and proposals for 
experiments. The time and space that were created “in the shadow of policy” during 
these years, effectively contributed to cooperation between niche and regime actors 
in drawing up a transition agenda.  
 
But when in later years the processes started losing their coherence and the discourse 
coalitions began to disentangle, old patterns resurfaced. This is best visible in 
DuWoBo, where by 2011 the representative actors from the construction sector and 
architects had turned into followers, watching over their interests, but not carrying 
the process forward anymore. This can be interpreted as patterns and rules of policy-
making that are typical for the regime level, that slip into the niche. This “invasion” 
of regime rules into the new political space of the TM-processes is in fact something 
that happens regularly. What may mean that Hajer’s institutional void is not as 
empty of rules as he thinks it is. I give a few other examples: 
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• In both cases: finding finance for experiments requires adapting to the criteria of 
external funding mechanisms 
• In both cases (but stronger in Plan C): the need is felt to present oneself as an 
innovation partner that can play an important role in ViA 
• In both cases (but more visible in DuWoBo): the difficulty to get involvement 
from other departments, that do not seem to feel the need to work from an 
integrated perspective 
• In DuWoBo: the need to adapt criteria for sustainable building to the international 
BREEAM standard 
• In DuWoBo: the lobbying of sector organisations to move the process from LNE 
to DAR, where it has a more neutral position 
• In Plan C: the impossibility to escape the BBB-rules, as well as the budget 
austerity and recruitment stop of the Flemish government when pleading for an 
autonomous vzw 
• In Plan C: the need to work towards a vzw Plan C made up of organisations, 
because that has more legitimacy and can easier find funding 
 
6.4.4. Gaining wider influence: new political spaces collide with the real world 
 
Are the TM rules exported outside the arenas? There is hardly any evidence of that. 
Instead, there are several examples that once the shielded environment of the “strict” 
transition arena falls away, the new rules are difficult to sustain. Rules that are 
adhered to in the arenas, are contested outside them, even though similar actors are 
involved. In particular regime actors expect that the conventional patterns of policy- 
and decision-making from their sector or from the Belgian/Flemish political 
structures are duplicated. 
 
This tension is best visible in the new sustainable housing and building arrangement. 
It does not only contain the DuWoBo-process itself, but also the Belgian Sustainable 
Building Council and the provincial centres. In both cases, I showed in chapter 5 how 
regime rules shaped the decision structures of the processes and how regime actors 
played an important role in forcing this through. In both cases, the role of NGO’s was 
contested and classical actors from the building sector did not just want to share 
power with NGO’s. In both cases, also the logic of the state structure intervened. In 
the BSBC, a compromise had to be sought for structure and ambitions between the 
different Belgian regions. In the provincial centres, a cooperation agreement had to 
be sought between the Flemish and the provincial level. 
 
Also when trying to gain wider influence for substantive results, the existing 
institutional structures of policy-making are a hindrance. This seems in particular to 
be the case with the compartmentalisation of policy domains, where old patterns 
prevail. In the DuWoBo case this is exemplified in the lack of coordination between 
the different segments that make up the policy regime, such as in the examples given 
in chapter 5 of how difficult it is to discuss bottlenecks for sustainable 
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neighbourhoods between policy domains (5.2.3), or of how Flemish new industrial 
policy takes the building sector as its first target but ignores the sustainable housing 
and building initiatives and keeps out niche actors (5.3.1). In the Plan C case, we saw 
how VLABEST, the advisory council for domestic administration, found that the 
BBB-structure of the Flemish administration is not flexible enough to deal with new 
societal challenges, in particular in the field of sustainability. 
 
Yet, the picture is not completely bleak. In different domains, signs can be found of a 
renewed interest in long-term strategic policy-making through consultation with a 
broad array of actors (from individual citizens to organised groups). This is the case 
in the materials domain, where OVAM intends to continue its tradition of 
stakeholder involvement, for example in the Flemish Materials Programme. 
Initiatives are also found in the spatial planning domain and the housing domain. 
And there is of course ViA where it is specifically transition management that has 
been turned to in order to provide an approach for long-term policy and multi-actor 
networking. However, as repeatedly said, early 2012 is was as of yet unclear which 
direction and form this would take. 
 
 
6.5. TRANSITION MANAGEMENT AND THE BALANCE OF POWER  
 
The central axiom of political science is that politics and policy-making are 
essentially about power. The preceding parts of this chapter showed how politics 
and policy is also about ideas, about intelligent manoeuvring of entrepreneurial 
actors and about institutional settings and rules. In empirical studies from the group 
of researchers around Arts, Leroy and Van Tatenhove that use the policy 
arrangements framework, the dimension of resources is almost invariably equated 
with power (see e.g. Arts and Leroy, 2006). This is somewhat strange, because in a 
2004 article by Arts and Van Tatenhove, they use a much broader conception of 
power. However, hardly any empirical work using this framework has been 
published. This broader conception is not just about how actors draw on resources to 
realise their goals, but also pays attention to structural aspects of power and to 
power that derives from the position of actors. This conception has been adapted by 
Grin (2010) and proposed as a framework for studying power in transition studies. I 
use Grin’s interpretation here to insert a last refinement in this chapter in the 
understanding of how transition management influences regular policy. Again, the 
three processes that play a role in the route to policy change (establishment of the 
policy niche, institutionalisation, gaining wider influence) structure the discussion. 
 
6.5.1. Power in different layers 
 
Let me first present a brief overview of the power framework that I introduce. Arts 
and Van Tatenhove (2004) realise of course that the power debate is one of the most 
contested debates in the political sciences. In line with how they position the policy 
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arrangements approach – as taking into account structure and agency, substance and 
organisation, stability and change – they also define their concept of power as a 
multi-faceted concept. Power resides on the one hand in the hands of social actors, 
who have resources that they can use to achieve certain policy outcomes. This power 
can rely on organisational resources (such as money, personnel), but can also be 
discursive when actors gain influence by arguments or persuasion. On the other 
hand, power has also structural aspects, because the historically grown context in 
which actors are embedded also exerts influence. Arts and Van Tatenhove therefore 
define power as “the organisational and discursive capacity of agencies, either in 
competition with one another or jointly, to achieve outcomes in social practices, a 
capacity which is however co-determined by the structural power of those social 
institutions in which these agencies are embedded” (ibid., p. 347). 
 
They detail this somewhat more in a three-layered conception of power (based on a 
combination of the work of Clegg (1989) and Giddens (1984)). The first layer is the 
layer  of relational power, which refers to actors that use the resources at their disposal 
to achieve outcomes in interactions with other actors. Relational power is transitive 
when actors achieve an outcome at the cost of other actors. It is intransitive when 
different actors develop joint practices and achieve common results. The second layer 
is the layer of dispositional power. This is power that derives from the position actors 
occupy in a certain situation (an organisation, a system etc.). Because of their position, 
some actors are better able than others to make use of the resources available, they 
can easier employ rules to achieve an outcome, they have more legitimacy when 
drawing on a certain discourse. Dispositional power privileges some actors and their 
practices, while hindering the practices of others. The third layer refers to structural 
power or macro-societal structures and evolutions that shape the conduct of 
individual and collective actors. This form of power is about “orders of signification, 
legitimisation and domination, which are ‘materialised’ in discourses as well as in 
political, legal and economic institutions of society” (Arts and Van Tatenhove, p. 351).  
 
Arts and Van Tatenhove link these three layers of power to the different concepts of 
the policy arrangement approach. In a consecutive step, Grin (2010) has linked them 
to the different levels of the multi-level perspective, which then each entail a 
different type of power (see table 6.1)108. Relational power is the most dominant form 
of power for realising policy innovation, e.g. through policy niches, because it is here 
that actors actively decide to try out new forms of policy-making “either by 
overruling ‘conservative forces’ that defend the status quo (transitive power), or by 
collectively changing rules of the game and/or policy discourses (intransitive 
power)” (Arts and Van Tatenhove, p. 351). Dispositional power is situated at the 
regime level: the features of the regime (such as rules and discourse) privilege 
established actors and practices, who can draw on them to safeguard or strengthen 
                                                  
108 This is in line with the discussion of the relation between PAA and MLP in chapter 2 
(2.5.2), where I showed how the different concepts of the PAA can be interpreted as the 
policy parts of the three MLP-levels. 
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their position. Dispositional power forms a barrier for innovative policy practices 
such as transition management processes. In other words, actors in such practices 
have to work hard to realise change. At the landscape level, structural power is 
dominant. 
 
Type of power Focus Policy concept 
(Arts and Van 
Tatenhove, 2004) 
Level in MLP 
(Grin, 2010) 
Structural  Power deriving from macro-societal 
evolutions and orders of 
signification, legitimisation and 
domination 
Political 
modernisation 
Landscape, 
structural 
processes of 
transformation 
Dispositional  Power deriving from the position of 
agents in a regime, comprising 
rules, resources, discourses, actor 
configurations 
Policy 
arrangement 
Regime  
Relational 
(transitive and 
intransitive) 
Power of agents to achieve policy 
outcomes in interaction with other 
actors, drawing on their resources 
Policy innovation Experiments, 
policy niches 
Table 6.1. Three layers of power and their relation with the MLP (Arts and Van Tatenhove, 
2004, Grin, 2010). 
 
The different levels incorporate different forms of power, but there is an interaction 
between the levels and different forms of power. Exercise of relational power 
through innovative practices and/or the influence of structural power may lead to 
changes in dispositional power in the regime, which in turn may further ease the 
gaining of influence of innovative practices. Grin (2012, p. 75) refers to this as a 
dialectical relationship between power dynamics and transition dynamics:  
“On the one hand, the dispositional power implied in the incumbent regime may 
privilege established practices and confront innovative practices, such as transition 
experiments, with inertia and resistance. But, the other way around, to the extent that 
some elements of the regime change (that may have been ignited by landscape trends or 
transition experiments), the implied change in dispositional power may stimulate these 
and further innovative practices. Especially when interplaying with wider societal 
changes at the ‘landscape’ level, these changes in dispositional power may then contribute 
to further regime change, and so on.” 
 
From this point of view, policy change (or stability) is intricately linked to change (or 
stability) of dispositional power. The relational power that can be mobilised at the 
policy niche level of TM-processes such as DuWoBo and Plan C, combined with the 
influence of structural power from the landscape and how actors succeed in 
employing this in their favour, will be an important factor in explaining policy 
change. Can this insight learn us something new about the role of DuWoBo and Plan 
C in policy change? Quite some observations and insights from the previous 
paragraphs (6.1 tot 6.4) also have a power aspect to them or could be reinterpreted 
through a power lens. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, I focus here on those 
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episodes and observations that have either not been treated or where a power lens 
adds relevant additional information. 
 
6.5.2. Power and the establishment of TM policy niches 
 
There is no a priori reason why the initiative for a transition management process 
should be taken by a government department or agency. It might even be somewhat 
counterintuitive to expect the initiative from the government, since in principle TM 
aims for radical change in societal systems and that is not immediately associated  
with government action. On the other hand, government agencies seem to be well 
suited as initiators, because their dispositional and relational power allows them to 
initiate TM processes with a sufficient degree of credibility. After all, starting up a 
TM process presupposes that enough suitable actors are willing to invest time to 
cooperate during several months or even years in a process of which neither the 
internal results can be well defined at the start (what will the contents of the 
transition vision be? which experiments will be defined? etc.), nor what the external 
influence will be (will it influence regular policy? what will I or my organisation be 
able to do with the result? etc.). Concretely, in DuWoBo as well as Plan C, the 
initiating government actors LNE and OVAM seem to have had enough legitimacy 
and credibility to persuade societal actors to step into the processes, start thinking 
about the long-term future with an unusual group of participants, and during several 
months deliberate about vision texts and potential experiments. This dispositional 
power upon which LNE and OVAM could draw, allowed them to introduce the 
processes and attract participants. Their position also allowed them to free resources 
to start the processes and provide support for facilitation. Besides, they could show 
their legitimacy in the Minister’s Policy Note (Peeters, 2004), where the processes 
were framed as experiments in innovative policy, and they regularly had the 
personal support of the Minister and his/her cabinet (through attendance, video 
message), who told the participants that they were allowed some time and space 
before results were expected. 
 
There were in 2004 no other actors but government actors around that had the power 
and legitimacy to introduce an experimental governance approach such as TM and 
keep participants around the table during several years. Besides, the processes were 
not just initiated as pastime, but in the perception of the government and other 
involved actors, different structural trends created a sense of urgency to set up a 
policy initiative – the growing environmental and health impact of the building 
sector, the lack of control over waste volumes, more in general the feeling that 
Flanders was lagging behind in sustainable development and missing chances in the 
starting green economy. Both TM-processes were part of an answer to these 
challenges.  
 
Throughout the cases – from establishment to gaining wider influence – there is also 
another kind of actor that often mobilises these (and other) structural trends, namely  
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the advisory councils SERV and MINA-raad. Their position in the political system 
gives them some freedom to think about long-term orientation, beyond the current 
governmental legislature. This can in turn be capitalised on by entrepreneurial civil 
servants to inform and legitimise a particular course of action. This shows for 
example in how SERV’s and MINA-raad’s advice about the MINA 3 plan and the 
suggestion to introduce transition management (see 4.2.1 and 5.2.1) served as one of 
the handles for civil servants to propose TM to the Minister.  
 
6.5.3. Power during the institutionalisation of the policy niches 
 
TM-theory claims that transition arenas are power-free zones where participants 
deliberate on an equal basis. In spite of the criticism this position has attracted, in 
their overview of lessons learned about TM, Loorbach and Rotmans (2010, p. 218) 
still maintain that “a transition arena itself actually is a created, relatively safe and 
free, protected environment without any power hierarchy.” While in the DuWoBo 
and Plan C cases there is indeed proof that during a certain amount of time transition 
arenas offer a free mental space to cooperate, this does not mean that there is no 
power hierarchy between participants. Power and power relations are in several 
ways inherent to the functioning of the arenas.  
 
First, the position of the government actors is not just one among many. The financial 
resources that the government is willing to provide and what these resources can be 
used for, is already an indication of its special position. These financial means make 
up a crucial component of the relational power that a TM-process can build up. 
However, funding has always been limited in DuWoBo and Plan C. In both cases, 
during the first two years, it was enough to create a network, develop visions and 
formulate experiments. Once the transition agendas were completed, the ambitions 
grew, the network management became more complex, and in particular: the whole 
approach contained a promise of carrying out experiments by participants (and thus 
funding for experiments). But in what I called phases 3 and 4 of DuWoBo and Plan C 
(see 4.2.2 and 5.2.2), financial means did not grow accordingly (in fact, not at all). 
This made it difficult to keep up a dynamic process. At least as important, the means 
were also not intended for developing experiments, which almost automatically 
inhibited attracting entrepreneurial individuals or firms. In other words, with the 
provision of financial means, the government is able to influence the contours of the 
processes. 
 
Further, the dispositional power of the government as regime actor remains crucial 
during the institutionalisation phase for legitimacy and credibility. Participants 
expect that the government is engaged in the processes and provides guidance on 
what is expected. Government engagement is needed to keep actors on board. This is 
perhaps most obvious in the reorganisation that DuWoBo and Plan C were searching 
for end 2011 early 2012: without government engagement, actors were not willing to 
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commit themselves to vzw Plan C; without government engagement, the DuWoBo 
2.0 process would not even have started. 
 
The dispositional power of the government also shows in other ways. In the Plan C 
case, OVAM first decides to allow an autonomous Plan C made up of individuals, 
but it is powerful enough to change its mind during 2010 and enforce that an 
autonomous Plan C will have to be made up of organisations, in which itself will 
keep a prominent role. In the DuWoBo case, the Minister’s cabinet is in a position to 
take the decision to shift the process from LNE to DAR. This last example was 
however not only a governmental decision and proves that also some societal actors 
are able to draw on their dispositional power to enforce changes in the TM-processes: 
in this example, the shift was influenced by a demand from the big construction 
sector organisations to move DuWoBo from the environmental department to what 
they conceived of as the more neutral DAR department.  
 
It is one more indication that it is impossible to keep power outside arenas.  In fact, I 
would argue that the power relations outside the arena (dispositional power relations) 
are the basis on which cooperation inside the arena is built, and that these 
dispositional power relations provide the arenas with legitimacy and credibility. 
Simply put, niche members need regime members because it gives the process an 
aura of seriousness and because regime members are exactly the ones they want to 
target with their ideas; regime members need niche members to bring in innovative 
solutions and possibly tap new markets; both need the government for support, 
guidance, legitimacy; and the government needs the participants to rethink its 
policies and help in solving a societal problem As long as the arenas function well, 
there is a delicate power balance between the participants: the different actors 
recognise each other as necessary for producing the vision, for formulating ambitious 
yet realisable ideas and experiments, cooperating in setting up experiments, jointly 
communicating results to policy-makers and the public. 
 
When dispositional power relations make cooperation possible, they can also prevent 
or distort it and become an obstacle for further development. This is best visible in 
phases 3 and 4 of the processes. In DuWoBo, regime actors fall back in an 
observational, mainly representational mode. Quickly, the process becomes 
paralysed and loses part of its legitimacy. In Plan C, business actors give up their 
active involvement in the steering of the process, which later necessitates a 
prolonged process of negotiation to draw them back into Plan C vzw. In both cases, 
the delicate power balance is distorted and the process stalls. I have frequently 
indicated above that this situation is a combination of internal problems and a 
changing external environment. What can be added here is that the relational power 
that the TM-processes could build up in that period (through deployment of funding, 
consultancy, ministerial support…) was not high enough to persuade regime actors 
to actively invest in them, because the position of these actors ensured them access to 
more interesting resources, platforms etc. outside the TM-processes. 
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Still that is not the whole story, at least not for Plan C. The fact that plan C was 
finally able to start its vzw, that a mix of regime and niche actors became members, 
and that plan C has been assigned a role in the governance structure of the materials 
regime, confirms Grin’s point of the dialectical relationship between power dynamics 
and transition dynamics. Plan C has played a role in the transition from a waste to a 
materials policy regime. The resulting change in dispositional power has opened up 
new possibilities for Plan C, that it has been able to seize with the support of OVAM. 
A comparable mechanism can as of yet not be observed in DuWoBo. 
 
6.5.4. Power at work when gaining wider influence 
 
Which power dynamics have played a role in the gaining of wider influence of both 
processes? Several patterns stand out.  
 
The importance of structural power is fairly obvious: when actors succeed in using 
structural trends to their advantage, it becomes a lot easier to realise change. Both in 
the DuWoBo and the Plan C case, structural power manifests itself in a combination 
of, first, trends that are perceived as a threat (worldwide competition over resources, 
climate change) and, second, European legislation or programmes that oblige or 
stimulate countries to take action (Waste Directive, EPB Directive …). The way the 
Flemish Minister of the Environment and OVAM take advantage of the EU Waste 
Directive to initiate a materials turn to policy, is an excellent example of coupling of 
structural power to the opportunities they can create because of their position and 
the resources they have at their disposal.  
 
An important difference between this materials turn and the energy trend in housing 
and building, is that the materials policy is essentially pro-active, while energy policy 
is reactive. This seems to have roots in a kind of structural power that is not related 
to contemporary trends, but that is situated in the historically grown features of the 
system and its policies. Over the last 30 years, Flanders has succeeded in occupying a 
leading position in the EU in waste treatment and policy, and it wants to stay in the 
lead. All actors in the field share the perception that remaining a frontrunner will 
provide opportunities to reap economic and ecological benefits from that position. In 
contrast, Flanders (or Belgium) has never been a frontrunner in energy saving or 
renewables, and it is only under pressure of contemporary structural evolutions that 
during the last years the building sector has been forced to search for the 
opportunities in the changes that lie ahead, instead of perceiving them only as a 
threat. 
 
There may be subtler mechanisms at work as well. Waste and materials is a relatively 
young policy domain, where decision-making patterns and practices are less 
engrained. And while waste is of course essentially connected to our way of living, it 
is not something people identify with. In contrast, housing and building policy has a 
history of a century and a half, with institutions, culture and practices that result 
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from years of confrontation between different views of society. The core regime 
image – the privately owned house with garden on the outskirts of town – is at the 
heart of who the Flemish are and what Flemish society finds important. The 
structural power that derives from this image and associated institutions (“orders of 
signification, legitimisation and domination”), lies at the core of the stability in 
housing and building policy. 
 
These examples show how being able to mobilise structural power at one’s 
advantage, or not being able to counter structural power, plays an important role in 
explaining change and stability of policy regimes. But the combination of 
dispositional and relational power is crucial as well. This shows in the important role 
of strong government actors to let something break through in the regime. 
Historically, OVAM has played a central role in the development of the waste regime. 
The whole story of the shift to a materials orientation, including the Materials Decree 
and the new governance structure with OVAM, Plan C, SuMMa and the Flemish 
Materials Programme, testifies to the continuance of that central role. Without the 
policy options discussed and chosen within OVAM, in concert with a series of actors 
(including Plan C), the materials shift would not have been realised. OVAM’s 
position and the resources on which it can draw were crucial in that shift. 
 
This position and resource base differ immensely from the government actor in the 
DuWoBo case, namely the DAR-SD team, where there is hardly one full time staff 
member available to support the theme of sustainable housing and building, and 
further a few 100.000 Euros for operational support. Just like LNE that initiated 
DuWoBo, DAR is a player in the margin of the housing and building regime. Its 
dispositional and relational power are insufficient to influence the complex, 
historically engrained regime as a whole on the basis of DuWoBo’s encompassing 
vision. In contrast, when there is movement in the housing and building regime, 
such as in the energy segment, again a government actor takes a central role (VEA). 
A similar argument can be made for the role of the department spatial planning in 
the Beleidsplan Ruimte Vlaanderen (Spatial Policy Plan Flanders) and the department 
housing in the Woonbeleidsplan Vlaanderen (Housing Policy Plan Flanders). 
 
A somewhat similar pattern can be recognised in the positioning of other regime 
actors, in particular the business world, in the two systems. At the level of the 
waste/materials regime, it is not only the repositioning of OVAM that has caused the 
shift to a materials orientation. Actors, such as the federations Agoria, Essenscia, 
FEBEM and their respective members also react to structural trends and either 
reposition themselves or become new crucial players in a materials regime that is  
beginning to take shape. What is important is that, even though they may differ on a 
lot of details, they all embrace the materials orientation and present themselves as 
partners in it. The dispositional and relational power of organisations such as Agoria 
and Essenscia can hardly be underestimated: for giving prominence to the transition, 
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as well as for the rearrangement of power relations in the shift from the old waste 
system to the new materials system. 
 
Again, there is a stark contrast with the evolutions in housing and building. There 
are hardly any industry actors that actively champion the holistic interpretation of 
sustainable building as defined by DuWoBo. The majority of activity is focused on 
the energy segment, where the policy norms and criteria are most imperative. When 
the government gives the sector some freedom to formulate its own agenda in the 
framework of Flanders New Industrial Policy, the holistic agenda does not even 
appear on the table. Here we see how the dispositional and relational power of the 
sector, rooted as it is in historically grown institutions and practices, slow down a 
breakthrough of a broader agenda. As I showed earlier, some of these old patterns 
even appear in the new arrangement around sustainable housing and building, such 
as in the discussions about the BSBC, where for example cooperation between 
federations and NGO’s is no evidence, and where the dispositional power of the 
federations allows them to make demands about the governance bodies and power 
balance in the BSBC.  
 
A last pattern that is worth mentioning, is that in the process of gaining wider 
influence, the role of Ministers and their cabinets is more prominently visible than 
during establishment or institutionalisation. In the Plan C case, the growing 
importance of the materials storyline with different societal actors, and not in the 
least the political success at EU level, strengthens the position of the Minister to 
introduce sustainable materials management as a necessary part of the ViA agenda 
and the innovation of the Flemish economy. The breakthrough of transition 
management as such in ViA would have been impossible without the power of the 
Flemish Ministers to decide on a new course for ViA, although the decision needed 
prior support from different actors (SERV, Verenigde Verenigingen, Council of Sages) 
to strengthen the legitimacy and credibility of the new policy line. 
 
 
6.6. COMPARISON WITH THE LITERATURE AND INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 
 
Before going to the final conclusions and answers to the research questions in chapter 
7, I draw some interim conclusions and make a brief comparison with the 
international literature. The housing and building system and the waste/materials 
system in which DuWoBo and Plan C began intervening in respectively 2004 and 
2006 were both going through changes by early 2012. The most obvious change is 
visible in the policy regime of the waste/materials system, where a discursive and 
organisational renewal of the policy regime as a whole can be observed. In the 
housing and building system, the best visible change is in the energy segment of the 
regime, although other segments are showing sings of change as well. Further, a new 
segment has been added where sustainable housing and building is promoted. 
DuWoBo and Plan C have had a role in these changes. DuWoBo lies at the basis of 
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the new sustainable housing and building segment, but its influence in the rest of the 
complex policy regime is barely visible. The discursive renewal realised in Plan C has 
been an influence in the shift from a waste to a materials policy regime. Both TM-
processes have the intention to continue playing a role in their respective systems, 
but the role that Plan C can play as part of the new governance structure in materials 
was early 2012 better circumscribed than that of DuWoBo, where a 2.0-process was 
set up to try and define a new role and position. Finally, the experiences of both 
processes also had an influence on the flowing through of transition management to 
the ViA-process. 
 
To get more refined insights in what exactly changed, and in particular in how it 
happened, it proved useful to complement the original MLP-PAA analytical 
framework with several other frameworks and theoretical concepts. This provided 
insights in the importance of coupling of streams by policy entrepreneurs, the role of 
substantive and transition discourse, the influence of rules inside and outside new 
political spaces, and the role of different forms of power. The picture that emerges of 
how DuWoBo and Plan C gained influence on regular policy is fairly complex and 
seems to go through at least three processes that all play a role. I labelled them as 
establishment of the policy niche, institutionalisation of the niche, and finally gaining 
wider influence.  
 
What happens during these processes in terms of coupling, of discourse structuration 
and institutionalisation, creation of and deliberation over rules, and of power games 
all has an influence on the final result. Furthermore, there is a lot of contingency in 
the processes over which actors have no control, although smart entrepreneurs and 
organisations can try to make use of passing events. In general then, the analysis 
confirms the observation from which this dissertation started, namely that the 
current understanding of how transition management works in practice and how it 
influences regular policies is far from adequate. The current TM approach and 
associated guidelines seem to cover mainly the early phases of transition work (such 
as gathering frontrunners and developing visions in a transition arena). These are 
certainly important, given the influence discourse can have and the role engaged 
network participants can play, acting as policy entrepreneurs. However, the analysis 
shows that realising this influence and these roles in practice demands activities that 
go far beyond what is conceived of in current TM theory. The work that I referred to 
in chapter 2 by researchers such as Meadowcroft (2009), Grin (2010) and Smith and 
Kern (2009) on a broader concept of transition governance, in which TM can find a 
place alongside or even be replaced by other strategies, shows its high relevance 
here109.  
                                                  
109 This search for other transition governance approaches is already happening in practice in 
Flanders, where the Flemish government (partially) finances processes that engage with 
transitions – such as a civil society network (“Transitienetwerk Middenveld”) and a network of 
the cultural sector (“Pulse, Transitienetwerk Cultuur”) – but that do not use the TM approach 
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Quite some conclusions from this literature are being confirmed by the analysis of 
DuWoBo and Plan C, but there are also some interesting differences. On the one 
hand, some of the more positive effects of TM also appear in Flanders. The TM 
approach exhibits characteristics that make it promising as a governance approach 
for sustainable development: it takes a long term perspective with sustainable 
development as normative orientation, it looks at the level of systems, it works with a 
multi-actor approach and searches for a “coalition of the willing”, it tries to couple 
the long term vision to short term action and practical experiments, it stresses the 
necessity of combining technological with social innovation, it provides an active role 
to the government, it creates enthusiasm among participants to think about a more 
sustainable future and engage with politics and action. However, these effects are 
mainly visible  during establishment and in the institutionalisation process, and even 
then only for a certain period of time (2 to 3 years in both DuWoBo and Plan C). 
After that period, both cases show a loss of coherence and of legitimacy with the 
participants, and the dynamism in the processes is hard to uphold. 
 
The process of gaining wider influence shows an interesting difference between the 
two cases. The DuWoBo experience seems to resemble somewhat the experience of 
the Dutch energy transition. Just like in the energy transition, there is no major 
disturbance of the existing policy or of incumbent policy networks. The energy 
transition further complicated the existing energy mix through “layering”: the 
addition of new goals and new instruments to the existing policy mix, without 
abandoning previous goals or instruments. This is similar to the current situation in 
the housing and building arrangement, where a new sustainability segment has been 
added with new goals and instruments, without abandoning others. Just like the 
energy transition, DuWoBo was not able to change existing structures, institutions or 
organisational routines. A noticeable difference between DuWoBo and the energy 
transition is that DuWoBo has never been taken over by regime actors. On the 
contrary, DuWoBo as well as Plan C had difficulties in keeping these actors on board. 
One of the major underlying reasons may well be the immense difference in available 
funding for experiments. The very modest scale of DuWoBo and Plan C never turned 
them into a battleground over innovation funding. 
 
Plan C and the materials transition show another major difference with the energy 
transition. Here, we do observe a major change in the whole policy regime, with a 
turn from waste towards materials, including a new discourse and new goals, new 
legislation, a new governance structure, new actors in the domain, and a search for 
new policy instruments. In how far this will also result in effective new practices and 
routines in the rest of the regime – beyond policy – will show in the future and will 
only partially depend on what happens in Flanders. What is similar with the energy 
transition, is that, in spite of a new discourse, this discourse is mainly technologically 
                                                                                                                                                          
and where, furthermore, the government remains in the background. As part of the research 
for the Policy Research Centre TRADO, I am involved in both processes. 
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oriented and fits completely in ecological modernisation thinking (with the Flemish 
Materials Programme as best example). The transformative elements of the original 
Plan C discourse have not been transplanted to the new regime discourse. 
 
In all this, it should be stressed once more that the difference between DuWoBo and 
Plan C in gaining wider influence, cannot be primarily attributed to the internal 
working of the processes, such as a better functioning discourse coalition, more 
efficient use of funding, or smarter manoeuvring of policy entrepreneurs. The main 
difference is situated in the differing context: the regime and its historically grown 
institutions and routines, the responsible government actor and its dispositional and 
relational power, the political and problem streams that came along and could be 
used, the opportunities this offered for translation in political decisions and new 
institutions. 
 
This is why I mentioned a few lines earlier the pertinence of the comments of authors 
such as Meadowcroft, Grin, Smith and Kern. Meadowcroft’s emphasis on the role of 
state institutions and the political conditions under which sustainability transitions 
make more or less chance, show up in the role of OVAM and DAR, the wrestling 
with regime rules and institutions, the influence of political processes such as ViA, 
the political salience of a theme for the Minister, or the weighing of interests by 
regime actors when strategically choosing where and when to participate. Grin’s 
remarks about dual track governance and three types of creative agency can easily be 
coupled to the role of policy entrepreneurs and their work of connecting streams and 
looking out for policy windows. His definition of a dialectical relationship between 
power dynamics and transition dynamics was useful in the analysis above. Kern and 
Smith have drawn attention to the transformative potential of new discourses, but 
also to the doubled-edged sword nature of the interpretive flexibility of the transition 
storyline. This shows throughout the cases, in particular in how difficult it is to 
transfer the holistic vision that is developed within a TM arena to a regime 
environment. Also in the translation of the transition approach to ViA, there is a very 
real risk that the sustainability and transformative aspects may disappear from view. 
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7. 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this dissertation I have studied a question to which transition management 
research has paid little attention until now, namely how transition management 
influences existing policies. The theoretical and practical development of transition 
management is mostly associated with the work of Jan Rotmans and Derk Loorbach 
at DRIFT (Rotterdam University). The approach employs a so-called transition arena, 
consisting of a small group of niche-players and forwards-thinking regime-players to 
first develop a common problem structuring of the system under discussion, and 
second to develop a transition agenda. This agenda contains a future vision for the 
system, transition pathways towards that vision, and a series of experiments to test 
and initiate the paths in reality. The whole process is intended to function in the 
shadow of regular policy, and from there to serve as a source of inspiration for 
reorienting regular policy towards the long-term vision of the transition arena. 
 
Although the influence of transition management on regular policy is thus a crucial 
aspect of the approach, the relation between the two is only superficially 
conceptualised in the theoretical literature. Furthermore, detailed empirical studies 
of the influence of transition management on regular policy are very limited and  
mostly focused on the Dutch energy transition. My general research question therefore 
was: how do transition management processes influence existing policy regimes and 
policy practices? Which characteristics does this influence have, how can it be 
explained and what does it imply for the further development of transition 
governance? I sought to answer that question through studying several sub-
questions.  
 
The general argument that I have constructed throughout the study is that what a 
TM-process realises and how it influences policy regimes, can only be understood by 
1. investigating the historically grown institutions, practices and ways of thinking in 
which it is introduced; 2. by analysing the contemporary trends and evolutions 
amongst which it has to find its way; 3. by understanding the characteristics of the 
TM-process itself; and 4 by investigating the interaction between TM and its 
historical and contemporary context of 1 and 2. A transition arena may produce 
challenging visions and propose innovative experiments from the shadow of policy, 
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but when these enter the “real” world they are confronted with institutional inertia, 
dominant discourses and existing power relations, that result out of historical and 
contemporary processes and patterns. One may lament that this seriously hampers 
the potential influence of transition management, but it is in fact a common situation. 
Is that the end of the story? No, because where policy change is observable, the 
transition arena trajectory has played a role. It is there that a new discourse and a 
network is created, which through creative agency and smart usage of passing 
streams can be built upon to gain wider influence. It is however a bumpy and 
winding road between the start of a TM-process and its later influence on policy, 
with a lot of intervening factors that are often not under control of TM-proponents.  
 
I will now flesh out this general argument by answering the several sub-questions of 
the research. I also propose several hypotheses upon which future work may build 
(in 7.3) and end with policy recommendations and suggestions for further research. 
 
 
7.1. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
The first sub-question was: what is a suitable analytical framework for examining the 
interaction between transition management processes and regular policy?  
 
Since the knowledge base about the influence of TM on regular policy is quite limited, 
I positioned my research as exploratory research, based upon two case studies. The 
ambition was to develop an integral view on how change or stability happened in 
these cases, starting from practical experiences and taking into account the complex 
of factors that is at work. With the study of DuWoBo and Plan C as basis, the 
dissertation broadens the empirical basis for discussing transition governance by 
moving into new domains (housing and building, waste and materials) and a 
different political setting (Flanders). I explained in chapter 3 how the interpretative 
research tradition thinks about the generalisability of the results of such case studies. 
On the one hand, on the basis of a detailed description of the cases, the reader is 
invited to think herself about the transferability of results to her own context and 
situation. This can be done on the basis of my analysis in chapters 4 , 5 and 6. On the 
other hand, in exploratory research the researcher can formulate tentative, 
contextualised hypotheses that may be sensitising for further research. As said, I will 
do this in part 7.3 of the chapter. 
 
As for the analytical framework itself, this had to be able to do four things: first, 
identify the characteristics of regime policies at the start of the TM-processes; second, 
identify the characteristics of the TM-processes themselves; third, identify whether 
after several years change had taken place in the policy regime; and fourth, explain 
how this change had happened and what the role of TM had been. My ambition with 
the framework was that it would be able to take into account a diversity of factors 
that had been mentioned as important for transition management by other 
Chapter 7. Conclusions 
 297 
researchers, but usually studied more or less separately, such as discourse, 
institutions, power questions and structural trends. The combination of the multi-
level perspective and the policy arrangements approach seemed promising to 
perform such an analysis. While the MLP is useful for charting the different levels of 
a socio-technical system and the dynamics between the levels, the PAA is 
particularly useful for making explicit the policy features of that system. TM-
processes such as DuWoBo and Plan C could be framed as policy niches with 
characteristics that distinguish them from regular policy.   
 
The combination of the MLP and PAA proved, in general, to be a good heuristic 
device for focusing attention on the different dimensions that are relevant when 
trying to understand the characteristics of policy niches (such as TM-processes), of 
regime policies, and of the changes that are developing in them. It also allowed for 
an encompassing view of the context within which the TM-processes have to find 
their way, such as the historical and current influences on the system. And in 
particular the PAA-dimensions (discourse, actors, rules, resources) made it possible 
to describe in great detail the discursive and organisational features of policy at the 
different levels. By comparing different periods, change and stability of policy could 
be uncovered. So, the framework does a lot of what it promises to do: it draws 
attention to change and stability, to discursive and organisational aspects of policy, 
to structural influences and conscious agency. 
 
Yet, I also encountered two problems with the framework. The first is the most 
important one and is, according to me, a major problem for explaining policy change 
through this framework. Namely the fact that the PAA is quite good at analysing 
what changes in policy, but weak on how this happens. The authors of the PAA (Arts, 
Van Tatenhove, Leroy and colleagues) have indicated themselves that, depending on 
the needs of the analyst, the framework may have to be complemented by other, 
more refined tools. My needs were explaining the influence of TM on regular policy, 
and for this task the PAA was not refined enough. I therefore introduced several 
additional frames that could complement the analysis because they allowed to better 
operationalise the how-question. One addition, Kingdon’s multiple streams model, 
was motivated by a pattern that surfaced in the case studies, namely the work done 
by entrepreneurial individuals in and around the processes to realise couplings 
between different kind of evolutions. The other additions are essentially a deepening 
of the PAA-dimensions that make mechanisms or patterns of change explicit: Hajer’s 
discourse analysis for the discourse dimension, Hajer’s institutional void and new 
political space for the rules dimension, and Grin’s power framework that allows to 
connect actors and resources to different levels of power. Since the MLP/PAA 
framework is such a broad framework, it is undoubtedly possible to combine it with 
yet other theoretical concepts, but in my opinion, the current combinations work 
fairly well to explain what has happened as well as how it has happened.  
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The second problem is mainly related to different aspects of the practical usage of the  
MLP/PAA. One aspect is that while its breadth allows to present a comprehensive 
picture of policy development, the different levels and dimensions are also quiet 
demanding for the analyst. How far should one go in the analysis of rules? Where 
does the inventory of relevant resources in the system end? In particular these two 
dimensions become difficult when they have to be applied to complex systems such 
as housing and building, with a myriad of actors and policy domains. A second 
aspect of practical application of the MLP/PAA framework has already been 
mentioned in the introduction of the DuWoBo-case in chapter 4: MLP and PAA both 
presuppose relatively clear defined socio-technical systems (MLP) or policy domains 
(PAA) to start the analysis from. When this is not the case, as in housing and 
building, the object of analysis becomes a more difficult construct. I therefore started 
from how the participants of DuWoBo themselves in the first phase delimited the 
starting point of their work and the “system” they were trying to influence.  Also in 
later phases, when the two TM-processes began gaining influence beyond their own 
system – as in the VSDO and ViA – the MLP/AAP-framework could not cope with 
that. The only solution I see here is to work with other analytical tools (such as the 
streams analysis). 
 
For future research with this framework, it might be useful to make a distinction 
between a more static and a more dynamic version, and then in particular in relation 
to how the dimensions of the PAA are treated. If the analyst is mostly interested in 
analysing policy in specific periods or in comparing between periods, the PAA is 
able to answer the relevant what-questions: What was the discourse in period 1, what 
were the actors, rules, resources? Which structural influences do we see on the 
prevailing policy arrangement? What were the discourse, actors, rules, resources in 
period 2? Do they differ and in which aspects?   
 
Of course, the more interesting questions, and certainly so in relation to transitions, 
are the how-questions: How do discourses change? How can the change or stability 
from period 1 to 2 be explained? How have discourses, rules, actors, resources and 
structural trends played a role? This requires a more dynamic framework. In such a 
case, I would keep the general structure of the PAA-framework (see figure 2.6), but 
immediately look at the discourse dimension through Hajer’s frame, investigate how 
actors draw on resources and use power through Grin’s frame, take Hajer’s concepts 
of institutional void and new political spaces to deepen the rules dimension, and see 
how couplings have to be made with Kingdon’s multiple streams frame. 
 
 
7.2. TM-POLICY NICHES VERSUS REGULAR POLICY 
 
The second sub-question of the research was: what are the historically grown 
characteristics of the policy regimes in which DuWoBo and Plan C intervened? How 
do DuWoBo and Plan C differ from regular policy? What has been the interaction 
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between both processes and the contemporary dynamics in their respective policy 
regimes? To which changes did this lead?  
 
This question was treated in chapters 4 and 5, the within-case analyses of 
respectively Plan C and DuWoBo. In both cases, we see how the TM-approach 
succeeded in creating a policy niche of which the policy characteristics clearly 
diverged from the regular regime policy. The later influence of these TM policy 
niches on regime policy differed however. 
 
7.2.1. Waste and materials policy and Plan C 
 
In the Plan C case, the TM policy niche intervened in a regime that began taking 
shape with the birth of modern environmental policy in the 1970s. Until then, the 
waste system was organised locally, but this structure could no longer handle the 
waste streams that flowed from the booming economy. The chaotic local situation, 
the young environmental movement and European Directives put pressure on the 
government to intervene. After the constitutional reform of the Belgian state in 1980, 
Flanders began organising its waste system. From the first legislation, the discourse 
of the waste hierarchy was introduced, which implied that waste policy had to start 
from waste prevention. In practice however, waste policy started on the lowest rung 
of the ladder by reorganising landfilling and incineration practices, later increasingly 
replaced by a focus on selective collection and recycling. By the 21st century, Flanders 
was considered one of the leading examples in the world for the organisation of its 
waste system, its high degree of collective selection and recycling, and its relatively 
limited amount of landfilling and incineration. The rules of the system were laid 
down in the Waste Decree, that was translated through sectoral implementation 
plans and accompanied by instruments such as the acceptance obligation and 
voluntary environmental policy agreements with industry. Consultation of 
stakeholder groups mainly had an instrumental motivation. The dominant actor in 
the system was the Flemish waste agency OVAM, but also municipalities played an 
important role. The private sector is structurally involved in the waste chain, in 
particular in the market of industrial waste, and offered a package of services 
covering each link in the chain, from waste collection to processing of waste. The 
growing role of the private sector since the nineties and the resources they have 
brought in, caused a shift in power to individual large companies and sectoral 
management organisms.  
 
Yet, while Flanders scored well in recycling, just like in other industrialised countries, 
waste prevention policies were not successful and the total amount of waste, in 
particular the industrial segment, was not under control. To break through the 
standstill in policy and formulate a more ambitious vision, OVAM started thinking 
about a broader orientation, materials policy. The transition management process 
Plan C was introduced in 2006 to give content to this new policy line. The working 
procedures as well as the contents of Plan C diverge from those of the waste regime. 
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In the Plan C discourse, waste has become a small part of an overarching materials 
system. Production and consumption activities and related policies are reoriented 
towards closing of material loops and a life cycle approach. The vision contains a 
mixture of transformational and ecological modernisation elements. Except for 
employees from OVAM itself, the actors in Plan C come predominantly from outside 
the ‘old’ waste system and are connected with the different transition paths. The 
process tries to work by the rules of transition management: operate in the shadow of 
policy, the government as one actor among many, trust in self-organisation etcetera. 
In other words, Plan C diverged significantly from what was common practice in the 
waste policy regime. As a network of frontrunners, Plan C was until 2008 the main 
voice in Flanders on sustainable materials management. Between 2009 and 2011, the 
dynamism in the process began fading away, while simultaneously the context 
around the process started changing. By the end of 2011, Plan C was in serious crisis, 
but it could be revived by providing it a place in the new policy regime that was 
taking shape by then. 
 
Indeed, when making an analysis of the system in 2012, a drastic reorientation can be 
observed. The policy regime has shifted from a waste to a materials discourse. The 
Materials Decree  (that replaces the Waste Decree) allows for the introduction of new 
rules and OVAM is developing new policy instruments. The existing waste industry 
is repositioning itself as a provider of secondary materials and important newcomers 
have entered the system, such as the technological and chemical industry. This also 
changed the distribution of resources in the system. In the governance structure that 
is currently taking shape, OVAM remains the leading government actor, but more 
cooperation is sought with other government entities. In this structure, the vzw Plan 
C is expected to think about the long-term orientation, cooperation with stakeholders 
is sought in the Flemish Materials Programme, and scientific support is expected 
from the policy research centre SuMMa. 
 
Plan C has played a role in this evolution, mainly through its discourse development 
and how this discourse was picked up in the network it created and in OVAM itself. 
While this discourse creation has been important for Flanders, it has nevertheless 
been but one influence among many. Discourse elements could catch on because they 
were also present in other forums and levels and could be linked to the new 
European Waste Directive, to the EU 2020 strategy, to the concern of industry and 
policy-makers about the worldwide competition for resources, and to the felt need to 
innovate the Flemish economy and society. Furthermore, only the ecological 
modernisation elements are retained in the new regime discourse. The embedment in 
this context, characterised by discourses of competitiveness and liberalisation, 
filtered out the transformational elements from the Plan C discourse but retained the 
ecological modernisation elements.  
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7.2.2. Housing and building policy and DuWoBo 
 
In the DuWoBo case, the TM-process intervened in a regime that has been shaped 
over the last 150 years and that consequently is deeply embedded in the Flemish 
society. Its political choices, policy institutions and policy practices are the result of a 
long process of social and political struggle and negotiation. The discourse of the 
policy regime converges around the promotion of private home ownership, and was 
during several decennia rooted in an anti-urban sentiment. The rules of the regime 
are spread out over several policy domains, such as spatial policy, housing policy 
and fiscal policy. The Spatial Structure Plan Flanders and the Flemish Housing Code 
are some of the important legal texts in the regime. The actors in the system are 
diverse as well, ranging from government departments, over building professionals 
and civil society organisation to occupants. On the government side, the Flemish 
level sets the conditions and determines the policy principles and priorities. From the 
non-governmental actors, most influence comes from the professional building sector 
and the real estate developers. The resources these groups have give them a 
considerable lobbying power. On the side of the government, most resources are 
situated in the spatial department and the housing department and their agencies.  
 
Within the housing and building regime, a social housing niche is embedded, which 
originally started as counter-model after the First World War, but now functions to 
mitigate the social problems created by the regime. During the seventies, another 
niche developed that was mainly occupied with the ecological and health concerns of 
the dominant housing model. These concerns also formed the basis for the DuWoBo 
TM-process, initiated by the environmental department LNE in 2004, a department 
that was in the margin of the regime arrangement. DuWoBo succeeded in 
formulating a future, integrated vision for the housing and building system, setting 
up a network of regime and niche actors, and initiating innovative projects. Its 
discourse aimed to be holistic and to find a balance between economic, social, spatial 
and environmental elements, but in the final analysis the economic-technical and 
environmental elements dominate, so that also here ecological modernisation is 
prominent. Like Plan C, it tried to apply the informal rules of TM. In all these aspects, 
DuWoBo diverged from regular policies and could until 2010 claim to be the only 
platform for housing and building with a long-term, holistic view and a broad pallet 
of actors. However, similar to the Plan C case, the dynamism of the process faded 
away over the years. Again, a combination of internal problems and a changing 
context lie at the basis. Early 2012, a DuWoBo 2.0 process was set up to discuss a new 
role and position for DuWoBo. 
 
By 2012, the complex housing and building system was under pressure in several of 
its segments, but changes were still limited. Best observable were the changes in the 
energy segment, previously of minor concern, but now moving to the centre of 
attention of the construction sector. In several other segments, the dominant policy 
discourse was being openly discussed, such as in spatial planning and housing, 
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where several multi-stakeholder policy processes had been set up to discuss future 
policy orientations. But in the other dimensions of the regime (rules, resources, 
actors), no major changes were visible. DuWoBo was hardly a factor of pressure on 
the housing and building regime. Pressure for change originates mainly in European 
policy initiatives (such as the EPB Directive) or in regime problems (such as spatial 
trends and problems with the home ownership model). However, DuWoBo was 
involved in promoting niche activities and, remarkably, the dynamics initiated by the 
DuWoBo-process led to the introduction of a small, autonomous and still forming 
policy arrangement around sustainable housing and building. The position of 
DuWoBo itself in this construction is under discussion in the 2.0-process. 
 
 
7.3. EXPLAINING POLICY CHANGE AND THE ROLE OF TRANSITION 
MANAGEMENT 
 
While the within-case analysis focuses mainly on the characteristics of regular policy, 
of the TM-processes and on what change can be observed, the cross-case analysis in 
chapter 6 aims at a more refined understanding of how the observed change and 
stability in policy have happened and what the role of transition management has 
been. This should lead to an answer to the third sub-question of the research: What are 
the empirically observable similarities and differences between both cases? How can 
these be explained in terms of patterns and mechanisms in the relation between a 
transition management process and regular policy? 
 
Apart from answering the questions, I use the results of the cross-case analysis also 
to formulate some tentative hypotheses about the role of transition management in 
regular policy change. As I stressed before, I do not claim that these hypotheses are 
generalisable over all contexts. The context in which they originated, is Flanders and 
two TM-processes in sustainable housing and building and sustainable materials 
management. Nevertheless, they may be sensitising for further research about 
transition governance (and more specifically about transition management) in 
Flanders or elsewhere. 
 
7.3.1. Three key processes and different forms of policy change 
 
In which aspects are DuWoBo and Plan C similar or different in the kind of policy 
change they realised? Arts and Leroy have observed different forms of how policy 
arrangements innovate: 1. the full or partial integration of existing and originally 
juxtaposed policy arrangements; 2. the discursive and/or organisational renewal of 
existing policy arrangements; and 3. the introduction of new arrangements that 
should then be able to perform autonomously and institutionalise. The three types 
they hypothesise can also be found back in the DuWoBo and Plan C case, but in a 
combined form. In the Plan C case, we observe the discursive and organisational 
renewal of the existing policy arrangement at regime level (type 2). Plan C itself has 
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become embedded and hierarchically nested under the new materials regime (type 1). 
In the DuWoBo case, a new sustainable housing and building arrangement has been 
added to the complex regime that is juxtaposed in a non-hierarchal fashion to the 
already existing segments (type 3). The existing regime arrangement is undergoing 
discursive and organisational changes in its energy segment, while some other 
segments are showing signs of change (partial type 2 renewal). Finally, the 
experiences of both cases also played a role in how transition management reached 
the Flanders in Action programme (ViA) of the Flemish government. This influence 
can, however, not be categorised in the mentioned types. 
 
In DuWoBo as well as in Plan C, it was possible to distinguish three processes that 
both cases went through before these changes were realised: the establishment of the 
TM policy niche, a form of institutionalisation of the niche (but with a lot of problems 
to maintain the niche after a few years), and the gaining of wider influence beyond 
what happens in the niche. Unpacking what happens during these processes, was 
done in this dissertation by investigating how couplings of streams is realised, how 
discourse plays a role, how rules function, and how power is at work. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Realising policy change through transition management 
proceeds through at least three processes: the establishment of a TM policy 
niche, a form of institutionalisation of the niche, and the gaining of wider 
influence beyond what happens in the niche. The conditions under which 
these processes take place and what happens in them, has an influence on the 
kind of policy change that can be realised. 
 
7.3.2.  No change without coupling 
 
As a first method to unpack how policy change happened, I made use of Kingdon’s 
multiple streams model. Since this is essentially an agenda-setting model, it proved 
useful for understanding the establishment and the gaining of wider influence of the 
processes, but not for the institutionalisation process.  So, which insights can be 
drawn from the episodes that were analysed? There are at least five interesting 
points that surface from the Flemish experiences. 
 
First, coupling of transition management to ongoing developments in and around 
the relevant policy domain is necessary in order to get TM established or to gain 
influence. Transition management in Flanders is not a policy approach that was 
somehow suddenly introduced by a visionary Minister or a progressive government 
agency, nor did its results easily flow through and gain wider influence. The 
analytical lens of the streams model helps in showing how problems, policies and 
political streams develop alongside each other and how at certain moments (policy 
windows) they can be coupled, in that way pushing policy change. The 
establishment of TM as a new approach to policy in Flanders was not only possible 
because there was a felt need to develop long-term integral sustainability policies, 
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but also because the approach could be coupled to domain-specific policy problems, 
either for controlling the environmental and health consequences of the construction 
sector (for DuWoBo) or for controlling the waste problem (for Plan C). For spreading 
the ideas developed in the arenas and gaining wider influence, this coupling is even 
more important. It is very unlikely that the two TM-processes by themselves could 
have gathered enough power to change the waste regime into a materials regime or 
to break into the ViA-process. These kind of changes can only be explained through 
coupling to events in the political stream (such as the obligation to implement the EU 
Waste Framework Directive) or in the problem stream (such as the lack of societal 
involvement in ViA). 
 
Second, transitions and transition management hardly make it as such to the political 
agenda. They seem rather an example of “alternative specification”, as Kingdon 
formulates it, in the sense that they surface as the answer to a political problem or 
decision. At least, that is the case in these Flemish examples. It is not “transitions” or 
“transition management” as such that reaches the government agenda. During the 
establishment of the DuWoBo and Plan C process, the main preoccupation was 
developing integrated and long-term sustainable development policies (in housing 
and building or in waste policy) and developing solutions for domain-specific 
problems. The form that was chosen and that had surfaced during the preparatory 
work of advisory councils, civil servants and scientist was transition management. In 
the case of ViA, the political challenge on the agenda is the transformation of the 
Flemish economy, preparing it for the top 5 of Europe, and that in cooperation with 
societal actors. The form that surfaced in the policy stream was again transition 
management. From a different angle, this reconfirms the first point: TM can be 
presented as a policy solution when it is coupled to other streams. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Coupling of transition management to ongoing developments in 
and around the relevant policy domain is necessary in order to establish a 
TM-policy niche and to gain influence. Transitions and transition 
management do not make it as such to the political agenda, but they surface 
as the answer to a political problem or decision. 
 
Third, however, gaining influence for transition management is strongly dependent 
on factors that are not under the control of TM-actors. Developments at EU-level or 
in the ViA-process were clearly outside the control of TM proponents. Yet, policy 
entrepreneurs in the TM-processes can try to be ready to hook their ideas and 
approaches to policy windows that come along. As Kingdon remarks: ”Individuals 
do not control waves, but can ride them. Individuals do not control events or 
structures, but can anticipate them and bend them to their purposes to some degree” 
(Kingdon 2011, p. 225). This is nicely visible in the Plan C case and the shift to a 
materials regime. The Plan C process was important in Flanders in maturing the 
minds of relevant actors for the sustainable materials discourse. When the EU Waste 
Framework directive came along, entrepreneurial civil servants in OVAM saw a 
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possibility to connect this European obligation with the materials discourse. This 
work of policy entrepreneurs is essential, because the coupling does not fall out of 
the air. It is the result of a lot of preparatory work that is usually done without a clear 
view of the final result and without certainty of success. The same can be said about 
the breakthrough of transition management in ViA. Nobody could have foreseen this 
evolution when TM was introduced in 2004. Tracking the history of this decision 
reveals a process with a high degree of contingency, resulting from a series of small, 
incremental steps, without a master plan in mind.  
 
Fourth, the policy entrepreneurs in these cases are generally people that are either 
willing to experiment with new approaches and/or that see in the “management” 
side of TM an approach that resonates with their institutional environment. Either 
way, they have some freedom to experiment (or that are able to conquer that 
freedom), and are open-minded enough to cooperate between departments as well as 
with a diversity of societal actors. And crucial in light of the necessity of coupling 
streams: these are people that are capable of connecting their practical terrain 
knowledge with a helicopter perspective that makes them aware of the ongoing 
changes and opportunities in the context in which they operate. They are thus 
actively practicing what Grin (2010) has aptly called “dual-track governance” (see 
also chapter 2). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Gaining influence for transition management is strongly 
dependent on factors that are not under the control of TM-actors. Policy 
entrepreneurs must be prepared to “ride the waves” of passing events and 
structural trends, but success is not guaranteed and a lot of contingency is 
involved. Therefore, building up capacity and networks for strategic thinking 
within and between government departments and other societal actors, with 
participants interested in innovative forms of governance, is a good 
investment for governmental and non-governmental actors that have the 
ambition to work towards sustainability transitions. 
 
And fifth, the episodes show the important role of ideas or discourse in explaining 
the potential influence of TM, but also the work that is needed to get them adopted. 
DuWoBo and Plan C formulated their ideas in a transition agenda that consists of an 
analysis of the system in which they are involved, a vision for the future with 
transition pathways towards this vision, and ideas for experiments. But ideas do not 
work at once. They move around for some time, are discussed and reconsidered, are 
introduced in different forums and organisations. Kingdon calls it “softening up” of 
the system and making it susceptible to new ideas. In the DuWoBo and Plan C cases, 
a diverse set of practices can be discerned of how TM proponents try to promote 
their case: studying and getting acquainted with the concepts of transition and 
transition management, organising internal and external learning forums and 
workshops, bringing in external expertise and using scientific reports, writing policy 
notes for senior officials or for the Minister’s cabinet with different paths that can be 
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followed, “telling the story” in a diversity of forums, trying to convince actors to set 
up projects and experiments in the vein of that story, and of course searching for 
opportunities to couple TM to regular policies. From this perspective, transition 
management looks like one gigantic discursive exercise. This conclusion brings me 
smoothly to the role that discourse has played in realising policy change in the two 
cases. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Discourse development is an important and influential result of 
transition management, but ideas do not work at once. They need active 
promotion and a diverse set of supporting practices to catch on. 
 
7.3.3. Discourse is important for policy change 
  
To develop a more refined view of the function of discourse in policy change, I made 
use of central concepts of Hajer’s discourse analysis, mainly the role of discourse 
structuration (the extent to which different actors adopt a discourse and 
conceptualise the world through it) and discourse institutionalisation (the extent to 
which policy institutions and practices change because of a new discourse). What did 
this reveal? 
 
First, two kinds of storylines play a role in the relationship between DuWoBo and 
Plan C and the regular policy regime: storylines about what transition and transition 
management is or should be, and substantive storylines about sustainable housing 
and building and sustainable materials management. Both kinds have had influence, 
but at different moments and in different ways. 
 
Second, during the establishment of DuWoBo and Plan C, the transition and TM 
storylines were crucial. They presented the kind of language that proponents of 
sustainable development had been looking for and, in more practical terms, they 
indicated how the TM-processes had to be set up and organised. The introduction of 
the transition and transition management storylines created a new language in 
Flanders that stressed the importance of taking a long-term view in policy, focusing 
on societal systems, aiming for radical renewal in these systems and stimulating 
cooperation in networks of frontrunners. They thus structured thinking, but they also 
revealed themselves in the design of the TM-niches. Yet, as also the streams analysis 
revealed, coupling to existing problem framings was necessary to be able to start 
both TM-processes. 
 
Third, during the phase of institutionalisation of DuWoBo and Plan C, the transition 
and TM storylines provided the framework upon which the substantive problem 
analysis, future vision, transition paths and experiments were founded. It is however 
the substantive storylines that created the discourse coalitions that gave the processes 
their dynamism in this phase. Creating these coalitions between niche and regime 
frontrunners demanded actively engaging with divergent opinions and seeking 
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techniques to control the divergence (such as making an inventory of ideas, freezing 
the text, keeping results informal, keeping the agenda broad). In both cases, the 
transition agendas are a mixture of transformational ideas and ecological 
modernisation. Thus from early on, also ambiguity crept in. When the context 
around the processes started changing and other platforms or policy initiatives 
became competitors in terms of policy relevance and financial means, the discourse 
coalitions broke up. Participants strategically decided to follow other paths to reach 
their goals when the gains from participation were not obvious enough anymore and 
when external developments made the processes less salient. By the end of 2011, 
there was hardly a discourse coalition left in both cases, although they tried to 
reconstruct one (in the vzw Plan C and in the DuWoBo 2.0 process).  
 
Hypothesis 5: Transition thinking provides a framework for developing a 
substantive agenda for change. The discourse coalition that is built around 
such an agenda has to be actively constructed because divergence in opinions 
has to be bridged. This makes the discourse coalition vulnerable when the 
context starts changing. 
 
Fourth, neither the substantive ideas that were developed in DuWoBo (the transition 
agenda for housing and building) and Plan C (the transition agenda for materials 
management), nor the ideas about the governance of transitions find their way 
untouched to regular policy or to wider encompassing regime processes such as ViA. 
In the process of gaining wider influence, the discourses are moulded and 
reinterpreted when they enter such a new context. In the Plan C case, the sustainable 
materials discourse gained wider influence in the policy regime itself, and is 
currently structuring the whole language in the regime and exerting influence on the 
governance of the system. These are however only the eco-modernist elements of the 
discourse. Of course, as I stressed throughout my whole analysis, this is not solely 
due to Plan C, but predominantly a consequence of the influence of the stronger 
discourses in other forums and levels such as new European Waste Directive, the EU 
2020 strategy, the concern of industry and policy-makers over the worldwide 
competition for resources, and the innovation discourse for the Flemish economy. All 
these are strongly shaped by agendas of competitiveness and liberalisation. In the 
DuWoBo case, the transition and substantive storylines have been hugely influential 
in the creation of the new policy arrangement around sustainable housing and 
building. In the rest of the regime, however, “sustainable” as a term is widely used, 
but interpreted restrictively in the sense of energy-efficient or environmental friendly. 
In both cases, it can thus be observed that the more transformative elements are 
filtered out.  
 
There is another interesting evolution in the gaining of wider influence of the 
transition and TM storylines as such, namely in the second VSDO and in ViA, where 
in particular in the latter case this translation is ambiguous. The practice of the 13 
ViA TM-projects will have to reveal how transformative the interpretation really is. 
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In any case, the interpretive flexibility of the transition and transition management 
storylines surfaces once more: the flexibility of the storylines allows for connecting to 
different agendas, but also threatens the commitment to deep, transformational 
change when confronted with as of yet stronger embedded discourses. 
 
Hypothesis 6: When the discourses of TM policy niches flow through in the 
regime, they lose most of their transformative elements. The interpretive 
flexibility of the storylines allows for connecting them to different agendas, 
but also threatens the commitment to deep, transformational change when 
they are confronted with stronger embedded discourses. 
 
7.3.4. A difficult time for new rules 
 
Through the lens of Hajer’s concept of institutional void it is possible to interpret 
DuWoBo and Plan C as two new political spaces that were established to fill in a void 
of sustainability policy, and more specifically to create a space where sustainable 
housing and building could be discussed and where the broadening of waste to 
materials policy could be worked out. TM theory proposes informal rules for how 
such a new space should work. What can be said about how these rules worked and  
about their influence on regular policy? 
 
First, although the steps of the TM approach were fairly strictly followed in Flanders, 
we notice from the beginning a grappling with the rules.  Some rules are adjusted, 
some are applied but regularly debated, some do not seem to work at all.  Debates 
include the selection of participants (what are “frontrunners”?), the role of the 
government (how to combine different roles?), the lack of self-organisation and  of 
learning. Institutional ambiguity and multi-signification are omnipresent. 
Furthermore, the space is less void than it seems, because there is a clear intrusion of 
regime rules on the working of the TM-processes. Yet, in the first few years, the TM 
approach seemed workable enough for the processes to produce some of the desired 
results, such as a transition agenda and a mixed network of forward-looking niche 
and regime actors. Given these results on the one hand, and the constant grappling 
with rules and the intrusion of regime rules on the other, one might wonder whether 
TM does not work in spite of its own rules. 
 
Second, in Hajer’s conception of these new political spaces, he expects that they grow 
stronger as the discourse coalitions grow stronger. However, as I argued in the 
discourse discussion, over the years the discourse coalitions started to disentangle 
under the combined pressure of difficulties in the processes and dynamic evolutions 
outside them. By 2011, the two TM-processes hardly worked at all as they were 
expected to do, and certainly not according to the informal rules of transition 
management. The search for a revival of the processes is the reason why Plan C 
began looking for a new organisational form as vzw Plan C and why DuWoBo 
started the DuWoBo 2.0 process in March 2012. That both are searching for new rules 
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of the game to guide the processes – beyond what TM currently prescribes – is 
obvious from the first discussions about these new structures.   
 
Third, as for the gaining of wider influence of the TM rules, most evidence shows 
that when the shielded environment of the transition arena falls away, they are hard 
to sustain, even in environments where similar actors are involved. Several examples 
show that in particular regime actors are not keen on letting new rules intrude in 
settings outside the arenas and even actively resist that intrusion (such as in the 
BSBC). In general, the existing institutional structures (such as the 
compartmentalisation of policy domains) and their old patterns of policy-making 
remain a hindrance for tackling new societal challenges such as sustainability 
transitions. 
 
Hypothesis 7: TM-processes can be regarded as new political spaces that fill in 
an institutional void. However, since the void is far less empty than expected, 
the new rules that TM proposes, experience opposition and are difficult to 
apply in practice. As far as they work, it is mainly during the limited period 
of formulating the transition agenda. They cannot be maintained outside the 
transition arenas. 
 
7.3.5. Tipping the balance of power requires more than TM 
 
To analyse the role of power in realising policy change, I built on Grin’s adaptation 
of a power framework of Arts and Van Tatenhove. It distinguishes three forms of 
power that can be attached to the levels of the MLP: relational power at niche level, 
dispositional power at regime level and structural power at landscape level. What 
did the employment of this framework teach about transition management and its 
influence on policy?  
 
First, it counters the proposition in TM theory that arenas are spaces that are power-
free or without power hierarchy. Power relations are in fact inherent to the 
functioning of arenas. Power is present from the establishment of a TM niche (e.g. in 
who has the power the establish it with any form of legitimacy and credibility), 
during the institutionalisation process (e.g. in how power relations outside the arena 
form the basis on which cooperation inside is built) and during the process of 
gaining wider influence (e.g. in which actors promote the results). 
 
Second, a strong government actor that has a central role in the system, supports the 
process and sees uses for its results, makes a difference. This is particularly true in 
the process of gaining influence where the dispositional and relational power of 
government actors seem crucial. The contrast between OVAM and the SD-DAR team 
is striking here. OVAM is the central government actor in the waste-materials system, 
actively promotes the materials orientation and has used its influence to give the vzw 
Plan C a place in the new governance structure that is taking shape. DAR is a 
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marginal actor in the housing and building regime, the SD-team has no resources 
and further does not have the legitimacy and credibility to enforce DuWoBo’s results 
on the rest of the system.  
 
Third, whether and how the discourse of TM-processes finds a way, also depends on 
how it is picked up by other actors in the system, in particular regime actors, and 
whether it induces a repositioning of actors. When influential business actors in the 
waste-materials system embrace the materials orientation, its salience gets a boost. 
The construction sector, on the other hand, is much slower in picking up the holistic 
DuWoBo agenda, because other concerns are more pressing.  
 
Hypothesis 8: The presence of a strong government actor with a central role in 
the system and supportive of transition management, is essential for TM-
discourses to gain influence beyond their niche. The attitude of in particular 
business actors also affects whether and how a discourse is picked up at regime 
level and induces a repositioning of actors. 
 
Fourth, structural power of processes at landscape level do not just make change 
easier, but have in fact been essential for realising change. The translation of the EU 
Waste Directive in the Materials Decree is here the outstanding example. But also 
historically grown patterns show their importance. Flanders has experienced that its 
frontrunner position in waste policy provided opportunities to reap economic and 
ecological benefits, and wants to repeat that in the materials transition. The much 
older engrained structures and patterns in the housing and building regime, and the 
fact that the building sector is internationally not a frontrunner in environment or 
sustainability, makes this system much more stable. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Without historical or contemporary processes of structural 
power that can be mobilised by TM-proponents, creating policy change is not 
possible. Such processes can however also inhibit change. 
 
7.3.6. Wrapping up 
 
Summarizing the insights from the preceding pages, it is fair to say that transition 
management such as it has developed in practice in Flanders, is strong in two areas: 
introducing and developing transition and substantive storylines, and creating a 
network that mixes forward-looking niche and regime actors. In a third area, namely 
connecting discourse development with actual practices under the form of transition 
experiments, there is some success, but limited. These yields from TM are not easily 
won, though, nor do they last indefinitely. Doing TM in practice (in Flanders) is hard 
work because discourse coalitions need active construction and yet remain fragile, 
rules are difficult to apply and work only partially, resources are limited, actors seem 
easily diverted by other strategic opportunities.  
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Still, by end 2011 it could be shown that both processes had influenced policy, albeit 
in quite different ways. DuWoBo lies at the basis of a new segment in the housing 
and building regime, specifically focused on sustainability. This is founded in 
DuWoBo’s discourse development and in several projects that resulted from the 
transition agenda. DuWoBo’s influence in the rest of the complex housing and 
building policy regime is negligible. This contrasts with the Plan C case, where a 
substantive and organisational renewal of the waste arrangement has created a 
materials policy regime. Plan C’s discourse has had a direct influence on this shift, 
even though its influence was one among many. 
 
The difference between the two cannot be explained primarily by reference to the 
internal working of the processes, such as a better functioning discourse coalition, 
more efficient use of funding, or smarter manoeuvring of policy entrepreneurs. The 
main difference is situated in the context around the processes: the regime and its 
historically grown institutions and routines, the responsible government actor and its 
dispositional and relational power, the political and problem streams that came 
along and could be used, and the opportunities this offered for translation in political 
decisions and new institutions. These kind of factors differed considerably between 
DuWoBo and Plan C and are the main explanation for the diverging developments. 
In the Plan C case, the context offered, first, much more opportunities for realising 
policy change than in DuWoBo (such as through the EU Waste Directive). Second, 
institutional inertia, dominant discourses and existing power relations were easier to 
overcome, amongst other things thanks to the position of OVAM. Yet, whatever the 
context, chances still have to be recognised, and exploiting them requires active 
intervention. 
 
Let us try out a line of thought for a moment: could more have been expected from 
the two processes than what currently has been realised in terms of policy change? In 
the Plan C case, there is a fair chance that participants would have been relatively 
satisfied, had they known in 2006 that 6 years later regime policy had shifted to a 
sustainable materials orientation, that all actors in the system embraced the materials 
orientation, that a Materials Decree had been introduced, that Plan C had become 
autonomous as vzw Plan C and been allocated a role in a new governance structure, 
that a Flemish Materials Programme had been agreed upon, that sustainable 
materials management was one of the spearheads of ViA, and that the supportive 
policy research centre SuMMa had been set up. Further, the experience with Plan C 
has indirectly had an influence on the current role of transitions in the VSDO and 
ViA. Of course, as I keep on emphasizing, Plan C has been but one factor in all this, 
but it can safely be said that its discourse and the people involved, have been a layer 
on which could be built to grab the chances that came along. Important caveats are 
necessary. Policy may have shifted, but the practice of sustainable materials 
management is still far off. The transformative elements that the transition vision of 
Plan C deemed necessary, have been filtered from view. And had participants 
expected that all of this would happen through self-organisation and emergence, as 
Chapter 7. Conclusions 
 312
TM-theory thinks, they would have been rather disappointed in the work that was 
necessary. 
 
What about DuWoBo? Also DuWoBo can show some interesting results in terms of 
policy change: sustainable housing and building has become one of the spearheads of 
ViA, the theme has found a light form of institutionalisation in DAR, provincial 
supporting centres have been set up, a Flemish Standard for sustainable housing and 
building is operational, work is underway for a Belgian Standard and the creation of 
a Belgian Sustainable Building Council, and the experience with DuWoBo has 
indirectly contributed to the current role of transitions in the VSDO and ViA. And 
much more than in materials: sustainable housing and building is actually getting 
realised in the field, albeit usually still far from the holistic form that DuWoBo 
envisages. Yet, it is probably also true that when DuWoBo started in 2004, 
participants probably hoped for more policy change after 7 years, for example in 
terms of coordination and cooperation between policy domains such as housing, 
spatial planning and environment, and the integration of DuWoBo’s ideas. The least 
that can be said, is that, given the fact that the process was introduced and 
maintained by a government actor in the margin of the regime arrangement (LNE, 
later DAR), more resources and a more offensive political strategy were necessary to 
break into the deeply rooted, complex and uncoordinated housing and building 
policy regime. This would have created greater relational power for the DuWoBo-
process and might thus have generated more chances for smart agency. However, 
this is not the choice that has been made politically (although it may yet be a strategy 
for the future in the DuWoBo 2.0 process). 
 
It can be concluded, that all things taken together, the proponents of both policy 
niches have been relatively successful in their own context and given the resources 
they had at their disposal. But the work is far from finished. Plan C has to prove itself 
in its new role in the materials governance structure, and DuWoBo has a way to go in 
reinventing itself in the changed context of housing and building. These roads will 
probably not be less winding and demanding than the ones they travelled on until 
now. 
 
 
7.4. CONTRIBUTIONS TO TRANSITION STUDIES 
 
The previous parts have formulated answers to what, in Flanders, the influence has 
been of transition management on regime policies, how this influence has worked 
out and which factors have played a role in it. There is one sub-question of the 
research left, namely the fourth sub-question: which lessons can be learned from the 
two case studies for the further development of transition governance in theory and 
in practice? 
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I will formulate an answer under the form of how this research contributes to the 
study of transition governance. I explicitly use “governance”, because as I explained 
in chapters 1 and 2, transition management (as developed by DRIFT) should be 
considered as just one way of working towards sustainability transitions. After the 
research in this dissertation, I am even more convinced of the necessity to work with 
a broader pallet of transition governance approaches, where transition management 
remains a valuable candidate for the things in which it is strong. So, which 
contributions to the study of transition governance? 
 
First, the analytical framework that has been developed, allows to make explicit the 
role of policy in transitions and the different aspects that are of relevance in 
investigating its role. More concretely, the PAA can be seen as a refinement of the 
MLP in its policy dimension (see chapter 2). The different additional frames that I 
have introduced in chapter 6 deepen the way in which policy change and the role of 
transition governance processes therein can be studied. The policy arrangements 
approach in itself as well as the combination with other frames make it possible to 
study a complex of factors that are at work and the relationships between them 
during policy change.  
 
Second, the research has brought forth a series of hypotheses about how transition 
management has influence on policy regimes. Although the hypotheses originate in 
research about transition management in Flanders, they may be sensitising for other 
contexts and other approaches. I group them here. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Realising policy change through transition management 
proceeds through at least three processes: the establishment of a TM policy 
niche, a form of institutionalisation of the niche, and the gaining of wider 
influence beyond what happens in the niche. The conditions under which 
these processes take place and what happens in them, has an influence on the 
kind of policy change that can be realised. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Coupling of transition management to ongoing developments in 
and around the relevant policy domain is necessary in order to establish a 
TM-policy niche and to gain influence. Transitions and transition 
management do not make it as such to the political agenda, but they surface 
as the answer to a political problem or decision. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Gaining influence for transition management is strongly 
dependent on factors that are not under the control of TM-actors. Policy 
entrepreneurs must be prepared to “ride the waves” of passing events and 
structural trends, but success is not guaranteed and a lot of contingency is 
involved. Therefore, building up capacity and networks for strategic thinking 
within and between government departments and other societal actors, with 
participants interested in innovative forms of governance, is a good 
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investment for governmental and non-governmental actors that have the 
ambition to work towards sustainability transitions. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Discourse development is an important and influential result of 
transition management, but ideas do not work at once. They need active 
promotion and a diverse set of supporting practices to catch on. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Transition thinking provides a framework for developing a 
substantive agenda for change. The discourse coalition that is built around 
such an agenda has to be actively constructed because divergence in opinions 
has to be bridged. This makes the discourse coalition vulnerable when the 
context starts changing. 
 
Hypothesis 6: When the discourses of TM policy niches flow through in the 
regime, they lose most of their transformative elements. The interpretive 
flexibility of the storylines allows for connecting them to different agendas, 
but also threatens the commitment to deep, transformational change when 
they are confronted with stronger embedded discourses. 
 
Hypothesis 7: TM-processes can be regarded as new political spaces that fill in 
an institutional void. However, since the void is far less empty than expected, 
the new rules that TM proposes, experience opposition and are difficult to 
apply in practice. As far as they work, it is mainly during the limited period 
of formulating the transition agenda. They cannot be maintained outside the 
transition arenas. 
 
Hypothesis 8: The presence of a strong government actor with a central role in 
the system and supportive of transition management, is essential for TM-
discourses to gain influence beyond their niche. The attitude of in particular 
business actors also affects whether and how a discourse is picked up at regime 
level and induces a repositioning of actors. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Without historical or contemporary processes of structural 
power that can be mobilised by TM-proponents, creating policy change is not 
possible. Such processes can however also inhibit change. 
 
Third, the analysis has clarified some of the strong and weak points of transition 
management (based on the experiences in Flanders and for the contexts I described). 
Transition management as a theory and an approach with guidelines about how to 
proceed, is in fact limited to the so-called TM-cycle (see figure 2.5 in chapter 2): 
problem structuring, envisioning, creating a coalition and a transition agenda, 
experimenting, monitoring and learning. Apart from the work of Rotmans and 
Loorbach, several other researchers have deepened elements of this cycle, such as the 
use of envisioning and scenarios (Sondeijker, 2009), experimenting (Van den Bosch, 
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2010) and dealing with power in it (Avelino, 2011). The TM-cycle has shaped the first 
phases of DuWoBo and Plan C and has enabled them to create a network, produce 
visions, a transition agenda and work towards experiments. That this works, is a 
strength of TM. However, once this has been done, TM has no more guidance to give, 
except to repeat the cycle. The analysis here shows that this is problematic when a 
TM-process wants to gain influence in policy. At that moment, its proponents cannot 
remain within their arena and TM-cycle. They have to show active agency that looks 
for couplings with ongoing trends and processes, that tries to change regime rules, 
that searches confrontation with dominant discourses, and that engages with 
institutionalisation. All this has to be realised while trying to cope with institutional 
inertia and existing power relations. This is no longer the terrain of transition 
management, because neither the theory nor the practical guidelines have anything 
to say about this kind of agency. In other words, it shows the necessity to move away 
from TM as a stand-alone approach and embed it as part of a broader governance 
strategy where additional theories are employed. The experiences of TM-in-practice 
in DuWoBo and Plan C can be informative for the elements such an embedding 
might take. I return to this point under “7.6. Policy recommendations”. 
 
Fourth, in spite of what I said in the previous point about the strengths of TM (such 
as discourse creation, networking, experiments), there is something intriguing in my 
observations and analysis of DuWoBo and Plan C and the way TM is brought in 
practice there. There seems to be a rift between the principles in TM-theory and how 
these turn out in TM-in-practice. In particular, such general principles as 
“emergence” and “self-organisation” on which the theory builds, do not seem to 
capture what is happening. Policy change does not emerge, but has to be actively 
constructed through hard work of accommodation, negotiation and deliberation, 
inside and outside the arenas. People and organisations do not self-organise in the 
arenas, but expect active government intervention, they trust in a few passionate 
proponents, weigh the pros and cons of active engagement, consider whether other 
platforms are more interesting. Also outside the arenas, there is no spontaneous self-
organisation that induces policy change. These are points that need consideration in 
the further development of transition management.  
 
 
7.5. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE POLICY SCIENCES 
 
This dissertation has used theories from political science and the policy sciences to 
study the influence of transition management on policy. It has brought some insights 
that may be useful in the further development of these frameworks in the policy 
sciences. 
 
First, the policy arrangements approach is intended as an analytical tool for empirical 
analysis of change and stability in policy. My analysis shows how the PAA can be 
combined with other frameworks in order to explain not only what changes or 
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remains stable, but also to provide a more refined understanding of how change and 
stability happen. The combination of the PAA with other frameworks gave better 
insights in the importance of coupling of streams by policy entrepreneurs, the role of 
discourse, the influence of rules inside and outside new political spaces, and the role 
of different forms of power. This has already been elucidated above. 
 
Second, the combination of policy analytical frameworks (PAA, multiple streams, 
discourse analysis, power analysis…) with the multilevel perspective from transition 
studies may be useful for political scientists that want to study the role of policy in 
coping with deeply rooted structural problems in societal systems. The MLP allows 
to bring in the different dimensions of such systems and draws attention to how 
policy is shaping but is also being shaped by these other dimensions. It may in 
particular make the political analyst sensitive for often neglected aspects (such as the 
role of technologies in this mutual influence). 
 
Third, the concepts of an institutional void and new political spaces are an attractive 
way to frame the position and function of a TM policy niche. The guidelines of 
transition management also seem to fill up the void with new rules for playing the 
game. However, the analysis shows that the idea of a institutional void should be 
qualified.  While Hajer acknowledges that in new political spaces there is always 
negotiation over content as well as over rules of the game, it is not the case that any 
form of rule formation is possible. At the moment a new political space is created, the 
context enforces rules on the new space from which it cannot escape. Consequently, 
installing newly created rules (e.g. of TM) not only meets with resistance, but will 
automatically become a game of negotiation and deliberation. 
 
Fourth, the multiple streams framework has been a very useful tool for 
understanding how events unfolded and for uncovering the work that had to be put 
into coupling the results of TM-processes to ongoing developments, before policy 
change could be realised. While Kingdon maintains that ideas matter in agenda-
setting, the combination with Hajer’s approach to discourse analysis clarifies how 
ideas matter.  The synthesis of both frameworks removes some of the randomness 
that seems present in the agency of policy entrepreneurs. It is in agenda-setting 
theory not always obvious why entrepreneurs act the way they do, but their 
embedment in a discursive order clarifies what structures their agency. This is even 
further strengthened when adding Grin’s power framework, since it explicates the 
structural power features of the context in which policy entrepreneurs have to find 
their way. While agenda-setting theory can be used to analyse any kind of item that 
reaches the political agenda, the combination with discourse analysis and power 
analysis is in my opinion necessary to understand how and under what form 
transformative change reaches the agenda (or does not). The analysis in this 
dissertation is an attempt at showing how such an analysis might work. 
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Fifth, in general, the analysis confirms the importance of ideas for policy change, 
although they are not the only explanatory factor. The inertia with which transition 
processes are confronted, can partly be explained by interest-driven politics, in which 
actors try to defend their material interests and prefer a status quo position. Part of 
the inertia can also be found in how a “logic of appropriateness” guides the 
behaviour of actors, through which actors are constrained by or feel obliged to follow 
certain norms and rules that are appropriate for the situation or the institution. 
However, in particular the Plan C case shows how new storylines can transform 
interests, and how later this new storyline informs the creation of new institutions. 
This not only confirms the role of discourse, but it also supports the relevance of the 
argumentative and interpretive turn in the policy sciences, that can make sense of 
such evolutions.   
 
 
7.6. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Transition management is still the dominant approach to transition governance and 
has as one of its advantages that it has methodological guidelines at its disposal, as 
well as practical experiences. This dissertation was intended to contribute to a better 
understanding of where its strengths and where its limitations lie, in particular in 
relation to influencing policy. The analysis is grounded in the Flemish context, but – 
that is up to readers – may also be relevant in other contexts. Here, I will briefly 
elaborate on two possible tracks for policy-makers and other actors that want to 
engage with transition governance. 
 
The first track focuses on better using the strengths of TM and coping with its 
weaknesses. What do the Flemish experiences teach about when TM has most 
influence on policy? Or in other words, what are favourable circumstances under 
which to initiate TM? TM seems to have most influence110: 
• When it is connected with a strong government actor that has a central position in 
the societal system that is being discussed 
• When this government actor is itself willing to work with the results of TM 
• When the system in which TM is active, is mainly steered by one policy domain 
• When this domain has a relatively young history, so that institutions and 
practices are less engrained 
• When TM’s discourse can be coupled to and made relevant for important 
evolutions and policy initiatives in its domain 
• When it can count on experienced policy entrepreneurs that have the capacity of a 
double vision: well-informed of structural trends and opportunities for change, 
and able to strategically connect these to the practices they are involved in 
                                                  
110  Several of these points can be interpreted as a reformulation of the hypotheses I 
formulated earlier, therefore “seems”. 
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• When the substantive discourse of a TM-process is championed by important 
actors in the system  
 
There is an irony in several of these points of course. For example: TM as a form of 
complexity governance seems to have more influence in a not too complex policy 
environment. Or: TM as a governance approach, intent on self-organisation, works 
best when supported by a strong government actor. Yet, at least in the cases that 
were studied in this dissertation, these are the circumstances under which the 
strengths could surface and the weak points – in particular the lack of political 
strategy outside the TM-cycle – were dampened. Under the above circumstances, 
weak points are dampened because what is lacking, is filled in by the role of the 
government actor, the efforts of policy entrepreneurs and so on.  
 
The foregoing argumentation implies that there may be circumstances under which 
results from TM have a lot more difficulties in overcoming institutional inertia and 
the reigning powers. The DuWoBo case shows for example that in a context where 
several policy domains compete in the system and where TM is only supported by a 
government actor in the margin of the system, gaining influence is difficult. In such a 
case, other strategies are needed. This is where a second track might come in.  
 
This second track starts from the observation that there is no a priori reason why 
transition governance should work with arenas, visioning etcetera. An actor who 
wants to influence a societal system, can also find inspiration in other streams of 
transition research. This broadens the pallet of available approaches. Depending on 
the problem one wants to tackle, the circumstances in which one finds oneself, the 
resources available etcetera, transition governance could: 
• Focus on strengthening technological and/or socio-cultural niches: such an 
approach can build on strategic niche management (Kemp et al. 1998, Raven, 2005, 
Schot and Geels, 2008) or the study of functions of technological innovation 
systems (Hekkert et al., 2007, Negro, 2007, Bergek et al., 2008, Hillman et al., 2008) 
• Focus on the consumer side: this can draw on societal practices approaches 
(Shove, 2003 and 2004, Spaargaren et al., 2007, Spaargaren et al., 2011) 
• Focus on building coalitions around the solution of specific systemic problems: 
this can draw on reflexive design (Grin et al., 2004, Grin and Van Staveren, 2007) 
 
While these approaches stay relatively close to the transition framework such as it 
has been presented in this dissertation (see chapter 2), Dewulf et al. (2009) have 
pertinently remarked that transition studies in general, and transition management 
in particular, seem to ignore (at least partially) a long tradition and the much wider 
debate about systemic social change (see also 2.4). In their view, TM should be one 
approach alongside other approaches, that are built on different theories and that 
serve as alternative tools to analyse situations as well as to design interventions. 
They mention inter alia theories of multi-actor collaboration, network governance, 
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policy agenda setting, social learning, adaptive management, and organisation 
change management.  
 
These are predominantly multi-actor approaches that build on collaboration between 
different actor groups. The history of social change shows however that the great 
examples of transformative change (from the abolition of slavery, over voting rights 
for working class and women, equal rights movements, or the construction of the 
welfare state and its social security system) have always also been built on protest 
and struggle, ideology and political movements. It seems unlikely that the transitions 
needed for more sustainable societies can do without such strategies. The different 
dimensions of the PAA give some guidance on what to focus on when looking for 
points of entry: developing anti-hegemonic discourses, building up counter-power, 
reforming institutions and organising lobbying to change rules, developing 
alternative practices. Social movements have a crucial role to play in such strategies. 
This goes of course far beyond the topic of this dissertation, but the central point is 
that it would be a mistake to think that the ultimate theory about transformational 
change derives from TM and that the best change strategy always starts inside 
transition arenas. TM certainly has its strengths, but it is also limited in its scope and 
possibilities. 
 
 
7.7. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
I end with some suggestions for further research, predominantly restricted to what 
arises from the empirical research.  
 
Some research avenues can be derived from the hypotheses:  
• Discourse development is a crucial activity in transition governance. Discourse 
coalitions have to be constructed and ideas have to be actively promoted. Under 
what conditions can stable discourse coalitions for sustainability be constructed? 
How do discourses diffuse and which activities are best suited to stimulate this? 
• When the discourses of TM policy niches flow through in the regime, they lose 
most of their transformative elements. Are strategies available to increase the 
influence of transformative discourse? Or is interpretive flexibility the cost that 
has to be paid to couple transition discourse to regime policies? 
• The rules that TM proposes for arenas are difficult to apply as a package, some 
work, others are not applied, still others are constantly being negotiated. How can 
this be explained and is their a strategy to cope with it? 
• Building up capacity and networks for strategic thinking within and between 
government departments and other societal actors enhances the potential for 
policy entrepreneurship. Which capacities are needed for promoting 
sustainability transitions and how can policy entrepreneurs and networks acquire 
these capacities?  
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Other avenues can include: 
• Policy change (new substance, new organisation) is important, but it can be 
questioned which effect it has on actual practices and routines in the rest of the 
system (e.g. in industry). Does policy change also lead to new practices and what 
determines its impact?  
• An important topic is under which circumstances it is useful to invest in TM and 
when other approaches are more suited. What are the experiences with other 
approaches? And if TM is applied, how can it best be supplemented with other 
frames to increase its influence outside the TM-arenas? 
 
A lot of this work could also be comparative, such as between the experiences 
analysed in this dissertation and attempts at systemic renewal in housing and 
building or in waste and materials in other countries, or in other sectors/systems in 
other countries. 
 
As for political science (including the policy sciences), its research agenda should 
much more than today be based upon and contribute to great societal challenges 
such as sustainable development. An important avenue of research could relate to 
how existing theories and frameworks can contribute to the analysis and the 
orientation of transformative change for sustainability.  
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